II. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AFTER ATATURK PERIOD (1938-2002)
After 1930, in which Turkey handled the issues remaining from Lousanne, the world entered into a crisis period and especially the crisis that erupted Europe influenced Turkey. For this reason, the period between two wars was a time in which the seeds of a new world war were discarded rather than being a period of world peace. Except the relatively softening period between 1925-1929, especially after 1929-30 world economic crisis, international tension in the world increased rapidly. An increasingly sharpening polarization break through between the anti-revisionist states ,seeking to keep the status quo that World War I brought, and the revisionist states that wanted to change this structure. In the years that Europe and the world entered in a crisis period in a short time, Turkey did not prefer to use crisis for its own interests like revisionist European states do. On the contrary, it followed an anti-revisionist policy as a passionate protector of collective peace and security. In this period, Turkey, maintaining its relationships with all states, was directed primarily to regional alliances by foregrounding its own security. (Balkan and Sadabat Pacts).However, as the military and political developments in Europe reached to worrying dimensions, especially the Italian threat, Turkey head towards a cooperation with Western countries as well as regional alliances. For this reason, beginning from the 1930’s, Italian threat became one of the factors that give main direction to the Turkey’s foreign policy. Though, the secular state order that was constructed after the radical reforms Ataturk realized, and the changes occurred in political, social, economic and cultural fields, undoubtly, bring Turkey closer to the West structurally. Parallel to these radical changes that started in domestic policy, Turkish foreign policy directed towards the West since 1930’s.Italian threat has played an important role in turning this drift into a cooperation first and then into an alliance. Since the National Struggle years, Turkey, proceeding to alliance with Western states against the Italian threat that aroused in the region, didn’t want to spoil its relationships with Soviet Union, the key aspect of the foreign policy. On the contrary, due to its geographical location and extremely strategic position, Turkey spent great efforts to establish a sensitive balance between the Western countries and the Soviet Union.
Turkish Foreign Policy in the Second World War Period
( URL: http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/İkinci_Dünya_Savaşı )
Turkey faced with an intense pressure of Allies and Axis, who wanted the country to enter the war in their side-as a result of the importance of Turkey’s geographical position. Against the pressures of these belligerent sides Turkey’s policy was to stay out of war, with the aim of sustaining country’s territorial integrity and independence without giving any concessions, and protecting itself against attacks by remaining its policy of being a balance element between the big states. While Turkey’s second president İsmet İnönü took over remaining this policy, Numan Menemencioğlu, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in an important part of this period, become the closest assistant of him. When Turkey, England and France signed tripartite alliance on 19 October 1939, World War I has formerly started with Germany’s attack to Poland in September 1939. Poland, defeated in this war, was shared between Germany and Soviet Union, so Soviet Union obtained bases in Baltic States. At the beginning of the war, which progressed as mentioned, Turkey followed a “stay out of war” policy, despite sympathizing with the Allies. However, the war spread to the Mediterranean region with Germany’s attack to France on May 1940 and with Italy’s taking place in France’s side. In this case, England and France wanted Turkey to enter in the war due to the tripartite alliance. On the other hand, Turkey didn’t fulfill England and France’s request by suggesting the protocol number 2 of tripartite alliance. Indeed, the concerns felt because of Soviet Union were really effective in Turkey’s staying out of the war. In the meantime, France has been pulled out by Germany and, England didn’t insist on this request. Italy’s attack to Greece on 28 October 1940, Germany’s going down to the Balkan’s alarmed England and Soviet Union along with Turkey. This case has led to an increasingly intensified power conflict between Germany and Soviet Union. As this conflict intensified, Turkish – Soviet relationships would begin to become better. Meanwhile, Germany’s going down to Balkan’s has led to England’s request from Turkey about entering the. According to England, Germany could go down to the Middle East and Suez as it was located in Balkan's. For this reason, British Prime Minister Churchill wanted Turkey's airbases in his letter that he wrote to President Inonu on 31 January 1941. Turkey, believing that England wouldn't be able to give necessary support, denied this request. On 26 February 1941, England, again, wanted Turkey to start a war against Germany, but Turkey set forth that Soviet Union might attack with Germany and that it was already inadequate in terms of military equipment. Meanwhile, in the spring of 1941, Germany occupied Balkan's and Aegean islands. Occupation of the Balkan's by Germany awakened concern in Turkey and led to the deterioration of relations between Germans and Soviets. Already, the German - Soviet cooperation, starting with 23 August 1939 pact, couldn't last for a long time and the apathy that began in mid-1940 have increasingly led to an influence conflict. During this time, Soviet Union, who wanted to achieve maximum profit before the end of German - Soviet cooperation, didn't hesitate about a last experiment with the aim of getting Turkey under its influence. In the negotiations made on 