Responsibility of ministers to Parliament

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Public Law                                                                                                                                     17/02/2005

Responsibility of ministers to Parliament requires not only that ministers should explain their (and their departments) conduct to Parliament, but also that ministers be ordered to stop what they (or their departments) are doing (Tomkins)

Using relevant examples, critically assess the extent to which existing procedures enable Parliament to obtain an explanation of ministerial departmental conduct and if necessary force remedial action.

Scrutiny of the government and administration is done by; parliamentary questions, debates, select committees, national finance and scrutiny of the legislative function through standing committees. The overlap of the Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary defines the lack of a separation of powers in the United Kingdom. It is imperative in a democracy for the executive to be accountable to Parliament. This ensures the power balance is monitored and the rule of law is observed fairly. The term ‘ministerial departmental conduct’ encompasses the actions of both Ministers and their civil servants.  It is thus pertinent to delineate the Government’s distinction between minister’s accountability and responsibility to Parliament. After reading myriad interpretations of this distinction, my understanding is that ministers are responsible to Parliament for their actions and those of their departments, but not actually blameworthy, or in other words accountable, for the actions of their civil servants. The diametric between responsibility and accountability will be attacked and used to frame the critical discussion of the shortcomings of parliamentary questions and select committees. Setting historic inquiries against recent examples will illustrate that procedures have not evolved to become anymore effective in forcing remedial action in the form of resignations. The benchmark defining the necessary conditions for a minister’s resignation will also be looked at.

Ministers resign for three reasons. First, they are to blame for their errors. Second, they mislead Parliament. Third, they lose the support of their Prime Minister. The David Blunkett affair, which saw Blunkett investigated for abusing his ministerial position, is testament to Tony Blair being the ultimate decision maker in the process of a minister’s resignation. Similarly, The Scott Inquiry was conducted on behalf of the Prime Minister instead of for Parliament. Instead of ministerial accountability to Parliament, accountability to the Prime Minister is played out time and time again. The PM himself is further weakly accountable to Parliament. This circular system ultimately undermines all procedures designed to scrutinise the executive. Moreover, Sir Alan, the appointed head of the Blunkett inquiry, was Blair’s old treasury colleague. Here the circular principle of accountability is clearly played out.

Drawing on historical examples, neither Sir Thomas Dugdale’s resignation over the Crichel Down Affair in 1854, nor Lord Carrington’s resignation in 1982 were a result of their ‘vicarious liability’ for civil servants actions. It is necessary for ministers to reign when there is a serious departmental error owing to their ‘supervisory role’. This would give a firmer definition to the malleable concept of ministerial responsibility and accountability which would shed the “cloak for a lot of ministerial muddle and slip shoddery within department”. Maxwell Fyfe, following Crichel Down, categorised the minister relationship with his civil servant in relation to the minister’s responsibility to Parliament. He crucially neglected a conclusion over the obligation of ministers to resign for departmental errors. History thus sets no precedent to follow. The question of when resignation is necessary is very subjective and is steered by politics, and, to an increasing degree, the public reaction of the day.

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The issue of Ministers blaming their civil servants is central to the distinction between accountability and responsibility. Sir Allan’s report reiterated this point;

“I have not been able to determine whether Mr Blunkett gave any instructions in

relation to the case”

This leaves room for blame to be apportioned to his civil servants who become convenient scapegoats in the affair. The problem with separating accountability and responsibility is that it opens up a chasm where no-one is directly responsible to Parliament, even though a Minister remains responsible. Looking to the lessons of history, the Scott report ...

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