The flow of argument I will use to identify the factors that account for weakness in the UK Parliament is as follows:
1.Set a frame of reference to identify weakness
2.Identify weak actions by the UK Parliament
3.Attribute causal factors for these weak actions
The final action should directly answer the questions and the previous stages should help to ensure a cohesive argument.
The first context I will use to identify weakness is a chronological one. The notion of Parliamentary decline seems to be supported by the words of John Smith who said ‘Parliament is weak in this country. I’ve been in it for twenty-two years and I think it’s got weaker every single year I’ve been in it.’ This quote comes from the dialogue of a Charter 88 meeting. There are many phenomena that support this statement the most prominent in my opinion is the absence of a successful no confidence motion during the last 22 years. The ultimate prerogative of Parliament is to withdraw support for the government and force the election of a new ministry. In 1979 this occurred when the incumbent Labour government lost their majority after a series of by elections and subsequently had the equivalent of a no confidence motion carried against them. Distant history records that no confidence motions were far more frequent between 1832-67 ten administrations fell because the Commons withdrew its support.
The reason Parliament has become weaker in this respect is due to the increased majorities governments have carried during the last 22 years of elections. Between 1979 and the present day the average government majority has been 110 seats, during the 6 elections and 20 years prior to 1979 the average government majority was just 40 seats. The increase in Government majorities has impinged upon The House of Commons’ ability to elect a ministry, to legislate and to be a potent check to the executive.
Parliament has less influence in choosing the Prime Minister now than it used to. Recent reforms in the Tory Party Constitution and existing provisions in the Labour Party rules have meant that the present Prime Minister and the present Leader of the Opposition have been only partially chosen by MPs and Lords. The other voting power was held by party members and this process of democratising political parties makes Parliament less able to ‘elect a ministry’ and thus weaker overall. In a wider sense the growth of corporate political parties has created weaknesses in Parliament, this increase in party cohesion of the last century has reduced the legislative influence of Parliament, which is now largely controlled by Government. This growing weakness is attributable in part to the increasing complexity of legislation and the decline in local or private Bills, which gave individual members a chance to legislate.
The House of Lords has also suffered a decline in power during the last century and in particular during the last decade. Manifestations of this weakness are evident in the 1911 Parliament Act that subjugated the authority of the Lords beneath that of Commons. The main effect of the act was to ensure that the Lords could only delay legislation not stop it completely. The Act was compounded by the 1958 reforms that legislated for the creation of life peers appointed by the government. The first reform placed the Lords increasingly under Commons control, which by proxy was executive control. The 1958 Act meant that the government of the day could slowly fill the Lords House with those affiliated to the party. In tandem they made the Lords a weaker institution that was more easily led by the executive of the day in issues of legislation and scrutiny.
The diminishing stature of the House Of Lords and the implied weakness in Parliament as a whole is a result of the unrepresentative nature of the House. Without the same democratic legitimacy as the Commons the Lords are unable to provide a strong checking force to the impulses of the Lower House. At best the House of Lords is an inertial damper acting to reduce the rate at which statutes and Bills can be passed. At worst it is a pawn of the Commons, vulnerable to the policies of changing government. This is clearly demonstrated in the recent abolition of 640 hereditary peers. The Lords were so weak relative to the Commons that they were unable to preserve their largest constituency of members. This fact is largely due to the Salisbury convention, which dictates that peers should not vote against Bills that formed part of the winning Election Manifesto (which in 1997 contained the Lords Reform) again emphasising the primacy of the Commons.
Developments over the last 30 years have also diminished the stature of the Lower House. The Commons is now less able to perform legislative functions unfettered. Influence from above comes as a result of the 1973 entry into the EU, part of this Union is the acceptance of the supremacy of European Law which has become more important as the Single European Act of 1986 and the Human Rights Convention have been implemented. The first act overrules previous British statute on Trade descriptions and most notably obliges traders to use metric units. The Human Rights Convention has made a more profound dent in the powers of the UK Parliament. This is demonstrable in the present legislative session where the Government supported by Parliament is attempting to enact anti-terrorist legislation surrounding immigrants and asylum seekers. The Government’s current policy drafts have been deemed by some in contravention of the European Human Rights Act. In this instance Parliament’s weakness is a direct result of joining a supra-national body to which power has been handed.
Parliament is also subject to legislative interference from below, the process of Scottish and Welsh devolution has placed significant legislative power with the first nation and a smaller degree with the second. Both packages of devolution were approved by referendum and this indicates a desire for increased local power amongst the two populations. The Scottish Parliament has a degree of autonomy on tax, education, health and other issues but the central weakness it exposes in the UK Parliament is known as the West Lothian question. This question interrogates the legitimacy of allowing Scottish MPs to vote on issues in England that English MPs have no influence on in Scotland. Parliament is now less able to accurately express the will of those who elected it. The resultant weakness is a result of confused power jurisdictions and this confusion arises because a non-unitary or partially federal state is being governed as a unitary one.