12-13 November 1940 in Berlin, with the aim of finding a final treaty base between two states and including Soviet Union in the Axis, along with the other requirements Turkey wanted to stay under Soviet influence and to be given the authority to control the Turkish Straits. In Berlin negotiations, two states couldn't reach and agreement and Hitler didn't steer to accept the Soviet's requests. At last, Hitler -who understood that Soviet's cooperation would not be provided- decided to start a war against Soviets in December 1940.Soviet Union, also, understood that alliance with Germany would not live long and, as it find Turkey's status important in a forthcoming war, felt the need to change the policy that it followed against Turkey while the German - Soviet relations were corrupting. Indeed, Soviet Union - taking action after Bulgaria's joint to the Axis on 1 March 1941, Germany's settlement to Balkan's and Hitler's informing Turkey about the Soviet Union's demand over Turkish Straits - began to approach friendly against Turkey. As a result, Turkey and Soviet Union declared that the pact dated 1925 is in effect by issuing a nonaggression statement on 24 March 1941. Soviet Union's friendly attitude against Turkey would last until Stalingrad victory. Thus, the Soviet threat on Turkey disappeared in a great extent. On the other hand, Turkey faced with the German pressure in the spring of 1941. On April 1941, Germany wanted to pass its soldiers to Iraq via Turkey, and in return promised nonaggression guarantee and land from Aegean islands to Turkey. As those requests were rejected by Turkey, Hitler, seeking to get the entire Balkan front under security before the attack that he would do against Soviet Union, proposed a nonaggression pact to Turkey and by 18 June 1941 this nonaggression pact between Germany and Turkey was signed. Later, Turkey's agreement with Germany on 9 October 1941, which envisaged a sale of 90.000 tons of chromium, made her allies angry. As Germany's attack to Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 confronted Turkey, it emerged a new concern to Turkish diplomacy in addition. Turkish statesman began to fear that England could give concessions to Russia over the Turkish Straits and territories, as it has done in the World War I. So, the Soviet Union and England declared that they would show respect to the Monteux Convention and to Turkey's territorial integrity by giving a collective diplomatic note to Turkey. However, the former attitudes of Soviet Union towards Turkey have shaken the confidence of Turkish Government to the Soviets. Indeed, as Soviet Union got closer to victory, it would be understood that Turkey was absolutely right in those concerns. On the other hand, on 11 December United States entered the war after Japan's attack to America's Pearl Harbor Base on 7 December 1941. With the U.S. entrance to the World War II, the period of British - Soviet - U.S. cooperation started. In this period of war, the pressure of allies , especially Britain's, on Turkey's entry into the war increased. The most important reason of that was Germany's defeat in Stalingrad and North Africa. Allies began to prepare strategic plans in order to cause a final defeat for Germany, so that, Turkey's involvement to these plans was natural in means of its geographical situation. Allies found Turkey's entry into the war necessary especially in the attacks against Germany in Europe and the Balkans. Churchill forwarded this decision of Allies to President Inonu when he came to Adana on 30 January 1943. In Adana meeting, Churchill didn't want a final commitment from Turkey about entering the war, but more than this, he wanted to resolve Turkey's concerns about Soviet Union. The efforts of England about including Turkey to the war went on even after the Adana Meeting. While British experts were discussing the military aids that would be done to Turkey on the one hand, the British liables on the other didn't hesitate in specifying that they were waiting from Turkey to go war in near future. Finally, as Germany was stopped in Stalingrad and began to withdraw, the attitude of Soviets began to change along with the change in progress of the war. In the meeting held on 19 October 1943 in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov wanted to put a pressure on Turkey about entrance to the war. By the way, in Moscow meeting a decision was given about usage of Turkish airports by the Allies and about entrance of Turkey to the war till the end of the year 1943. Along with these decisions, British Foreign Minister A. Eden negotiated with Turkish Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu and declared the Alliance proposals to him. However, Turkey rejected those requests with the reason that giving airport to Allies would mean joining to the war. In Tehran Conference, held on 25 November - 1 December 1943 between the Allied leaders, Turkey's case has been hold up in terms of overall Allied strategy. By the end of the conference a common decision was given about the usage of Turkey’s airports by her allies and about Turkey’s joint to the war till 15 February 1944. Inönü was invited to Cairo by Churchill and Roosevelt, as a result of decision given in Tehran, and the decisions of alliance were declared to him. In response, Inönü agreed joining to war in principle for the first time, and wanted to come to a decision about making a joint military plan, completing military aid in advance and the region’s political future because of the discomfort felt about the Soviet Union. Although the Turkish – British military negotiations started after the conference in early January 1944 in Ankara, they were stopped without giving any decision. As the military negotiations remained inconclusive, that led to an increased pressure on Turkey by Allies. England and U.S. wanted Turkey to stop chrome shipment to Germany, so Turkey stopped export of chrome to Germany. Moreover, the German ships that passed from Turkish