When the United States and the USSR faced each other down in the Cold War, one of their most favored weapons of choice is the economic carrot that they dangle in front of unaligned states to lure them into their respective camps. Other economic instruments include economic sanctions which the United States has increasingly used to great effect. China herself used the economic mace in her attempt to weld Vietnam to herself during the period of the Vietnam War, otherwise known as the second Indochina War. With China’s increasing economic power, there is a possibility of China using her huge consumer market, with the corresponding potential to withhold it; to influence governments to accede to her political demands. This paper posits that China’s economy is not fungible enough to give her coercive political clout. China would suffer greatly in a trade war with the United States and thus her ability to play the economic card vis-à-vis the United States is almost totally non existent, although China’s volume of trade with the United States and subsequent value to the United States economy is sufficient to deter the United States from trying the same tactic on her. China’s ability to exert economic pressure on states other than her allies is also suspect because of her limited amount of trade with them. States most relevant to China’s possible expansionist ambitions are the ASEAN (Association of South East Asia Nations) states. Yet they have yet to have substantial volume of economic exchange with China . China’s limited influence with its ASEAN neighbors led Robert S. Ross to comment that ‘The consequence of limited ASEAN trade and investment relations with China is that the ASEAN countries have yet to develop significant economic incentives to consider Chinese interests in developing policy toward other bilateral issues or in relations with third parties.”
The Chinese are however, not blind to their stark drawbacks in the various spheres delineated previously. One new front that the Chinese have been trying to develop in order to offset their weakness on both the military and economic front is cyber-warfare. This new front would include having hackers forcing entry into the Pentagon computer system and sowing confusion among the United States command and control network, it would also not count out hacking into emergency response systems of American cities and disabling it in order to create chaos in American society. James Adams in his article “Virtual Defense” draws attention to two PLA colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui who believe that rather than imitate “Moscow spend(ing) itself into oblivion trying to win the Cold War arms race,” China should explore cyber-warfare as a serious alternative because, “a digital attack will give China a significant asymmetric advantage and even bring about the defeat of the United States.” This is a credible threat by China for the American infrastructure is heavily dependent on computer systems and Art Money, assistant secretary of defense for command, control, and intelligence was forced to admit that “And that’s where the vulnerability in the United States resides.”
What is the size of China’s gun barrel then? It must be said that if any assessment concentrates solely on China’s achievements in absolute terms, especially in the arena of cyber-warfare, nuclear capabilities and economic instruments, there might be a conclusion that China is acquiring overwhelming coercive power. That conclusion however, could not stand once the balance of power effect of the rest of the great powers, especially the United States, is brought into the picture. The coercive powers of all the above instruments fall away once the concept of retaliatory measures is brought into play as China recognizes that the United States possess retaliatory options on every front. The fear that China in the near future would be able to, through economic growth, outgrow such retaliatory measures is ill founded. Firstly, this would entail the outstripping of the United States technology lead by China and secondly would involve China’s economy overtaking that of the United States. The former is inconceivable given the United States formidable lead in research and development and the later is not probable because even if one allows China economy an optimistic annual growth of 9%, it would not likely surpass the size of the United States economy even in 10 years. The impact of China’s economic growth on China’s coercive prowess is also limited because although the Chinese government would have a larger economic pie to finance its continued investment in the armed forces, simply improving the welfare of its soldiers and bringing antiquated equipment up to par with present modern standards would likely exhaust whatever increased budget the military is allocated. Therefore, even an optimistic projection for China’s future capability by 2010 is restricted to the maximum possibility of her achieving only a regional hegemonic influence.
Smaller gun barrels support cautious talk
If given a choice, it would not be surprising that China would not seize the chance to secure global dominance. China’s image of herself has never been a humble one and even in a position of relative weakness, “China has acted politically as a world power.” China’s leaders however, understand intimately the limitations that China’s capabilities confine her to. Any bid by China for regional or international dominance would necessarily bring her into confrontation with the Untied States and Chinese leaders are convinced that they do not wish to have any conflicts with the Untied States at present as far as possible. As Lanxin Xiang observed, “Since the economic reforms started by Deng Xiaoping two decades ago, the prevailing theme of Chinese Foreign policy has been ‘peace and development’” George Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham agreed with this assessment and offered as a explanation for this orientation of Chinese foreign policy that “Confrontation with the United States would jeopardize China’s economic reform program and continued prosperity.” Even though there has been apprehension about China’s goals, especially during the 1995-96 confrontation over the Taiwan Straits, China’s at present non-revisionist intentions are indicated in many various forms other than her cautious treatment of Sino-American ties, most notably in her interactions with her regional neighbors.
