Born from the ashes that the Napoleonic Wars had left, the ‘great powers’ of Europe, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain, met at Vienna to create what has become known as the Concert of Europe. At the Congress of Vienna, the lands from which the defeated France was expelled were divided amongst the members and other states to achieve a relative balance, where no state was severely at loss to the others. More importantly, the borders of France were set to pre-Revolution positions, not carved up amongst the victors, which has so often happened after wars. Also, it is important to note that the Revolution in France had caused much concern amongst the leaders of the great powers. Having seen what happened in France, they were fearful of similar sentiments, liberty, equality, fraternity, may threaten there domestic positions. The framework of the Concert of Europe reflected these tensions. When the four great powers met at Vienna, their positions generally coincided. All were war-weary and fearful of revolution. It was agreed that France must never be allowed to become such a hegemonic force that it had previously, but also that no state should gain this position. It can be seen from this that the prerequisites of a collective security system were in place in 1814-15. There was an approximately equal diffusion of power amongst the four great powers and a general desire to maintain the existing geopolitical situation. Is it correct then to expect a collective security system to emerge from this situation? The answer would seem to be in the negative.
The Concert of Europe differed from collective security in respect to the principles previously stated. Universality, far from being accomplished by the system, was never attempted. Since the ‘great powers’ of Europe were the only ones with the necessary resources to threaten it, the smaller states were excluded as they offered the system no benefits in practice. However practical and sensible this decision by the great powers to exclude smaller states was, it is certainly incoherent with collective security theory. Also, it misses one of the potential benefits of collective security; that by involvement in the system, states growing in power can be socialised into the system desired by the great powers and discouraged from ever becoming a threat. Examples of such can be seen in the twentieth century. President Nixon visited China in the 1970s as he recognised it as an emerging power, which needed to be engaged, not excluded. Certainty, also one of the principles of collective security, was absent from the Concert of Europe. Although attempts by Tsar Alexander of Russia to create guarantees from the other great powers to agree to suppress revolutions within any states, as he believed this threatened his position of authority, gained some support, Great Britain never agreed. Russia, Prussia, and Austria formed the ‘Holy Alliance’, which accepted such intervention could be made in the name of maintaining the ruling elites and suppressing revolution. However, as Castlereagh, Britain’s foreign minister during the Congress of Vienna, stated;
We [Britain] shall be found in our place when actual danger menaces the system of Europe; but this country cannot, and will not, act upon speculative principles of precaution.
Exclusion of such a great power from the certainty principle once again shows how the Concert of Europe was at odds with the notion of collective security. While the Holy Alliance may have had such certainty, without Great Britain, which may have chosen to act against such intervention, it is of little value in a collective security sense. Also, this shows how even regarding the great powers, universality was not achieved in all parts of the system. In addition, and perhaps more fundamentally, the Congress at Vienna also created the ‘Quadruple Alliance” of all the four great powers. The primary purpose of this alliance was ensuring that France never again gained the necessary power to pose a threat to European peace. This clearly suggests that a balance-of-power logic was prevalent at the founding conference of the Concert of Europe.
In practice, as in principle, the Concert of Europe tended to act in way more consistent with balance-of-power theory. It could be seen as early as the Congress of Vienna, the starting point for the Concert of Europe. Following the defeat of Napoleon, the victors redrew the borders of Europe to the extent that none were overly happy, nor that any were grievously unhappy. The congress many times foundered on the position of Saxony, coveted by many other states. Eventually, agreement was reached, but one that maintained the equilibrium of European power. A further example of how European relations within the Concert of Europe remained to be viewed from a balance-of-power perspective can be found in the British perspective of the geopolitical landscape. As Castlereagh once again pointed out, “When the territorial Balance of Europe is disturbed, [Britain] can interfere with effect.” Another example of balance-of-power logic prevailing within the Concert is found with the British response to the secession of Belgium from Holland in 1830. Britain threatened war on France should it attempt to dominate the new country. Hardly collective security at work! Indeed, the focus of Britain’s policy in the Concert of Europe throughout the early nineteenth century, was the prevention of Russia from gaining the Dardanelles, and thus becoming a threat to British dominance of the Mediterranean Sea and most of its policies reflect this rather than a true desire for collective security.
Though the Concert of Europe has been shown not to conform to the principles of collective security, it did on occasion act in a collective way against aggression. Also, the Concert of Europe dealt relatively peacefully with questions, which if seen from a purely balance-of-power perspective may have resulted in great power conflict. It is clear that the great powers in the Concert of Europe did not act with only self-interest in mind, as a balance-of-power system would assume. Partly due to a mutual recognition that Europe needed a period of peace after so costly a war and that, the alliance between the great powers that defeated Napoleon’s France, created bonds between them that could be useful in peacetime. For all the great powers, international relations was no longer about the unrelenting pursuit of self-interest that characterises balance-of-power, but was concerned with general consensus, respect for other states, and self-restraint even when substantive gains were possible. The Holy Alliance, which has previously been mentioned, did operate between the three eastern powers of Austria, Prussia and Russia and, to a certain, degree had some success in maintaining peace through collective methods. This was done through mainly the personal efforts of the various states leaders of foreign ministers. Metternich, the representative of Austria, was particularly adept at uniting the three powers even when a purely balance-of-power situation would have led to its disintegration. Such an example can be seen in reference to the Ottoman Empire. Russia could have exploited the relative weakness of its Turkish neighbour, and surely would have done so if it acted rationally and in accordance with its own interests. It was the ‘Metternich system’ of linking the conservative ideologies of Russia, Prussia and Austria, which allowed him to urge the others, mostly Russia, to think of its international role in more collective terms.