Straits on 5 June 1944 led to a further breakdown between Turkey and Allies and Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu resigned because of this event. With the Normandy landing on 6 June 1944 Germany got much closer to defeat. Because of that, Allies wanted Turkey to cut off economic and diplomatic relations with Germany, so, on 2 August 1944 Turkey cut off relations with Germany. After that in Yalta Conference, held on 4-11 February 1945 with the aim of determining post-war principles, Turkey come into a question as Stalin set forth Turkish Strait and Montreux Convention. Stalin wanted Foreign Ministers to come up together after Yalta in order to talk this matter, as he claimed that the Montreux Convention became out-of-fashion and that Turkey’s clamp to Soviet Union by closing the Straits in war was injustice. At the conference, it was decided to discuss this matter in the meeting that will be held in London, and to inform Turkey, also. Thus, a condition enquiry about the intensions of Soviet Union on the Straits was done. Another decision given in the Yalta Conference was that, the nations, which would join to the United Nations Conference held on 25 April 1945 in San Francisco as a founding member states, should declare war against Axis before 1 March 1945. So, Turkey become one of the founding member states who abided by the Yalta Conference decisions by declaring war against Germany and Japan on 23 February 1945. Meanwhile, World War II ended with Germany’s surrender on 7 May 1945 and Japan’s surrender on 10 August 1945.
Turkish Foreign Policy after Second World War
As described above, Soviet Union’s policy towards Turkey gained its real nature, finally, at the end of the war, after some changes due to the situations of fronts. Indeed, before the end of the war, Moscow’s Ambassador Molotov, who accepted Selim Sarper, declared that Soviet Union terminated the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, as they believed that it delayed the main changes as a result of being inappropriate about the new conditions occurred after the World War II and the daily ones. In the diplomatic note as a reply, Turkey mentioned that a new deal can be done for the sake of continuity of friendship and good relations between two states. However, after a while it emerged that it would be impossible to have a treaty with Soviet Union if Turkey didn’t give some concessions from territorial integrity and independence. Indeed, on 7 June 1945, Molotov urged to Ambassador Sarper that in order to make a new treaty between two states the Straits must be defeated together, and for providing that naval and land bases in Straits should be given to Soviets, Montreux Convention must be changed and Kars and Ardahan should be given back to Soviet Union. Those unacceptable requests were rejected by Turkish Government, as a result, Soviet Union begun to put a political pressure on Turkey on mid-June 1945. In this environment, in Potsdam Conference, that U.S. and England held with the aim of carrying out the post-war cooperation with Soviet Union, one of the most important issues that were discussed was Turkish Straits’ situation. In the conference, Soviet Union asked for military bases in the Straits by indicating that the Straits’ situation was only a two-sided matter which concerned the Soviet Union itself and Turkey. A year after the Potsdam Conference, on 8 August 1946, Soviet Union gave a diplomatic note to Turkey including opinions about the Straits. In this diplomatic note Soviet Union suggested that Montreux Convention was inadequate in assuring the security of Black Sea states because of the events occurred in World War II. So, proposed that the privilege of editing the transition regime of the Straits should belong to Turkey and Black Sea states, and that the Straits should be defeated jointly by Turkey and the Soviet Union. Turkey, who negotiated with U.S. and England after this diplomatic note, rejected this request. After that, Soviet Union repeated the same requests by giving a second diplomatic note on 24 September. In this environment, Turkey searched for the support of England, with whom it was allied since 1939, and the United States, who emerged as the most powerful state of the world at the end of the war, with the aim of protecting its independence and territorial integrity against the Soviet threat. But at the beginning she couldn’t find the needed support both because Turkey remained neutral at the war and because the Soviet behaviors that provoked a major concern in Turkey didn’t provoke the same reaction in West. However, when Turkey was seeking for U.S.’ diplomatic support, civil war began in Greece and at the same time, depended on that, a threat of communism emerged. Meanwhile, England, giving military aid to Turkey and Greece since World War II, declared that she could not continue to help this states by giving a memorandum to U.S. on 21 February 1947. England proclaimed that independence of those states is important in terms of defense of Western world, therefore, U.S.’ military and economic aid is a must. Getting the British memorandum, U.S. considered the communist regime established in Eastern European countries and the situation of Turkey and Greece. U.S. decided to take action in order to stop Soviet expansionism. In this context, U.S. President Truman read his message on 12 March 1947, which will later take the name of “Truman Doctrine”, and asked the congress for authority of giving military aid to Turkey and Greece. The Law of Help to Turkey and Greece, based on this, inured on 22 May 1947. After that on 12 July 1947 Turkish-American bilateral treaty was signed and U.S began military aid to Turkey. After the Truman Doctrine, which aimed military aid, an economic cooperation treaty was signed on 4 July 1948 between Turkey and U.S. U.S gave economic aid to Turkey between 1949 and 1951 due to the Marshall Plan. This aid would be included to "Joint Defense Program" after 1951.
