As Kennedy has argued, one cannot begin to explain the Arab conquests without looking at them in the context of the decline of both the Byzantine and Persian Empires. Wars, plagues, infighting and natural disasters were to leave them in a position where they would be unable to oppose the Arab invasions militarily. Moreover, both empires were in the midst of a century long process of far reaching social and economic change, in which the increased importance of pastoral peoples and absence of civic autonomy were well underway. The role of the Arab conquest was thus to fill a power vacuum left by this decline, as well as to shape and accelerate some of these existing trends. In Byzantium, the effect of plagues, earthquakes and a prolonged war on the Persian front was to cause a loss of population and revenue which weakened it militarily, decreasing its ability to mount an effective military force. The system of limitanei border defence was to be weakened, and armies were soon to be composed almost solely of Armenians and Arabs. The gradual disappearance of urban, greek speaking and classically influenced culture was to leave the eastern part of the Empire as an area in which the culture of villages and pastoral peoples was dominant, and entirely indifferent to the fate of Byzantine rule. A similar combination of war and natural disaster was to afflict the Persian Empire in much the same manner. The conflict launched by Khusrau II in 602 was to leave the Anatolian cities of Syria, Palestine and Egypt devastated, and cause further demographic and urban decline. A generation was to grow up in these regions which was to have no memory or experience of Byzantine rule, and in combination with religious dispute was to cause a situation in which the leadership in the area was recent, shaky and widely resented. Persia’s defeat was to leave its Empire ruined and bitterly divided, with Khusrau’s military failings leading to his deposition and the proclamation of ten different Kings. Thus, when understanding the ‘spectacular rise’ of the Arabs, one must look at it in the context of the decline of these two empires. When engaged in conquest, the Arab armies were to come into contact with powers that were weak militarily, and societies that were rapidly changing. Thus, any account of Arab success cannot ignore the international circumstances in which these were to occur.
Furthermore, one cannot consider the question of this ‘spectacular rise’ without examining the nature of pre-Islamic Arabian society and the preconditions
that were to feed into the cause and success of the Arab conquests. As safety in Arabian society was provided not by the State but by kin and the principle of retaliation, it led to a situation in which it was geared towards warfare. Amongst full members of the tribe there were few civilians, and all adult males could be mobilised to defend the camp or participate in the institution of ghazw or raids. This resulted in a state of affairs whereby at the time of the Arab conquests, most Arab men were to have military training and experience, in contrast to both the Byzantine and Sassanian Empires. Additionally, the Arabic speaking populations were united by both a common language and sense of ancestry. The sixth century had seen the development of a collective poetic language at the court of the Kings of Hĭra, which was generally understood throughout Arabia. This language was vitally important in understanding the unity that was to lead to the conquests, as it was to make communication possible between groups from many different areas, and make the fundamental teachings of Islam comprehensible to many different tribes. In understanding both Arab military prowess and unity, it is important to remember that preconditions for both of these were inherent in Arabic society for a significant period of time before the conquests were to come about.
Indeed, when examining the unity of purpose which was to lead to the conquest, one cannot ignore the role of the rise of the Quraysh tribe in the city of Mecca and its eventual control of trade in north eastern Arabia. Whilst the Arabian trade in luxury goods had faced almost total decline by the end of the sixth century, the control of trade and profits of locally produced goods was an essential part of pre-Islamic politics. This was to involve the passage of caravans through areas settled by nomadic tribes. Instead of supplying a large armed force in escort, trade agreements were to be made with these tribes, where caravans were allowed to pass in exchange for favours, support, protection or a share of the profits. The Quraysh tribe was able to make the most of Mecca’s status as a haram (which was neutral holy ground where members of different groups could exchange goods and settle disputes), to begin to create a vast trading network from the middle of the sixth century onwards. This was possible through an outstanding feat of political and diplomatic skill in which the Quraysh were able to manipulate relations with the surrounding nomadic tribes as well as those in Abyssinia, Syria, Yemen and Iraq. This is chronicled in Islamic accounts which see the leading members of the third generation of this tribe being sent to the very same four countries in order to foster trade links. It was this diplomatic expertise which was to turn Mecca from one of the many harams serving local tribes into a city at the centre of what Kennedy describes as the ‘Meccan Commonwealth,’ a commercial and diplomatic network which enabled caravans to travel throughout the entire region in relative security. It was through the take over of this system and the establishment of a similar set-up in Medina, that Mohammed was able to create a power base from which the his message of Islam could provide a unifying force amongst the Arabic tribes.
Whilst all the above issues are important understanding the ‘spectacular rise of the Arabs,’ one could certainly argue that the key factor responsible for this must certainly be the role played by Mohammed and the message of Islam. Within a short space of time, he was able to establish a haram in Medina, and bring Mecca and Medina together. He managed to incorporate the alliances which formed part of the ‘Meccan Commonwealth’ and take over the associations which had pre-existing links throughout Arabia and beyond. This led to his Islamic society developing the feature of what one might call a ‘super tribe,’ which was to serve the traditional purpose of defending its members against outside attack, organizing raids to supplement their incomes and provide a framework for solving internal disputes; whilst at the same time transforming the old Meccan from a series of agreements amongst equals into a mechanism whereby the authority of the Muslim elite could be imposed by force if necessary. The powerful ideology of the new religion would make its society a dynamic and commanding force which was to quickly find friends and allies anxious to recognise Mohammed as the prophet of Allah in order to foster friendly relations with the new and mighty umma. This ideology of universal religion meant that this ‘super tribe’ would no longer be content with a limited and local sphere of influence, as those who refused to accept it were facing eternal damnation. This society did not have the option of remaining static, it would either expand or disintegrate. As long as there were Arabs who did not accept the dictates of Islam, its ideological position would be challenged. Moreover, if Islam was to be the religion of all humanity, there was no reason why it should be confined merely to Arabia, therefore conquest was the next logical step. Furthermore, as the unified Islamic community was to bring an end to raiding within the community, it was necessary to find both another outlet for the martial energies of the tribesmen and another source of revenue for nomads. Thus, whilst preconditions for Arab conquest were certainly present, it was the actions of Mohammed and the dynamism of the message of Islam as both a unifying force and motivation for conquest which was to bring the ‘spectacular rise’ into fruition.
In conclusion, one cannot account for the Arab conquests without looking primarily to the role of Mohammed and the message of Islam. Whilst one can certainly assert the importance of the decline of the two neighbouring powers, the predisposal of Arabic society to unity and conquest and the importance of the Meccan network of trade, in terms of unification and motivation, Mohammed’s feats and message were the key. Mohammed was able to take advantage of the common Arabian culture in addition to the network of Mecca, turning them from a trading alliance of disunited tribes into a powerful, unified force through the message of Islam. This force was able to, in turn, take advantage of the weaknesses of its neighbours resulting in a spectacular and sudden conquest. Thus, whilst the preconditions for the spectacular success of the Arabic world were in place, it was the force and energy of a single man and his message which was to bring it into execution. Therefore, in understanding the establishment of Arabic and Islamic hegemony, one need not look further than Mohammed himself.