This therefore raises an important issue outside the traditional deterrence paradigm justification – that nuclear weapons are viewed as an effective tool for the display of power in international relations. Whilst the deterrence theory clearly offers a compelling explanation for behaviour in the first nuclear phase, the motivation for nuclear programmes in the second nuclear phase appears to have followed a somewhat different dynamic. Therefore, it is argued that the extent to which nuclear weapons are stabilising or destabilising forces within international relations will ultimately depend on the world political framework.
The end of the Cold War ushered in a new world order – a multi-tiered system radically different from the previous US/Soviet bipolar system (Waltz, 1995). This new multi-polar system followed Hobbes’ view of foreign policy: that the international system is anarchical in that there is no enforcement authority, and instead there is a complex myriad of multi-polar institutions and interstate relations (Waltz, 1995).
In the first nuclear era, Western Europe was given protection by the US, which became the subject of scrutiny as the Soviet Union built up nuclear capabilities to counter the growing power of the US. In response – and in line with the domino effect theory – France and Britain began developing their own nuclear programmes to enable counter action if necessary and as a deterrent against Soviet attack (Barnaby, 2003). Similarly, the aftermath of the Korean War left China fearing a US attack, and accordingly by 1964 China had a fully developed nuclear weapons system in place for self-preservation purposes. However, whilst these five traditional nuclear states developed their nuclear capabilities as a direct result of the aftershock of the Second World War and for deterrence purposes, the dynamic has clearly shifted in the post Cold War environment. Indeed, the second nuclear period has resulted in countries such as India, Pakistan and Israel developing nuclear programmes, where the state motives clearly appear to go beyond mere deterrence.
3. DETERRENCE THEORY: CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Proponents of the argument that nuclear weapons act as a stabilising factor in the international system often point to deterrence as the main justification for nuclear weapons (Towle, 2005). Towle, for example, has argued that during the Cold War nuclear weapons paradoxically existed only to prevent their actual use (2005: 163-64).
Many theorists suggest that deterrence is still relevant in the context of contemporary international relations, citing the Cold War First Nuclear Age era as providing lessons useful to understanding the current Second Nuclear Age. Indeed, Kenneth Waltz has argued that the greater the number of states with nuclear weapons, the less likely they are to be used: “Nuclear weapons restore the clarity and simplicity lost as bipolar situations are replaced by multi-polar ones” (1995: 14). Waltz’s argument is rooted in the concept that the costs of war between two nuclear states clearly outweigh the actual benefits, making any nuclear victory ultimately pyrrhic (Waltz, 1995: 7-8). Along these lines, deterrence theory suggests that nuclear weapons primarily play a stabilising role in international relations, underpinned by the assumption that no state would actually initiate a war that would lead to obliteration. This is referred to as the ‘Mutual Assured Destruction’ (MAD) theory of deterrence (Walton & Gray, 2007: 219-220).
Waltz has further asserted that having nuclear weapons is therefore preferable to conventional military resources and that the nuclear threat is all that is needed to maintain security, with the resultant effect of international balance (1995: 42-43). Moreover, according to this theory the threat of nuclear war reduces the actual occurrence of conventional conflict, which would clearly be more costly and destabilising to the international framework (Waltz, 1995).
Building on this argument, Waltz has provided six security-focused motives for the development of nuclear weapons within the deterrence theory:
1) Intimidation by other great powers
2) Fear that a great power ally will not retaliate if another great power attacks
3) Country without nuclear allies wants nuclear weapons more if adversaries have them
4) Fear of adversaries’ strength
5) Cheap alternative to other economically ruinous weapons
6) Offensive purposes
However, a common flaw in the six-tiered security centred approach is that whilst nuclear states may well fall into the above six categories, most non-nuclear states also fit into at least one of these categories and therefore most of the threats identified in the first five motives apply to other security environments in which nuclear weapons programmes have not been pursued (Crawford, 2000).
Nevertheless, Waltz rejects the notion of pride or emotions providing a motivational factor: “the nuclear military business is a serious one, and we may expect that deeper motives than desire for prestige lie behind the decision to enter it” (Waltz, 1981). However, it can be argued that his rejection of this notion points to the flaw in the contemporary relevance of deterrence theory. Indeed, as Crawford has argued, the “main raison d’être of neo-realist theory is based on its claim to reflect the world as it is, not as it should be. By dismissing a wider range of motives underlying cognitive processes as inappropriate for guiding important decisions (like the acquisition of nuclear weapons), Waltz describes how arming decisions should be made rather than how they are made in actuality” (Crawford, 2000).
Indeed, the inherent difficulty in considering existing norms and emotions in nuclear policy and international relations is their subjective nature as they exist beyond material or legal dimensions and lack empirical evidence. Some realists have tried to reconcile this by arguing that the emotional norms are part of a state’s struggle for power gains (Gray, 1999).