III. AKP PERIOD
The criteria we will use to be able to evaluate AKP's foreign policy, will be the "traditional" and "basic" foreign policy principles of Turkish foreign policy that were tested and filtered throughout the century. Of course, I think, we have to remind shortly those principles that we say "traditional basic principles": Westernism, keeping the Status Quo, and Legitimacism. (Oran B, 2004 p. 46-53. )
Turkey is a country that has always followed a policy close to the west Europe. Both its geopolitical position and Ottomans history, also, Republic's ideological structure has required this.
On the other hand, Turkey is a country founded in too risky geopolitical position. This risky position can bring a big importance, make it a "strategic" country or cause big troubles to it. In such an environment, Turkey, that can be described as “Strategic Medium-sized State (SMS)" which has to keep the Status Quo by saying “Peace in world". This policy has two meanings and two dimensions: 1- ) to protect existing boundaries. This dimension means that Turkey would not cope with irredentism (irredentism: a country's policy to add the lands near its borders on which its cognates are located to its own lands), would stay away from it, otherwise it would endanger the motherland. Indeed, except the Hatay instance, Turkey applied this policy fussily and resolved Cyprus problem that posed a danger of being like Hatay .2-) to protect balances: Turkey doesn't want any country’s being hegemonic enough to have monopoly in Turkey's region. Because a strategic SMS can breathe only in balance, otherwise it would become satellites nation or at least its "non-relative autonomy" would decay, Turkey (the Ottoman Empire and Byzantine) has always seeked for balance. This balance should be established in the best way between West and anti-West (e.g. England and Russia, U.S. and SSCB), if not among West’s own sects (e.g. England and France, Britain and Germany).
Thirdly, Turkey would observe the principle of Legitimacism because as it's a medium-sized country, it needs law and law can only be omitted by a hegemonic state (e.g. a state that influences whole world alone with its army, culture and economy) only for a while. In this case, Turkey would either obey the international law (Legitimacy) strictly or would behave appropriate to the "notebook covered black" so as to give the impression that it obeys this rule, at least: it would take permission from the regional power or hegemonic country when it would get out of line. Indeed, in Hatay event, creating the exception in Turkish foreign policy as it is an irredentism, this permission was get from England.
The Initial Disadvantages of AKP
Now we can begin to discuss our topic. However, before that, we need to know, shortly, the facts-documents-interpretations between the years 1990 and 2001.
