The reality of Africa's situation internationally has checked the movement for unity within the continent. Discuss.
Prof. P. Woodward
African G&P
The reality of Africa's situation internationally has checked the movement for unity within the continent. Discuss.
Janek Mikulin
Following independence most African states had closer ties, especially in the economic field, with outside states than they had with each other, and foreign powers thus exercised considerable leverage within the continent. This applied especially to the former colonial powers since the 'mother country' was normally the new states' principal trading partner; economic, financial and cultural links between France and its former colonies (except Guinea) were particularly close.1
Tordoff's bold statement seems, initially, to make this a one-sided debate, with the result a foregone conclusion. However, if we take a closer look at the details we can see that the African model is not so unilinear in construction.
This essay shall explore the various movements made towards and away from unity in the African continent. It shall highlight how the climate, mood and impetus have changed over time through both internal, domestic, influences and those from the international community as a whole.
As Tordoff illustrates, there have been many differing organisations that have had varied success in achieving regional or, in some cases, continental cooperation in both the economic and political spectra. 2
These movements' objectives and powers have changed over time and have witnessed many phases in their development. For the purposes of this essay, we shall explore four stages in the African movement: post-independence; the Cold War period; the post-Cold War period and the mid-late 90s onward.
Post-Independence
President Nkrumah of Ghana thought that African independence was simply the advent of a neo-colonial experience in which the national interests of African states were subordinate to the economic strategies and desires of their former colonial masters. He called for a pan-African movement in order that the African states joined to combat this exploitation and grow together.
He saw regional blocs as detrimental to the African cause, not as helpful stepping-stones, and sought to create an International Governmental Organisation (IGO) that would enable the peoples of Africa to meet the new challenges put before them in the post-colonial era:
It is clear that we must find an African solution to our problems, and that this can only be found in African unity. Divided we are weak; united, Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world.3
This powerful message resonated across most of the African continent immediately after independence and brought about a wave of optimism for the future of the African people, both domestically and internationally.
Nkrumah viewed the colonial experience from a critical perspective, believing that they had systematically pursued policies for the 'development of underdevelopment'4 and had created a set of exploitative relations between themselves and their former colonies.
In an attempt to combat this feeling, many organisations were set up, not only by the African peoples, but also through the colonial powers; it was mainly the Anglophone states that were encouraged to go along the 'regional track', the French bureaucracy held little credence for regional entities and baulked at such manoeuvres.
Some of these organisations focussed on political unity, while others focussed on more 'structural' issues. Those designed to combat political separation were set up to counter the arbitrary colonial territorialisation of the African continent and strove to bring together areas of ethnic closeness, e.g. Ghana and British Togoland (1957) whose ties were put into place to bring together the Ewe speaking people of both states.5
Other unions appeared over the coming decade, including the union of the Republic of Cameroon with the Southern Cameroons (1961) and Tanganyika with Zanzibar (1964). These were formed for similar reasons and continue today. However, the Tanganyikan bond is under immense strain due to political differences between the two parties.
It should be noted that these coalitions were started before all parties had attained independence; their purpose and direction possibly motivated by the colonial powers. However, this potential influence was accepted for the good of the regions; the larger unions would be better able to 'surmount local crises'6 and would 'promote political stability'7.
They were part of a liberal wave of development that saw African stability and growth as attainable only through modernisation and industrialisation.8 The emphasis here was on expanding the electorate; moving away from the 'primitive'9 identifiers that caused so many problems, i.e. ethnicity and religion, and towards more modern identifiers, such as ones' profession.
There were other attempts at unifying otherwise separate states - British and Italian Somaliland (1960) and the Gambia with Senegal (1981). However, these unions did not have such a positive lifetime; the alliance of Senegambia collapsed in 1989 in response to the Gambia's refusal to extend the union10 and the newly established state of Somalia fell into intense internal conflict as warlords fought for control of various areas within the fresh boundaries.11
Some commentators believed that the failure of Senegambia and Somalia lay in the interference of external forces; others thought that it was simply too early for such ties to be made, without suitable infrastructures and reciprocal measures arranged. These differences in opinion are due to the differing schools of thought regarding African unity. Those of the former opinion coming from the critical tradition and those of the latter coming from a liberal one.12
Whichever tradition one ascribes to, it is clear that foreign powers were pivotal in the early stages of unification/regionalisation immediately after independence. This could be due to ulterior motives or simply that they thought the new states lacked the experience required to execute such measures.13
One can continue this comparison with the first of our 'functional' unions, the East African Common Services Organisation (EACSO), later the East African Community (EAC). Initially inaugurated as the East African High Commission (1948-1961), it was set up by the British in order to aid the administration of the area, which covered ...
