How well equipped is the British cabinet for the role as the strategic policy making body in the UK?

The British cabinet was created in 1702 by George the first as a result of his desire to spend less time on English political affairs. Thus, the Privy council was evolved into the cabinet which became the senior advisory body to the monarchy. Today the cabinet has somewhat different functions. Generally speaking, it is seen to plan the business of Parliament, to arbitrate in disputes between departments, to provide political leadership for the party in govrnment, to provide oversight and co ordination in government policies, and most importantly, it is the arena in which most important decisions are taken. Many of these broad functions have important ramifications for policy making, as do many features related to cabinet such as the conventions of collective and ministerial responsibility. It is the purpose of this essay to dicuss the various organisational and institutional features of the cabinet in relation to the question, how well equipped is the British cabinet for its role as the strategic policy making body in the U.K.?

There are a number of ways in which it has been suggested that the British cabinet is equipped for its role as a strategic policy making body. For example, with regard to the conventions which are implicit to the working of the cabinet. The two main conventions are ministerial responsibility and collective responsibility. According to the doctrine of ministerial responsibility each minister is responsible to Parliament for his own personal conduct, the conduct of his department, and the policy related actions of the civil servants within this department. As regards the cabinet as a whole, the convention of collective responsibility requires all cabinet ministers to assume responsibility for all cabinet decisions, and any minister who does not is expected to resign. This convention is supported by the secrecy of cabinet proceedings, so as to present a united front to Parliament, and to the country. Finally, cabinet is expected to resign if defeated on a no confidence vote in the House of Commons. These conventions, if adhered to, are conducive to cabinets policy making role in the sense that, in theory, the threat of having to resign is enough to ensure that a cabinet minister,and the cabinet as a whole, keep a close eye on the work of the cabinet departments overall policy orientation, and their own personal conduct

However, certain events in recent years suggest that cabinet conventions are not always adhered to. In many ways collective and ministerial responsibility have been seen to break down. For example, in the Labour government of 1974-79 the cabinet was publically divided over the issue of whether to have a referendum on the issue of British membership to the E.E.C.(1975), and the vote on the European Assembly Elections Bill(1977). Various leaks occured in the Thatcher administration with disagreements between Leon Brittan and Michael Heseltine over plans for the rescue of the Westland helicopter company being widely reported in the press. Arguably this breakdown in the conventions of cabinet has damaged the British cabinets role as a strategic policy making body in that it is shown to be less unified in the publics eyes, and thus appears to be less accountable.

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It could be said that cabinet is well equipped for its role as a strategic policy making body because, through a number of related institutions, it is well co ordinated which allows for thoroughly researched policies and for the presentation of a clear overall policy picture. For example, the treasurys control of public spending, and annual spending reviews provide an opportunity for an oversight of government policy as a whole. The role of the cabinet office in servicing cabinet and its committees is also relevant here. It is staffed by approximately 120 civil servants, and in carrying out its main tasks i.e. preparing the cabinet agenda, recording its conclusions and supervising the implementation of cabinet decisions, it is able to provide a broad overview of the cabinets policies, and can assist in the co ordination of committees, departments, and individuals to ensure the policies settled on fit the problems being tackled. Cabinet committees and the use of bi laterals or tri laterals i.e. Prime Ministerial meetings with one or two ministers, also help to co ordinate government policy as well as being a positive reaction to the problems often experienced with the size of the cabinet. For instance, in 1918 the Haldane committee report recommended a cabinet of no more than twelve. However, increased state activity has demanded a cabinet of 20 to 24 members. L.S. Amery wrote that the full cabinet, "...is quite incompatible with any coherent planning of policy as a whole, or with the effective execution of such a policy.", and it is this problem that bodies like cabinet committees attempt to resolve. Cabinet committees are of basically two types. Standing committees, which are permanent committees concentrating on long running issues, and Ad Hoc committees, which deal with particular, specialised issues, if and when they crop up. It has been said that cabinet committees are an aid to the policy making process in that they are a positive response to the cumbersome size of the full cabinet and its huge work load. Also, they are said to allow for a more detailed and specialised study of a certain issue than could be given by the full cabinet, thus permitting the cabinet to perform its functions more efficiently and effectively than would otherwise be possible.

However, there is a sense in which the institutions designed to help co ordinate strategic policy making in cabinet have been seen to hamper such a process. For example, with reference to cabinet committees, Richard Crossman, a former Labour cabinet minister claimed that committees erode the authority of the full cabinet by taking decisions on behalf of cabinet, or through pre packaging the issues which do go to cabinet. A number of important decisions have been taken in committees without ever reaching the full cabinet. For example, the decision to make the Atom bomb, or the decision to go ahead with the poll tax during Thatchers final administration. In 1968 J.P. MacKintosh claimed that this was a worrying development because, "...the old system whereby any minister who disliked a committee decision could "reserve his position" and thus take the matter to the full cabinet has ended."

Other attempts to combat co ordination problems, often caused by the cumbersome size of cabinet, have centred around the separation of cabinets policy making functions from its administative functions. For example, Lloyd Georges war cabinet of 1916 comprised of five members, only two of whom had departmental responsibilities, allowing the cabinet to meet on an almost daily basis to plan overall policy. Clement Attlees cabinet comprised of three tiers of ministers, the top tier were charged with directing broad policy, and presiding over the committees of ministers in charge of administration. Churchill took this experiment one stage further with his "overlords" scheme, where Lords Woolton, Leathers, and Cherwell were to have no administrative duties whatsoever. Laski and Morrison claimed that these experiments largely failed because it is impossible to draw viable distinctions between policy making and administrative duties, and is unrealistic to exclude departmental ministers from the policy making process. Thus, the problems which arise from large, cumbersome, uncoordinated cabinets, to a large extent, still exist.