Firstly, U.S. is a “hegemonic power “and is constructing an “international law”. Turkey ,on the other hand, is a Medium –Sized State, which has built its basic policy ( very accurately) on equilibrist way of keeping status quo……Secondly, (……) if this “humanitarian interventions” chain takes the form of a model, Turkey wouldn’t be able to leave that, even if she wants, and gradually would index its foreign policy to U.S. (……). Thirdly, this threat is more serious for a country whose economic dependence on outside has fantastically increased. It can be easily said that, Turkey ,who became so depended to outside that it made country long for the 1950-60 period, is faced with a serious risk of congestion in current situation and can be compelled to do actions that it will not want to do. So, when AKP came into power Turkey’s internal and external situation was very constricted. According to statistics of late 2001, all of the collected taxes were insufficient to pay the interests of debt and %2-3 of it remained left. External debt was 150 billion dollars and internal debt was 100 billion dollars. Moreover, Turkey remained morally obliged to U.S. as this country turned Apo over to Turkey in February 1999. Besides, Turkey was alone in the region and the international plan. Turkey never had good relations with Arabs and EU and the problems about Armenian Projects, Cyprus and the establishment of Kurdish State in North Iraq made it too difficult to reject U.S’ excessive demands. The AKP, who came to power in November 2002, found, in her presence, Bush’s administration’s project about invasion to Iraq and inexhaustible demands of U.S. connected with this. On the other hand, during the process of EU integration (i.e. democratization) launched by Ecevit coalition in October 2001, the reforms encountered with a very serious resistance of Sevres Paranoia (Oh! If democratization comes, our country would crumble.). Moreover, when AKP came to power it was a party that has nearly any experience about state and its “legitimacy” was even discussed. Only 1, 5 years passed over. I always thought that, if we add all of the situations above to the shortness of this time, it is too early to evaluate AKP’s foreign policy in terms of philosophy and macro consistency. Therefore, I believe that in recent years ,in which Turkey carries out an internal and external comprehensive shell replacement operation, its possible to revise AKP’s foreign policy limitedly; only by considering some sample events. We can order these as follows:
1- ) EU Integration Packs, 2- ) the Invasion of Iraq 3- ) Cyprus Solution.
Here we will inquire if AKP complied with traditional basic principles of Turkish diplomacy in these 3 events.
EU Integration Packs
( URL: )
As I said above, AKP didn't initiate this process. The process began in Ecevit (coalition) period in Nejat Arseven's, Minister of State Responsible for Human Right, time. In October, 34 Constitutional changes were made and in February 2002, 3 EU Integration Packs were enacted. When AKP come to power alone in November 2003, Ertuğrul Yalıçınbayır was promoted to the same position. He went on with a greater desire, momentum and will and, unlike formerly, by taking the chance of working without the other coalition parties' lanyards. In due course, 4 EU Integration Packs and a ten-claused Constitutional Pack were enacted. Varieties of circulars were added to this. (Radikal, 19.6.2004) It can be said that in the Sevres Paranoia atmosphere, in which 1930 modeled national-state mentality handled all parties, no other party than AKP could enact those packs so eagerly, furthermore, in an atmosphere in which the AKP faced with a huge bureaucracy resistance that can not be compared with the previous government.
Reasons of AKP's Adherence of EU
( URL: http://www.emekdunyasi.net )
It may seem odd for an "Islamic" party to do something like that. However, it was logical.
1- ) AKP was minority itself. Recently, in March 2004 local elections, votes of Islamic core was around %10 while the party get %34 of votes, the rest was votes of protest. Therefore, AKP understood what other minorities felt and was behaving fast in human and minority's rights.
2- ) %24 vote of protest was quickly directing the party towards EU, so, towards seeking for democracy and prosperity.
3- ) AKP and EU's opponents were common: the one's that were against democracy with the reason that "the country would be fragmented" and some of the military-civilian bureaucracy.
4- ) The most important is that, AKP wasn't crippled with nationalist ideology unlike the previous governments, it wasn't wearing the blinkers of this ideology. It didn't see the events as they should be but as they are.
Kemalism, which was a progressive ideology in 1940's, didn't fall into a grave error as in the 2000's. It understood that the country's sub-identities' expressing themselves would not bring fragmentation, unlike this, would bring transition from mandatory citizenship to voluntarily citizenship, and would contribute to the " indivisible integrity of the country with its state and nation". If we didn’t add these
very important elements of “infrastructure” to those elements of “superstructure”,the topic we talk about would be left in suspense: 5-) Anatolia's “Islamic” capital declared itself as pro-national capitalism and opposed to international capital (European Union,etc.) until 1980's.
