That which we value most about ourselves is proposed by Harris as the concept of rationality and self-awareness in a time frame. The fact that as persons we can indeed value our own existence and justify this, and want to go on living is said to be the thing that makes us valuable over other entities. Such value is said to be species neutral but complex language such as ours seems to be definite proof of this value. In our case of mother and child the only person valued as described here was the mother before she became ill. Upon her [brain] death, she ceased to be a person losing her entitlement to full human status or human rights. Her child has never been a person so there should be no great loss if it does not survive. It retains at present however, the capacity to become a person.
The obvious drawback of Harris’ previous explanation is the analogy placed on a viable foetus and a neonate. If the viable foetus is not a person due to its lack of mental capacity, it follows that the neonate, and some mentally disabled human beings, are not persons as they lack the capacity to value their existence. Instrumental killing of a person is wrong and amounts to murder but where is the line between a non person and a person? Presumably here, the moral status of the person and the rights they are due should develop at the same rate as biological development. In answer to this Harris points that we should err on the side of caution when attempting to define a position when personhood is reached. Infanticide is therefore morally permissible since the neonate lacks consciousness? Warren accounts for infanticide that it is not the same as murder but the act would require a strong moral justification, such as to defend one’s own life and physical integrity. Such an act could never be justified since there are always adequate measures to care for unwanted infants who are valued to an extent by society. Killing such creatures as does killing say chimpanzees would require a justification. Her argument here is unsound since there is a justification to kill these higher animals. Killing infants as non persons for research or organ donation is therefore justified to benefit a greater number of persons.
The argument against allowing such activities by law is answered by Feinberg as the social utility of the protection of neonates by society even though they have no right to life per se. Here the effect on society of allowing infanticide would be so great, because the surviving children (being non persons we intended to keep) would be worse off when they do eventually become persons. The fact that they would have been seen differently and consequently been treated differently would have a negative effect on their later personality. The effect on persons already present in society would also be negative if neonates we intend to discard are allowed to be killed (as foetuses are now). Marquis argues that the explanation of treating the infants we intend to keep with care is analogous to killing the infants we tend to discard. I would argue this was not the case since Feinberg’s explanation also accounted for undesired neonates, that they should be protected for the good of the rest of society. It does however raise the point that since we do kill the foetuses we intend to discard, is it a simple fact of out of sight, out of mind?
If a foetus is valued from the moment of conception or after 14 days, it would be wrong to kill this foetus even if the woman was raped. The foetus would still hold a value and it would be wrong to kill it simply because the way it was conceived was wrong. Here, we would never say the death of a neonate is morally acceptable, so it follows the death of the foetus is not acceptable. The right to life should then outweigh the right to the full use of ones own body. The right for a woman to use her own body is then said not to be the right to allow her to end someone else’s life.
Looking at abortion more generally, the point is often raised that the woman has control over her body to do whatever she wishes. The analogy used by Thompson states that if someone was kidnapped and awoke with a violinist attached to them for the sole use of keeping this violinist alive, the person would not be morally responsible for the violinist and moreover for his death if they decided to sever the connection. Harris points out that this is not the case. Ownership does not entitle full usage of the artefact by using the example of owning a valued painting. Destroying it on a whim would be a wrong, even if legally sound, since it would be valued by others and not owned by them. Foetuses are valued by some members of society and destroying them would then be a wrong. The mother can however do what she likes with her property (the foetus) if it can be claimed there is no value in it, or less value in the foetus than the reason for killing it. The right to chose is said to be because the moral reasons for ending the life of the foetus are greater than those for keeping it alive – not because of ownership. Before Sarah’s illness she could therefore have aborted the foetus for her own wishes that it not live in her body. For the same reason she could have removed head lice since both creatures have no value. Her wishes are now no longer an issue.
It seems appropriate that if all the necessary precautions are taken and the woman still becomes pregnant, she cannot be forced to carry her baby, perhaps she is selfish in not allowing the foetus to use her body for the nine months as explained by Thompson but she still retains the right to refuse to have the child – not because of ownership, more the fact the foetus is not a person.
If our case foetus was indeed a person of some description with rights, Sarah has died losing all her rights to or not to carry this child. The rights then would be all in favour of the foetus and every effort should be made to ensure its survival.
