Actors and citizens exist within boundaries of laws, constitutions, habits, formalised understandings, traditions and rules. Thus, the argument is that institutions ‘structure the behaviour of individuals’ (Peters 1999, p.3)
Hence, structure is important, as it seemed to determine the behaviour of actors.
By their very nature, institutions can and do exclude ‘other’ interests from the realm of public policy making. Additionally, they may also include those interests that ‘fall in’ with the ‘structure’.
Moreover, State power is allocated via institutions and institutional actors. Thus their influence on the rights of the ordinary citizen is an important one.
Within Institutionalism, history and the past as a frame of reference plays a crucial role. It serves to explain future actions, as these actions are ‘locked in’ as preferences right from the outset. The main assertion is that future choices are in many ways predetermined by the actions and activity of the past. Riker, (1982) describes these future choices as ‘congealed preferences’, indicating that future policy action is derived from earlier policy choices.
Due to this persistent nature of initial policy choices, institutions are consequently said to be ‘path dependent’ (Krasner, 1984)
In interpreting the nature and importance of institutions, it is useful to consider their impact on the political sphere. This essay has elected to discuss three examples in analysing the role of institutions:
{i} Electoral Systems
{ii} Presidential versus Parliamentary Systems
{iii} Bureaucratic politics
{i} Arend Lijphart (Democracies 1984) has contributed certain key ideas in the studies of political democracies and electoral systems. The aim has been to examine the effectiveness of majoritarian systems, in contrast with more consensual systems. Parliamentary majority versus Proportional Representation. A good example will be the UK (Westminster) model in contrast with say, the Netherlands, which operates a system of coalition.
The affirmation that consensual government is more cooperative is true. This is because the adversarial approach of majoritarian governments often delivers populist policy choices. This does not necessarily mean ‘proper’ policy choices, as in most cases, it is tied to amassing the most amount of electoral votes. For example, in economic policy ‘boom & bust’ economic management ensued in the UK for most of the sixties and seventies. The is allied to the ‘STOP – GO’ economic management style of various governments in the UK. At election time, and with the motivation to secure majority votes, it is not unusual for governments to propose ‘soft’ policies. An example will be to relax Tax regimes and thus influence the electorate’s access to disposable income. The majority government is elected, and the electorate, with more money in their pocket, goes off spending. ‘Boom’ ensues. Accelerated spending creates inflationary pressures in the economy and growth is stifled. ‘Bust’ ensues. Although this is a somewhat simplified account, it necessarily follows that majoritarian institutions influence greatly the effectiveness of governance in many democracies. A single view of good policy is often delivered. It is true that consensus coalition regimes involve negotiations and trade offs between effectiveness and representation, as a consequence of coalition formation. Nevertheless it is also very true that a more representative view of policy is commonly adopted.
{ii} The role of institutions under Presidential and Parliamentary governments is a fascinating one. Weaver & Rockman, in Do Institutions Matter (1993) consider the impact of institutions under these two regimes. They essentially argue that systems with strong parties, strong executives – Parliamentary regimes, and those with weak parties, weak executives – Presidential regimes both show that institutional arrangements have a key influence on the determination of policy. There are, what are known as veto points in the political system, as a direct consequence of the impact of institutions. These veto points allow interferences in policy formation by groups often outside the main policy formation process. By way of example, the UK Parliament as the executive and legislature, carries enormous power. Parliament is indeed supreme. However, there are occasional examples where a small, determined group has been able to utilise the institutional set up to advance or protect certain ideas, to its advantage. In effect, to veto the process. One can refer to the issue of fox hunting as a demonstrable example. The legislation to ban fox hunting, after many years and attempts, has still not been settled, in spite of the strength of government majority. The fox hunting lobby has been steadfastly determined and it seems, succeeded, in preventing the full legislation to be enacted against fox hunting. Parliament’s supremacy has not prevented the use of the ‘veto.’
On first sight, it might seem plausible to argue that veto points are present in all regimes, all countries, all sectors. However, on closer inspection, there are significant and substantial dissimilarities across regimes, countries, regions, sectors and levels within sectors. Additionally, there are differences in cultural, political and socio-economic approaches. Whilst it may be possible to point out certain influences or impacts, the problem exists that a vast majority of factors are involved. Hence Weaver, Feigenbaum and Samuels (1993) acknowledge that in comparing energy policies across USA, France, Germany Japan and Canada, it is very difficult to demonstrate variations, as far as policy is concerned. Although, it is possible to note the impact of federalist structures and constitutional courts.