During that period, this capital was subjected to the large capital represented by TUSIAD. But after a point, “intermestic” (international-domestic,local organisations' establishment of international links)relations were made possible by Özal's economic policies and globalization. Asa a result of this, this capital wasn't added to capitalism and didn't arose economical objections. It changed its general attitude according to this. For example, although anti-Semitism have always been one of the main themes of Islamics, members of MUSIAD,that represents Islamic capital (Private Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, many people think that here M is “ Muslim” and maybe the choice of this letter is in order to make people think like that) participated ,but didn't drink, to the Israel Consultate's cocktail in honor of 50th anniversary of establishment in May 1998 in İstanbul because ,for a while, Israel was an important strategic and economic partner for Turkey. This infrastructural reason caused a great contribution to AKP's foreign policy about being adherent to EU. Though AKP couldn't find courage to go over basic points in itself. For example, it couldn't bring a change to the “ indivisibility of the nation “substance (and its reflection to the law of the state) of the 3/1 clause of Constitution, which continually led to closure of parties with the reason of creating minorities”, that would prevent being understood as eliminating democracy. Or, it couldn't touch the clause of Radio and Television Organizations Organization and Public Law that says publication would be done in Turkish, as a rule, and this publication in this case occurred tragicomic situations. Even, it was said that the doors of the building are 5 cm narrow in order to block language courses. Until 2003, the goods of Private Property and of non-Muslim foundations, in a country that Lausanne is valid, were confiscated freely of structure and after this date the Directorate General for Foundations showed a “wholeheartedly” resistances for not registering these titles.(Oran B, 2004 p.101-110.)
However,that event was a great success. It's not easy to overcome resistance from the military and civil bureaucracy in a country where Sevres Paranoia stalks. Indeed, EU offiacials have also understood that and began to praise what have been done.
The Moment EU Needs Turkey
Meanwhile, EU collided with two very important events : 1-) It was scared of U.S' invasion to Iraq because at this event, as a result of desperation that it doesn't have any military dimensions, members were divided into two parts.
2-) Unlike the U.S.,experienced Europe saw that in the fright atmosphere that “Islamic” terrorism brought,it is impossible to kill mosquitoes by bombing the swamp. These two very important cases alarmed EU,just like the Korean War in 1950 alarmed the U.S,and heightened Turkey's strategic importance for the organization: Turkey would both give the opportunity to the EU,devoid of military dimension,to reach the crisis areas and would contribute to the EU to get rid of the evil of terrorism by proving that democracy could comply with Islam.
These situations provided a great advantage to AKP (and of course,to Turkey). All of the important EU authorities, especially Verheugen, began to express those two situations and to say that Turkey began to have great importance for them. When the stable Eu Integration Packs that we mentioned were added to that, EU come up closer to Turkey. In December 2004, the necessary conditions for giving negotiation date to Turkey have occurred. In fact, it was definite for a careful observer since May 2003 that this date for negotiation would be given. (Oran B, 2004 p.183-188. ) As a result, I believe that AKP's EU policy is stable and successful.
The Invasion of Iraq
( URL: http://www.guzelresimler.net )
The policy that AKP implemented after Iraq's invasion by U.S. Showed serious fluctuations and discrepancies in that atmosphere. On 6 February 2003, AKP passed the first missive, which allows to modernize the Turkish ports and airports in order to get U.S' soldiers and equipment, from the Parliamentary with 308 votes against 193. Immediately after this, negotiations with Bush administration about U.S. Soldiers' arrival started while the preparations were being done about a second missive which foresaw that U.S. Soldiers can make bases for attack to Iraq in Turkish lands, on the other hand, Turkish forces' invasion to North Iraq. In this negotiations, in which economic elements (U.S' aid to Turkey) were emphasized, Turkey gave hard times to EU diplomats. Even, the negotiations about nearly 1600 technical personnel of U.S. That will come for port and airport modernization and about the law that they will be subjected went on nearly 15 days. (Oran B, 2003 p.10-25. )
This had two different effects opposed to each other. On one hand, in the long lasting negotiations U.S. Lost a long time and meanwhile anti-American public opinion grew hugely in Turkey and international area. On the other hand, this economic aid negotiations led to an atmosphere that can be expressed as “Merchant Turkey” in outer world; Turkey gave the expression as trying to sell itself as expensive as it can in order to give permission for rape to another's territory. Aside from these effects, AKP willy-nilly gave that image in those contentious negotiations :” When those negotiations are settled amicably, the U.S. Military can come.”U.S,getting this message like that, cluttered naval forces to the open sea of İskenderun airport.
March 2003 Denial Missive and Its Contradictions :
( URL: http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr )
During this time, the missive that allows 62.000 foreign soldiers to come to Turkey and Turkey to send soldiers to North Iraq was submitted to the Parliament on March 1 and has been voted. 533 deputies took part in the session that AKP released its own group (didn't take a group decision) and it was a hidden voting. In this voting, in which its calculated that AKP diminished 97 votes, there were 264 approve, 250 disapprove,19 noncommittal votes and missive was denied as the required absolute majority couldn't be provided.
