What problems have the SPD faced in gaining political credibility and power in the post-wa

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What problems have the SPD faced in gaining political credibility and power in the post-wa

The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) re-emerged after the War as the only major former Weimar political party, its organisation strong and its credentials impeccable (in March 1933 it was the only party to vote against Hitler's Enabling Act, and Schumacher had been incarcerated for 10 years under the Nazis). With the old order discredited by its fascist associations, the SPD felt it had a national claim to govern, being, it believed, the party with the credibility and policies most suitable to take on this responsibility as democratic politics resumed at the national level. Its membership had been quickly re-established at a grass-roots level, an executive leadership committee had been maintained in exile and, on a wider level, socialists in all European countries had high expectations that their policies would be the ones implemented to lead the continent along the lengthy road to post-war reconstruction (Smith,1990,Conradt,1986,Carr,1987).

        The SPD failed however, to lived up to these expectations falling far short of an absolute majority in the 1949 parliamentary elections and clearly losing out to Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the 1953 elections (Conradt,1986). How can this be accounted for as there seemed "an undeniable relevance" with regard the SPD's 'democratic socialism' to immediate post-war Germany. The necessity of active state intervention in a planned economy, in a democratic framework, seemed essential if German society was to be rebuilt and the mistakes of the past were not to be repeated, yet the SPD failed to become Germany's major governing party, what explanation can be offered?

        The failings can be attributed to a number of factors. Firstly the uncompromising strategy of party leadership taken up by Schumacher, convinced that his party were the rightly heirs to the German political estate he was determined that the SPD should achieve power purely on its own terms, and consequently refused to compromise on policy with other parties for fear of risking losing the initiative through too close an association (Smith,1990). However the new CDU proved to be a strong and popular party and objectively it would seem that close co-operation in the government and administration of the Lander would have had beneficial consequences. However, regarding the SPD as primarily a working class party that would inevitably win power through the logic of history, Schumacher refused to co-operate with 'bourgeois' parties (Carr,1987). Consequently, in 1947 with the formation of the Economic Council to run the British and American zones (Bizonia), despite being given a parity of representation with the CDU - reflecting party strength in recent Land elections - Schumacher, with his reputed intransigence, refused to co-operate, allowing the CDU to dominate the Council and secure Erhard's appointment as Economics Director (Carr,1987).

        The free-market economic policies of Erhard, and Adenauer's unexpected appeal were similarly an important factor in the SPD's immediate post-war failure. As it turned out the abolition of rationing and the promotion of free enterprise had a far greater appeal to voters in 1949 than the planned economy demanded by the SPD (Carr,1987).

        A further factor was the SPD's misreading of the mood of the German public on the key issues of foreign and domestic policy. Schumacher understood that the "widely held belief that Social Democracy had always failed to put Germany's interests first" (Smith,1990,p98) was a major obstacle to be overcome if the party was to be successful. As a consequence a strong 'national line' was followed, demanding a fully unified Germany, opposing the policies of the Soviet Union, and also of the Western occupying powers, demanding independence from them and co-operating only on the basis of equality and even then "only if German national interests were not sacrificed" (Smith,1990,p98). The nationalistic stance meant fierce opposition to a swath of the CDU government policies - including rearmament, European integration, negotiation with the Soviets and membership of Nato.

        Domestically his bitter attacks on conservatism, capitalism and Catholicism (both historically and because of its active support for the party's opponents) managed to offend a vast number of potential voters! Structural changes here combined with their anti-clericalism to militate against SPD gains. For with Germany's division the party lost its pre-war stronghold of the Prussian hinterland and in the new Federal Republic the percentage of Catholics increased from 33% (pre-war) to 45%, all of whom were being encouraged by the CDU/CSU to turn against 'godless socialism' (Carr,1987,Conradt,1986).

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        So in terms of both internal and external policy Schumacher's politically intransigent stance was not an electoral asset. Whilst he viewed Adenauer as accepting allied dictates that were not primarily in Germany's best interests and which could jeopardise the potential for reunification, the electorate were strongly supportive of the Chancellor's foreign policy. Adenauer concentrated on making the Federal Republic a significant power within the Nato alliance and a united Europe, believing the division of Germany into 2 separate states made reunification unlikely, and seemed to be in accord with public sentiment. The SPD's persistent commitment to 'old-style' socialism and their ...

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