Explain why it is central to Kant's moral philosophy that we treat people, including ourselves, never as means but always as ends?
TITLE OF ESSAY:
Explain why it is central to Kant's moral philosophy that we treat people, including ourselves, never as means but always as ends?
Kant's moral philosophy is centered on his ideas of the obligations of absolute duty and of individual autonomy, without necessary consideration of the consequences of the actions. On the basis of Kant's principles of duty, all rational beings should be able to decide whether they ought to do any action and these principles are applicable to all rational beings. These rules apply to rational beings on the basis of their rationality, their ability to reason being the source of moral behaviors. Actions taken which result not from duty but from desires, emotions, etc. cannot be deemed as having moral worth, regardless of whether they are in accordance with morality.
He identified what he called the Categorical Imperative as being the foundation rules of moral actions, providing unconditional principles by which actions of duty (and therefore by which morality itself) must be governed. He also identified Hypothetical Imperatives which are driven by rational principles other than duty and which can be followed except when they conflict with duties guided by the Categorical Imperative. It is within the notions of the Categorical Imperative that Kant's reasons for treating all people as ends and not means are characterized. The Categorical Imperative provides a test of moral actions rather than actually advocating particular actions in themselves and it is up to moral agents to apply these tests to their own actions. There are three formulations of the Categorical Imperative, which Kant views as being three versions of the same idea. However, recent readings of Kant have provided reasons for seeing them as three parallel but different ideas and this has caused problems which will be elaborated on here. This paper will focus on the centrality of the Formula of Humanity but it cannot do so without considering other aspects of his imperative. The contribution of the second formulation to decisions about moral actions will be considered as well as contradictions within the imperative.
Kant's first formulation of the Categorical Imperative sets out that moral actions are those which can be equally applied to all rational beings, as he illustrates in the following way: 'act only on those maxims that you can at the same time will as universal laws'. The second formulation, or the Formula of Humanity, has greater implications in terms of the question posed. It conveys Kant's theories on how moral agents should treat people, including themselves: 'act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end in itself'. Kant's third formulation of the Categorical Imperative is that moral agents should act only as though they were rational beings creating a universal law in the 'kingdom of ends'. The rational beings are both king and subject in the 'kingdom of ends' so that actions are part of the natural law; regardless of the role the individual plays in the circumstances which result from the action. All individuals in the kingdom of ends are autonomous moral beings, both lawmaker and subject and all should be which may not always be attained respected equally. The 'Kingdom of Ends' is seen by Korsgaard as a 'democratic ideal' which may not always be attainable. (1)
In the first formulation, that of Universal Law, any action which cannot be universally applied to all rational beings in similar circumstances is not permissible. For this reason Kant can be interpreted as saying that lying is wrong, on the basis that lying cannot be 'willed' as a universal law applicable to all rational beings. The benefit of a lie lies in its deceit and the fact that others are assumed not to lie. A rational being would not want to be lied to and, by lying, he is making an exception of himself; neither lying itself nor making an exception of yourself can be universalised. If lying were to be universalised, it would not bring any benefit because eventually no one would trust anyone. Lying is only beneficial to a liar if it is not universal; it is therefore self-defeating and morally prohibited. This argument is countered by Korsgaard when she states that in the case of evil, as depicted by the 'inquiring murderer' (where an individual has to decide about lying to a murderer at the door about the fact that his intended victim is upstairs) the application of the first formulation can make lying permissible.(2) I will return to this later and the contradictions it raises with treating rational beings as ends.
Kant considers that the Formula of Humanity is a part of the same concept as universalisation but many authors, including Hill, Campbell and O'Neill, have argued that it in fact involves a different but parallel principle. It is another guide to how moral agents should act. It states that rational beings should act only in ways that respect 'others capacities to act' and therefore 'leave them able to act on the maxims we ourselves adopt' (3). Kant is not saying here that we should never treat people as means to our own ends, but that we should not ...