These results led to greater anger in U.S. Authorities as they believed that they were cheated. On the other hand, it caused a feeling in AKP that its compelled to U.S. in a sense. Meanwhile AKP was under another pressure, even two ones: 1) A group that took the support of major media behind repeated aloudly that Turkey should join the Iraq invasion alongside U.S. and that Turkey would gain a big profit from this.(see footnote 14) Some set forth this “necessity” by spreading fear. For example, Cengiz Candar said “ If Turkey doesn't invade Iraq it will will be fragmented.” (Düzel N, 13 Ekim 2003, Radikal) 2-) Some journalists, who reminded that Turkey has receivables from Mosul petrol, didn't hesitate setting forth that in this hard situation of Iraq,Turkey must suppress about this issue (Oran B, 2003 p.269-271). This very important denial decision had very important results. Firstly, Turkey gained self-confidence. According to public opinion polls, the people who were % 85,9 up 94 against attacks,liked their parliamentary for the first time. The world understood that Turkey is not a “banana republic” . Although unwillingly, international media, the public and various countries released the “mercenary” treatment they have already made to Turkey and indicated their appreciations ,”the Turkish Parliament rejected bribe” entitled articles began to be published. The American cartoon that formerly ,during negotiations, draw Turkey as a belly dancer dancing in front of American Generals and making them insert money to her bra, added a second frame to the same cartoon after this denial decision; the same dancer was rounding an American general down from the table with a hip movement. In another cartoon while Bush was saying “ We want to see democracy in Iraq” in the first frame, in the second one he was saying “....but not in Turkey.” Its open to debate whether her joint , on 6 March 2003, to the France-Germany-Russia trio in terms of rejecting the occupation in China is related with this decision or not. Another result of this denial decision was AKP's being afraid of it. This fear increased with North Iraqi Kurd's protest against Turkey. Meanwhile, the American troops in İskenderun began to move towards the border. It was understood from the revelation General Staff made after this event that after the adoption of the first missive, General Staff signed a secret agreement with U.S.,which was understood to have been signed on 8 February, and gave the right to construct a “central logistics base” in the region among Mardin-Kızıltepe-Nusaybin-Oyalı ,also decided that U.S. military equipment will remain in region “till the end of the war”. Government, after a while, would deport 3 Iraqi diplomats, due to EU's request,reasoning that they have “activities
incompatible with their missions” and would make statements that troops would be send to Iraq. As today is very early and the documents didn't occur yet, it isn't certain from where this attitude of Government derived. It could have derived from fear from U.S., from General Staff's plan about taking PKK under control and invading Mosul,or could have derived from both of these. But, it's clear that if there was a General Staff pressure , AKP didn't come or couldn't come against it. At least, fear of a Kurdish State in North Iraq affected Turkey's actions very much and led AKP to have contradictory attitudes. Let's add that major newspapers, TOBB and TUSIAD, so Turkey's bourgeoisie continually stated that if Turkey invade Iraq the business would refresh,otherwise would incur losses. Also, army supported sending troops.
The Gift of North Iraq Kurds to Turkey
However, U.S. who decided to enter Iraq only from South, changed her attitude especially with the pressure of North Iraqi Kurds:she said “ If you enter North Iraq, there is a risk of battle among your soldiers, Kurds and American forces.” According to American officials' pronounce, U.S. installed special codes to her planes in order to find out the friendly powers and if Turkey invades to North Iraq one-sidedly (ie,without U.S' permission) she may be accidentally shot. Meanwhile, on 20 March, a third missive was voted in the Parliament and was accepted with 322 votes against 202 disapprove votes. In the missive, in which AKP diminished 40 votes, they allow sending Turkish Army Forces to North Iraq and using the Turkish airspace for a period of six months to the foreign forces. In fact, the same day, the U.S attack to Iraq began. After this event, AKP's fluctuation would go on. The Prime Minister Gül would sometimes give statements about invading to Iraq and sometimes about not invading to it. In this environment, in all televisions, retired generals and “civil generals” were busy with explaining and analyzing from where, how much and how strong the U.S. army would hit. In this national hysteria environment, General Staff was in position that wants the war at least. However all this cries of war would lessen when U.S. and England began to compel and would shut up with the shock that occupiers had after the fall of Baghdad with the development of civil resistance.( However, even today, in which occurred that the U.S. attack is only based on lies,(29 June 2004),and even when the Bush administration gave the responsibility of Iraq to the civil administration of Iraq,which was assigned by itself two days earlier such as in the way of “give-get over”,none of the war decoys and the ones saying” we want our money from Mosul”couldn't show the courage and honesty to say “we made the wrong analysis”.Turkey would get rid of entering to Iraq and,so, from letting this great trouble in for that the U.S. soldiers increasingly stay under by a process of dialectics. All during this process the incident that shocked Turkey and affected her behaviors most was the possibility of establishment of Kurdish state in North Iraq, because Turkey wasn't sure from her own Kurds and knew that she couldn't make them happy. AKP, on the other hand,couldn't suffer from this fear, as well as, was compressed between fearing from U.S. and an illegitimate attack made to a Muslim country. The government has showed a very unstable behavior.
