Should we seek to confirm or falsify a scientific theory?

In order to debate whether one should seek to confirm or falsify scientific theory, one must first approach the question of what science actually is. The question is comprehensible enough, but the answer is far less clear. Our life and our thinking are so dominated by science, we have so much faith in science, and we refer so much of our education and our problems to people called scientists or technicians, that anyone would assume we have a clear idea about what this powerful thing is that stands at the centre of our culture. However despite the fundamental role science has in our lives, there is a lot of confusion by what we actually mean by the term. There seems to be a general assumption that we all know more or less what science is, and the few things that we might not quite understand are all taken care of by a consensus of experts or academic philosophers with time on their hands Many of most important social and political decisions involve scientific questions, we are constantly being asked to evaluate scientific studies of particular issues, and repeatedly we are required to think about imposing limitations on science (or at least the technological implications of science). In one way or another, an understanding of science appears central to the exercise of our political responsibilities.

Perhaps a starting point when seeking to define the concept of science and scientific theory means of understanding certain problems; science, they would claim, is characterized by a set procedure called, appropriately enough, the scientific method .And to the extent that one applies this method rigorously, one is doing science, thinking scientifically, being a scientist. One has the general idea that scientists engage in the business of carrying out measurements, collecting data, conducting experiments. According to Avner Offer (2003) science can be seen as ‘a norm for secure knowledge, an attempt to establish validity on logical foundations and a century’s quest for objectivity’

Once an amount of quantifiable information has been collected, the process of science constructs a theory to account for the problem under investigation. On the basis of that theory, certain predictions are made, which are tested. To be scientific is thus pre-eminently to concern oneself with the objective search for quantifiable information about something, constructing theories on the basis of that information, and then testing the theories with further experiments, and thus refining an understanding of the world with knowledge free of the biases and subjective uncertainties of other forms of knowledge. However this analysis of science can be seen as very .insufficient. Nobody can set out to gather data, make measurements, conduct experiments, and so on, until she is clear about what she is looking for, about what counts as evidence and what does not, about what to include in the data and what to exclude. Besides all the statistics that are gathered would be merely data, therefore some of theory must be constructed in advance so we can put meaning to the statistics, so informative conclusions can be brought out of what would otherwise be meaningless data.

Many think that science can be overly simplified if it is just seen as fact gathering so it becomes constantly challenged by those who want to falsify certain theories Science begins with the development of a theory which contains in itself a means of being confirmed (i.e., tested). The major work of science involves subjecting such theories to rigorous and repeated testing, by making predictions based upon the theory and then conducting experiments or field work to see if these predictions do, in fact, take place. If they do not, then the theory has been falsified. It must be modified, recast, or abandoned, and the process begins again. Science, thus, is not so much a means of discovering the truth as it is a means of removing error, and its conclusions, the statements which survive repeated testing, have a progressive character, that is, we become increasingly certain that they are not false and they become increasingly sophisticated and secure and, perhaps, closer approximations to the truth of nature, so long as they have not been falsified. Now, this view has much to recommend it. In the first place, it emphasizes a crucial point: science concerns itself only with claims about the world which can, in fact, be checked independently and objectively (i.e., by experiment, measurement, and objective fact gathering). Any statement which cannot be so checked does not constitute a scientific statement and therefore is excluded from the enquiry. But this account generates no predictions which can be tested to confirm it independently by any form of experiment or measurement, and hence wider implications of and justifications for the activity.

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The philosopher Karl Popper rejects the whole orthodox view of scientific method and begins his solution by pointing to a logical asymmetry between verification and falsification. The main demarcation criterion associated with Popper is falsifiability - in order to be scientific, a hypothesis should be falsifiable - it should make predictions that can be tested by observation or experiment. By tested, Popper meant some of its predictions must be such that, at least in principle, the contrary could be observed. This was his primary demarcation criterion and was seen by him as very important. On this basis, for example, he criticised the various schools of psychiatric thought because each could accommodate all observations. As a result the ideas did not compete with one another and attempts to distinguish them could not be informative. This test separates the hypotheses inherent in an act of faith - religion for example - from a scientific hypothesis. The statement, "God created the heavens and the earth," cannot be contradicted by observation. Therefore, Popper would not see it as a scientific hypothesis, whether or not it is believed true.

