Perhaps learning from many criticisms lodged against it after Bosnia and Kosovo, the UN Was very slow in actively engaging in Sierra Leone. Instead, the first instance of International Intervention came in the shape of the Economic Community of West African States' Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1993. ECOMOG's involvement was initially an example of coercive intervention. Aligned with the SLA, ECOMOG helped push back the RUF, and seized back some diamond mines. Unprecedented in Africa at the time, such intervention, to restore the democratically-elected head government, ECOMOG was poorly equipped and trained, and provided no extra expertise. Also, it is this essays view that such partisan intervention was not justified. Although internal sovereignty was being challenged, and democracy is of course favourable to dictatorship, the SLA were as guilty of humanitarian crimes as the RUF. Nevertheless, this regional intervention proved to be inadequate and the conflict continued at a low level which was perfect for the rebels.
As the situation worsened, the International Monetary Fund funded mercenary group Executive Outcomes, to push back the rebel forces. EO, a well trained, paid and equipped group, were highly successful in recovering diamond mines. A common argument for international intervention is if it is successful, it is justified. The success, however, was not in bringing peace but only in minimising the effect on international trade. It is no surprise that this form of military intervention, not under the patronage of the United Nations, has always been hard for the general western public to accept. Whilst EO were successful, it is despicable that the International Monetary Fund should fund military operations in a sovereign state. There is little difference, beyond the aesthetic, between the IMF being permitted to indent a states sovereignty in the interest of freeing its riches, and Charles Taylor, or a 'terrorist' group doing the same.
The subsequent Abidjan peace plan was overseen by the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, the first real example of cooperative intervention. The peace plan asserted that the EO would leave Sierra Leone, and be immediately replaced with a neutral peacekeeping force. It is hard to argue with the motives of mediation, as they are explicitly in the interest of peace. However, such a peace plan smacked of rashness and was counterproductive. As the EO left, no peacekeeping force has yet to be deployed an Sierra Leone quickly plunged back into violence. When a peacekeeping force eventually did arrive, it came in the shape of a returning ECOMOG. At the same time, the UN dispatched a monitoring group (of around 50 observers) to report on whether peace was being maintained. Of course, monitoring is a useful tool in combating civil war, and necessary for the international community to be kept abreast of development, particularly in areas of large-scale humanitarian dangers (Berdal & Economides, 2007). In this case, the monitoring exposed the inadequacies of ECOMOG led to the eventual deployment of the UN Peacekeeping force. ECOMOG and the UN observers were at loggerheads during this period, with ECOMOG soldiers resenting the observers "they are here on holiday. I wish we could open the beaches for them to sun-tan and enjoy their dollars" (Berdal & Economides, 2007). This two-tier intervention is detrimental to tackling conflict. A power struggle inevitably arose between ECOWAS and the UN, as ECOWAS felt it was being used as a scapegoat whilst the UN failed to fund ECOMOG with better equipment and more troops. This threatened the peace process as Nigeria, wary of the UN's actions, began to withdraw troops in 1999.
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Lowe, Roberts, Welsh, & Zaum, 2008), the UN Peacekeeping force finally arrived in Sierra Leone. The same peacekeeping force which in 1988 was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for representing the "manifest will of the community of nations" (Goulding, 451-64), and is widely regarded as a force for good. With no personal gains to be made, and no offensive mandate, they are often a welcome sight in a conflict, at least by civilians.
In the time after the ECOMOG troops had left, the rebels had done well in seizing the opportunity. Within a few months, 18,000 UN peacekeepers had been deployed, the majority from the ECOWAS nations (Adebajo, 2008). However, the UN still failed to adequately equip the peacekeepers, just as it had ECOMOG. Furthermore the mission details were complex and misunderstood by many. Once again, also, a power struggle arose as some senior peacekeepers accused the Nigerian members of the mission of colluding to prolong the war, so that they may benefit from the illicit diamond trade, and whilst no proof was found, the damage to the missions reputation was done. It is imperative that a peacekeeping mission is seen, at all times, to be above and beyond the deplored violence of a war's combatants. (Goulding, 451-64)
It is also imperative that the peacekeepers are seen to have a stronger military force than the combatants, otherwise their deterrent potential is diminished. However, in this case, the presence of the UN Peacekeeping force did more harm than good. The RUF asserted that the peace accord made no mention of the UN sending the force, and as such would not adhere to their involvement. The peacekeepers would soon find out that the "biggest problem in implementing peace accords in civil wars is getting parties to live up to their commitments" (Stedman, 1996). Whilst the Sierra Leonean people had high expectations of the blue helmets, it quickly became clear the peacekeepers were ill-equipped and the position of the UN became increasingly feeble very quickly. The RUF continued to draft in more troops from Liberia. The rebel held, diamond rich, areas remained a no-go area for peacekeepers and this was proven in just a matter of months as peacekeepers were kidnapped by RUF troops, who subsequently seized their weapons and used them to march on Freetown. As a mode of co-operative intervention, should the peacekeepers have been in a conflict due to a peace plan that was clearly not going to be acted upon?