Solution of Cyprus Problem
In contrast to down-output and unstable attitudes that AKP had during invasion of Iraq, its policy according to the Annan Plan,offered for a solution in Cyprus, was the same with the EU Integration Packs; clear, stable and positive. The Sevres Paranoia that gained action during EU Integration Packs,was the same as well :”You want to do give-get rid of in Cyprus but you can't. In addition, Cyprus has a vital importance for defense of Anatolia.”This attitude was diverging from the traditional attitude of Turkish foreign policy,keeping the Status Quo and Legitimacism, as denying a solution in Cyprus and Saying “the solution is insolubility” meant including Cyprus to Turkey ,in a manner, and was officially expansionism. On the other hand, Turkey's retention of island was an attitude that can't be defensed in means of international law and was a big hit to Turkey's legitimacist foreign policy. In July 1974 operation to Cyprus,Turkey was legally justified because in the 4th article of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee it was mentioned that Turkey has the right to intervene when she thinks that constitutional order is in danger ,and used this right when Samson pulse reduced the legal head of state, Makarios. But when the constitutional order was given back,there remained any legal basis for Turkish Armed Forces to stay in the island. On the other hand, there occurs the question that “ if the island is essential for the defense of Anatolia,before the operation of the Turkish Armed Forces on island in 1974, how could you defend Anatolia?” Moreover, if Cyprus is essential for the defense of Anatolia, Egypt is also essential for the defense of Cyprus and this line can be extended towards South Africa.AKP resisted all those pressures consistently and determinedly. He supported the Annan Plan and got its result: When Turkish Cypriots said “yes” to the plan, contrary to the Greek Cypriots,the great isolation that Cyprus brought ended. On the contrary, Western pressure on Greek Cypriots began. Since 1974, for the first time, Cyprus released from being a major headache for Turkey. In addition ,Turkey's peaceful attitude was pointed as an example and become one of the most important elements that improved relations with EU.
Conclusion
Here, I turn back to what I said at beginning of the article:
It is too early to subject AKP's foreign policy for a general analysis. Moreover, when the AKP came to power the political environment was very negative and all these negative things saddled with the party. Its hard for a state that has more than 250 billion dollars debt to be strong in foreign policy. However, it can be said that,up to now, AKP's foreign policy conducted in accordance with Turkey's basic (and ideal) principles of foreign policy:Westernism,keeping the Status Quo and Legitimacism. These 3 examples that we examined suggests the same thing. Its appropriate to Westernism as EU-axis policy was followed without a compromise and strongly. Its appropriate to keeping the Status Quo and Legitimacism because the problem was solved not with a kind of annexation but with a EU-U.S.-UN axed international solution.(“protecting the borders the same” and “avoiding from irredentism”).Also, they paid close attention in protecting the “protecting the borders” line of keeping the Status Quo,because ,AKP both keep the relations with “eastern” countries,especially Iran and Syria, and rejected U.S' mentioning them as “terrorist state” and wanted to balance U.S. by approaching EU. In addition, they tried ,as possible it is in such an environment,to raise the political autonomy against U.S. by declaring that if the 8,5 billion dollars loan isn't freed from the political term of ”Turkey's not invading to Iraq stand-alone”,they wouldn't use it. All these are vital for a strategic country like Turkey in means of SMS.
This quest for balance in Turkey, in such a country walking on a string all time, seems to depend on both AKP's domestic performance,especially in economy,and on the other hand, on the success that AKP will show in approaching to EU.
Conclusion of conclusion: I am convinced that AKP's foreign policy suits to the historical lines,with the shape that is implemented up to now,and is positive.