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Kant considers that the Formula of Humanity is a part of the same concept as universalisation but many authors, including Hill, Campbell and O'Neill, have argued that it in fact involves a different but parallel principle. It is another guide to how moral agents should act. It states that rational beings should act only in ways that respect 'others capacities to act' and therefore 'leave them able to act on the maxims we ourselves adopt' (3). Kant is not saying here that we should never treat people as means to our own ends, but that we should not do so exclusively. For example, people participating in research trials are being used as a means to obtain some results at the end of the study, which could be interpreted as them being used for the researcher's or society's ends. However, their consent to their participation in the research means that they are not being treated exclusively as means, but that they have a share in the ends of the researchers or of society. Were the research subjects not told of their participation, they could not consent to the 'ends' of the researchers or society. It would result in their being used as means or tools rather than being treated as rational agents with their own ends.
Kant says that Humanity should be treated as an end in itself, and not exclusively as means to the ends of others. 'Humanity' here concerns a characteristic of rational, autonomous beings. The characteristic of humanity is 'the power to set an end', regardless of what that end is. (4) Therefore, humanity in Kantian terms is to be found in all rational beings, good or evil and it is an objective 'end in itself'. The capacity for autonomy bestows rational beings with humanity and such beings have an intrinsic value; Kant uses the term 'dignity'. Inanimate objects and animals, because of their lack of autonomy or rationality do not posses any intrinsic value, any dignity. They can have a 'price' which indicates their worth in relation to another inanimate object but human dignity is 'above all price'. Non-rational things are essentially tools who cannot choose how to act and cannot choose their own ends. Rational beings have humanity and the capacity for autonomy; they choose their own ends through the exercise of their autonomy. The priceless, incomparable nature of their dignity is absolute and cannot be 'traded' or compared in the same context as can animals or objects, who have 'worth' only by virtue of the fact that they are of use as tools (or means) to human ends. Rachels illustrates this by the example of a car having value only if a person wants to travel somewhere, it has no intrinsic value in itself. (5) The value of a person and that of a car cannot be compared.
If rational beings are 'above all price' by virtue of their dignity, they must have worth in themselves and not just in terms of their use to others. Rational beings are all intrinsically valuable and none should be used as tools put to use by other rational beings, or as means to the ends of others. To treat any rational being as a means to one's own end is to deny their autonomy, their very humanity. If the ends of others are as important as one's own individual end, consideration has to be made of the interests and preferences, the ends of others. Hill argues that the Categorical Imperative upholds the active promotion of the ends of all rational beings as a moral duty, not just the avoidance of or indifference to treating them as means.(6) Simply considering the humanity of others is not enough as it may still be possible to account for the chosen end of an individual but still override it for the benefit of a wider group. The importance of treating rational beings as ends is not conditional on the ends of others.
Humanity as the end in itself is something against which others should never act negatively or even indifferently... 'the ends of a subject who is an end in himself must....be also, as far as possible, my ends'.(7) Therefore, if rational beings are to be treated as ends because of their humanity, it needs to be determined that they agree with or 'share in the end of the very same action'.(8) A well-used example from Kant, of seeking to use another in this way is that of making a false promise to repay a loan. A person needing money but knowing that they will not be able to repay it can make a deceitful promise to repay a loan in order to get it. However, by lying about repaying the loan the individual is using the lender as a means to their own end (of obtaining money), and is therefore manipulating the situation to his or her own ends. The lender may agree to the loan believing that it will be repaid. The fact that they were lied to resulted in their autonomy to choose in light of the full facts being undermined and their rights to be seen as an 'end in themselves' (rather than simply as a means) not respected. Were the individual to be truthful about the loan and any difficulty about repaying it, the lender would have the opportunity to choose to give the loan or not. If they agreed, the ends of both individuals would be aligned, i.e., the loan would be given with full knowledge that it was unlikely to be repaid and was therefore in effect a gift or donation. This is in accordance with Kant's belief that 'rational beings ....must always be esteemed at the same time as ends, i.e. only as beings who must be able to contain in themselves the end of the very same action'.
