ARGUMENTS, DEBATES AND ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIAL
Despite some minor rifts within the cabinet, for example between Blair and Brown, the cabinet seems largely united in support of the PM. The PM’s dominance has increased as Blair removed those that he would not have originally chosen without being under pressure to do so, and those who have failed. The government is run on a tight rein from the centre. Number 10’s job is to drive policy forward, and to co-ordinate the work of the cabinet as a whole. The number 10 Policy unit has been strengthened, under the control, along with other No. 10 institutions such as the Premiership office, firstly of Jonathon Powell, and more recently Alistair Campbell, equivalent for some to a US style Presidential Chief of Staff (and indeed this title has been used). After the 2001 General Election, it was announced that Downing Street was being reorganised into a tripartite structure, in order to strengthen the centre of government. The first section was headed by Jonathon Powell as Chief of Staff, with Alistair Campbell running the second section as Director of Communications and Strategy, whilst the third section was responsible for relations with minister. This structure of government shows a definite surge of power towards the Central control and direction of power. Aside from these, Blair has relied on a small group of advisors, mainly the Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine, and the now disgraced MP Peter Mandelson. Mandelson became a Minister without Portfolio, which allowed him to take on the role of ‘progress chaser’, which essentially meant he ensured that all members of the administration were ‘on message’ with Blair. The Number 10 Policy Unit has been greatly expanded, with staff numbers well over 200.
There are a number of other factors which show Blair as premier acting similarly to a Presidential style: the infrequency and shortness of cabinet meetings; the regular abandonment of the cabinet agenda; Blair’s preference for informal meetings with ministers; and the extensive use of political advisors. Blair in a similar way to a US President has often relied on a small group of powerful and influential cabinet colleagues, known as the ‘big 4’, to make decisions. Originally it was Blair, Cook, Prescott, and Brown. But after the demotion of Cook, Blunket has effectively replaced him within this core group. Some of the Big 4s decisions include deciding to hand interest rate control to the Bank of England before the first Cabinet meeting, as well as excluding Formula One from a ban on tobacco sponsorship. On a smaller scale, Blair seemed personally obsessed with war on Iraq, and disclosures later revealed he nearly resigned over the trouble he had personally forcing the policy through. In addition, there have been times when there has been no collective decision making process involving the responsible minister. For example Blair promised that NHS spending would match the EU average within a few years without consulting his Chancellor to see if it was plausible. Mo Mowlam has claimed that Blair prefers one to one meetings with ministers and that little was decided in full Cabinet, showing Blair’s dislike for collective cabinet government.
The evidence of Blair building up a PM dept similar to the US Presidents Executive Office is perhaps the biggest indication of the style of Tony Blair’s premiership. The No.10 policy unit, as well as a Press Office, are now under control of the Chief of Staff Alistair Campbell. Their task is to essentially portray the PM and government in a good light, as well as ensuring that all his aims are pressed forward. This is also achieved with the use of close allies, who sit on a range of cabinet committees, to ensure policy proposals fit in with overall aims and ideology, for example in 1998, Peter Mandelson was sitting on 11 different committees. There are also more whips than ever before, who reprimand anyone who steps out of line, such as Paul Marsden who voiced his discontent over Labour’s handling of the Afghanistan crisis, while the PM personally and publicly reprimanded Claire Short over her comments on tax rises. Also, the lack of a formal cabinet agenda is a further sign that the Cabinet does not operate as a decision making machine. There are many comparisons between the methods of Blair, and the highly successful Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher also expanded the No.10 policy unit, and used her patronage power to shape the cabinet to her thinking, as well as using cabinet committees to bypass full cabinet (the Trident missile system, whereas Blair used his Big 4 to bypass cabinet).
So how is Blair able to operate in such a manner? Labour has a majority of 167 in the House of Commons, and so can possibly afford some rebellion within the party (single parent and disability benefit cuts). Big majorities mean that he can be fairly forceful with his policies, without risking any major backlash. Also, after 18 years of Conservative rule, the Labour party appreciates that major internal rebellions will only weaken the party (at least until lately over Iraq).
However, there are some limitations on the powers that the PM wields and this means that first, any PM without the advantages in terms of political circumstances Blair enjoys may revert to a more collective style of government, and second, that Blair himself may have to revert to a less centralised style of decision making in certain circumstances. No matter how big a party’s majority is, if party and public opinion is against a certain policy of the PM, then the PM may be forced to back down, as ultimately his party can remove him from power. Blair took considerable risks in taking Britain to war in Iraq, given the opposition of 139 Labour MPs in the last Commons vote on the issue. If the war had dragged on or caused unacceptable casualties it could have meant the end of his premiership. This is a situation which does not occur in the same way in a Presidential system. The fact that the Big 4 exists provides evidence that Blair is dependent on others, and realises that certain ministers wield large amounts of influence within the party, such as Brown and Prescott. Many believe Thatcher’s downfall began after the Westland affair, which caused a rift between Thatcher and Heseltine, an MP who carried great influence.
Furthermore if a forceful PM is consistently unpopular, then they can be seen as an electoral liability, throwing their position into doubt, as with Thatcher’s eventual downfall in November 1990 after upsetting various prominent Conservatives, pursuing the unpopular poll tax policy, and looking likely to lose the next election. Also, a PM has to keep potential powerful rivals and rebels within the cabinet where they are bound by collective responsibility. Blair has accommodated Gordon Brown and John Prescott in powerful positions, and Claire Short in a less important post, and so should not have to worry about open criticism from them (though unusually this was not the case with Short over Iraq). However, Blair does not appear to have balanced the Left and Right within his cabinet to any great extent, which could cause some friction from the PLP, especially traditional Labour MPs, as decisions will be seen as purely influenced by more centre-right politics. Admittedly, John Prescott was once deemed old Labour, but nowadays “two Jags” seems to have been swayed more towards New Labour’s thinking. This lack of balance within Cabinet has caused concern to Blair, and probably contributed to some rebellions such as single parent benefit cuts. In addition there seems more trouble ahead over issues such as the Private Finance Initiative and Foundation status hospitals.
CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS
Fellow Labour MPs have some criticisms about the extent of power which is centralised, as a Labour MP commented, "The increase in the Executive arm of the government has far exceeded all its initial powers”. There are several factors that affect the balance of power between the Prime Minister and Cabinet: the ideology of the PM; the character of the PM; their skills; and most importantly the circumstances under which they must operate. Hennesy said in 1998, “the system is driven more from No.10 under Blair even than under Mrs. Thatcher at her height”.
An event such as the war on Iraq would usually be largely influenced by cabinet government, but Blair showed an almost personal lust for war, demonstrating the extent to which his powers have stretched. Blair’s style has caused some resentment, firstly from Mo Mowlam from within the Cabinet, as well as MPs over the Iraq crisis, which has the potential to escalate. Thatcher can be seen as a warning to Blair, as to what could happen in the future.
It seems clear that under Blair a Presidential PMs department is developing on the model of the US executive office, with control of the party and all its major decisions undertaken primarily by Blair and like-minded colleagues and advisors, resulting in a deterioration of cabinet government. However, whilst there does seem to be evidence of similarities between the US and UK executive, Blair operates far more collectively than his American counterpart Bush, who will mostly make decisions with his executive office colleagues as he sees fit. Blair must at least consult senior cabinet colleagues, and must keep one eye on the mood of the Parliamentary Party. Any reduced majority for Blair in the House of Commons however could possibly lead to a Major style cabinet government, as a reduced majority for the PM would mean less of a mandate to act as an individual and more chance of cabinet challenge of Parliamentary defeat, leading to considerably more consultation with others.
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