China’s pursuit of increased links with both Japan and the ASEAN states could largely be interpreted as China’s reluctance to rock the international boat at the present moment. One significant step taken by China to build better relations with Japan could be seen in the visit by the Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian to Japan in February 1998, a first in fourteen years. To calm the fears of her smaller neighbors, China’s Jiang Zemin made a pledge to ASEAN leaders in 1997 that “China would never ‘seek hegemony’ but would ‘forever be a good neighbor, a good partner and a good friend with ASEAN countries.’”
Although some analysts have concluded that China would soon start to have revisionist ideas once she achieves the prerequisite global economic and military superiority. This paper would argue that this view is overtly alarmist. Other than the limitations on China’s economic growth and military modernization drive outlined earlier, there are at least two other reasons why the scenario of a globally technological and economic dominant China is very slim. The first is that managing such a huge country is a very huge job and that any calculation of China’s phenomenal acceleration in development, whether in research and development or in the economic sphere must take note that China’s political institution is ill-designed to withstand the rigors of a growing economy and an increasingly politically conscious populace. In “China’s Coming Transformation”, Gilboy and Heginbotham highlighted a number of social birth pangs that China would have to deal with in the near future as Chinese economy and society comes of age. These include disgruntled farmers frustrated over high taxes and corrupt government officials, high unemployment rates that have resulted in riots in cities, and the rise of religious and spiritual movements. The second cause for doubting the wolf cries about China centers on the fact that assumptions that China would be able to define a coherent enough foreign policy that could propel it to hegemonic status are simply that, assumptions. Lanxin Xiang is particularly skeptical about even the possibility of those assumptions, commenting that “Chinese internal politics always border on the incoherent, stuck in slow-motion power transitions, and lacking any reliable formula for political legitimization. It is a mystery that anyone should expect a coherent foreign policy to issue from such a mess” (emphasis added).
On handing out gun barrels
There has also been much concern over China’s irresponsibility in the area of preventing the spread of both conventional arms and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Branding China as a threat because of the former is ridiculous when records show that China barely made it to the list of top ten arms suppliers, at a rank of ninth while the Untied States continue to hog the top spot. The later however, is a legitimate concern as one looks at China’s implication in both Pakistan’s and Iran’s nuclear weapons program in the past. China’s export of missiles, missile technology and nuclear expertise to countries situated in volatile regions like the South Asia security complex and Middle East region could have a destabilizing effects.
It’s not only China’s call
Any analysis would not be complete if it does not consider the fact that China alone does not hold the cards that determine the stability of the international security regime. China is not the only actor on the international political arena and her choices, capabilities and intents would not alone determine the outcome of the search for peace. China’s future foreign policy would not follow a linear progression. China’s international actions would be largely affected by how the world treats her and would adapt itself according to the international political situation that she finds herself in. The state that should pay closest attention to this fact is the United States. This is because as Joseph Nye pointed out, it is Spartan and Athens’s common belief that a conflict is inevitable between them that created a self-fulfilling prophecy that spawned the destructive Peloponnesian war. Gilboy and Heginbotham likewise cautions against the United States pursuing a neo-containment policy against China by pointing out that the power struggle taking place within China between hardliners bent on a confrontation with the Western world and moderates intent on domestic economic development could very much be decided by the stance taken by America against China. They also pointed out that giving China the respect she deserves as an emerging world power would facilitate the United States quest for China’s cooperation on essential issues, including limiting the spread of WMDs.
The Final Tally
There is no doubt that China is definitely emerging as an economic powerhouse. It would also be safe to conclude that a resurgent China would try to convert her economic power into political capital essential for a bid for a place as a world power. However, China’s relative weakness in the economic, technological and military field meant that China’s leaders would most likely tread a careful path in the international political system. This meant that if the world, especially the United States is willing to engage China constructively and grant her the respect her large size and population rightly deserves, there is great potential for China to become a responsible political actor even as a great power and contribute significantly to maintaining international security. On the other hand, if the international system insists on viewing China as a threat, then it is also equally likely that China, like a cornered and wounded beast would throw logic to the wind and unleash whatever retaliatory weapons back at those pressuring her and bring the international security regime down together with her.
Gilboy & Heginbotham, “China’s Coming Transformation”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No.4 (July/August 2001). pp. 29
China belongs, together with the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, and France as the five states that are declared nuclear weapon states.
