The International Politics of Democracy Promotion.

        These converging opinions bring the essay neatly to the consideration of motives. Amongst these motives, as we have already seen, are idealism, national security agendas, international peace and economic interests. Yet there are more, the following section is a deliberation of all these motives.

Let us start with idealism. This is the most overt motive. It principally constitutes the belief that democracy and its values are necessary and conducive to peaceful international and national relations and a high standard of economic prosperity and human rights. Notions of the West being the home of the oldest standing democracies and are the best advocates for promoting and assisting governments to attain these values elsewhere and of a duty that the West has to promote democracy in order to obtain a ‘New World Order’ of international peace are often flagship comments in many Western leaders’ foreign policy speeches. Realists argue that this form of governance does not actually describe, nor is it necessarily desirable in, international relations.

Yet idealism does not mean that the West is promoting democracy completely unselfishly in order to aid others to reach the same level of prosperity and political stability they enjoy. One of idealism’s aims is to achieve world peace and this is generally beneficial to any nation. The idea that democracy is conducive to peace arises from what is known as the ‘Democratic Peace Thesis.’ This claims to demonstrate that democratic countries don’t go to war with each other; the self-evident implication of this being that spreading democracy is a means of lowering the probability of the West’s security being threatened. The international extension of democracy would produce a greater degree of predictability in the behaviour of governments around the world and would facilitate the establishment of regime-like networks of co-operation between the developed and the developing worlds. Moreover, the West would benefit from more cordial relations with democratic governments whose rise to power has been actively assisted by Western powers.However, the ‘democratic peace’ framework has also been widely criticised. Most prominently it was pointed out that the statistical correlation between democracy and peace was weak in proving causality.Nevertheless, it has proved to be influential, particularly in the USA, as a reason to promote democracy.

        The issue of security raises a number of reasons behind the promotion of democracy. The notion of a national security agenda comprises different aspects, from that of military security to economic security. In the case of military security and physical safety this entails reducing nuclear armaments, halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction, regulating the international flow of dangerous technologies and combating international terrorism.From President G.W. Bush’s latest State of the Union address, it is evident that these take top priority on the USA’s current foreign policy agenda, yet the extent to which they will be addressed with democracy promotion methods is dubious.

Indeed security shares a rather peculiar relationship with democracy, whilst promoting democracy is definitely regarded as conducive for long-term security, when faced with short-term security crises, democracy promotion actors will actually turn their back on any efforts to promote democracy. For example, as Stefan Schirm explains, ‘because the EU’s international ‘power’ is of an economic nature, and because the EU members do not agree on a common military security policy, a socio-economic approach to CFSP is the more appropriate option. Europe can focus on its specific strength as a civil power in order to promote ‘stability transfer’ as a preventive security policy.’ However, if there is a conflict between promotion of democracy and security, and if the EC/EU therefore has to make a choice between the two, the Community will always give the highest priority to security. What is basically argued here is that security is still ‘high politics’ whereas democracy is ‘low politics’, when it comes to ‘Europe’s’ external actions in the post cold war era. In contrast, it implies that only if no other concerns, like security or economy, are important in a given situation, the Community/Union might seek to promote democracy with considerable consistency and vigour.Algeria provides a perfect example of this behaviour. In January 1992, less than two months after the Council of EU development ministers in November 1991 had decided that democracy and human rights should be conditions for receiving European aid; the military carried out a coup in Algeria and thereby stopped the cautious democratisation process in the North African country. Despite the fact that the EC had just adopted clear guidelines as to how such situations should be tackled, France and most European governments remained silent on the rights and wrongs of the military intervention. Evidently, a number of European governments considered a military government in Algeria to be less of an evil than to adjust to an Islamic Salvation Front government, at least in the short run. Instead of cutting economic assistance as a response to the reversal of the democratic transition and to the massive human rights violations, the total aid from the EC/EU and the bilateral European donors doubled from less than $200million in 1990 to $409 million in 1994.

Linked to this are the cases of Western powers continuing a ‘business as usual’ approach with ‘unsavoury’ regimes. This can be correlated to democracy promotion in two ways. China and, more recently, Pakistan provide examples for the first manner. That is, although it is perfectly obvious that neither are democracies and both, especially Pakistan have received international criticism for their authoritative and abusive manners of government, the West, and especially the USA regard and treat both countries as allies, without making the slightest inclination towards promoting democracy in these countries. ‘Getting China’s cooperation in halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology is more critical to U.S. security today than is its political liberalization.’Pakistan’s military bases and co-operation in the war against terrorism is also regarded more important for security than its political liberalisation. Whilst from a security orientated point of view these attitudes can be understood, as Larry Diamond points out, ‘where other interests push Washington to abide authoritarian rule, it at least ought to appreciate the symbolic importance of not dignifying that rule with praise, as administrations have done so often in the past,’ and did so most recently with General’s Musharraf’s military government during the war in Afghanistan.

