How efficient was the Tsarist system of government?

Candidate No: 020549134 HS 2657 Tutor: Dr. M. Lynch

Late Imperial Russia 1894-1917

I strongly believe, to a large extent, that the Tsarist system of government was not efficient. This is because the Russian system of government in the nineteenth century failed to modernise its near-feudal structure, and conclusively proved incapable in dealing with twentieth century problems including rapid growth in population; famine; peasant unrest; strikes; riots, and most significantly, war. Though these would be important factors in the downfall of the Tsarist government, I believe it was the very nature of government, which created these conditions that caused its eventual collapse in 1917. This essay will primarily focus on the Russian government during the reign of Tsar Nicholas II (1894-1917). However, to understand the efficiency of government in late imperial Russia, it is important to examine the Tsarist system in its wider context, and also, assess government in the period before Nicholas II to achieve a complete understanding of the Russian structure. There are four key elements to address in the Tsarist system of government: first, the role of the Tsar; second, the part played by the Tsarist ministers including Plehve, Witte, and Stolypin; third, the function of parliament and bureaucracy; and finally, the Okhrana, a reactionary and oppressive police force. This essay will argue that the Tsarist system of government was not efficient, and also, essentially created the conditions which caused its own collapse in 1917.

In late imperial Russia, one person, the Tsar, who practised autocracy in a totalitarian system, arguably ruled the Russian government. It was the Tsarist tradition: Nicholas I (1825-55) issued in 1832 the ‘Fundamental Laws of the Empire’, which Article 1 stated:

‘The Emperor of all Russians is an autocratic and unlimited monarch. God himself ordains that all must bow to his supreme power, not only out of fear but also out of conscience.’1

Given the conditions of Russia: the largest country in the world, with a large number of non-Russian nationalities, a significant proportion of poor and under privileged peasants, and few natural boundaries apart from the Artic in the north and the Pacific in the east, in addition to the constant threat of invasion from foreign powers; historians agree that is was almost inevitable that Russia would have had an autocratic ruler. Nicholas II was the last Tsar in the Romanov dynasty, which had ruled for three centuries since 1613, but little had changed in the ideals of authority and leadership since the reign of Peter the Great (1689-1725) or Alexander II (1855-81). The Tsars inherited a sense of duty and responsibility towards the Russian people from God and history, which could not be evaded. Therefore, according to Dominic Lieven, it is certainly arguable that,

‘Only an authoritarian regime sheltering behind the monarch’s legitimacy could hold together a vast and multi-ethnic empire, develop its human and natural resources, defend it against outside enemies and maintain a peaceful balance between sharply conflicting classes and nationalities.’2

The Tsarist system of government and the authority exercised by the Tsar centred on three bodies: first, the State Council, which consisted of counsellors all appointed by the Tsar; second, the Cabinet of Ministers, which was responsible for administration and government with the Tsar; finally, the Senate, which supervised the way the laws operated. All these bodies were consultative, which meant that the Tsar was not obliged to accept their advice. Essentially, the Tsar had the final word in all matters concerning the state and law. It was the tradition of the Tsarist system that an efficient Tsar practised autocracy and imposed his will heavily on those around him: before 1906 there was no parliament, no political parties were tolerated, and state censorship was enforced on the press and on published books.3 However, these innovations in Russia’s political system would have been beneficial if, for example, the Tsar invested little interest in his duties to govern his people? A weak Tsar meant poor government. I strongly believe that it is impossible for one ruler to govern effectively a country like Russia, given its size and population, alone without the support of a strong and capable government. The Tsars were overwhelmed with pointless tasks when decisions were required on important issues and policies. The Tsars themselves were wholly reliant on his ministers for information, which unfortunately for the Tsarist system meant he tended to agree with their interpretation without question or so much as any requisite knowledge. This does make an efficient government. Serious incidents, such as ‘Bloody Sunday’ on 9th January 1905, occurred because of negligence on part of the Tsar over the suffering of his people. The event had disastrous consequences and proved that efficiency could not be achieved through use of force. At times, ministers provided conflicting advice, which only complicated affaires more for the Tsar. This obviously created problems in governmental policy for Nicholas II because he lacked direction until his ministers forced one on him.

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The ministers were largely depended on for the day-to-day administration of Russia. After the Tsar, the ministers were the most powerful men in the Russian state. However, the Tsars had no real political allies of which to rely because the relationship with the ministers was strictly professional. Business between the Tsar and his ministers was conducted in weekly one-to-one sessions, and no records or documentation were kept.4 This is an illustration of a problem caused just within the structure of government: a lack of interaction involving the Tsar and his key advisors. Nicholas II unfortunately did not have the comfort of a Bismarck by his side, but instead rival ministers of who competed for the Tsar’s approval and more importantly, aroused major opposition from left-wing factions. The assassination of Peter Stolypin, Prime Minister from 1906 to 1911, is just one example of the level of hostility caused between ministers and the people.