Indeed, on a broader level it could be said that attempts to co ordinate cabinet with regard to its policy making role have failed, given the lack of method or system to provide an overall policy perspective within the institution. Barbara Castle, former Labour cabinet minister claimed that upon entering cabinet she thought,"..cabinets were groups of politicians who met together and said, these are the policies we were elected on, now what will be our political priorities? However, I suddenly found I wasn't in a political caucus at all. I was faced with departmental enemies." Richard Crossman also became disillusioned with the way in which each department was more interested in fighting for its own corner rather than a satisfactory overall cabinet view. "...We came briefed by our departments to fight for our departmental budgets, not as cabinet ministers with a cabinet view." It has been suggested that the fact that for each minister the test of his success in office depends on his ability to deliver clear departmental goals does not help the cabinet to work in unity. Generally the results are infrequent reviews of government policies, discussion of priority setting in only very general terms, and the lack of any safeguards against a strong departmental minister, all of which has been seen to hamper cabinets strategic policy making role.

It has been suggested that cabinet is the best place for strategic policy to be made because in many cases it does provide for collective decision making, and acts as a valuable constitutional check against Prime Ministerial government. For example, Douglas Wass stated that it is right that cabinet should remain the supreme governing body, and that the power to take decisions on major policy resides in the cabinet, and not with the Prime Minister alone. There are a number of constraints which operate on the office of the Prime Minister which allow cabinet to maintain its role as the strategic policy making body. For instance, the Prime Ministerial power of patronage must take into account political considerations. For example, Harold Macmillans night of the long knives, in which he sacked seven cabinet ministers and nine ministers outside the cabinet in 1962, caused deep resentment in the party. With regard to the Prime Minsters control of the agenda, there is only so long the Prime Minister can keep an issue a colleague strongly wants to be discussed off the agenda. The power of dissolution is made less effective by the fact that two thirds of Commons seats are safe seats, thus many ministers are not too scared about losing their seats if the Prime Minister to threatened an election.

However, it could be said that cabinet is ill equipped for its role as strategic policy making body because it is relatively powerless against the power of the Prime Minister, and thus relatively impotent when it comes to final policy making and planning. For instance, the Prime Ministers powers of appointment and dismissal, agenda setting, dissolution, and the ability to take important decisions outside the full cabinet, whilst having constraints, have also been used effectively by many Prime Ministers.

Certain assetts which most ministers have attained help to make the cabinet well equipped for its role as strategic policy making body. For example, ministers must sit in Parliament, and most must be members of the House of Commons. This parliamentary background means that ministers will be skilled in debate and able to handle Parliamentary questions concerning the work and policies of the cabinet. Also, many cabinet posts must take into account a ministers political skill or specialised area of knowledge. Hence, posts such as the Lord Chancellor or the Attorney General must be filled by lawyers in the party, whilst the Chancellor of the

Exchequer is expected to be competent in economic matters.

However, in many ways it is a ministers lack of experience which harms cabinets ability to be a strategic policy maker. A politicians suitability for a certain ministerial post may often have little to do with their appointment. Prime Ministers use some appointments to reward loyalty, or to limit dissent in the party. For instance, Thatcher excluded Heath from her 1979 cabinet due to their political differences, and for much the same reason Enoch Powell was excluded from Heaths 1970 cabinet. There is no adequate preparation for being a cabinet minister, with much reliance being placed upon "on the job" learning. For most ministers their departmental brief holds little interest, and in many ways is simply seen as a career stepping stone. This is perhaps best illustrated by the haphazard movement of many ministers between departments. For instance, Richard Crossman was shadow education minister in 1964, but became Minister of housing and Local Government once his party won office. The fact that the average period any minister stays in one department is two years means that at any one time there are a number of ministers who are actually learning their jobs.

The work overload of any cabinet can also present problems as far as long term strategic policy making is concerned. For example, former Labour minister Joel Barnett has said that, "The sheer volume of decisions, many of them extremely complex means that by the time a fairly modest analysis of a problem is done....you find yourself coming up against time constraints. Consequently ministers often find themselves making hasty decisions, either late at night, or at an odd moment in a day full of meetings." This problem is compounded by the fact that ministers are expected to be familiar with the work of all other departments represented in the cabinet. The work load of ministers can have adverse effects upon their health and family life, and given that the job is, in relative terms, poorly paid with no job security it would seem clear that only a certain type of person would be prepared to live such a life. This has led to accusations that the cabinet are unrepresentative, full of people who lack a normal concern for their families personal welfare, and are so financially well off that the poor pay is of little concern to them. Thus, the overloading of ministers can arguably prevent co ordination of strategic policy planing, and attract an unrepresentative cabinet. All this suggests that the cabinets role as the strategic policy making body is less effective due to constraints upon cabinets time and the ministers themselves.

In conclusion, in many ways it could be said that cabinet is well equipped to carry out its role as the strategic policy making body in the U.K.. The conventions of cabinet, if adhered to, can create a suitable environment for effective policy making. The use of bodies such as cabinet committees and the cabinet office can allow for more detailed policy analysis and provide an opportunity for studying long term policy strategy. Also, the experiences of ministers in Parliament can give them a good grounding for their work as a cabinet minister. However, in many ways the opposite could be said to be the case. Most ministers have no experience or intrinsic interest in their departmental briefs, cabinet committees can lead to the bypassing of the full cabinet on crucial policy issues, and the way in which cabinet revolves around each department fighting for themselves rather than the most satisfactory policy strategy, all suggest that cabinet is ill equipped to carry out its strategic policy making role.