Mearsheimer has provided further support to the deterrence theory utilising NATO’S nuclear policies. The overall objectives of NATO require that member states share the risk and responsibilities of preserving international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Nuclear weapons comprise a key part of NATO’s defence plans and collective defence policy. According to the defence doctrine of NATO laid down in 1949, the defence policy ensures “the ability to carry out strategic bombing including the prompt delivery of the atomic bomb,” going on to state that “this is primarily a US responsibility assisted as practicable by other nations” (NATO Strategy Document 1949 -1969, M.C.3/2).
Mearsheimer argues that with regard to the NATO nuclear deterrent “with the presence of thousands of nuclear weapons, there is good reason to be very confident about NATO’S deterrence posture” (Mearshimer, 1985; Gray, 1999: 45). He further argues that it is vital in the international arena to keep the military risk high in order to make deterrence more effective (Gray, 1999: 21). One may argue, however, that the potential costs of such measures may outweigh the deterrent effect.
Conversely, critics of the deterrence theory have argued that it is outdated and that its underlying assumptions are naïve and not applicable to contemporary state leaders and international relations policy (Gray, 1999). In this, deterrence theory is underpinned by the assumption that the opponent is rational and mutually vulnerable and that the opponent is in fact a state (Gray, 1999). Opponents of the deterrence theory also highlight the fact that as a theory, deterrence has not been practically tested, and cannot provide unequivocal evidence that the Soviet Union was actually deterred by the USA during the Cold War (Segal, 1988: 21).
The key factor, however, is that even if such restraint during the Cold War was attributable to deterrence, the political and social context of this era was considerably different from the contemporary climate, particularly with the current proliferation of non-state terrorism, state terrorism and the rise of rogue states.
As such, it is proposed that the intrinsic presumption of ‘rationality’ at the core of deterrence theory is no longer relevant or reliable and fails to account for the complex ideologies influencing state leaders, whether rogue or others, in the contemporary climate. In addition, it is suggested that the underlying weakness of a Cold War influenced deterrence theory is the presumption of an international consensus and predisposition to generic hegemony with American ideals (Freedman, 2005). It can also be suggested that in order for deterrence to work in any meaningful way, states need to be mutually vulnerable, which is undermined by the proliferation of nuclear capabilities of states such as Israel, already supported by unwavering US support.
Indeed, this undermining of deterrence theory is further compounded by the proliferation of nuclear development in Iran and Iraq (Cassese, 2005). It can therefore be submitted that whilst the original aim and purpose of nuclear development may have ostensibly been rooted in the notion of mutual deterrence, the second nuclear era – marked by the proliferation of states and non-state terrorist actors with nuclear weapons programmes, and possible wider usage of such weapons – indicates that nuclear weapons clearly have the potential to be utilised as a destabilising tool in international relations.
The influence of political and economic factors on nuclear weapons policy has gained evidence with the demise of the Soviet Union. In this, Manning has referred to a societal move in the latter part of the twentieth century towards a nuclear taboo, stating that “under current arms-reductions accords, entire categories of weapons (intermediate-range missiles) have been eliminated, and after START II and III are implemented, U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals will have been reduced by nearly 90 per cent from their Cold War peaks” (Manning, 1997: 71).
Along similar lines, the international treaty banning nuclear testing (CTBT) was hailed by Greenpeace as “opening up the way to a world free of the threat of nuclear weapons” (Manning, 1997). What is interesting is that it is evident that financial incentives played a part in such international treaties, and the efficacy of any treaty or enforcement measure restricting nuclear weapons use is inherently dependent on compliance. For example, unaccountable military regimes in Brazil and Argentina which had been pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities saw dramatic changes following protection assurances from major western powers and moves towards democratisation (Manning, 1997). However, the policies of successive governments will often change and there is no guarantee that this will not change again in the future (Walker, 1998).
Indeed, in the late 1990s, the fractures in the ‘nuclear taboo’ were beginning to manifest (Walker, 1998: 5). This can be seen in Russia’s slow progress in implementing plutonium and uranium disposition programmes, and the nuclear testing of India and Pakistan (Walker, 1998). Walker has argued that during this period increased utility was attached to nuclear weapons, and whilst they did not have the same roles as in the Cold War, they in fact gained fresh importance in political and military contexts (Walker, 1998). The result of this shift culminated in arms control measures involving restraints on nuclear programmes becoming transitory. In addition, Walker has suggested that during this period nuclear arms control objectives and processes became tangled and confused, partly out of deliberate intent and partly due to increased state autonomy (Walker, 1998: 15).
Indeed, the significance of the shift in contemporary world politics is demonstrated by the political standoff between Pakistan and India (Bidwai & Vanaik, 2000). For example, India’s emphatic refusal to endorse the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 and the subsequent testing of nuclear capabilities highlighted the destabilising role of nuclear testing in international relations: “there was a palpable sense of violation, of hard-won and cherished norms being trampled by an exultant India, and of neighbours being threatened with intimidation” (Walker, 1998: 1).