This is a preview of the whole essay
Whichever tradition one ascribes to, it is clear that foreign powers were pivotal in the early stages of unification/regionalisation immediately after independence. This could be due to ulterior motives or simply that they thought the new states lacked the experience required to execute such measures.13
One can continue this comparison with the first of our 'functional' unions, the East African Common Services Organisation (EACSO), later the East African Community (EAC). Initially inaugurated as the East African High Commission (1948-1961), it was set up by the British in order to aid the administration of the area, which covered Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.
EACSO (1961-1967) was developed after independence to continue these links and aid the development of the region. It was meant to provide a community
...in which a shared and centralised administration was to provide services, including transportation, communication, tax collection, scientific research, social services and university education. The EACSO charter was also to create a common currency, a common appellate court, and a common market in which goods and labour could circulate freely. These were to be directed by a central legislative assembly. By 1965, the EACSO began to come apart due to growing tendencies toward nationalism and diverging economic and political policies.
In 1967, a new organisation was founded under the rubric of the East African Community (EAC), established under the Treaty for East African Cooperation. 14
[The] East African Community collapsed in 1977, due to among others; the variability of economic policies then pursued by the member states, the change of Government in Uganda in 1971, the continued perception of disproportionate sharing of benefits accruing from economic integration and the lack of adequate compensation mechanisms to address the situation, and the exclusion of civil society and the private sector from participating in co-operation activities.15
The attempts of the EACSO/EAC to provide a regional solution to its member states' problems were laudable; they were attempting to cooperate and coordinate efforts to deliver a resolution without external assistance and had some successes.16 However, they were not exempt from external influences and interference.17
Cold War Era
Many people perceive this era as one of great interference from foreign powers, where African states were used as pawns in the global game of chess that was played out over many years between the former Soviet Union and the United States of America. However, once more, the model is not as simplistic as one may first think.
In Addis Ababa, 25th May 1963, a conference between 30 independent African states occurred. It was inspired by the possibility of an African union. Before arriving at the conference stage there were many political obstacles to be faced; there were essentially three contrasting blocs of opinion that had to be reconciled if there was to be a deal.
The three blocs represented very different views of how the union should be forged. The Brazzaville group thought that the union should be as loose an affair as possible, with the states' sovereignty the most important element.18 Conversely, the Casablanca group followed Nkrumah's 'hymn sheet', believing that a federal union of states was the only way forward.19 Finally, sitting somewhere in the middle, were the Monrovia group.
If we look at the original objectives of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Charter, we can see where the compromises took place. It declared five objectives; to promote unity across the continent; to coordinate efforts to improve the life of the African people; to defend African sovereignty; to promote international cooperation; to eradicate colonialism.
Despite some people complaining that it fell short of its potential, the OAU can be seen as a great first step to the rebuilding of a truly independent Africa.
Notwithstanding this massive move towards continental and international recognition of an independent Africa, after 1945 many states found themselves dragged into the ever-increasing hostilities between the USA and the USSR. None was more involved than South Africa, whose government were instilled with anti-communist doctrines.
The South African experience spread into Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia). These regimes perceived their enemy (i.e. any political opposition) to be those who would overthrow capitalism and nationalise the private sector.20 As such, the West, who was willing to ignore minority rule and racism, if it meant that their way of life was preserved, quietly and discreetly supported these anti-communist bulwarks.
The Zairian leader, President Joseph Mobutu, was similarly supported by the West for making a public stand against Communism, while at the same time he systematically stripped his country of its wealth and resources.21
However, the West was not alone in offering support to the African nations. The USSR, whose socialist, Marxist-Leninist revolutionary ideals had spread to some of the more 'militant' parts of Africa and the pan-African movement (especially parts of the Casablanca Bloc) offered assistance.
Aside from military aid, the former Soviet Union also offered a number of educational scholarships to young people, mainly in the former English and Portuguese territories.