However an individual purchasing an item from a shopkeeper cannot be said to be using that shopkeeper exclusively for his or her own ends. The shopkeeper has a 'share' in the ends of the purchaser, at the very least through the exchange of payment for the service or item. Similarly, Hill provides the example of a carpenter being employed to build an opera house. It is not necessary for him to be a great opera fan in order for his work not to be seen as a means to the employers end. It would be sufficient for him to be satisfied that he was being paid fairly for his work so that both the carpenter and the employer found the situation mutually acceptable.(9) Conversely, slavery, and servility are not permissible. Slaves are treated by their masters as means to ends not chosen by the themselves and they are not paid for their services in the way that the carpenter is, so cannot be said to have a share in the ends of their masters. Servitude whether through love or self-condemnation is proscribed because it does not place one's own dignity 'above all price'.
The first formulation of Kant's Categorical Imperative, that of universalising all actions essentially provides a guide to what is permissible in terms of our moral action. Those actions which are not able to be universalised cannot be morally acceptable and vice versa. The Formula of Humanity can be seen to narrow and refine what is a morally acceptable action. For example, the maxim that 'I am allowed to kill anyone (i.e. not a murderer, in this instance)', not that individuals must kill but that they are allowed to do so, can be universalised as a right of all rational beings. However, when the Formula of Humanity is applied, killing anyone is proscribed by virtue of the fact that killing someone does not respect their own ends equivalently to the ends of the person who kills them, whatever those ends are. These anomalies will be discussed further.
Although killing innocent people can be seen as something which is not acceptable, even when it may ultimately result in the saving of large numbers of others, capital punishment for murder is deemed appropriate by Kant's theories on retributivism and supported by his thoughts on treating people as ends and not means. Assuming the murderer was a rational being and therefore possessed 'humanity' and 'dignity', it could be interpreted that their existence should be continued. The incomparable value of humanity in every person must be preserved, regardless of any crime committed. However, Kant argues that an individual within such a society who commits murder knowing that the punishment for such a crime is death, can be said to have 'willed' the punishment for the crime they committed. Their execution would be treating them 'as an end' as execution is the way in which they have 'willed' that they be treated, by committing the murder in the first place. Execution may also treat the murderer as a means in that by sentencing him or her to death, it ensures at least that the perpetrator cannot repeat the crime, which is the 'end' of society or the justice system. However, the murderer is not being 'treated merely as a means but also as an end'.
The rules against lying discussed earlier and similar rules prohibiting suicide on the basis that they are acts which treat rational beings as means and not ends have been re-interpreted by contemporary philosophers. Korsgaard states that in the case of evil, as depicted by the 'inquiring murderer', lying could be permissible.(10) Kant is traditionally seen as arguing that on the basis of the Formula of Universalisation, individuals cannot lie regardless of what may happen as a result of telling the truth. They are responsible for their actions only. Korsgaard counters that the murderer who is at the door is being deceptive by not telling of his or her true intentions so that the individual opening the door will not know the intentions (if that were not the case and s/he assumed that the individual did know, then he would probably not simply ask at the door about his intended victim). Therefore, s/he has already broken the rule by treating the person at the door as a means to his or her own evil ends (which presumably are not shared) and so s/he is placed in a position outside of moral protection by the deception s/he instigated and so 'has created a situation which universalisation cannot reach'.(11) Therefore, lying to him or her would not be prohibited. Similarly, should force be to get an answer, then lying is permissible for the same reasons. However, the application of the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative prohibits the act of lying even in these extreme circumstances, as lying would mean not treating him or her as a rational being and using him/her as a means to your end regardless of the fact that the end s/he has in mind is evil. One the same basis, the criminal facing execution was treated as a rational being whose ends should be respected (in that case to be executed). Therefore under the first formulation, there is an argument which supports lying in these extreme circumstances. However, in treating all rational beings (and the inquiring murderer is such a being, despite his 'badness') as ends and not just as means, the truth would have to be told or nothing said at all, regardless of the consequences.