The idea is that only models which can, in principle, be falsified are scientific - others need not be considered. It is useful to view this assertion from a different perspective. Popper is saying that, to be meaningful, a scientific theory must deny something. The idea must prohibit some observations from being made; this is extremely important, because Popper's logic is purely negative, it asserts that the actual meaning of a theory lies not in what it asserts about the universe but what it denies. Bryan Magee (1978, p. 26) suggests ‘we are in a position to see why it is inherent in Poppers view that we call our knowledge of its nature provisional, and permanently so. At no stage are we able to prove that what we now ‘know’ is true, and it is always possible that it will turn out to be false’. One only has to look through history to see the truth in this statement- there have been very many times when we have thought we have scientifically proved something only to have it disproved at a later date.

One can express Popper’s theory in terms of the logic of statements: although no number of observation statements reporting observations of white swans allows us logically to derive the universal statement that ‘All swans are white’, one single observation of a black swan allows us logically to derive the statement ‘Not all swans are white’.’ In this important logical sense empirical generalisations, though not verifiable, are falsifiable (Bryan Magee 1978 p.22). Popper sought to distinguish between the logic of this situation and the implied methodology. The logic is simple: if a single black swan has been observed then it simply cannot be the case that all swans are white. In logic therefore a scientific law is conclusively falsifiable although it is not conclusively verifiable. Popper recognises the fact that in practice it is always possible to doubt a statement- there may have been an error in the reported observation; the bird in question may have been falsely identified or perhaps due to the fact the bird is a different colour we may decided not to categorise it as a swan but as something else. This means it is always possible to question the validity of a observation statement and we could reject all falsifying experiences but since conclusive falsification is unattainable at the methodological level, it is a mistake to ask for it (Bryan Magee 1978 p.22).

Popper proposes a methodology, that we do not systematically evade refution (whether by making predictions and definitions, or by always refusing to accept the reliability of inconvenient experimental results, or by any other such device; and that we can formulate our theories as unambiguously as we can, so as to expose them as clearly as we can to refutation.

Popper himself states that ‘The philosophy of conventionalism deserves great credit for the way it has helped to clarify the relations between theory and experiment’ but he also suggests that conventionalism is ‘self contained and attempts to defect inconsistencies in it are not likely to succeed’ (Popper eds. David Miller 1983 p.144)

However, Popper’s view has caused debate itself over the years. The work of Popper’s one time student Imre Lakotas illustrates the disagreements about the theory. Lakatos’ interpretation and modification of Popperian themes are crucial contributions to the demarcation problem. Lakotas can be said to elaborate on Popperain theory. Lakotas perspective on the philosophy of science generally and the demarcation problem is known as the methodology of research programme. In his own words this “account implies a new criterion of demarcation between mature science, consisting of research programmes, and immature science, consisting of a mere patched up pattern of trial and error”. Lakotas maintains that a scientific elite makes evaluations of particular claims, research programs and so on as a matter of course. Popper’s work can be seen as primarily an analysis of logical relationships between propositions, Lakatos’ criterion allows for the consideration of temporal factors in the assessment of “relative progressiveness” (Charles Alan Taylor 1996 p.32).

Charles Alan Taylor (1996 p.30) argues that ‘Popper’s falsification cannot begin to account for the “true” nature of science insofar as he recognises that a strict application of his demarcation criterion would, by necessity, exclude all forms of scientific practice. It could be argued that this is evidence no criterion is possible and that we should abandon Popper’s and everyone else’s search for one or perhaps just make more pragmatic our standards for a reasonable criterion’. One could also suggest that falsification cannot be applied in or accommodated to the vagaries of scientific enterprise- such a non-empirical perspective leaves falsification as R.Nola, puts it “untrammelled by actual science” (1987, p.458).

Critics of Poppers work argue that replacing the need to justify our beliefs on what can be proved, with the concept of falsifiability and acting on theories that have not yet been proved to be false, is not satisfactory as a rational philosophy to live by. Whatever Popper calls it there is only a verbal difference between regarding it as rational to retain and act upon those theories that have survived testing and regarding those theories as in some sense confirmed. If they are not confirmed in some sense, how can it be rational to act on them?

Another point is that Popper fails to take account the way in which observations and measurements are themselves impregnated with prevailing concepts and expectations. This has been expressed by Thomas Kuhn. If one is trying to establish whether we should seek to confirm or falsify scientific theory, it is imperative to consider the works of Thomas Kuhn.