But the Soviet Union gave little in the way of aid or trade. There was no great Soviet strategy for taking over Africa, and generally, the Soviet Union was under informed about history, political structures and the needs of the countries it supported.22
In an attempt to move away from such wrangling, the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) was developed in 1975, it was finally realised in 1978 and had many aims, among which were
...to promote co-operation and integration in economic, social and cultural activity, ultimately leading to the establishment of an economic and monetary union through the total integration of the sixteen national economies in West Africa. It also aims to raise the living standards of its peoples, maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among member states and contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent.23
It was ambitious in its aims and looked to be setting the example for the rest of Africa to follow. However, the fortunes of ECOWAS were not entirely positive. The community lacked homogeneity in its outlook; partly due to the mixed colonial experiences;24 partly due to the conflicting regional interests of other groups and partly due to a lack of commitment, as most states still pursued policies of economic nationalism, supported by foreign powers' continued trade and aid.25
Other attempts were made during this extended period to counter the feeling of dependency among African states. In 1979, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was held in an attempt to encourage trade between the southern African states, reducing their reliance on the apartheid state of South Africa26 as well as on foreign trade and aid.
Trade within the region was to be encouraged and priority was to be given to improving transport and communications. A development fund was set up, with finance supplied mainly by Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) governments.27
The readiness of the OECD to assist in the development of the SADCC was a double-edged sword. It provided the funds and guidance required to set up such an institution, delivering experienced personnel and training. However, the SADCC's need for large amounts of money (over three-quarters the total funding) from the OECD did little to offset southern African dependency on foreign trade and aid.
During the Cold War many movements were made to try and alleviate the African situation and prompt a wave of self-sufficiency and growth. These initiatives were encouraged and developed from both the domestic and international arena. However, the west's concern over the looming spread of communism overshadowed many of the programs' potential.
The inability of the African states to adequately fund these schemes exacerbated the dependency phenomenon and further weakened the state. This had effects on the type and style of government which saw a drastic shift toward centralised, authoritarian rule during this period. This shift was left unchecked by the wider community who were more concerned about the USA and USSR's posturing.
After the conclusion of the Cold War, many of these projects were reinvigorated and saw a gradual change in fortunes. We start by examining the shift in possible prosperity of the SADCC, which, after democratic elections and the cessation of apartheid in South Africa, saw the entrance of a new and powerful member.
Post-Cold War
The end of the Cold War brought about a fresh motivation for the democratisation and capitalisation of the world, as the apparent failure of communism left, for the west at least, no real alternative. The OECD picked up its efforts to stabilise and expand African unity. Once more, South Africa was a pivotal player in this process as the SADCC was revamped in 1995 under a new title, the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
The SADC relied heavily on South Africa, whose GDP was more than four times that of the other members combined. The newly, democratically elected, president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, personified the African struggle. Here was a man who had been imprisoned for his defiance of the oppressive forces witnessed in South Africa, who had worked hard to reinvent himself and fuse the peoples of South Africa (black and white) behind a vision of a united, fair and free South Africa. If one man can accomplish so much, then why not a group of governments?
This optimism and purpose made the SADC a cohesive and determined force. The legacy issues remained (political instability; economic nationalism; differences in ideology, language, culture and political strength; direct economic competition; poor inter-state communication), but they seemed hell-bent on tackling them and moving forward.
Their decisive intervention in Lesotho (1998) to quash a rebel uprising and re-affirm democratic rule was a major step forward for the SADC and Africa as a whole. It was one step closer to a peer review system, casting off the original ideals of non-interference for a more progressive agenda.
Mid-Late 90s Onward
The increasing fervour and pace of the globalisation process put Africa back in a difficult position, regionally, continentally and internationally. The areas of comparative advantage that Africa enjoyed were not enough to stimulate the development required to grow and secure its place within the international community.
The continued direct economic competition between neighbouring states hindered its progress and meant that more investment and training was needed. This further slowed the African experience and prompted the international community to act. The USA have been the most vocal and forward with aid, yet it has not been a matter of simply handing over money and training.
The changing global construction has left many groups unhappy with the inequity that is so rife and has seen the rapid growth of terrorist groups and networks. Globalisation, pejoratively nick-named 'Americanisation', has taken the major blame for this. As America has slowly woken up to this slur, it has added elements of conditionality28 to its aid offerings and hopes to fuel African resistance to such activities by changing their experiences of capitalism and democracy to positive ones, secure in their growth potential and able to stand on their own two feet (not only economically in the international arena, but also against this growing terrorist threat).
Recently, Africa has made big steps towards a more proactive development cycle, introducing new and powerful institutions, most notably the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU). These programs are aimed at empowering the African states to fully meet the challenges of globalisation and unification - processes which are now seen as inextricably linked.