Again, in traditional Kantian terms, suicide is unacceptable to morality. Committing suicide denies one's own humanity and this goes against the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, which concerns 'humanity, whether in your own person or that of any other'. Regardless of the pain an individual may be suffering, the fact is that the human life is intrinsically valuable and an end in itself. The relief of pain by means of self-inflicted death is not sufficient reason to commit suicide and therefore is not legitimate. Such an individual is using himself as a means to an end - that of the relief of pain (even though it is that same individual which is carrying out the self-killing). As Hill states, it 'places the cessation of pain which is mere "relative" and "conditioned" value, above rationality and autonomy which have worth that "admits no equivalent"'.(12) Some counter arguments to this conclusion are also provided by Hill, on the basis that this view is too absolutist to be acceptable to many, that it places too absolute a value on the rational side of humanity without encompassing it's 'feeling' side(13); this is a argument used to counter many Kantian principles. Suicide is sometimes justified in that it is an act not always a compulsive act based on feelings of a lack of self-worth; it is often the case that life in question has fallen below a certain minimum level of existence due to pain and disease. Additionally in some sense, it is impossible for an individual to 'violate his own rights'(14) which Kantian arguments about suicide seem to imply. In fact, suicide itself could be seen as the ultimate autonomous action.(15) Korsgaard indicates that suicide by people suffering acute pain and misery could be universalised; such individuals could commit suicide, without the act becoming self-defeating in the same way as lying when it is universalised to individuals in similar circumstances.(16) However, on the basis of applying the Formula of Humanity, suicide denies human value and 'dignity' and therefore cannot be justified from 'an ideal point of view'.(17)
The strict principles of treating 'humanity as an end in itself', and not just a means do indeed seem to be a slightly different principle from the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative, that of universalisability. It would appear from the preceding arguments that some contemporary re-readings of Kant's theories do appear to give different solutions to certain vexing problems, depending on which of the formulations are deemed most important. The Formula of Humanity provides, according to Korsgaard, a stricter set of rules than the Formula of Universal Laws and she seems to suggest that the former is an ideal which rational beings should try to live up to.(18) However, she does go on the say that if in doing so they are put in situations which uses them as a tool for doing wrong, such as that depicted by the inquiring murderer, then they should not live up to it but move towards the universalisation principle of what a rational being would do in the same situation (which is likely to be to lie to the murderer).
The second formulation provides Kant's views on morality from the point of view of 'others', the fact that all rational beings are deserving of respect because they are rational beings, with all that this entails. The treatment of their humanity as an end in itself is central to Kant's views on autonomy and for respect for persons. Individuals have to be allowed the opportunity to choose their own actions, their own ends. Without this freedom, they are unable to choose to act morally. The slave whose ends are not respected by his master cannot be an autonomous agent because he is not free to choose to act in the same way as the carpenter is free to choose to build the opera house. The application of universalitsation does not necessarily respect the person, it merely indicates in an abstract form what is or is not allowed in moral terms. The new interpretations of these areas of Kant's moral philosophy add rather than detract from it and prove that although in its purest form it is 'over-absolutest' it does possess strength in depth.
References & Bibliography
. Korsgaard C.M 'The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil. Philosophy & Public Affairs ( ); 235 - 349. pp 336.
2 ibid.
3 O'Neill O 'Kantian Ethics' pp 178 from Singer P (ed) A Companion to Ethics
1994; Blackwell
4 Hill T E 'Humanity as an end in itself'. Ethics 1980; October 84-99. pp 86)
5 Rachels J. The Elements of Moral Philosophy Chapter 10. 1995. McGraw - Hill International.
6 Hill op.cit. pp. 87
7 Hill op.cit. pp. 89
8 Hill op.cit. pp. 89
9 Hill op.cit. pp. 89
0 Korsgaard op. cit.
1 Korsgaard op. cit. pp. 330.
2 Hill op.cit. pp. 93
3 Hill op.cit. pp. 94
4 Hill op.cit. pp. 95
5 Hill op.cit. pp. 95
6 Korsgaard op. cit. pp 347.
7 Korsgaard op. cit. pp 347 - 8.
8 Korsgaard op. cit.
Additional bibliography:
Campbell A V 'Moral Dilemmas in Medicine' 3rd ed. 1984. Churchill Livingstone.
Hill T E 'Autonomy & Self Respect. 1991. CUP.