In his book 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' Kuhn argues that scientists work within the background of an unquestioned theory or set of beliefs which he calls a paradigm. This paradigm encapsulates the current basic ideas about the subject matter, determines the methods of research to be used and organises the form under which the data under investigation are viewed. Thus the paradigm determines the perception of scientific results. Sometimes a paradigm is challenged by a different set of beliefs and at these points of crisis where one paradigm is set against another; Kuhn's central claim is that there is no strictly logical reason for selecting one over another. This is because the paradigm determines the data being dealt with, so there is no paradigm-independent observation on which genuine comparisons can be based.

Paul Feyerabend [1970 p. 342] stirred things even more by arguing that there was no such thing as the Scientific Method, either, something Kuhn held to exist in a more philosophical sense. Feyerabend argued that method was restricted to small subdisciplines, and that at any point any scientists could bring in anything from astrology to numerology if it helped. He even cheered on early recent creationism. This was the extreme end of the 'science is what scientists do' approach. Feyerabend wanted scientists to do anything they wanted, and call it science. Feyerabend (1987 p. 42) argues that the attempt to find a universal truth (a universal way of finding truth) has led to disasters in the social domain and to empty formalism combined with never –to-be fulfilled promises in the natural sciences.

In one sense the critics of Popper’s view of science are correct: Popper’s view of science does

not do a good job of solving the problems that these critics think must be solved. Most of his

critics insist that any good philosopher of science must be able to provide criteria by which good theories can be distinguished from bad theories › that is, it must solve the problem of theory choice (Tarascio and Caldwell 1979 p.983). The root of the issue is the common view that anyone who discusses the philosophy of science must be promoting their form of a ‘scientific method’ and claiming that, if properly followed, their method will always produce scientifically acceptable results. For some people, the scientific method is needed in order to specify conventional criteria by which one would rationally choose the best theory from a list of competitors. For others it is a means of justifying or verifying the truth of one’s prior beliefs. So in a sense in depends on the kind of experiment you are embarking on.

Popper’s well-known work clearly shows, he is not promoting or recommending a particular scientific method. ‘Should anybody think of scientific method ... as a way of justifying scientific results, he will also be disappointed. A scientific result cannot be justified. It can only be criticized, and tested’ (Karl Popper 1961/72, p. 265).

In conclusion both confirmation and falsification in scientific theory have their advantages. If one seeks to confirm something they can set up experiments and actively look for what they want to find out. It involves testing and implies truth. However, this method can be said to be subjective and fallible and observation is not independent of theory and some another problem is that of ‘Over determination’ of facts by theory- more than one theory can explain the same observations (Avner 2003). Falsification tries to make scientific theory less subjective by suggesting scientists should not seek to confirm their theories but falsify them- in this essay we have looked at Popper’s definition of falsification and the fact that he views confirmed theory not as truth but as merely conjecture. However, falsification also has its problems as facts do not select theories (under-determination) and observation itself is fallible so it cannot reject theories absolutely (Avner 2003). It seems to be impossible to favour one theory over another as they both have strengths so logically I think whether one chooses to confirm or falsify scientific theory depends on the individual and the nature of the scientific experiment.

References:

Feyerabend, PK: [1970]. ‘Consolations for the Specialist. In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge’, p.342, eds I Lakatos and I Musgrave, Cambridge University Press,

Feyerabend, PK (1987) taken from Taylor, Charles Alan [1996], Defining Science: A Rhetoric of Demarcation, p.42, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Magee, Bryan [1974]. ‘Popper’, p.22, The Woburn Press: London.

Miller, David [1983] A Pocket Popper, p.144,Oxford: University Press.

Nola, R. [1987] The Status of Popper’s theory of Scientific method. British journal for the Philosophy of Science, p.458.

Offer, Anver [2003], The Pursuit of Objectivity: Philosophers of Science, University of Oxford retrieved on 12/01/04 from http://www.history.ox.ac.uk/ecohist/pdf/203lecpdf/lec/pdf.

Popper, Karl [1961/72] ‘Evolution and the Tree of Knowledge’ reprinted in Objective

Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, p.265, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tarascio, Vincent and Bruce Caldwell [1979] ‘Theory Choice in Economics: Philosophy and

Practice’, p.93 8,Journal of Economics Issues, 13,

Taylor, Charles Alan [1996], Defining Science: A Rhetoric of Demarcation, p.30-32, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.