The main argument of the foetus as a person is on potentiality. The anti- abortionist or pro lifer is not overly concerned with the fact of personhood but more the person the foetus will or could be. Analogies against such thought include Tooley’s kitten, which has the right not to be tortured but no right to life as it has no concept of self – the desire not to suffer pain is not essential with a concept of the continuing self. On administration of this wonder drug, such kittens would be entitled to the same protection of adults assuming potentiality is important. It is stated firstly that since the drug exists, every kitten is a potential person and as such would be entitled to some morality, except, ‘the possibility of transforming kittens into persons will not make it any more wrong to kill kittens than it is now’. Further it would not be wrong to halt the progression of kittens that had this drug administered accidentally. Harris’ idea of potentiality states we should respect human precursors as far back as the sperm and the egg which are also potential humans; potential voters do not have the right to vote.
Don Marquis claims that the right to life is something all humans should have, regardless of age. As we have already seen however, it is only persons who have the right to life – a category all foetuses fall out of. Marquis’ account of the value of human existence over other animals differs from that of personhood. Having a ‘future like ours’, means humans are valued for having a future allowing them to experience all the goodness in their life or the goods that life has to give them, such as friendships, pleasures or pursuit of goals. Marquis states that it is wrong to kill an adult human being, not simply because they are a conscious being, but because it denies them of the future goods of their consciousness. Further, it is not necessarily the fact that I value my own life that makes it important, more ‘those aspects of my future that I will (or would) value when I will (or would) experience them, whether I value them now or not’. That is, not the things I will come to value, not my present desire for my future goods (as my definition of values will change in the future), but that I will later experience something I will value at that time. The same applies to foetuses, who have no capacity for value. Since foetuses also have a future like ours, denying them of their future conscious goods is also a wrong. Before they are conceived, there is no individual to be killed; no future goods to be denied, so the potentiality objection is said to be invalid to this argument. Basically, what makes humans valuable is already present in the foetus (not its precursors) by this account. In the account of personhood, the value of a person comes later, sometime after birth.
The main problem I have with this account is that in situations where the pregnant mother’s life is at risk, the foetus would stand to lose more future conscious goods than the mother. In this case it would be feasible to kill the mother to save her child, allowing it some future goods which its mother has already had. If this point of view was upheld, all women who became pregnant would be worth less morally than their children. Society’s view of women could diminish further than it has ever done in the past to baby factories. The consequences of outlawing aborting in our present society are also obvious.
It seems the ‘personhood’ explanation has the most relevance to foetal value despite my preconceived ideas to the contrary. Without further convincing literature opposing this idea (which may be available), personhood therefore will serve as the reference to the rest of the essay.
Returning to the case, we have already seen that Sarah has lost her personhood and is morally dead. Her unborn child remains alive, however it is not a person. Allowing it to die would be morally acceptable since we are not denying it the life it values (since it cannot value anything). Allowing it to suffer unnecessary pain before its death would be wrong and cruel as torturing animals is wrong and cruel.
Sarah died supposedly without advance directives as to the treatment of her baby. The right thing to do would be to allow her family to make the decision about the fate of the child. Intervention of the law or healthcare system would be wrong here if the family wished the baby not to live. As we have already seen, the foetus has no right to life. If it was delivered at the request of the law or the medical team and survived, it would acquire a right to life and protection by the law. Its future would then be speculative, either ultimately ending up with the family (after a change of heart) or ending up in care or adoption. None of these possible existences are more or less worth while than the others since the child would be able to value its existence. The psychological suffering that may be caused to the child as a result of its birth circumstances would probably not be great enough to warrant its non-existence. It would be valuable.
If we now return to the hospital, the foetus presently has no value and is therefore unimportant in the debate. The family has been advised of their options. Despite their distress it is made absolutely clear they understand the implications of their options. If they chose to allow the baby to die in utero, nothing of value has been lost. Should the law or medical team go against their wishes the distress caused to the family would be greater than that of losing something of no value. Here we are faced with the fact that the value of the child once born (or once a person) would be greater than the distress caused to the family. Since that person would never have existed at the request of the family, and as potentiality holds no value, the decision of the family should be respected above others. The value other people in society hold on the foetus is also less than that of the relatives wishes.
The consequences of such actions should also be noted. If medical teams persistently went against familyies wishes regarding end of life or any treatment, and without a valid ethical reasoning, trust and cooperation with such teams would diminish.
Another valid reason for not allowing the foetus to live would be the high likelihood of disability or brain damage, in this case it would be difficult to adopt and may rely on state care. If it did live however, it would and should be entitled to state care if the disability was severe. Allowing it to die because it may have a disability is no less moral than allowing it to die because it was not wanted, since it has no value. Disabled persons present in society are valuable because they can value. Disabled non-persons are not valuable in this way but may be valued by a relative. Again it is social utility which should afford their protection as it does to neonates.