Nye, Joseph, Jr., “The rise of China and the future of international security.” Lee Kuan Yew Distinguished Speaker Program. National University of Singapore. 08th Jan 1999.
International observers have routinely multiplied China’s declared defence budget by factors ranging from three to ten. For more details, refer to Nye, Joseph, Jr. “The rise of China and the future of international security.” Lee Kuan Yew Distinguished Speaker Program. National University of Singapore. 08th Jan 1999. The most recent 2002 military budget announced by China during the National People’s Congress continued to be met with such interpretation by western analysts. See Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. “China plays down army budget increase” CNN 6th Mar 2002. 6th Mar 2002 < http://asia.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/03/05/npc.willy/index.html>
Recent incidents include China’s missile tests over Taiwan in 1995-1996, the occupation of Mischief Reef by China in 1998 and the recent spy plane standoff with the United States in April 2001.
Brians, Paul. “Quotations from Chairman Mao” <http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~wldciv/world_civ_reader/world_civ_reader_2/mao.html>
Nye asserted that analysts should never forget to put China’s absolute capability in relative relief against the capabilities of other powers, like the United States. Nye, Joseph, Jr. “The rise of China and the future of international security.” Lee Kuan Yew Distinguished Speaker Program. National University of Singapore. 08th Jan. 1999
This has been aptly demonstrated in the Gulf War where the United States led coalition forces defeated a numerically superior Iraqi military force.
“Most importantly, the PLA is organized and equipped as a defensive force with scant ability to project its armies to areas distant from China’s borders.” Nelson, Harvey W. The Chinese Military System: An Organizational Study of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1981) pp. 2
“Critics point out that Chinese firepower does not begin to equal that of the US or Soviet forces until the opposing troops are within a few hundred meters of each other.” ibid. pp 124
In a study of China’s efforts to modernize her armed forces, Ngok Lee came to the conclusion that “despite the recent formation of group armies, a considerable proportion of the Main Forces is probably still composed largely of foot infantry.” Note that the PLA encompasses the Army, Navy and Air Force and the Army itself is divided into Main Forces and Regional Forces. The Main Forces are the equivalent of a state’s standing army while the Regional Forces could be described as local defense forces called into use in the event of an invasion into the interior of the Chinese mainland. Lee, Ngok. China’s Defense Modernization and Military Leadership (Sydney, Australia National University Press, 1989) pp. 48
“The Air Force’s transport capability….could probably only support one or two regiments in combat operations” ibid, pp 62-63
“Chinese Marines are coastal defense troops rather than a ship-borne assault force” Nelson, Harvey W., 1981. pp 172
“For many years the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has been the world’s third largest-after those of the US and USSR- with 4700 aircraft in its inventory.” ibid, pp 159
“China’s Air Force: The long road to modernization” RAND 06th Feb 2001, 7th Mar 2002 <http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB32.html>
Records show that China has received delivery of two Sovremenny Class Destroyers from Russia in 2000. “Transfer of major conventional weapons” SIPRI Yearbook 2001 (New York, Oxford University Press Inc, 2001) pp 369
The Sovremenny destroyers are in the same size class as the US Aegis-equipped missile cruisers and have a range of capabilities including air-defense missiles and anti-submarine helicopters. The inclusion of air-defense missiles is significant given the PLAAF relative weakness. For more details on the Sovremenny destroyer, see “Sovremenny Class (Type 956) Destroyer, Russia” Naval Technology 07th Mar 2002 < http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/sovremenny/>
“Two Sovremennys have been in service with the PLAN since late 2000; the decision to order another pair indicates that employment of the first two has been deemed a success.” Kidd, Joanna. “East Asian Naval Developments” The International Institute of Strategic Studies 17th Jan 2002, 7th Mar 2002 < http://www.iiss.org/pub/sp/sp02001.asp>
“United States Navy Fact File” The United States Navy 1st Mar 2002, 7th Mar 2002 < http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/ships/ship-dd.html>
“Nuclear Arms Control” SIPRI Yearbook 2001 (New York, Oxford University Press Inc, 2001) pp 475
This function, however, China has been able to achieve remarkably well. Through a process of deception and enormously powerful warheads placed on its missiles, China has ensured that the other nuclear states do not have an assured first strike capability while fearing the potential huge retaliatory effects of China’s second strike capability. For more details, see Goldstein, Avery. “China: Nuclear Deterrent” Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 2000) pp. 111-138
Nuclear Arms Control” SIPRI Yearbook 2001 (New York, Oxford University Press Inc, 2001) pp. 458
The concept of the People’s War interacting with Nuclear Deterrence theory is complex but in short, China’s ability to have its command structure survive in outlying regions even after a nuclear first strike meant that any first strike attacker could not be certain that China would not start a second-strike or even an all out suicidal total nuclear exchange. China’s ability to deter first strike is thus present even if the recent rumored SLBM capability is discounted. For details, see Goldstein, 2000. pp 132-133
“China’s no-first-use pledge is: “We will not attack unless we are attacked: If we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack. China will counterattack only when the enemy uses nuclear weapons first.” Goldstein, 2000. pp 134
The United States have their Marshall plan and the Russians also supported China with economic aid in her early stages of development in the 1950s.
