The ills in the institution of repeated human interaction, familial ties, property, and law are obvious to Rousseau for it sets the foundation for man to compare their talents and highlight their differences. The combination of “this repeated interaction of various beings with himself as well as with one another ”, and the “…habit of living together… [having each] family [become] a small society…must naturally have engendered in man’s mind perceptions of certain relations” (162). As a result, man came in a situation to judge similarities and differences between him and others. The consequences of family co-habitation span farther than perpetuating “amore pompre” (self-love that is dependent on the opinions of other); it laid the grounds for sexual inequality as the beginning of the institution of social inequality as a whole. Rousseau writes, "Women became more sedentary... while the man went to seek their common subsistence" (164). The division of labor according to gender roles within the proto-family brought about leisure time for man and the division of labor outside the proto-family marked the beginning of the concept of property. In this state of affairs, equality could not be sustained. The talents of individuals grew to be noticeably unequal: whilst “…wit, beauty, strength, skill, merit, talent” could for the first time come into their own, this was not for their own sake, but as property or weapons in the struggle against others (158). The strongest did most work; the most skillful turned his labor to best account; the most ingenious devised methods of diminishing his labor and all wanted more and more. The difference between men, developed by their different circumstances, became more sensible and permanent in its effects, and began to have an influence. This involved the creation of a supreme power which would govern individuals according to law and would “…defend and protect all the members of the association, repulse common enemies, and maintain them in eternal concord” (173). This association transforms natural proceedings into a legal right sustained by universal agreement. With the acquisition of differences, property and law, social inequality is established by the consent of men, where the rich perpetrate and poor suffer inequality.
Evidently, Rousseau observes that his modernity is the product of man’s authorization of the loss of social equality in this long historical process. His thoughts clearly illustrate the state of nature in a positive light as he states "…[savage man] lived free, healthy, honest and happy lives, so long as their nature allowed and as they continued to enjoy the pleasures of mutual and independent intercourse” (167). Contrastingly, he shows his discontent towards his present society as he states “Humankind, debased and devastated, no longer able to turn back or to renounce its wretched acquisitions” (172). Though he may feel admiration towards the state of nature, alas Rousseau recognizes it is “… on the basis of conjectures”, on an imaginary time that we cannot possibly return to (159). While he acknowledges that humans will never be able to return to a state without language, property, and family, he still provides an important intellectual check into the continued progression and development of society. Rousseau calls for a future that relies on the idea that human beings can improve themselves dramatically by attending to reforms in their social environment. After all, if all the major troubles in life stem from the organization in our surrounding social structures, then it follows that there is something that can be done about improving and even perfecting our condition. Rousseau proves that “…ills are of our own making…” are socially constructed and thus are able to be socially deconstructed (137). He leaves us with no clear options, no systematic program of reform which might address these issues. However, it was never part of his intention to do so.
Rousseau also never had the intention of giving a factual documentary of how natural man transformed into civil man; he acknowledges that these “…investigations that may be undertaken concerning this subject should not be taken for [truths], but only for hypothetical and conditional reasonings, better suited to shedding light on the nature of things than on pointing out their true origin," (132). In exploring the origin of social inequality among men, he is necessarily constrained by the lack of empirical accessibility of the natural state. Rousseau recognizes and addresses this handicap in his text and skillfully argues in spite of the hindrance. He “admit[s] that the events [he has described] could have taken place in several ways” (159). If we accept the basic elements of his argument, that man in the state of nature was mostly solitary and without property, we agree to his distinction between natural and social inequality. It is then that we can disregard minor inconsistencies in his account of man in his developing stages and still agree that it follows that social inequality is a human creation. Consequently, Rousseau’s argument is regarded as consistent and reasonable.
Rousseau, in his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, successfully points towards an improved social environment and construct by mapping the development of man in the state of nature to man in civility. More impressively, he successfully argues for this topic where the premises can only be hypothetical and establishes a new use for historical thinking as a tool of social criticism and political reform. His use of history critically to reject rights to power was revolutionary; his narrative undercut any claims by existing authority to some form of justification by appeals to a law of nature or God’s established order as authority arose from law and universal consent. When deviating from the specific conclusions and recommendations of his argument, the impact of Rousseau as a great thinker invariably emerges, not from his ability to persuade people to agree with his conclusions, but from the way his argument redefines our approach to challenge issues of authority and equality even today.
Works Cited
Gourevitch V. and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 1997. The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.