The second option is that the family choose to have the child. When told Sarah was brain dead they requested the child to be delivered immediately ‘to get it over and done with’. The status of the foetus has now changed whether it is to be brought up by the family or to allow someone else to bring it up. It is valued as much as to allow it to live over allowing it to die. This means allowing it to reach personhood. The foetus may have an infection or other condition causing brain damage and it may not survive the procedure. In this case nothing of value has been lost. Since it is impossible to tell if the foetus is brain damaged, it should be treated as if healthy, to be cautious. This is because in allowing the foetus to live, it is likely it will one day be a person who can value his own existence. This person may be disabled or have brain damage as a result of the natural circumstances of his birth. If we assume he can still value his own existence, although unfortunate, no wrong would have been done to him. If however after deciding to keep the foetus alive and it was not treated in such a way as to maximise its chances of health, once a person, he would have been wronged by the lack of adequate treatment given to him, which caused his disability. If the foetus survives but never develops in to a person as its brain damage is so severe, no wrong has been done to it since it never has had, and never will have the same value as a person.
In the instance of the family requesting the foetus survive and the right treatment being to maximise the health of the foetus, the foetus must stay inside Sarah for as long as possible. Sarah should also be moved to the county hospital to enable a safer delivery in case her heart was to suddenly stop. The family are therefore left with a choice of allowing the foetus to live inside Sarah until it is born or allow both Sarah and the foetus to die. It would be acceptable for the family to chose the former option, and change their mind until delivery.
In discussing the foetus in relation to the family we have been missing out one of the most important points; that the father of the child is not mentioned.. Every effort should be made to find his opinion and it is wrong for Sarah’s family not to consult him.. The case of …. It seems the rights of parenthood are equal, since the embryo exists outside the body. Once implanted in a woman only her choice can be upheld. Going against this would presumably involve an assault or some form of confinement. Since Sarah now has no rights it is up to the father of the child to make the decision. Should he chose to allow the foetus to die, nothing of value has been lost, whether it is not wanted for the sake of the responsibility, or the possibility of disability or any other reason – any is valid. This may cause distress to the rest of Sarah’s family but the rights of the parent are no different here than for example a mother terminating her child despite her families wishes to the contrary. The fact that they may want the child to remind them of Sarah does not outweigh the right of the parent to or not to have his child.
The father’s decision may be to keep the child, I which case Sarah should be ventilated as long as possible. This may of course distress Sarah’s family but that distress and right to control the body of their daughter does not outweigh the right of the father to have his child to be born as healthy as possible. The rights of a parent over their living child are surely greater than the rights of a parent over their dead child.
I began the essay with a preconception that I would be able to prove the child should be born, and be kept inside the mother as long as possible. Despite my best efforts to protect the life of the foetus in this case I was unable to find an argument that was sound enough to support the value of the foetus over the value of the family, more accurately the father.
The main problems I had in the research of this essay were reading the different opinions and analogies in the different essays I read. Most of them made sense and seemed to convince me over previous ones. Most applied their own rules but it eventually came to the fact that the foetus was either as valued as a person or not. If it was not valued, it could be allowed to die such as an animal or a collection of cells. If it was valued it should be protected with the same rights as a person. I was unable to find an argument which could truly convince me of the latter, although I had hoped the potentiality argument could. The added dimension of the future person the foetus could be had to be added if it should live. This is different from potentiality which would be allowing the foetus to live because of what it could become. Harming the foetus would wrong it by bringing a person in to the world with a disability that could have been prevented.
The merit of coming to this sort of conclusion of the value of the foetus is that it can be used in any other scenario and provides a framework with which to work off. Other similar cases and even none related cases should therefore be answered without having to consider each case from each different angle.
‘Though shalt not kill but needs’t not strive officiously to keep alive’ Cited in Gillon, Raanan, Philosophical Medical Ethics, John Wiley & Sons on Behalf of the British Medical Journal, 1985, 1991. p.126
Veatch cited in The value of life 238
tooley, applied ethics 81 He proposes that there is a drug which can cause kittens to develop into self aware persons with the same potential as foetuses. On administration of this drug, such kittens would be entitled to the same protection of adults assuming potentiality is important.
avbortion is wrong? 86-87
I am pretty sure I got the analogy of harming future selves from a lecture by Prof. John Harris on Moral Philosophy. 22 October 2003, Room 3.10, Williamson Building, University of Manchester.
Two women who had undergone IVF requested permission to use the rest of their frozen embryos in order to have more children. Their former partners objected to this. Having withdrawn their consent for their embryos to be used the court found in favour of the fathers