Any economic fallout with the United States would include serious repercussions for China such as the impediment of technology transfer and possible loss of membership in the WTO
“Ultimately, that China is America’s fourth-largest trading partner may serve as the greatest curb on a hostile United States policy toward China.” Bachman, David, “The United States and China: Rhetoric and Reality”, Current History, Vol.100, No. 647, September 2001. pp. 262
“Thus, despite China’s rapidly developing and modernizing economy, economic exchange between China and most countries of Southeast Asia remains relatively small.” Ross, Robert S. “China and southeast Asia: The Challenge of Economic Competition” Southeast Asia in the New World Order: political economy of a dynamic region (New York, St. Martin's Press , 1996) pp 154
Adams described a possible scenario of “China launch(ing) a network attack to turn off the power in Chicago in midwinter, killing large numbers of the city’s residents.” Adams, James. “Virtual Defense” Foreign Affairs Vol. 80, No.3 (May/June 2001) pp.110
Although China is not as vulnerable to cyber attacks as the United States, China is still vulnerable to cyber-attack to a certain extent, and only the lack of standard operating procedures in cyber-warfare in the United States is presently preventing the United States from being able to respond robustly and quickly to cyber-attacks. For details, see Adams, 2001. pp. 98-112
This is assuming that United States economy does not stagnate while China’s economy grow at a phenomenal rate of 9%, a safe assumption considering how interconnected the world’s economy is. For more details, refer to Nye, 1999.
“Most of the increase (in defence budget, in 2000), 5.6 billion Yuan, was allocated to the daily operation of the armed forces to compensate for their lost income from commercial activities which were banned in 1998” “Military expenditure and arms production” SIPRI Yearbook 2001 (New York, Oxford University Press Inc, 2001) pp 255
To throw this point into greater relief, it helps to look at David Bachman’s comment that, “Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Zhu Rongji evidently believe that China has few effective response to a more assertive United States.” Bachman, 2001. pp262
“Several factors inform China’s self-image as a global power, including its size, huge population and significant resources. The Country’s long and illustrious imperial history is also important.” Bessho, K. Identities and Security in East Asia, London, IISS, 1999, Adelphi Paper No.325. pp. 31
Xiang, Lanxin, “Washington’s Misguided China Policy”, Survival, Vol. 43, No.3 Autumn 2001. pp. 13
“Chinese civilian leaders, especially those about to take the helm in 2002-3, do not want a new cold war.” Gilboy & Heginbotham, 2001. pp. 38
Gilboy & Heginbotham, 2001. pp. 31-33
The world’s attention to China’s crackdown on the FaLun Gong brought the Chinese government much inconvenience on the international political stage.
Xiang, Lanxin, 2001. pp. 12
“Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons” SIPRI Yearbook 2001 (New York, Oxford University Press Inc, 2001) pp 357
“Since the 1970s, China has been instrumental in Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs.” Fisher, Richard D. & Dori, John T. “The Strategic Implications of China’s Nuclear Aid to Pakistan” The Heritage Foundation 16th June 1998, 08th Mar 2002. < http://www.heritage.org/library/execmemo/em532.html>
“Some in the military appear willing to take a more confrontational approach, especially on issues related to national sovereignty, such as Taiwan” Bachman, 2001. pp 262
“Chinese hard-liners will not be able to stop the coming political reform (in China)-unless they are aided by an adversarial attitude from the United States” Gilboy & Heginbotham, 2001. pp. 39
“Indeed, a more measured approach to secondary security interests would enhance U.S. leverage on more vital issues, such as halting the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and encouraging peaceful resolution of the standoff across the Taiwan Strait.” Gilboy & Heginbotham, 2001. pp. 38