There were three central figures in government during the reign of Nicholas II: Witte, Minister of Finance (1892-1903); Plehve, Minister of the Interior (1902-1904); and of course Stolypin. All three of the ministers were deeply conservative, though firmly agreed that reform was necessary if the Tsarist regime was to survive. The autocratic Tsar responded to this with a high level of suspicion, and this is illustrated in the dismissal of Witte as Minister of Finance in 1903, and then his reinstatement into office as Prime Minister in 1905. Furthermore, not all changes in governmental departments were controlled by the will of the Tsar: the office of Minister of the Interior, for example, was frequently subject to acts of terrorism from left-wing Marxists and revolutionaries: Sipiagin was assassinated in 1902 and was succeeded by Plehve, who was in turn also assassinated in 1904. It is certainly questionable whether efficiency in government could have been maintained during a period of abrupt and unexpected changes in the system.

However, in late imperial Russia, there were tremendous gains achieved in the process of economic modernisation because of the efforts of ministers in government such as Witte and Stolypin. Witte committed himself to industrialisation, whilst Stolypin concentrated on agricultural reforms. Through state capitalism, both men used state power as an effective means of controlling the economy to suit their policies and achieve their targets. Stolypin, in particular, was notorious for his brutality as a means for asserting his authority to the extent that the hangman’s noose became known as ‘Stolypin’s necktie’. In truth, economic historians argue that Russia’s economic expansion and modernisation was a deliberate government policy to strengthen their military forces.5 However, for both Witte and Stolypin, they believed their economic and social reforms were vital for the very survival of Tsarism. Plehve, however, left the fate of Nicholas II in the balance with his notion of ‘a small victorious war’ with Japan in 1904, which was a significant factor in the 1905 Revolution.6 Another example of poor government among key ministers is Rasputin, a monk who had been given political power in government because of his ability to ease the pain of Nicholas II’s haemophiliac son. Rasputin was eventually murdered because of the dramatic changes he employed in government in the Tsar’s absence during World War I. These were periods of serious inefficiency in the Tsarist system of government.

Though there was a great cry from the intelligentsia and left-wing reformers to create a parliament, what materialised proved to be counter-productive. In a period of weakness on part of the government to successfully diffuse the 1905 Revolution, the reformers forced constitutional changes that included the makings of an elected parliament, the Duma. The first Duma came into being in April 1906. However, the structure of the new system did little to improve the efficiency of government in general. This is because the Duma was only one part in the legislative process, and the second institution formed was the State Council, which in essence acted as a counterweight. Members of the State Council were elected directly by the autocratic Tsar and the conservative nobility. Also, all legislation had to be approved by the Tsar before it was passed. The structure of Nicholas II’s government in 1906 had taken big leaps to catch up with governments in industrialised European countries with the exception that the Tsar retained absolute authority and granted none to the parliamentary body. This had happened before in the reign of Alexander II when his reforms allowed the establishment of the Cabinet of Ministers in 1857, largely modelled on the British Parliament, but refused to grant it legitimacy and power.7

From the perspective of the Tsars, the government was a threat to their autocratic authority, but the various hierarchical ranks and offices reduced the amount of paperwork the monarchy was traditionally responsible for. This would have surely extended the authority and improved the efficiency of the Tsarist government. However, again the conditions created within the system caused problems. Nicholas II, once law and order had been restored, issued the Fundamental Laws on 23rd April 1906 in response to the first gathering of the Duma. Nicholas II’s decrees stated that he could dissolve parliament when he so wished. Nicholas II essentially put his decree into practise immediately: the First Duma was dismissed just three months after it first convened in April because it was too radical with demands for land reforms and expropriation of noble-owned land. The Second Duma formed in 1907, but similarly failed to cooperate with the government efficiently, which led to its eventual dismissal after just four months. By the time the Third Duma met later in November 1907, changes were made in the electoral law, which reduced the number of representatives for the peasantry and increased the number of conservative party members. The Third Duma was much agreeable with government and lasted longer than its predecessors.8 However, government and parliament in this period before the war acted as merely complementary components of Tsarist autocracy. Therefore, the efficiency of government depended on the Tsar. If the Tsar was weak and lacked interest in politics, then the government too would lack competence.

Bureaucracy in the nineteenth century is a good example of the level of poor efficiency in the Tsarist system of government. Few Russians had faith in bureaucrats:

‘The bureaucracy was widely disliked in Russian society . . . frequently denounced as the source of all the Empire’s ills.’9

At a local level in the provinces, bureaucracy became extremely corrupt because many bureaucrats resorted to bribery and extortion to supplement their poor salaries. At the senior level, many bureaucrats were noblemen and believed their privileged position was under attack from the emerging middle classes and academics. It was the senior official’s aim to block others from participating in government.10 Bureaucracy was a central institute in government but undermined itself with nepotism and poor administration.

