The Commons no longer acts as a constraint on the executive.' Critically evaluate this claim made by Simon Jenkins in a recent commentary in The Times (8 December 2004, p.20) in the light of recent inquiries into the effectiveness of the House

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Elizabeth Wenzerul PO304

The Blair government, like it or loathe it, gets away with murder because the Commons no longer acts as a constraint on the executive.’ Critically evaluate this claim made by Simon Jenkins in a recent commentary in The Times (8 December 2004, p.20) in the light of recent inquiries into the effectiveness of the House of Commons as a legislative chamber.

Accountability has always played an important part in a democratic state. In the United Kingdom accountability has been upheld through democratic input at the ballot box and the checks and balances placed upon the Cabinet by Parliament. However, Simon Jenkins’ report in The Times, which seemed to be stimulated by the scandal involving the then Home Secretary David Blunkett, argued that the executive no longer felt constrained and that the ‘Government fixed its own system’. He was also quite adamant that in this day and age only the press could hold the executive to account. This essay aims to explore how the Commons can be used as a constraint on the executive, to what extent the Commons is used effectively in this way, what its limitations are, and how these limitations affect accountability in the United Kingdom. The two main sources I will be using, in order to assess the Commons’ current capabilities are: The House of Lords Paper 173, Parliament and the Legislative Process by the Select Committee in the Constitution 2003-04; and the Hansard Society, Parliament, Politics and Law Making: Issues and Developments in the Legislative Process, by Alex Brazier (2004).

        

The House of Commons consists of six hundred and fifty nine MPs (elected by the people), a speaker and three deputy speakers. Their meetings consist of ‘General debates, questions to and statements from ministers, (and) certain stages of legislation’. There are two types of committees where most of the work is done: standing committees and select committees. The standing committees examine the bills after their second reading and the select committees examine the wider issues which are at stake. In theory both of these types of committees should be able to influence amendments in legislation and therefore this should provide a constraint on the government.         However, Simon Jenkins obviously believes that recently this influence has been lost. One reason for this loss is the ever increasing amount of paper-work that passes through the House, “There are imperatives within Government which have encouraged a significant growth in the volume of legislation…. It is not only getting much bigger, it is arguably becoming more complex”. As a result, legislation is being inadequately scrutinised, hence the government can push through perhaps more contentious bills.

Although the increase in work load is a valid point, it is worth taking into account the amendments that Robin Cook introduced while he was Leader of the House. When the Labour government was voted into power in 1997 they were determined to make Parliament, ‘a more effective and efficient legislature’.  Parliamentary reform measures which were successfully passed in the Commons included: increased timetabling and the greater use of carry-over and pre-legislative scrutiny. These measures were consolidated under Peter Hain’s leadership of the House, and as stated in the Hansard Report, one former Commons clerk wrote, “The programme of modernisation instituted under Cook undoubtedly did more to strengthen Parliament than anything implemented before or since”.  Consequently, Simon Jenkins’ insinuation that the executive is ‘no longer’ constrained by the Commons seems unfounded as the New Labour government has done more to strengthen the power of the Commons than any other party before it.

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The Commons’ main function is the scrutiny of legislation. Pre-legislative scrutiny involves ‘the publication of Bills ahead of their introduction to Parliament’. This means that comments can be made before the measure is finalised and formally introduced and allows Parliamentary input ‘at a formative stage’. Therefore, the influence of the Commons can be felt in this early stage when ministers are more likely to be persuaded in the way of amendments. A good example of this is in the case of the joint committees on the Draft Communications Bill and the Draft Civil Contingencies Bill when the government accepted 120 ...

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