Intelligence does not win wars. It does not shape foreign policy. Intelligence does not operate in a vacuum. But nonetheless, intelligence activities are an inseparable part of the process of the making and application of policies. Discuss.

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Missing Dimensions Research Paper                                                  9501 2577 802 Q

Intelligence does not win wars. It does not shape foreign policy. Intelligence does not operate in a vacuum. But nonetheless, intelligence activities are an inseparable part of the process of the making and application of policies. Discuss.

Intelligence could be simply described as the covert collection and analysis of information. Since knowledge is power, the gathering of information about another’s capabilities and intentions is a vital aspect of state behaviour, both internally and externally. It can be open or covert, strategic or non strategic. In all cases, its purpose is to acquire, analyse and appreciate data in order to facilitate policy-making. While the acquisition of confidential information is the prime function of the intelligence community, other roles associated with are, counter-intelligence, which is to prevent others acquiring information on your state, deception, which is to spread disinformation, and covert action which means implicating political warfare or subversion. Intelligence is gathered in two ways, technical and human. Human intelligence primarily refers to espionage and spies, like that are seen in fictional works such as in James Bond.

Intelligence is often referred to as the ‘missing dimension’ of the diplomatic history and international relations. Apart from the very nature of the enterprise, one of the reasons for this is that intelligence successes are rarely made known outside the professional circles involved in them, and then only when the outcome is not affected.

Intelligence is regarded very important in war scenarios because it is considered vital to know, beforehand, the enemy’s battle strategy and movements in order to avoid being taken by complete surprise. In gathering intelligence and analyzing the collected raw data, generals on the battlefield and high-ranking personnel in the government could formulate their own strategies to counteract that of their enemies. Although the prior knowledge of the enemy’s capabilities and possible movements could provide a massive advantage and thus bring victory on the battlefront, a question remains; does intelligence actually win wars? What evidence can be found to show that intelligence won wars in the past?

On researching this matter, some complications seemed to crop up. Some instances were found where intelligence reports were ignored and therefore those states were taken by surprise and therefore sustained loses as a result of not taking any action. This shows that, if officials and generals had heeded clear warnings and danger-signs, they would have had the ability to thwart the surprise moves by the enemy and therefore emerge victorious. But there were also some instances where, even with the most accurate intelligence, armies lost to their enemies.

For example, the German airborne assault on the Grecian island of Crete in May 1941 showed that even with the best intelligence, a battle could be lost. British intelligence had been reading and deciphering Luftwaffe secret codes and had informed the commander of the Allied forces stationed in Crete of the date, the time and even the objective of a German air-raid codenamed “Unternehmen Merkur” which translated as Operation Mercury. So, when the attack took place on the 21st of May 1941, nothing was a surprise, because the forces knew exactly where and when and what to do. But the Germans managed to inflict heavy losses and British still lost, even with prior knowledge of the attack. The Luftwaffe had changed their plans slightly after seeing their original plan was not working as well as they had previously hoped whilst the British forces stuck to theirs. The battle of Crete is important because it was the first time Allies made significant use of intelligence from deciphered German Enigma codes. Still, the loss shows that intelligence alone does not win a war.

The naval battle of Midway, between the United States and Japan, in June 1942 is another such example. The Americans had, through the successful deciphering of Japanese coded communication, managed to gain intelligence of what the Japanese intended to do. This should have, theoretically, put the Japanese carrier ships at a major disadvantage. But, five out of six American strikes were completely destroyed by the Japanese, the sixth only managing to succeed almost by chance. This incident also shows that in warfare, intelligence alone does not win a war.

Sir John Keegan, in his book “Intelligence in War- Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to al- Qa’ eda”, attempts to answer the question “How important is intelligence in bringing victory or averting defeat?” .Keegan goes on to say that “Codes, ciphers, spies and secret operations make such gripping stories that their point is usually overlooked. We all know about the Cambridge traitors. What we do not ask is what real damage they did…[The answer is that] Burgess did no damage at all, that Philby was harmful only to some unfortunate operatives whom he betrayed to the Russians and that Maclean may have conveyed nuclear secrets to Moscow. Moreover, the Cambridge traitors were figures of the Cold War, not real war.” This is another case where intelligence, in itself, didn’t win a war. The Cold war was mainly fought on an intelligence battlefield and the result and final verdict on the intelligence history of the Cold war is still unfolding.

Going further back in history, another case where intelligence alone didn’t win a war was when Lord Nelson successfully pursued and defeated a fleet of French ships off the coast of Egypt in 1798. Here, the challenge for the Lord Nelson and the British naval fleet was to find and pin-point the location of the Fleeing French fleet. Nelson was successful and the French were defeated and their ships sunk. But Thomas Powers, a literary reviewer for the Washington Post, poses an argument that “Hard fighting was required to send the ships to the bottom, [although] finding them was the decisive thing...” In his argument, Powers goes on to say that even with superior intelligence, a war cannot be one only by foresight and foreknowledge.

Keegan, in his book “Intelligence in War- Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to al- Qa’ eda”, goes on to conclude that “Decision in war is always the result of a fight…and in combat willpower always counts for more than foreknowledge. “ He gives a wide range of examples such as Stonewall Jackson’s campaign in the Shenandoah Valley in 1862 to the German assault on Britain in 1944 with their revolutionary their cruise and ballistic missiles, where intelligence played a key role, but was not decisive enough to be the only cause for the victory or success.

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Therefore, through numerous examples, we see how intelligence is paramount in scenarios of warfare but does not win wars on its own. This also means that states and generals should not overly rely on intelligence because it can never be a hundred percent accurate and winning a war or gaining the upper-hand in a battle requires much more than foreknowledge.

Although intelligence is important aiding generals and armies to win wars, it also helps statesmen to formulate foreign policy. Foreign policy is simply explained as the activity whereby state actors act, react and interact. Foreign ...

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