Is deterrence still a useful concept in the post-Cold War world?

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Is deterrence still a useful concept in the post-Cold War world?

ABSTRACT

The literature discussing the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear policy in international relations has been historically shaped by the related concepts of deterrence and mutual assurance. However, whilst analysis of the ‘First Nuclear Age’ of the Cold War era clearly demonstrates a link between deterrence and the development of nuclear weapons, the gradual proliferation of nuclear weapons programmes in the post-Cold War era in states such as Israel, India, North Korea and Pakistan clearly points to a shifting justificatory rationale for nuclear weapons.  

This essay develops the argument that deterrence theory no longer provides a comprehensive explanation of the role of nuclear weapons in international relations. Instead, it is now clear that further research is needed to examine the relationship between the various motivational factors underpinning nuclear weapons programmes and changing international norms in order to truly evaluate the stabilising or potentially destabilising impact of nuclear weapons in international relations.

1. INTRODUCTION

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, international policymakers became overwhelmingly preoccupied with the potential ramifications of nuclear warfare within the world political order. After the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Stalin issued a clear demand to his comrades: “Provide us with atomic weapons in the shortest possible time. You know that Hiroshima has shaken the whole world. The balance has been destroyed. Provide the bomb – it will remove a great danger from us” (cited in Sagan, 1996/97: 58).

Stalin’s demand at the close of the Second World War ushered in the beginnings of the Cold War and what has been termed the ‘First Nuclear Age’ (Walton & Gray, 2007). During this period nuclear weapons programmes were rooted directly in the attempts of both superpowers to assert power in the international arms race (Freedman, 2005). The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War marked the end of the ‘First Nuclear Age’ (Walton & Gray, 2007: 210) – and, as Howard has argued, the end of the most peaceful period in contemporary European history (2001: 136; see also Howard, 1983). With that collapse nuclear weapons began to take on new roles and meaning in international relations.

During the Cold War era nuclear weapons remained entirely unused, yet their existence remained rational as an effective deterrent (Segal, 1988: 13). In stark contrast however, the ‘Second Nuclear Age’ of the post-Cold War era ushered in a dramatic shift in nuclear dynamics; indeed, their very role in the international system remains the subject of much debate, with little international consensus on whether they are in fact stabilising or destabilising. With this, critics of deterrence theory have further undermined justifications for nuclear weapons in contemporary world politics.

As Walton and Gray have suggested, the demise of the superpower rivalry appears to have directly re-ignited the problem of nuclear proliferation in the world political framework (2007). This suggests that the stability of the international relations system and the political balance at the international level are intimately linked with the axis of nuclear control. In essence, whilst deterrence theory undoubtedly offers a key understanding of the relationship between nuclear weapons programmes and international relations, the inherent weakness of the theory is its failure to account for the changing global political climate, in which nuclear strategy and proliferation is shaped by a correlation of complex, multifarious objectives.  

2. RATIONALES FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

The reasons for embarking on nuclear programmes are multifarious and complex. In this, Sagan has highlighted the desire of states to counter balance the perceived military power of other states (1996/97: 54). This is particularly evident in weaker states in the international system attempting to alleviate power imbalances, as nuclear weapons programmes are often cheaper than conventional forces whilst simultaneously providing instant security (Epstein, 1977). Prime examples of this include China and Iran, with Iran’s nuclear ambitions arguably connected with mistrust of the West and the United States’ policies in the Middle East (Jervis, 2005). Echoing this rationale is the proposition that people have an innate need for power and influence in the international arena (Epstein, 1977: 17).

However, if we consider the wider ramifications of such an argument, the capacity of ‘inferior’ states to develop nuclear programmes arguably suggests wide horizontal and vertical proliferation, and by extension can stimulate a domino effect whereby states develop nuclear capabilities solely because of their neighbours’ nuclear capabilities (Freedman, 2005). It should be noted here that some commentators have argued that such a domino effect is in itself a stabilising factor in ensuring deterrence (Howard, 2001: 15). Regardless, such a rationale highlights the fine line between the potentially stabilising and destabilising impact of nuclear weapons in international relations.

Another suggested reason for the development of nuclear weapons is simply that of international prestige (Barnaby, 2003: 4-5; Epstein, 1977: 17). Indeed, Waltz has argued that the development of a sophisticated nuclear weapons’ programme is perceived as the optimum tool to display wealth in the international arena (1995: 9).

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This therefore raises an important issue outside the traditional deterrence paradigm justification – that nuclear weapons are viewed as an effective tool for the display of power in international relations. Whilst the deterrence theory clearly offers a compelling explanation for behaviour in the first nuclear phase, the motivation for nuclear programmes in the second nuclear phase appears to have followed a somewhat different dynamic. Therefore, it is argued that the extent to which nuclear weapons are stabilising or destabilising forces within international relations will ultimately depend on the world political framework.

The end of the Cold War ushered ...

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