The second manner of continuing a ‘business as usual’ approach has more significance for the concept of a ‘hidden agenda’ behind promoting democracy. The former Peruvian government of Alberto Fujimori and the military coup in Niger provide examples. As Alberto Fujimori calmly recited the pledge of his third term of office, a term which, under the original constitution he shouldn’t have been allowed to take, outside the congressional chamber police fired tear gas at 40,000 demonstrators. Even though his actions were roundly criticised by the U.S. and the European Union, and it was rather obvious that he was not a proponent of democracy in any meaningful sense of the word, he has made himself indispensable to the U.S. and other Western powers. Not only had he quickly industrialized Peru and made it more stable for investment, but he had also taken a hard line against drug trafficking, establishing himself as one of the American government’s greatest allies in the “war on drugs”. Fujimori is by no means the only example, ironically enough, the same man who is now sitting in the Hague being tried for the most ‘atrocious known crimes against humanity’, Slobodan Milosevic, was, a mere four years ago described as the “Fireman of the Balkans” by a U.S. envoy and was very much the man that the West looked to in order to secure peace in the Balkans. Saddam Hussien was a valuable ally against Iran, but was expendable during the Gulf War, Margaret Thatcher called Pincohet a “great gentleman”, but twenty years later was extradited from Great Britain to face trial for committing war crimes.The author of the article from which this information was taken, makes it clear that he is not defending these regimes, but merely stating how sad it is that ‘we are not only supposed to accept these state of affairs, but we are also expected to believe our leaders, as many in the media appear to, when they claim that they want to spread our so-called “Western” values.’

While this paper agrees that this state of affairs is sad, the case of Nigeria provides an example of how this type of behaviour has much more serious consequences for the promotion of democracy. Following the military coup that took place in Niger on the 27th of January 1996, the European Community reacted promptly to the military take-over that interrupted the process of democratisation launched in 1993. They decided to suspend their development co-operation with Niger for a period of six months. In order to change the image of a military dictatorship, the authorities in Niger decided to hold a presidential election in July 1996. This signal led the IMF to approve a new three-year loan under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility. Following the presidential election, the European Union issued a clear-cut statement criticising the way electoral process had been conducted, which to the EU raised serious doubts as to the credibility of the result. In defiance of the unanimous international rejection of the results, France announced that it was satisfied with the July election, and would therefore continue its bilateral aid to Niger.As the Danes pointed out at the time, this had obvious implications for the prospects of democracy promotion by sending the wrong signals to other African countries and potential dictators, by saying that all that was needed in order for aid giving Western countries to accept a country as being democratic, were elections, and not even free and fair elections at that.The French behaviour is to be explained by the specific French economic and strategic interests in Niger, especially the potential risk of regional instability that might open a corridor of influence for the Libyans in West Africa. However, it was neither to be ignored that Niger is also a very important contractor of uranium to France. Traditionally, France has been almost 100 per cent dependent on the import of uranium from Niger.

It is this form of Western behaviour that has lead some to say that what is actually being promoted is ‘low-intensity’ democracy and with the pure motive of Western self-interest. William Robinson is one example. He argues that ‘the immediate purpose of US intervention in national democratisation movements was to gain influence over and try to shape their outcomes in such a way to pre-empt more radical political change, to preserve the social order and international relations of asymmetry. Beyond this immediate purpose, democracy promotion is aimed at advancing the agenda of the transnational elite – consolidation of polyarchic political systems and neo-liberal restructuring. It seeks to develop technocratic elites and transnational kernels in intervened countries who will advance this agenda through the formal state apparatus and through the organs of civil society in their respective countries.’The former Soviet bloc is a perfect example of where political aid was introduced directed more at ‘identifying and supporting those groups and individuals within the loose coalitions of political clubs and civic groups in civil society that could gain leadership positions in highly fluid and semi-spontaneous mass movements and steer these movements into outcomes of free-market economies.’Although there is strong evidence to assert that free-market economies and democracy are interdependent, this evidence is not conclusive, especially if what is being promoted is polyarchy, or ‘low-intensity democracy’.There is great debate as to whether the West is more interested in the spread of democracy, or the spread of neo-liberalist economics and building strong foundations for their transnational capital.