This resulted in the British military forces, under Tony Blair (a proponent of Humanitarian Intervention), coming to the rescue unilaterally. The British involvement was successful both in rescuing the non-combatant hostages, and in raising global awareness of the Civil War. Certainly, the impact of the unilateral involvement of the British forces, strong, well-equipped, and well organised was huge. The Security Council put Sierra Leone at the top of the agenda, and in July 2000 Security Council Resolution 1306 officially placed a diamonds embargo on Sierra Leone.
The diamond embargo was not the first placed on Sierra Leone. The Security Council had previously implemented an arms embargo. The effectiveness of arms embargoes is often disputed, and it is the case in Sierra Leone that the embargo was frivolous at best. No nations in favour with the United Nations (i.e. not Libya or Liberia) has openly been selling weaponry to the rebels before the embargo. The weaponry was essentially sold in return for the diamonds, something no state would wish to expose. As such, the cloak and dagger means of arming the RUF continued, especially as ECOMOG, proved inadequate to do anything better than dent trade. The diamond embargo was infinitely more successful in ending the Civil War. Initially the embargo was laughable as it was a "stand-alone measure, not part of a coercive strategy; and because of poor implementation" (Oudraat, 2000) Once the UN made it part of the peacekeeping mission and that of international governments to see that no diamonds left Sierra Leone, rebel funding began to deplete. Again, however, it was the British military that was the most successful at enforcing the embargo. The diamond embargo also finally saw the UN acknowledging Charles Taylor, of Liberia, as a key belligerent of the Sierra Leonean Civil War and once he was targeted the war was essentially over (Hirsch, 2001).
The UN proved to be a more influential in rehabilitating the nation once the war was over. The disarmament programme was a success. With the RUF officially defeated, UNAMSIL oversaw the Sierra Leonean Disarmament, Demobilization and reintegration programme, which has begun (slowly) after the Lome Peace accord. What becomes clear when looking at the UN released figures of the programme is that during the conflict, the international organisations that intervened simply had no idea of the magnitude of the situation (161% of predicted figures) (UN, DDR, 2004). This raises the questions then, of how effective were the monitoring groups in observing the conflict progression, and how rash was it for the UN to send in peacekeepers with incomplete information. Certainly, one can see how the lessons were learnt with regards the proposed UN invasion of Iraq, eventually taken unilaterally by USA. As the UN acknowledges "The govern ment of Sierra Leone came to fully understand that it could not eliminate the insurgency and could not rely on the allegiance of its own army. For their part, the rebels factored in British military intervention and regional development, particularly the embargo on Liberia and the precarious position of the government there" (UN, DDR, 2004)E, once again highlighting the impact of British intervention.
Really, it was after the conflict that the UN begun to really demonstrate expertise. UNAMSIL offered incentives for regions that were certified "arms free" and the carrot approach proved highly successful. The Lome accord also arranged for the implementation of a Truth and Reconciliation Committee, an approach this essay is vehemently in favour of. Historically, after a civil war a pattern has emerged of communities divided between victor and opponents, each with tales of horror and victimisation. This rhetoric can haunt a nation for generations and subsequently lead to a renewal of war. It is with this that the committee was established to "address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered" (Adebajo, 2008). It is important that a Truth and Reconciliation is seen to be an internal affair, and as such was chaired by Sierra Leoneans.
The UN had an arguably larger job in arranging the Special Court for Sierra Leone, to try those accused of the most serious war crimes. The accused were many but included Charles Taylor, Foday Sankoh and Johnny Koroma. For precedent's sake, such an act is crucial for making it clear that humanitarian crime will not be tolerated in the international community (Bass, 2000). However, as previously stated, the soldiers of the SLA were in many ways as involved in the humanitarian suffering as the rebels, and if not more shamefully as they were the badge of the nation. Nevertheless, in a clear example of "to the victor go the spoils", no state combatant has been brought in front of the court. As Vinjamuri and Snyder assert, one of the key effects of such trials is to "emphasize the guilt of particular individuals and thereby defuse the potential for future cycles of violence…" (Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2003). If justice is to be within the ever-growing mandate of International Intervention, then much like a democratic national judiciary, it should be unbiased, fair, and willing to charge all those who in any way break the peace of the rules of war.
If it is so, that the outcome of intervention justifies the means, then surely the sum of International Intervention in the Sierra Leonean Civil War is justified. Effective, also, as although still one of the poorest nations on Earth, Sierra Leone has undoubtedly found the route to democracy, and has shown no real sign of slipping back into conflict. This is not to say, however, that the International Intervention was without criticism. Sierra Leone was an unprecedented case in when the conflict began, lacking in clear lines of division. Perhaps mindful of a public relations disaster, or perhaps sensitive to the history of the Sierra Leonean people (particularly the Krio), The United Nations was happy to delegate Intervention to ECOWAS. ECOWAS was formed for economic purposes, with little experience in military intervention and this was problematic from the very beginning. It would have better for all involved if the UN had taken the reins after the Abidjan Peace Accord. It should no longer be acceptable for the UN to delegate peacekeeping missions to the nearest regional organisation.
Interventionists failed, for far too long, to see the link between the diamonds of Sierra Leone, the international community, and the conflict. Had the embargo been placed sooner, the Civil War could have ended years before it did. As stated earlier, the Sierra Leonean Civil War saw many means of intervention used, some more effective than others. What cannot be tolerated, however, is the half-hearted approach the United Nations took to intervening early on.
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