The move from aristocracy to bureaucracy - discuss this view of the development of states within thi

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The move from aristocracy to bureaucracy – discuss this view of the development of states within thi

This question assumes much about the nature of an aristocracy in a Europe that saw countries such as Turkey where, until around 1570, the aristocracy was almost negligible to Russia, where the boyars of Ivan IV are believed by some to have replaced the Tsar himself. In a continent of such diversity, there is bound to be a different reasoning for each form of aristocracy and the development of each state.  The schism is particularly strong between Western and Eastern Europe.

 

In the fifteenth century, the Papal schism, the accession of such characters as Charles VI of France, the repeated minorities in Scotland and the limited constitutional power of the Holy Roman Emperor lent western rulers a dependence on their nobles who started the period as the best educated large class of lay people reliable for use at court, but this would soon change, aided by the growth of educational institutes, founded on the spur of the Renaissance and the Reformation.  The death of the feudal army or fyrd was vital in decreasing the importance of the nobility.  Experienced mercenaries were hired across Europe with their experienced veteran captains.  Henry VIII hired “Scots, Spaniards, Gascons, Portuguese, Italians, Albanians, Greeks, Tatars, Germans, Burgundians and Flemings” according to one contemporary whilst Michael Romanov kept 17,400 mercenaries in his service.  His son, Alexis, employed 60,000 by 1663.  Until the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, the French border along the Spanish Road was guarded by 10,000 Swiss pikemen.  Removing the need to rely on the aristocracy as one’s source of military power removed a vital part of the nobility’s hold on the monarchy and took away all of their power to insist on political influence.  The destruction of nobility in battle, such as that of the Scots at Flodden not only reinforced the need for professional soldiers but reaffirmed the decline of the soldier-noble as a class, and set the tone for an era of downsizing and demoting the old noblesse d’epee.  The muzzling of the aristocracy and the power to patronise the lower nobility increased the power of monarchies through this age

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Bodin wrote that the only “truly royal” states in Early Modern Europe were England, Spain and France, and it is with these category of states that we will start.

France was a strongly monarchical state that, from the reign of Francis I, openly held venal offices.  The growth of offices throughout the period and of the office-holding class was more advanced in the French kingdom than elsewhere. Between 1515 and 1665, the number of venal offices rose from 4,000 to 46,000 and the amount of revenue they produced was reckoned to be about 419 million livres – five times the annual royal budget.  As a result of ennoblement through these channels, the noblesse de robe emerged to challenge the three ancient estates (leading some historians to suggest, probably mistakenly, that the gentry wished to form a fourth estate), and in line with the increase in the sale of offices, they increased the power of their class. Whereas Henri II and Francois I had courts filled with princes of the blood, dukes, peers and great officers (reflecting the roots of the noblesse d’épée), by the late sixteenth century, the power of the old aristocrats even at the highest levels was being eroded.  In 1594, the Constable Montmorency-Damville sat on the Royal Financial Commission with three other great nobles, but by 1598, with the exception of the Protestant Sully, the King’s council was a representation of the noblesse de robe.

The accumulation of offices in France in some cases did reinforce the aristocracy as they bought they way to influence, and in some cases, wealthier aristocrats amassed such a number of offices of such influence that they could become local sovereigns.  This is paradoxical, given that a strong argument for the cultivation of the culture of venality was as a means to counter the growing irritation of the local Parlements and estates that were enforcing forms of local independence.  However, in general, this era saw a usurping of the great nobles by the gentry.

The growth of the influence of the gentry was not just recognition of the growth of their numerical strength and improved status as noblesse de robe, but as a result of the faction and intrigue that pervaded France’s old nobility throughout the Wars of Religion.  As a result, the nobility tended only to return to favour as regards appointments during exceptional cases of excellence or during times of royal weakness.  (For example, Gaston and Conde were recalled to the royal chambers during the minority of Louis XIV.)  Louis XIV’s reign, starting in 1661, typifies the trend: of his seventeen councillors, just two were from old aristocratic houses.  Not only were the old nobility racked with ancient grudges and prone to faction, but they almost universally lacked the legal training necessary to maintain a seventeenth century administrative position.  By the advent of the seventeenth century, all that the nobility were fit for were regional posts and army or ecclesiastical positions.