On 3 July 2001, the merger between the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) and the OMEGA Plan was finalised, spurring the creation of NEPAD. It wasn't until the leaders of the G8 countries endorsed the plan (20/07/01) and the Heads of State Implementation Committee decided on a framework (23/10/01) that NEPAD was officially inaugurated.
NEPAD was set up to promote accelerated growth and sustainable development; eradicate widespread and severe poverty and halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process. It is a massive step forward in African development and its endorsement by the G8 leaders not only shows how progressive its measures are, but also how important international assistance remains.
Another initiative, put into place in an attempt to negate the need for international assistance,29 is the African Union. Formerly the OAU, this new body, with far-ranging powers and a fresh mandate, it is hoped, will enable the political and economic unification of the African continent whilst constantly evaluating its position relative to the rest of the world and the continuing process of globalisation.30
Among the initiatives of the AU rests a Pan African Parliament (PAP), which intends to involve many more people than simply the heads of state and foreign ministers who arte currently involved in the AU.
PAP will have no legislative powers for at least the next five years. Ginwala31 notes it is no foregone conclusion the organisation would have the power to pass legislation even after that period.
Under the PAP protocol human rights and democratic principles are to be promoted in Africa with transparency and accountability being priorities. Development on the continent and solidarity among member countries are also to be promoted.32
Whether these new programs can finally allow Africa to develop into the international player it could and should be remains to be seen. One thing is clear though, given the political will of all involved (domestically and internationally) there has never been a better opportunity for it to happen.
Until recently, Africa has bee subject to mainly economic forces. Only when political conditions have been right has there been any serious development for the good of Africa. Given the current global climate and the immense political need to ensure that Africa unifies and fulfils its democratisation process, in order that it is not susceptible to terrorist infiltration, Africa may finally be given the type of aid and freedom it has required from the start.
Democracy and freedom are hard won. America fought a bloody war to ensure it achieved its goals, Europe witnessed many revolutions and counter revolutions before it stabilised an coalesced (it still has areas of conflict now). To expect to simply be able to implant democracy and capitalism was not only fool-hardy, but damaging to the progress of the African sub-continent.
In conclusion, therefore, one can state that despite Africa's variable situation internationally (through independence, the Cold War, globalisation and up to the present day) there has always been a simmering desire to ensure the unification and self-determination of Africa. It has been hampered and steered in differing directions during these periods, but remains as high on the priority list of the African people today as it ever has done.
Africa has come full-circle and is ready to listen to the words of Nkrumah again, as he stated...
Never before have a people had within their grasp so great an opportunity for developing a continent endowed with so much wealth. Individually, the independent states of Africa, some of them potentially rich, others poor, can do little for their people. Together, by mutual help, they can achieve much. But the economic development of the continent must be planned and pursued as a whole. A loose confederation designed only for economic co-operation would not provide the necessary unity of purpose. Only a strong political union can bring about full and effective development of our natural resources for the benefit of our people.33
Bibliography
P. Calvocoressi - Independent Africa and the World. London: Longman (1985; 1986)
J. Chipman - French Power in Africa. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd (1989)
P. Schraeder - African Politics and Society (2nd Ed). Belmont: Wadsworth (2004)
W. Tordoff - African Government & Politics (4th Ed) London: Palgrave (2001)
Other Resources
ABC News - http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/somalia_timeline.html [17/03/04]
African History - http://africanhistory.about.com/library/bl/blessentials-Independence.htm [15/03/04]
All Africa - http://allafrica.com/nepad/ [17/03/04]
BBC World Service - http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/storyofafrica/12chapter8.shtml [16/03/04]
Modern History - http://www.worldhistory.com/wiki/S/Senegambia.htm [17/03/04]
Modern History Source Book - http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1961nkrumah.html [17/03/04]
NEPAD Online - http://www.nepad.org.ng/ [15/03/04]
- ECOWAS Profile
- NEPAD Brief
- New African Initiative
- The Omega Plan
News 24
- http://www.news24.com/News24/Africa/News/0,,2-11-1447_1483933,00.html [17/03/04]
- http://www.news24.com/News24/Africa/Features/0,,2-11-37_1500104,00.html [17/03/04]
Tanzania High Commission - http://www.tanzania-online.gov.uk/eaca.html#strategy [16/03/04]