These concerns were compounded by Pakistan’s decision to respond with their own tests in 1998 (Walker, 1998). This diminished the notion that the post Cold War Second Nuclear Age had marked an eradication of nuclear issues from the international political agenda. Indeed, Walker’s question highlights the importance of the nuclear issue in international relations: “what kind of India, and what kind of Asia, is emerging in these late years of the century? Are we threatened by a renewed militarisation and nuclearisation of interstate relations?” (Walker, 1998). This further undermines the contemporary relevance of deterrence theory – particularly when one takes into account the statement of the then Indian Prime Minister’s response to the 1996 testing: “Never fight the US without nuclear weapons” (cited in Manning, 1997: 79).
This further highlights the complexity of international relations in the contemporary era, when the international political climate is controlled by state alliances, support treaties and bilateral agreements (Waltz, 1995). Along these lines, Sagan has argued that three main issues underscore the development of nuclear weapons: security, domestic politics and the creation of ‘norms’ throughout international society. The security point refers to the need for a country to be able to compete on an even scale with its adversaries (Sagan, 1996/97). Echoing previous discussion, Sagan highlights the paradoxical domino effect that “every time one state develops nuclear weapons to balance against its main rival, it also creates a nuclear threat to another state in the region, which then has to initiate its own nuclear weapons programme to maintain its national security” (1996/97: 58).
Turning to international norms, Sagan suggests that it is through such norms that international beliefs become legitimised and appropriated internationally. This concept of norms, whilst important in evaluating the resultant impact of nuclear policy in international relations, further links to the concept of the psychology of such norms. For example, in the First Nuclear Age, nuclear development was perceived as socially and internationally more acceptable; nuclear weapons programmes served “symbolic functions reflecting leaders’ perceptions of appropriate and modern behaviour” (Sagan, 1996/97: 75).
The fact that UN Security Council’s ‘Big Five’ had nuclear weapons programmes lends support to the idea that an international norm supported this situation (Sagan, 1996/97). This situation changed in the last decade of the twentieth century, when Russia began to feel increasingly weaker and isolated as an economic and military power, fuelling nuclear development as “an unassailable emblem of Russian power” (Walker, 1998). Meanwhile, the growth of rogue states and Russia’s poor relationship with the US led to US fears regarding the possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands and thereby being used as a destabilising force in international relations. As such, this has shaped US foreign policy, with Israel developing nuclear weapons to act as a bargaining tool (Walker, 1998).
Along similar lines, the emergence of non-state actors on the international scene – particularly in the form of terrorist groups – has further enhanced the destabilising nature of nuclear weapons in international politics. Smaller nations have also begun to play a larger part in contemporary world politics, pursuing nuclear weapons for what Manning has described as the “ultimate insurance policy” (1997). In essence, as Manning has asserted, “whether as a hedge against uncertainty in the case of China and Russia, as a means of security assurances for allies, or as a means of reversing proliferation, nuclear weapons remain part of the global and regional security equation” (Manning, 1997): clearly outside any overriding notion of ‘deterrence’.
This lends further support to the proposition in this paper that a difficult and indeed thin line divides the stabilisation and destabilisation effects of nuclear weapons in international relations. Ultimately, the resultant impact of a nuclear weapons programme is inherently dependent on the political and social climate of the time.
4. CONCLUSION
This essay has demonstrated that nuclear weapons are not inherently destabilising within the international system, but that their impact varies directly with the political climate of the time. Deterrence theory – centred on the prevention of the use of nuclear weapons – fails to properly address the issue of causality triggers behind nuclear policies.
Whilst deterrence theory undoubtedly explains much about nuclear weapons programmes in the international system, the inherent weakness of the theory is that it fails to account for the changing global political climate, whereby nuclear strategy and proliferation is shaped by complex, multifarious objectives. It is further argued that the stability of the international system and the political balance at the international level is inherently dependent on the axis of nuclear control. While deterrence theory was appropriate to explain the ‘stabilising’ effect of nuclear policy in the First Nuclear Age, it is plainly inadequate for the current political climate.
The impact of a nuclear weapons programme is inherently dependent on the political and social climate at any given time. Though in some periods nuclear weapons act more as a stabilising force, it must be stated that the risk of destabilisation remains potent as long as nuclear weapons exist as a potential tool in the battle for international clout. Yet beyond this, deterrence theory has clearly been subverted by North Korea and Iran with anti-colonial undertones motivating their nuclear strategies. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the bolstering of anti-proliferation legislation and the inception of the CTBT in 1996 paradoxically only served to fuel India’s nuclear weapons programme (Tannerwald, 2005). Not only does this again highlight the weakness of the deterrence theory in contemporary politics, it further highlights the failure of official measures to consider causality in foreign policy motivation, which in turn renders the nuclear weapon a potent tool for destabilising international relations. In order to redress this risk and achieve the overall purpose of the idealistic deterrence theory, it is proposed that in addition to considerations of causality, institutional frameworks assuming responsibility for international nuclear enforcement should consider actively working towards a compromise co-operative model with these ‘rogue’ nuclear states and non-state organisations.
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