Is China a Threat to International Security

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To what extent is China a threat to international security in the Post-Cold War era?

The implosion of the Soviet Union and subsequent collapse of the cold war that had held the attention of the world for four decades freed governments around the world to refocus their crystal balls on the next plausible threat to international security. Most signs point towards China as the most eligible candidate. With an annual GDP growth rate that averaged 9.7 percent between 1989 and 2000 and a military arsenal that boasts of membership in the nuclear club and the possession of the largest standing army in the world, China has attracted concern from governments around the world and especially in the Asia-Pacific region. As Joseph S. Nye pointed out, the rise of a new power is usually accompanied by anxieties and uncertainties in the international political system. Many analysts in the United States have put forth the view that China’s increased economic power would encourage her to expand her territory, both geographically and politically. Many are concerned how this revisionist attitude of China, if true, would affect both regional and global security. China’s lack of transparency, especially in her declaration of defense spending, forces governments around the world to resort to second-guessing China’s military make up and intentions for her military assets. China herself, by engaging in international political maneuvers that could only be described as confusing, did not help to calm international concerns.

In an attempt to determine the magnitude of the threat that China poses to the stability of the international security regime, this paper would examine whether China’s growing economic and military clout would enable her to revise the international status quo and whether she has any intention of wanting to. This paper would also look into China’s handling of her responsibilities as a nuclear power. Attention would also be drawn to the fact that China alone does not hold the key towards the security of the international political system and that much would depend on the behavior of other political actors, notably the United States.

China’s gun barrel size

        The Chinese are very clear that the volume of a state’s voice at the negotiating table is tied closely to the amount of military force it could muster. As Mao Zedong puts it succinctly, “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”. And yet in the present age in which the nature of warfare has changed, the examination of China’s swaggering rights must include more than mere assessment of China’s conventional forces. Such an examination would not be complete without also looking at China’s nuclear capability, economic coercion tools and possibilities in the realm of information technology. In addition, one must also keep in mind that China’s present or projected capabilities should be viewed in context with what other states are also capable of so as to come to an accurate “net assessment”.

        Much has been made of China’s large standing army, numbering close to three million personnel. Yet in today’s technology driven armies, numbers alone mean very little and when one takes a closer look at China’s ground forces, the conclusion is that China’s army is geared largely towards a defensive role with very limited power projection ability. China’s army has been described as being weak in fire power, lacking in mobility and still involved in developing modern military doctrines essential for a modern army. The ability of the army to execute airborne operations is severely limited by the lack of sufficient capacity in the Air Force. The amphibious capability of the Chinese equivalent of United States marines is also restricted to a defensive nature and there exits doubts as to China’s ability to launch an amphibious attack on Taiwan even if she should choose to do so.

        China’s PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air Force), though considered the third largest air-arm in the world is hopelessly backward compared to most modern air-forces. The factors contributing to the low effectiveness of the Air Force are varied. These include the antiquity of its aircraft, the inadequate training of its pilots and even the aftereffects of the Cultural Revolution. This led to a RAND Research Brief to conclude that “there is little possibility of China's air force emerging as a serious global offensive threat in the early 21st century.

        The Chinese Navy, PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) also suffers from antiquated equipment although China’s recent emphasis on acquiring a blue-water navy is probably contributing greatly to the PLAN’s modernisation programs. Recent success indicators include the announcement by Russia that China has placed orders for a second pair of Sovremenny Class Destroyers, which hints that China has successfully integrated the powerful ships into their naval operational doctrines. However when one considers the fact that the United States Navy boasts thirty-six modern Arleigh Burke class destroyers with two in Japan and four others based in Hawaii, the PLAN’s modernization program would still fall far short of enabling the PLAN to achieve even regional naval hegemony.

        Although it is apparent from even a cursory examination that China’s conventional armed forces could only perform a primarily defensive role, China’s nuclear arsenal still manages to cast a latent shadow over international security. Recent estimates put the China nuclear stockpile at four hundred and ten warheads, with twelve warheads designated as SLBM (Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles). The actual effectiveness of nuclear weapons in actual warfare is very much tied up in Nuclear Deterrence and Escalation theories which are beyond the scope of this paper. It is sufficient to state here that China’s nuclear arsenal has no effective aggression value against any of the other nuclear states and is designed primarily to deter nuclear threats to China herself. This becomes more perceivable when the eight thousand, eight hundred and seventy six declared warheads of the United States nuclear arsenal is brought into comparison. China’s concept of the People’s War also meant that China is not as afraid as the United States or USSR of being the target of a first strike and thus not as likely to suffer from a trigger-happy attitude prevalent among states eager to preempt each other in nuclear warfare. China’s ability to use her nuclear status to weigh in on interactions with non-nuclear states is also quite restricted by her no-first-use pledge.

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        When the United States and the USSR faced each other down in the Cold War, one of their most favored weapons of choice is the economic carrot that they dangle in front of unaligned states to lure them into their respective camps. Other economic instruments include economic sanctions which the United States has increasingly used to great effect. China herself used the economic mace in her attempt to weld Vietnam to herself during the period of the Vietnam War, otherwise known as the second Indochina War. With China’s increasing economic power, there is a possibility of China using her huge consumer ...

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