{iii} Graham Allison, writing in ‘Essence of Decision’ (1971) studies the impact of institutions on decision making in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. In this very event which brought the world to the edge of Nuclear war, Allison observed that far from an ordered process, institutions, in this case government bureaus, operated as highly disjointed entities. Each bureaucracy fighting for its view, and for its voice, plus interests to be heard. The conclusion is that Policy output and outcome therefore, is a direct result of this combative process, according to the Bureaucratic Politics approach.
Despite Allison’s important contribution, it is sensible to consider whether such a complex event can be simplified as such. These were complex circumstances in a very complex event.
LIMITATIONS
The existence of social networks and their success at having an involvement in policy formation is important. This represents the most relevant threat to the basic assumption that formalised institutions are all important. It substantially weakens the institutionalist position, as these interest groups do often achieve their aims and interests without recourse to the formal arrangements that exist.
Taking France as an example, the relations between the central bodies and local ‘mairie’ is an interesting one. Adopted central policies have often reflected the wishes of the local, influential bodies. The informally arranged relationships at the local and regional level frequently inform policy decisions, far more than formalised tiers of central governance.
Institutions are engaged in formal rules and arrangements. They best serve the purposes of explaining the structure of policy. However, the basic issue is that such an approach fails to explain changes in policy. Its focus is fairly static, as it concentrates on formalities and ignores behaviour of actors.
Another factor that weakens the position of institutionalism is Society itself. Institutionalists would have us believe that Institutions exist in a vacuum, structured and obedient to rules. Far from it. Institutions are a core fabric of society where Political and social conditions effect policy change and variation, not just formal institutional arrangements alone. Furthermore, institutional actors themselves are influenced politically. They do no operate entirely independently. Thus they can influence how institutions operate and how rules are made.
Institutionalism normalises variations in Policy sectors. That is to say that sectoral differences are simplified within institutional approaches.
It fails to recognise the complexities within sectors. When it is applied cross sectorally and across borders, institutional approach to defining policy formation struggles.
NEW INSTTITUTIONALISM
The first part of the twentieth century was concerned with the institutionalist approach. The post war period saw a rejection of this traditional institutionalism. Its limitations in embracing a humanist perspective brought about Behaviouralism and Rational Choice centre-stage. The new theorems had their emphasis on the individual. The actor himself, is seen as having the ability to respond autonomously, through socio-psychological reasoning and rational calculation. This was a key paradigm shift, from an institutional focus.
In the latter part of the century, namely the 1980’s onwards there was a return to institutional focus. However. this time the theories of the behavioural and rational choice approach also formed a background to reassessing institutionalism. It was therefore a move towards a different approach, and not merely a shift to the status quo ante.
This was characterised by the following branches :
Historical, Sociological and Rational Choice.
March and Olsen argued for this multi-faceted approach. Incorporating the Sociological context was necessary. The contention is that values and culture account for a great deal in policy making. This means that public policy actors take into account a ‘ logic of appropriateness’ in shaping policy. (March and Olsen, 1984)
Peter Hall examines how ideas come to the surface within the arena of institutions. He is able to delineate the importance of ideas in the development of policy. The notion really is that more important changes in policy involve equally important shifts in ideas.
He cites the shift from Keynesian approaches to Monetarism in the UK, from the 1970s to the late 1980s as empirical support. (Hall, 1992)
However what one ends up with is a new approach far too broad that it makes it difficult to clearly define institutions.
IN CLOSING
In outlining the institutional view of Public policy making, this essay has attempted to clarify the various approaches that exist. It has explained the chronological leap from Traditional Institutionalism, through behavioralism and rational choice, ending with New Institutionalism.
It has argued that institutions are essential in policy formation. It has suggested that public policy does not lend itself to a singular approach in in analysing the formation of policy.
It acknowledges that Institutions have an impact on policy outcomes, but struggle to explain policy change.
The more advanced form of Institutionalism though helpful, has created a field of study that is difficult to encapsulate due to the variety of ‘new’ approaches.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
John, P. (1998) Analysing Public Policy. London, Continuum
Peters, B. G (1999) Institutional Theory in Political Science. London, Continuum
Parsons, W. (1995) Public Policy UK, Edward Elgar
Nagel
Wildavsky, A. (1979) Speaking Truth To Power. Boston, Little Brown
Allison, G. (1971) The Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston, Little Brown
Lijphart, A. (1984) Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries. New Haven, Yale
Weaver, R. K and Rockman, B.A (1993) O Institutions Matter? Washington Brookings Institution
March, J.G and Olsen, J.P (1984) Rediscovering Institutions New York Free Press
Riker, W. (1982) liberalism Against Populism Prospect Waveland Press
Hall, P. (1992) The Movement From Keynesianism to Monetarism Cambridge, University Press
Krasner, S. (1984 Approaches to the State Comparative Politics