The University of Pennsylvania African Studies Centre - http://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/kforeignrelation.htm [18/03/04]
Word Count: 3299
W. Tordoff - African Government & Politics (4th Ed). London: Palgrave (2001), Pg. 250
2 Ibid. Ch. 9
3 Modern History Source Book - http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1961nkrumah.html [17/03/04]
4 P. Schraeder - African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation (2nd Ed). Belmont: Wandsworth (2004), Pg. 324
5 Tordoff, Ch. 9
6 Tordoff, Pg. 241
7 Tordoff, Pg. 241
8 For a detailed analysis of the liberal tradition see Schraeder, Ch. 13
9 Schraeder, Pg. 303
0 Modern History - http://www.worldhistory.com/wiki/S/Senegambia.htm [17/03/04]
1 ABC News - http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/somalia_timeline.html [17/03/04]
2 For a more detailed explanation of these schools of thought see Schraeder, Ch. 13 & 14
3 It has long been thought that their former colonial mother has unduly influenced the Francophone experience. However, it should be noted that this 'dependency' worked both ways - the French administration could be seen to be exploiting their old colonies, or the new Francophone elites could be exploiting these links to ensure they maintained their hold on power. One should, however, put this duality of interests into its context - the French administration has been vocal in its suspicion of 'Anglo-Saxon' (UK & USA) influences in the continent; through fears that it may lose what hold it has over its former colonies and the continent as a whole.
4 The University of Pennsylvania African Studies Centre - http://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/kforeignrelation.htm [18/03/04]
5 Tanzania High Commission - http://www.tanzania-online.gov.uk/eaca.html#strategy [16/03/04]
6 The successful removal of Idi Amin by the Tanzanian army, in 1979, is a great example of the regions ability to deal with things itself.
7 Whether conscious or not, the British partnership with Kenya acted as a destabilising force in the unity of these African states and hence it can be seen that during the post-independence era Africa was, to all intents and purposes, at the whim of the international situation.
8 One could postulate that this bloc was influenced by the French administration, not least because the city of Brazzaville held great symbolic importance for the French, who had launched their WWII counter from this enclave of support. For a more in-depth analysis of the French experience in Africa during WWII, see J. Chipman - French Power in Africa. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd (1989), Ch. 4
9 Possibly due to the emergence of the USA as a major world power after WWII and into the Cold War.
20 BBC World Service - http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/storyofafrica/12chapter8.shtml [16/03/04]
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 NEPAD Online - http://www.nepad.org.ng/ [15/03/04] - ECOWAS Profile, Pg. 8
24 The Francophone states remained 'loyal' to their former colonial mother and acted as a major obstacle in terms of economic liberalisation and progress. In effect, it has split into two blocs - the Francophone and the Anglophone. Nigeria could potentially emerge as a dominant force, but has chosen (so far) to act, along with Ghana, as a stabilising force against Francophone interests and influences.
25 Although trading links were maintained and relations were good between states, the process of profit repatriation was continual and the process of technological transformation was sporadic and at the mercy of the foreign investors. This simply propagated the dependency model, whilst seeming to the casual observer that progress was being made. States pursued 'outwardly directed development strategies', e.g. Senegal's peanut industry, which left little capital to develop other industries, but was vital to ensure the minimum level of finances to keep the state afloat.
26 Apartheid was built on a system of dependency - the black majority being forced to be dependent on the white minority.
27 Tordoff, Pg. 246
28 The American administration, especially under George W. Bush, has been keen to 'get something back' for its investment in Africa. Aid is now linked to areas such as 'good governance', 'democratisation', 'institutionalisation', Human Rights Charters, 'economic diversification', etc. The long-term effectiveness of such measures can be disputed, but the immediate impact can be quite drastic, as Kenya witnessed when its foreign aid was slashed due to non-compliance.
29 Not only economic, but political and administrative aswell.
30 An important step in Africa's recognition of its place within the world - one cannot hope to be a continent alone in this ever more competitive global composition. Nkrumah was on to something with his initial idea of pan-Africanism, but he was unaware of the part globalisation would have to play in world politics and economics.
31 Dr Frene Ginwala - one of the South African representatives
32 News 24 - http://www.news24.com/News24/Africa/Features/0,,2-11-37_1500104,00.html [17/03/04]
33 Modern History Source Book - http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1961nkrumah.html [17/03/04]
African G&P Prof. Woodward
Janek Mikulin Page 2 of 12