The Concert of Europe also offered a significantly new method of conducting international relations. Whereas previously, the norm was for diplomacy to be bi-lateral, the Concert of Europe offered for the first time a system of multilateral diplomacy. While this may seem at first to have little to do with the concept of collective security, it can be seen as having an affect of institutionalising ideas such as cooperation of collective action. That the Concert of Europe offered this forum for cooperation cannot be taken lightly when considering its collective nature.
Given how the Concert of Europe has demonstrated both balance-of-power principles and some more collective ideology in practice, this system seems difficult to define. One such definition, however, is put up by Charles and Clifford Kupchan in their attempt to form an idea of collective security that departs from the ‘ideal’ version discussed above.
Concert collective security relies on a small group of major powers to guide the operation of… [The]…security structure. This design reflects power realities…while capturing the advantages offered by collective security.
Morris too argues that a concert system can be viewed as a variation of collective security. By compromising the principles of certainty and universality, Morris argues that concert-based systems can pursue the ends of collective security, but by different means. Indeed, the Concert of Europe, as was seen earlier, does conform to this ‘new’ version of collective security. This system was exclusive for the great powers of the time and did not conform to certainty or universality, yet it involved the cooperation and mutual action by these major powers when they believed it should, and only when none of the great powers were adversely affected. Thus, it may seem that the Concert of Europe acted as an “attenuated form of collective security.” However, this would be incorrect.
Collective security is based around changing the international system from a balance of power to a preponderance of power, all of which is amassed against any aggressor. As Wright states, “The fundamental assumptions of the two systems [concert and collective security] are different.” Although the ends which it sought and the cooperation generated amongst the major powers suggested a collective outlook, the situation in which this cooperation occurred was that of a balance which all sides wished to preserve. Once this wish disappeared, as it did with Russian expansionism in the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent Crimean War, so did the system in a workable form. Following the Crimean War, nationalist movements and further Russian expansionism in the Balkans, let to the gradual decline of Austria. In collective security doctrine, the Russian moves would have been opposed by all member states, yet they were not. The decline of Austria benefited both France and Prussia, and thus these nations did not severely oppose Russia.
This essay first laid out the basis of what collective security is; basically, a system of international relations which seeks to reject the balance of power in favour of a system whereby all states act to deter any aggressor. The principles stated previously in this essay show how this was thought to come about. The Concert of Europe developed from a balance between the victors of the Napoleonic Wars. The coalition that defeated France feared its rejuvenation and so formed the ‘Quadruple Alliance’. Furthermore the ‘Holy Alliance’ was set up to resist the threat perceived by domestic revolutions. The principles by which the Concert of Europe operated were firmly based on a balance of power. Yet, as this essay has shown, in practice the Concert of Europe often acted in a more collective way. With special regard to the efforts of Austria and Metternich, who managed on occasion to deter Russia from aggressive moves by appealing to conservative unity based around anti-revolutionary thought. Also, the Concert of Europe represented the first system of truly multilateral diplomacy, a key advance by which many organisations have benefited. While recognising these elements, the concept of a ‘Concert collective security’ system, advanced by Morris, Lipson, and the Kupchans, seems to hold little water when the principles of the two systems are based on antithetical ideas; balance of power and collective security (in its ‘ideal form). Also, it has been seen that when faced with issues considered to be of vital national interest, where two great powers differ, the Concert of Europe ceased to function effectively. Given this, only one conclusion can be reached. The Concert of Europe should not be viewed as an example of collective security, but neither as a purely balance of power mechanism. In its principles and practice, it was a product of its time and circumstance, one that should be viewed as an approach to international peace different to both collective security and balance of power.
Bibliography
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Exact dates are a subject of much speculation as the Concert lasted in name until 1914. However, as a workable system, it ended with the Crimean War.
Claude, I. L., Swords into Ploughshares (4th Edition), (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1984), p.247
Morris, J. & McCoubrey, H., Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, (The Hague, Kluwer, 2000) p.4
Sked, A. (ed.), Europe’s Balance of Power 1815-1848, (London, MacMillan, 1979), p.1
Kissinger, H., Diplomacy, (New York, Touchstone, 1994), p. 81-2
Elrod, R., The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System, (World Politics, vol.28, no.2, 1976), p.162
Elrod, R., op. cit., p.164
quoted from Kissinger, op. cit., p.88
Gulick, E.V., Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (Ithaca, Cornell UP, 1955), p.254-257
Ward, A. & Gooch, G. (ed.) The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, (New York, MacMillan, 1923), p.632 (emphasis added)
Kissinger, op. cit., p.97
Morris, International Organisations in Practice, Seminar discussion (2003)
Kissinger, op. cit., p.85
Kupchan, C. & Kupchan, C., Concerts and Collective Security, (International Security, Vol. 16, No 1, 1991), p.120
Morris & McCoubrey, op. cit., p.13
It is fair to call this variation new as no evidence is to found that Woodrow Wilson or Inis Claude, two of the main proponents of collective security, never mentioned a ‘concert’ form. This development has only emerged since the end of the Cold-war.
Mearsheimer, J., The False Promise of International Institutions, (International Security, vol.19, no.4, 1995), pp.47-48
Betts, R., Systems for Peace or Causes of War?, (International Security vol.17, no.1, 1992), p.27
Wright, Q., A Study of War, Vol. 2, (Chicago, Chicago UP, 1942), p.781