Whilst the high nobility suffered, the robins (lawyers) gained a monopoly over the sercretaryships in all of the sections of royal affairs requiring routine administration and in the sovereign courts.  It must be realised that the old system of old families dominating the court had neither stigma nor problem for Early Modern Europe.  It was the order in which things lay.  As such, the growth of legal and financial noblesse de robe dynasties was a hallmark of this era.  The Phelypeaux family provided nine secretaries of state without a break between 1610 and 1777 whilst the Nicolay family provided the nine first presidents of the Chambre des Comptes of Paris between 1506 and 1791. By 1521, Francois I was complaining that “most of the offices of the kingdom, of all types, are owned in expectancy”.  Paradoxically, given their nouveau riche means, the old hereditary principle of office was actually reinforced by the noblesse de robe, who having bought offices, saw them as bought property and as a means of reinforcing their membership of the second estate.

Although Francois insisted that one had to survive the changeover of office by forty days in order to prevent the establishment of new dynasties and to allow the reversion of offices back to the Crown for their resale, the droit annuel was later adopted in exchange for the forty days rule, as a means of extracting money from the offices.  Time-shared offices were opposed at every turn, and eventually the format for the retention of offices was of offices that could be inherited, but which were taxed.  The price of offices was hit by inflation, which although reflected by the tied-in droit annuel, made offices unobtainable by the royalty, so the crown could not benefit from the rise in values. As another consequence of the inflation, the Crown could not afford to buy any offices and so could not reform them.  The growth in offices occurred at all levels. Offices, such as the businesses of urban fishmongers, were soon acquired by the government in an attempt to raise more revenue, but they succeeded only in confusing the convoluted societal structure further.  With offices out of the price range of the government, reform of the system was impossible.  Revenue was raised by the sale of new offices, created by adding layers upon layers were added to the state administrative system.  The Parlements recorded feelings of being threatened by a new executive justice across the kingdom. The French bureaucratic class grew massively, though most of the posts were redundant (the old taille office found itself monitoring the activities of a new office in charge of all taxes and levies) and so reduced the number of bureaucrats without increasing the active power of the government.  However, it is important to remember that with the bought offices, many of the supposed bureaucrats were almost of amateur status, and can not really be judged to be bureaucrats in the spirit of the question.

The growth of venal government never extended as high as the kings’ Chief Ministers.  The ministries were never purchasable offices and they relied on personal contact with the King for their appointment.  At this level, it is fair to say that a professional bureaucracy rose up, although whether one can regard the attitude of Richelieu as being any different to his predecessors is debatable.  Not a “professional,” in the modern sense of the word, he did use the position for personal financial gain (to the tune of three million livres per annum) as did his predecessors. Indeed, the nature of the post might suggest that although the post was meritocratic, it had always been so.  This was not modernisation on the part of the Renaissance kings, so much as royal common sense  Louis XIV’s decision to rule alone reflects that the king’s advisers needed to be suitably meritorious and that they were just a help to pragmatic kings– (it is hard to believe that the egocentric Sun King would have found anyone that he trusted more than himself.)  Had there ever been more than pragmatic realism to the post, then the ceremony-obsessed Louis would probably have had one.   Richelieu and de Mazarin were France’s two most illustrious Ministers and royal friendship was their sole qualification.

The importance of the royal ministries was the power to appoint, sack and reform ministers and ministries.  Richelieu was able to clear the court of redundant offices (such as Admiral and Constable) by 1627, reflecting the diminishing of the importance of the old hierarchy in favour of a new system. The King’s Council was rapidly becoming less noble, as typified by the afore-mentioned selection preferences of Louis XIV, and ministers of state were therefore less subservient to the Council.  The Council of State, formed in 1643, met passing statutes in the presence of the king and decrees in his absence. Ministers for individual areas emerged, and foreign affairs ministers, financial ministers and military ministers were all mandated by the rise of Louis XIV.  Vitally, this system not only reserved the king the power of appointment taken away by the venal offices, but also allowed a meritocracy to emerge at the highest levels of government. 

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Although the French system was more open to newcomers than its formality might suggest, it is important to remember that by the eighteenth century, the noblesse de robe and the noblesse d’epee were indistinguishable, and that although the later system was more competent, excluding those lacking judicial training, it was by no means a bureaucracy.  Indeed, it was with the aim of joining the aristocracy that bureaucrats emerged. 

Although the venality of the French system was very extreme, it is a good example of the muzzling of the aristocracy and the rise of the educated lower gentry and noblesse ...

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