Until the emergence of the radical and violent revolutionary groups such as the People’s Will in the 1870s, government invested little time in security police forces. A near successful assassination attempt on Alexander II life in 1866 led to the first security police bureau, the Okhrana. The Okhrana became a vital arm of bureaucracy within the structure of government, and it was largely believed by ministers that the very survival of Tsarism depended upon the efficiency of the police force to suppress hostile forces.11 The Tsars had largely adopted harsh measures to suppress all forms of opposition including a ban on public meetings; forced imprisonment or forced exile; heavy fines, and censorship. The chaotic climate in Russia during the reign of Nicholas II included famines, riots, strikes, and revolution, which meant the security police was needed more than ever to perform their duty. The People’s Will movements, which was predominately the largest organisation, had been largely defeated and outmanoeuvred by an organised and efficient Okhrana during in the reign of Alexander III (1881-94), but the pace had strengthened in the 1890s and now industrial workers were being incited to rebel.12 This encouraged an extensive programme on part of the Okhrana, which would eventually lead to its downfall. Within the Okhrana there were agents employed to spy on every social sector in Russian society from ordinary workers to the Tsar’s closest ministers. Though this might appear to be an illustration of an institution that proved to be effective in the Tsarist system of government; the secret police force had a rather negative impact:

‘One consequence of this ‘police state’ was to alienate potential supporters of the regime. Liberals who supported the Tsarism were spied on: workers co-operatives were banned for fear of inciting revolution: peasant activities were supervised by ‘land captains’ from St. Petersburg.’

The police force in Russia was just another arm of bureaucracy, and thus favoured the rich and abused their power to protect their monopoly of wealth from others. Furthermore, the Okhrana was not effective in its war on revolutionaries and many radicals including Lenin easily fled abroad to Britain or France to escape imprisonment.13 In truth, the Tsarist police force controlled by the Tsar and government, which unfortunately meant it was only as sophisticated and efficient as the Tsarist regime itself.

In conclusion, the very nature of the Tsarist system of government did not allow room for an effective government. Consequently, the autocratic Tsarist government collapsed under its own weight and resulted in the radical change in regime from Tsardom to the Provisional Government. Essentially, Tsarist autocracy had not reformed to adapt to the rising problems and conditions, which the system itself created out of incompetence and corruption. The ministers rivalled with each other for the approval of the Tsar, which meant there was no attempt to rationalise the system of government. The failings of the Duma to cooperate with the government, and the high level of corruption among the bureaucrats only distant the Tsar from his people and reality. This is revealed in the failure of the police force to overcome opposition of the regime. Finally, Tsar Nicholas II was not a natural leader; his lack of confidence and interest in government allowed for its decline and ultimate collapse.

Words: 2488.

Bibliography

1. I. Cawood and D. Bell, ‘Tsarism 1881-1905: a ‘superannuated’ form of government?’, Modern History Review, No. 31 (September, 1998), pp. 28-30.

2. J. Daly, Autocracy under Siege: Security Police and Opposition in Russia 1866-1905 (London, 1998)

3. J. Daly, ‘The Security Police and Politics in Late Imperial Russia’ in A. Geifman (ed.), Russia under the Last Tsar: opposition and subversion 1894-1917 (Oxford, 1999), pp. 98-180.

4. J. Gooding, Rulers and Subjects: government and people in Russia 1801-1991 (London, 1996)

5. D. Lieven, Russia’s Rulers under the Old Regime (London, 1989)

6. D. Lieven, ‘Nicholas II’, in E. Acton et al (eds.), Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution (London, 1997), pp. 176-181.

7. M. Lynch, Reaction and Revolution: Russia 1881-1924 (London, 2000)

8. T. Pearson, Russian Officialdom in Crisis: autocracy and local government, 1861-1900 (Cambridge, 1989)

9. P. Waldron, ‘Stolypin’s reforms failed and the Tsar’s Imperial government did not learn the lessons of the 1905 Revolution’, New Perspective Vol. 6, No. 3 (March 2001), pp. 22-25.

1 M. Lynch, Reaction and Revolutions: Russia 1881-1924 (2000), p. 5.

2 Dominic Lieven, ‘Nicholas II’, in E. Acton et al (eds.), Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution (1997), p. 177.

3 Lynch, Reaction and Revolutions, pp. 4-5.

4 Ian Cawood and David Bell, ‘Tsarism, 1881-1905: A ‘superannuated’ form of government?’, Modern History Review, No. 31 (1998), p. 29.

5 Lynch, Reaction and Revolutions, pp. 18-24.

6 John Gooding, Rulers and Subjects: Government and People in Russia 1801-1991 (1996), p. 93.

7 Thomas Pearson, Russian Officialdom in Crisis: autocracy and local self-government 1861-1900 (1989), p. 16.

8 Peter Waldron, ‘Stolypin’s reforms failed and the Tsar’s Imperial government did not learn the lessons of the 1905 Revolution’, New Perspective, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2001), pp. 22-24.

9 Dominic Lieven, Russia’s Rulers and Ruled under the Old Regime (1989), p. 282.

10 Cawood and Bell, ‘Tsarism, 1881-1905’, p. 29.

11Jonathan Daly, ‘The Security Police and Politics in Late Imperial Russia’ in A. Geifman (ed.), Russia under the Last Tsar: opposition and subversion 1894-1917 (1999), p. 218.

12Jonathan Daly, Autocracy under Siege: Security Police and Opposition in Russia 1866-1905 (1998), pp. 98-100.

13 Cawood and Bell, ‘Tsarism, 1881-1905’, p. 30.