Downs actually created a quantitative measure for calculating the rational probability that an individual would choose to vote:
Basic self interest model of voting
P×B+D•C
P - subjective probability that vote will bring about different policy outcomes
B – net utility gain from difference in policy outcomes (benefits of party A – party B)
D – private benefits of act of voting (this would be very high if the person was in fact the electoral candidate)
C – Cost of voting
In this inequality P is also a function of the number of people voting; obviously if only 3 citizens vote the probability of having a pivotal vote will be much higher than if there were 52 million people voting.
This model provides a mathematical explanation of how the utility gained must outweigh the cost in order for an economically rational person to vote as the value of a citizen’s vote is tiny: hence it is outweighed by the very small cost of voting (Downs). Relating it to recent events, one can show how there were rational motives for voting, if only negligible, in both the 1997 and 2001 elections. The 1997 election saw turnout increase dramatically. People were desperate to elect Labour but were afraid that free riders would prevail thus increasing the probability of a pivotal vote were they to go to the polling station. Also, the increase in tactical voting could be considered a rational act, as people would rather vote for their second choice if it increased the likelihood of removing the Conservatives from the seat and not wasting a vote on their first choice. In previous years such people may have stayed at home. The 2001 election saw the opposite effect: the electorate believed Labour to succeed with another landslide victory and did not feel the costs would be worth the benefits of their individual vote, thus turnout dropped.
The costs involved in voting can be anything from the cost of gathering information or the cost of travel to the polling station, to the time spent voting. However, it has been argued that such costs can be minimised by using cues or short cuts to information. This can be done through the media, for example by reading newspapers, or reading the party pamphlets and would go some way in reducing the left side of Downs’ inequality. Although this may appear to rationalise voting it doe not take into account media bias (who controls the content of the newspapers?) or party bias (Blair’s Pledge Card was obviously written with the intention of persuading people to vote Labour). The idea of a solution to the cost problem has been deemed as rational ignorance, whereby citizens are choosing not to become informed due to its costs, which often results in mistakes.
Popular control of government is illusionary (Iyengar 1987). This statement may lead people to believe that whilst the electorate is given the opportunity to vote for a party and its policy they have little control once they have been elected. Therefore, in an electoral dictatorship (Lord Hailsham) taking into account the costs involved, there is limited rational reason to vote as it is debatable as to how much difference citizens can make in how they are governed.
Although it would appear from the arguments already discussed, that voting is irrational, humans knowingly make many irrational decisions in their lives. For instance, the tobacco industry continues to grow even though people are fully aware of the risks involved and at no economic benefit to themselves. In reality people do vote in elections and there have to be reasons for this.
Fiorina led the idea of citizen duty. This basis of this philosophy ignores economic rationality; the electorate feels it is their duty to vote and uphold traditions of democracy. The believe is that people enjoy exercising their democratic power and there is a certain sense of guilt if they fail to perform this action. Barry also argued that the sense of guilt was a selective incentive. In other words, voting is a good as it prevents a bad, guilt. People may feel guilt at free riding or if their favoured candidate lost by one vote. Casting a vote can be considered a gamble. No one has knowledge of the outcome prior to their actions so people tend to take the safe option and accept the costs involved.
So, it can be reasoned that whilst people always try to maximise their utility, there is an aspect of benevolent utility involved. Rationally, voting purely on self interest will never bring the same degree of utility to those with altruistic tendencies as taking both self interest and benevolence on board. This can be supported by looking at examples outside voting such as charitable work. Why do people support Oxfam? Because they receive a certain satisfaction or benevolent utility in return.
Amartya Sen in Rational Fools also notes that people often have a commitment to a principle; they become a part of a group, diminishing purely self interest motives. Such people are no longer acting rationally as individuals but together as a group. For instance, if all your friends are political enthusiasts it may be expected of you to vote to prevent becoming socially excluded from them. There is also a possible social stigma attached to the idea of not voting: disenfranchisement associates itself with the imprisoned, the insane and legal “aliens”. So, as David Collard wrote in Altruism and Economy, human beings are not entirely selfish even in their economic dealings.
These ideas also link on to the work of Schumpeter and his theory of path dependency. He believed people do not go as far as to weigh up the costs of voting, instead simply acting as they have always done. For example, someone who has voted Labour for the past forty years will continue to do so as they are path dependent. It could also be the case that they only took on the cost of voting once, forty years ago. Thus, with information costs spread out, the benefits of voting will now easily outweigh the negatives. However, an important issue to remember in this analysis is that a political party evolves over time so that the information could well become outdated, leading to mistakes.
It must also be noted that in certain countries the act of voting brings with it great private benefit. In Greece, law states citizens must return to their birthplace at election time. Although this has its economic implications, they have the opportunity to visit friends and family. In Belgium compulsory voting makes the costs of not voting substantially higher than if they abstained, turning the electoral process into an economically rational decision.
The will always be disagreement over whether it is in fact rational to vote. However, I believe that the limitations of Downs’ Homo Economicus are too great to apply to the real world without further analysis of non-political rational thinking. If people were solely concerned with short-term personal economic gain nobody would ever vote; therefore we must look also to other explanations of motivation for human behaviour such as altruism and human dignity. As Downs’ says in reality men are not always selfish, even in politics. They frequently do what appears to be individually irrational because they believe it to be socially rational.
Bibliography
Mansbridge, J. The Rise and Fall of Self-Interest in the Explanation of Political Life in Beyond Self Interest
Downs, A. An Economic Theory of Democracy
Barry, B. Political Participation as Rational Action in Democracy A Reader
Weingast, B. Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives in A New Handbook of Political Science
Class and Lecture Notes