How helpful do you find the theories of Almond (on political culture and cleavages) and Sartori (on party systems) for explaining the political instability experienced by pre-Fifth Republic France during the Third and Fourth Republics, by Weimar Ge

Sartori offers us four main types:  i) predominant-party systems; ii) two-party systems; iii) moderate pluralism; and lastly, iv) polarised pluralistic party systems. Then he sought to create criteria for his schema ‘previous schemas are highly suggestive but it is too sweeping’ to show a coherent pattern. Polarised pluralistic party systems are where Sartori placed France, Germany and Italy the area which must be critically assessed.

France

Instability in France is unquestionable: the ‘93 governments in 65 years’ during the III Republic known as the ‘stalemate society’ plays strongly into Almond’s cleavage theory of France’s history of revolution and regime change. During this period France was economically inefficient, protectionist and not dynamic. Bourgeois fear and loathing of the working class combined with intense polarisation of ideologies consisting of Communist left and proto-fascist groups adorning the right dominated the nation. ‘The III Republic evolved into a political system dominated by a strong parliament, which ensured that for the most part – government remained weak and unstable.’ Cole suggests a problem with the passive proportional representation system allowing for elegancies.  Instability carried through to the fourth republic with the people supporting a referendum in October 1945. However, the task of re-writing the constitution was difficult at minute levels: only two heads of government managed to hold office for more than a year and to further compound the irregularity and weakness, one government held office for two days in 1948.

The IV Republic heralded modernisation in French society and economics. However this was undermined by “anti-system” parties on the Left and the Right: namely the Communists and Gaullists. Governments were short-lived coalitions of centrist Radicals and Christian Democrats, and Socialists or Conservatives. Continual political instability eventually destroyed the IV Republic.

These periods contained instability, but how does Almond translate the reasoning? It is clear that political cleavages existed as did massive divides in ideology. France is described as ‘ideological rather than gradualist’. Almond fails to find concrete conclusions in French politics as the system itself was under the scrutiny of parliamentary power which fed the historic differences of the anti-clerical left and Catholic right. Almond reflects on how ‘political culture take[s] the form of “movements” or sects, that than of political parties’.  Emphasising the political sub-culture is important, as the undercurrents were in constant turmoil and the political centre was one of an unjust system.

Polarised pluralistic party systems in France could be seen as an evolvement of Almond’s cleavages of the dissatisfaction of current system, which saw a creation of a fragmented polarised party system with disagreements across the political sphere (left debating left/right  stance was a rationalised democratic system. The Communists on the left and Gaullists on the right were the two major polarised parties who were looking to undermine the constitution. They advocated a strong President, who could remain above the petty quarrels of party politics. The PCF were of Jacobin traditioned a single direct assembly.

Sartori's argument is that the multi-partism led to the political instability. In contrast to the British and American two-party system there is little chance for consensual coherent pledges of opposition. Furthermore the confusing nature of each individual cleavage and their own political ideology creates fragmented parliaments and ruins any chance of coalition governments being able to make quick decisions or gain major support for any Prime Minster.  The system lacks any true form of holding anyone accountable. Macridis reflects that ‘after an election it was impossible which combination of political parties or parliamentary groups could provide temporary support for a Prime Minister and which new combination would bring about the prime minister’s downfall’. This comment outlines a key issue of multi-party system and coalitions: that of pronounced cabinet instability, mainly due to the proportional representation system. Satori’s notion of French history is solidified by Macridis’s reflection. The course of polarisation makes it the most important frame of reference as extremism is endorsed thus giving a voice in parliament and allowing Satori's blacking mailing affect leading to clear fragmentation.

Almond and Satori both seem to have both encapsulated French instability quite well especially when both theories are used in combination to create a whole scenario. Satori finds that the key issues in French governmental struggles lie in powerful anti-party system forces that combine with a lack of political leadership. It has to work with unstable majorities possibly caused by initial innate political cleavages. However, other factors in French history must be considered was there simply a lack of a dominant, enigmatic leader in control of a moderate party. Would the III or IV Republic have succeeded especially in the later as economic condition were more suited to stability? Evidence suggests that the future stability under De Gualle, who blamed the constitution which denied France the chance to be lead as ‘d'assemblée or 'government by assembly'’ and allowing an undisciplined cabinet, for the eventual breakdown of the IV Republic again. During periods of transition, the combination of all factors and the changing political (de-colonisation a major issue forcing the true end to the IV Republic) and sociological changes needed a strong political system at all levels.