Finally, one has to consider the possibility of all of these motives coming together to represent a Western wish to maintain hegemony through promoting democracy. This could be achieved through attaining higher military and economic security than the rest of the world through endeavouring to change countries into Western models whilst still retaining a certain amount of influence through certain practices of democracy promotion, such as political aid conditionality. This is more likely to be true of the United States, as Europe does not currently hold a particularly hegemonic position. Yet they do have their own similar motives for promoting democracy, namely the fact that ‘positive attitudes towards democracy in Western Europe could have definitely contributed to create and strengthen popular support to the ambitious goal of having a Common Foreign and Security Policy.’South Africa provides an example. ‘There is not much doubt that the involvement in South Africa served a number of other purposes (apart from promoting democracy) for Europe. Holland finds that the transition to democracy in South Africa offered the EU an opportunity to play a significant role on the international stage and has bolstered its tarnished image as an international actor.’ It could hence also be argued that ‘the promotion of democracy as a prominent theme in the foreign policy of the EC/EU could contribute to creating a ‘European’ identity and thus further the European integration process.’

Both the EU/EC and the USA have played very active roles in operations aimed at promoting democracy abroad. It is important to grasp an understanding, or at least to question, the motives behind their enthusiasm. While both have made no secret of the fact that they regard democracy and its values as the ultimate form of governance for the increasingly globalized modern world, it is of some dispute amongst the international community as to whether it is correct to ‘intervene’ in foreign sovereign governments’ agendas, even though it is in the name of democracy. Some see the West’s strong advocating of democracy leading them to risky overseas entanglements with little or no national benefits, others as a practical and sincere policy that reflects the West’s, especially the US’s, historical commitment to democracy and liberalism. Some claim democracy promotion is a manifestation of Western cultural imperialism. The West has also been accused of turning a blind eye to non-democratic state’s misbehaviour when they are allies or of business and economic use to the country, but punishing other non-democratic countries that hold no strategic use. There are also serious grounds for questioning how far the values of justice, equality, efficiency and freedom are promoted within democracy and there have been claims that what is being promoted is actually  ‘low-intensity democracy.’ Understanding the motives behind Western democracy promotion is essential in order to evaluate the above arguments, and their counter-arguments, correctly and fairly. The actual practice of democracy promotion is also highly dependent upon the motives, ‘the real grounds behind commitments of democracy support may also be responsible for characteristics of timing and sequencing and patterns of allocation that do not match the best interests of recipient countries defined in terms of their democratisation requirements.’

 Whilst the paper does not attempt to single out one motive as the barely concealed ‘hidden agenda’, it does recognise that there is a clear distinction between motives for promoting democracy for the self -perpetuating value of democracy itself and motives for promoting democracy based purely on the self-interest of the West. As seen from the discussion above, the latter seem to be in more abundance.

The paper is not directly condemning this, it is recognised that, especially after September 11th, western security is threatened and this issue needs to be addressed. However, as the title of this paper suggests these ‘hidden agendas’ are barely concealed, and while few may believe that democracy promotion is based on morally motivated principles, many believe this not to be the case, including the recipient countries. Again, this paper is not attempting to paint these recipient countries as victims of Western hypocrisy. Yet, it cannot be denied that there is a great deal of hypocrisy behind the democracy promotion agenda and this could badly affect the outcomes of democracy promotion. This, whether you support democracy as a valuable concept itself, or whether you are aiming to achieve security, economic prosperity etc. through democracy, is generally not a good outcome. Sanctioning countries for not being sufficiently democratic and abusing human rights, whilst praising another which does exactly the same but is a strategic ally will lead to less desire for countries to become truly democratic, and lead unsavoury regimes to lean more towards a democratic farce, whilst atrocities go on behind the scenes. Democratic transitions are rarely stable events, and it is extremely hard to consolidate a democracy, not being truly dedicated to promoting democracy, but rather preoccupied with maintaining Western security and economic interests in the region will not provide the political support and assistance that emerging democracies really need in order to continue their transitions. In order for the world to continue truly democratising and for existing young democracies to become solid, the West need to seriously reappraise their barely concealed ‘hidden agendas’ and realise that some of their motives such as maintaining ‘business as usual’ and maintaining solid bases for transnational capital are in direct conflict with promoting democracy and that in order to achieve Western security, it is essential that democracy be promoted wholeheartedly and without hypocrisy.

        

        

        

        

        

---