Conclusions about the weakness of Parliament over a historical period are difficult to draw; the general trend seems to be of diminishing influence with respect to the Executive. Perhaps this trend is valid if we extrapolate from the Classic Liberal days of the middle 19th Century but recent history has presented a more fragmented pattern of events. Arguably the most weakening measure to Parliament was enacted for the 1945-1949 Parliament. During this period of immense legislative upheaval Clement Atlee removed the time slots for Private Members’ Bills eliminating the ability of those in Parliament but out of government to legislate. So when accounting for Parliament’s weakness we should explore the distant past as much as we do the recent.
The second context I will use to identify weaknesses in the UK Parliament is an international one. The countries I shall compare and contrast the UK Parliament with are the USA and France. Direct parallels can be drawn between the bicameral systems in the UK and the USA with the House of Commons being analogous to the House of Representatives and the House of Lords being analogous to the Senate.
Immediately the UK Parliament seems deficient in a legislative capacity, not in a theoretical sense of what can be achieved but a real sense of how much influence does the Parliament have in creating legislation. Congress regularly creates taxation, borrowing and military Bills whereas the UK Parliament usually only scrutinises and approves them. This profound difference in legislative initiative shows the weakness of the UK Parliament as a largely reactive rather than proactive force in legislation. This difference in legislative procedure can be attributed to the absence of a codified constitution in the UK that separates the branches of government.
This direct comparison can be applied solely between the Upper Houses to reveal a weakness in the in the House Of Lords. The Senate can block legislation outright and does not have it’s structure or composition determined by the Lower House. In contrast the House of Lords cannot block legislation indefinitely and has had packages of structural reform imposed by the House of Commons. In comparison it can be seen that the reason for the relative weakness of our Upper House is the undemocratic nature of the Lords. This factor is reiterated in an international context because it is so important in explaining the weakness of the House of Lords.
Comparisons between the impact of the judiciary and supra-national agreements in the work of American and British Parliaments highlight weaknesses in both Parliaments. Both legislatures are subordinate to the mutual defence clause in the NATO treaty that takes away one of the constitutional responsibilities of Congress, namely to declare war. Both Parliaments are subject to the scrutiny of the judiciary, in the UK the High Court can rule a Statutory Instrument is being used improperly or that an act contravenes the European Human Rights Act. Similarly in the USA an act can be declared unconstitutional and hence be struck down. In the USA the power of the Supreme Court is wider and deeper than that of the High Court in the UK and in the context of judicial interference the UK Parliament could be judged stronger than the US.
The final international comparison is made with France and it also shows that in certain respects the UK Parliament is stronger than foreign counterparts. Controversial and contentious legislation can be passed rapidly through the French Parliament by invoking Article 49 of the French Constitution, which allows the Ministry to call an immediate vote of confidence purely upon the text of the bill. This measure eliminates the need for debate and scrutiny of the legislation and renders the French Parliament quite weak. This type of measure would only be acceptable in UK Parliament under exceptional circumstances of national crisis. Usually therefore the UK Parliament has significantly greater constitutional powers of scrutiny than it’s French counterpart does.
The conclusion with respect to the truth of the first premise is also unclear in the second context. Making international comparisons does not only reveal weaknesses in the UK Parliament it uncovers strengths in equal measure. However with respect to the factors that account for these weaknesses some themes have arisen regularly. The most salient factors that appear by making international comparisons are the absence of a codified constitution and the undemocratic nature of the House of Lords.
These points can be expanded to make a broader conclusion about the causal factors that account for the UK Parliament’s weakness. The House of Commons exhibits weakness largely because no codified constitution exists to grant it with protected legislative powers and because the Commons system is dominated by cohesive and centralised political parties. Even the growth in power and scope of Select Committees can still be interpreted as a weakness if there is a large government majority. Through this macro majority they will enjoy a commensurate micro majority on the committee. However in Parliaments with smaller majorities the Select Committee has the ability to emancipate Parliament as a whole giving it much greater legislative discretion.
The House of Lords seems to be more obviously weak because the decline or deficiency in Upper House power can be clearly plotted in a historical context from the Act of 1911 onwards and in an International context relative to the Senate. Principles of subordination to the Commons such as the Salisbury convention seem to emerge out of undemocratic nature of the House. Yet even these strong indications of weakness can be tempered by the success the Lords has in bringing matters to the public attention. A recent private Lords motion sought to reduce Junior Doctors working weeks to a maximum of 72 hours although the Bill was unsuccessful it did raise the profile of the issue with the electorate. It is for precisely this reason that I am unwilling to characterise the UK parliament as weak, the strength of the Houses is sometimes invisible as we are unaware of Government ideas that disappear in consultation with Parliament. Therefore I would prefer to classify the constitutional holes and democratic problems of Parliament as flaws in an important system, not symptoms of an inherently weak one.
Bibliography
Parliament Today (2nd ed) – Adonis
The Commons In Perspective – Norton
The Changing Constitution – Oliver
The New Select Committees – Drewry
Modernising The Commons – Seaton
Reforming The House of Lords: A Sceptical View - Bogdanor