Germany

Germany’s Weimar republic suffered from the same political instability as France and displayed many similarities. Many similarities support Almond’s suggestion of cleavages, as Germany had democracy thrust upon them when the historic emperor system was abolished “the new republic found itself without a respected democratic leadership”.  This uncertainty allowed religious cleavages to establish as the country became split between Protestant majority and a large Catholic minority, which shows that ideological fragmentation was entrenched in Weimar before it began. The left (pro Weimar SPD/anti-Weimar communists KPD), right (pro-Weimar of liberal and moderate conservatives/anti-Weimar national conservatives and Socialists) and central parties incoherent plan forced more voters to extremes of German politics “creating several structural faults in Germany politics that would contribute directly to the failure of liberal democracy and eventually the rise of fascism”. This created the polarisation of Germany’s politics; presenting a perfect extreme example of Sartori’s fragmented, unstable party system. Anti party organisations cannot be denied and with the need for coalition government blackmailing and overall control was existed but minimally until economic crisis which may be an even bigger reason for Weimar collapse allowed these parties to thieve as the public, looked for radical answers. This combined with German reparations and the underlying anger from the right towards the “November Criminals” and an allowance from a faulty constitution all manifested itself in the fall of Weimar and rise of the Nazi’s.

Almond and Satori’s theories provide useful analogies in explaining the deep cause of regime change due to instability, but both theories also require some form of catalyst to provoke such radical switch in voter patterns such as economic crisis or lack of discipline in France. Stability has been reached; however in both these countries with a switch away from true Proportional representation, a key route to Sartori’s claims the French embracing Almond’s Anglo-American system and Germans setting a 5% minimum for representation taking away some strengths of the extreme polar organisation.

Italy

Post-war Italy is separate: it encapsulates both the French and German political culture but within a more modern political time frame. Exploring the political divide can encapsulate the incisive debate by both Sartori and Almond. Almond’s cleavages are always apparent inside a country  with major splits between a sociological divide of religion and class creating obvious fragmentation. DCI was involved in every coalition during the 90’s; historic instability has become a feature and not a disruptive force in Italian politics between 1945 and 1988 there have been 58 different cabinets. Almond’s ideas are prevalent within the ideological system which is essential to the debate of stability in Italy. These fragmentations in Italy do not fit Sartori’s schema, as anti-parties do not exist at both extremes. The Communists of Italy never realised the disruptive or nation-changing divide of Italian government. I concede that some of Satori’s feature show signs with the anti-party systems (particularly the communists) not involving themselves in “Central placement” whereby their ideals moved to the extremes and negate the possibility of coalition. The whole systems seem to contradict  Sartori’s idea of a multi party system as every rule is not engaged. “in 1991 – 1993, the communist were no longer a threat” and it was corruption which ended  the first republic DC coveted money and despite political loses if this had not been discovered the republic may of stumbled on.  It is not however the end of relevance as multi party system the disruptive nature of both France and Germany in which instability is in no doubt endemic continues to Italy.

 A significant issue with Almond’s thesis is the lack of detail in which he exaggerates disruption, by ignoring certain countries. However, he picks up many issues regarding Germany, Italy and France. The main flaw in Satori’s studies may be his conservative notions these are prevalent in his evaluation of Italy, as he approaches the political left with too much suspicion. As a basic framework of analysis both theories open up intrigue and questions on each society.

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Bibliography

Allum, P. A., Italy – Republic Without Government? (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973).

Almond, Gabriel A, 'Comparative Political Systems', The Journal of Politics, 18:3 (August 1956), pp.391-405.

Berghahn, Volker R., Modern Germany: society, economy and politics in the twentieth century, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

Clark, Martin, Modern Italy, 1871-1995, second edition (London: Longman, 1996).

Cole, Alistair, French Politics and Society, second edition, (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2003).

Elgie, Robert, Political Institutions in Contemporary France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

Ginsborg, Paul, A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988, (London and New York: Pengiun Books, 1990).

Goguel, Francois, France under the Fourth Republic, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952).

Macridis, Roy C., Modern Political Systems: Europe, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1990).

Moeller, Robert G., ‘The Kaiserreich Recast? Continuity and Change in Modern German Historiography’, Journal of Social History, 17:4 (Summer, 1984), pp.655-683.

Nicholls, Anthony, J., Weimar and the Rise of Hitler, third edition, (London: Macmillan, 1991).

Sartori, Giovanni, 'A Typology of Party Systems', The West European Party System , Peter Mair (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

Smith, Gordon, Democracy in Western Germany: parties and politics in the Federal Republic (London: Heinemann, 1979).

Paper ID: 13068307 Paper Title: 7318411 How helpful do you find the theories of Almond and Satori Assignment Title: Submit Your POLI20911 Essay Here Author: Jonathan Glennon E-mail:

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