‘A federal state is a political contrivance intended to reconcile national unity and power within the maintenance of ‘state rights’.’ (Dicey, The Law of the Constitution)
A demonstration of the success of a federal system in uniting different peoples is seen in Switzerland. With ‘complex religious, linguistic and territorial divisions’ (Budge et al 1997: 76), the system differs from classic US federalism but offers a solution to the unification of a multi-ethnic society through ethnic federalism. The negative reasons for the formation of federations provides closer checks on power and are ‘necessarily conscious creations’, emerging from a settlement, for example, the 1787 meeting of 13 state representatives in America. In contrast to this, devolution is merely a process that arises when regional disparities exert a high level of pressure on the centre. In this sense, devolution has to have an end ambition and cannot survive as a static situation.
The practical differences of the systems also explain the constancy of the federal system compared to the tension within a devolved state between the centre and the periphery and the subsequent need for change. Burgess and Gagnon (1993: 6) argue that ‘…constitutional entrenchment is therefore the key to their political, economic and cultural self-preservation.’ and it is the protected position of the states within a federation and their ‘guaranteed voice in policy-making’ (Hague and Harrop 2001: 202) that allow a federal system to be successful and sustainable. With the addition of mutual economic and military benefits, some areas of state autonomy and the enhanced protection of a constitutional court, federal states possess no desire to change. It creates a stable environment with the bonus of collective security;
‘We must all hang together or most assuredly we shall all hang separately.’(Franklin)
In a devolved state, however, there is no protecting clause in the constitution as to the limits of central power nor a facility to protect the rights of the individual regions. Here lies the greatest difference between federalism and devolution, as argued by Heywood (2002: 167); ‘although their territorial jurisdiction may be similar, devolved bodies have no share in sovereignty; their responsibilities and powers are derived from, and are conferred by, the centre.’ Compared to the codified protection of a federal state and the inability of the centre to redefine the distribution of responsibilities, devolved bodies exist with the threat of dissolution. ‘The prospect of rescission is a part of the constitutional and political backdrop against which the new devolved institutions operate,’ is the factor that O’Connor (2001: 11) attributes the temporary nature of devolution to. Federalism is based on compromise whereas devolution is offered as a placatory option in order to silence the regional rebels.
Federalism and devolution both have negative implications yet those of the latter do create long-term, unsolvable difficulties. Working on the premise that ‘federalism represents a true division of power, whereas devolution is simply a delegation’ (O’Connor 2001: 10), it can be suggested that devolution merely increases regional tensions and catalyses the need for full independence. In contradiction to Enoch Powell’s statement that ‘power devolved is power retained’ (Hague and Harrop 2001: 210), devolution is not a satisfactory solution for staunch nationalists, such as the Scottish Nationalist Party, and infuriates these factions. Although it can be said that devolution promotes greater popular legitimacy as a more democratic and efficient government is produced, there is always the yearning for total autonomy. In addition, there is a loss of common citizenship and asymmetrical devolution, as seen in the UK, fuels further political and regional conflict. Keating and Elcock (1998: 4) claim that instability is also created as the state undergoes changes in the way it is governed, altering the relationships between the constituent parts and between the citizens and governing bodies. Criticisms of federalism should also be examined, yet it is the ‘dynamic nature of federalism’ (Burgess and Gagnon 1993: 10) that allows this system to resolve issues within central legislation. Although federalism can be said to be too complex to implement necessary change rapidly, the lack of overload at the centre provides freedom for the central executive to manage larger issues, such as foreign policy and crisis situations. Due to the interdependence of the states, and the mutual benefits gained from the system, there is no challenge or yearning for change. This creates a sense of stability within the federation and allows productive coexistence to take place.
Although it is argued that the UK, in its devolved state, does possess some ‘quasi-federal characteristics’ (Heywood 2002: 167), it can also be maintained that the devolution that has taken place since 1997 centralises the government further. Bonney suggests that much of the decisions made by the Scottish Executive are ‘slightly tartanised versions of UK government policy’ (2002: 135), especially for voluntary sector and local government policy and that it is proving more difficult to combine the broad ethos of UK government policy with the more specific demands of the devolved bodies. This could be due to the reluctance of the central government, Westminster, to fully release power and grant autonomy to the regions. Comparing the American system with the UK, O’Connor upholds the following statement;
‘…while the US must manage centripetal forces that threaten to erode the rightful role of the states, the UK must deal with the centrifugal forces that make its unitary status, long an axiom of British Constitutional law, an uncertainty.’ (2001: 13)
For the purpose of examining the differences between the systems, in a similar way in which the power is transferred from above or from below, it can be argued that, for federalism, destructive forces pull inwards, whereas devolution creates a pressure from the outside.
In conclusion, although devolution can be seen to be a ‘mere delegation of power from a superior political body to an inferior’, in a political sense, this system offers a window of opportunity for the regional assemblies and a chance to put pressure on the central government. Therefore, taking into account the causes for, the practicalities and implications of federalism and devolution, the primary and most significant difference is that whilst federalism can be viewed as a successful system for a socially diversified state, devolution is not a long-term solution to the same problem. Once power is placed in the hands of regional leaders, and some degree of democratic legitimacy is acquired, it is near impossible to dissolve or weaken the assemblies. Although, ultimately, chief power resides at the centre, compared to the equal distribution within a federation and its codified legislation;
‘devolution is a road with no logical stopping point short of independence’ (O’Connor 2001: 14)
Bibliography
Bogdanor, V. (1999) Devolution in the United Kingdom Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bonney, N. (2002) ‘Scottish Devolution: What lies beneath?’ The Political Quarterly vol 73 (2) pp 135-143
Budge, I et al. (1998) The New British Politics Harlow: Longman.
Budge, I et al. (1997) The Politics of the New Europe: Atlantic to Urals London: Longman
Burgess, M. and Gagnon. (1993) Comparative Federalism and Federation London: Harvester Wheatsheaf
Dunleavy, P. (1987) Theories of the state: the politics of liberal democracy Basingstoke: Macmillan Education
Hague, R. and Harrop, M. (2001) Comparative Government and Politics Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Heywood, A. (2002) Politics (2nd edition) Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Keating, M. and Elcock, H. (ed) (1998) Remaking the Union: devolution and British politics in the 1990s London: Frank Cass.
O’Connor (2001) ‘Altered States: Federalism and Devolution at the ‘Real’ turn of the Millenium’ Cambridge Law Journal vol 60 (3) pp 493-510
