Which offered the greater challenge to Britain's military and political institutions: the Crimean war or the South African war?

After the war was over, it was glaringly obvious that reforms had to be made.  The problems in supplying the forces in the Crimea with food, weapons and clothing had been partly due to Commissary-General Filder “resisting Raglan’s plea to issue fuel”.  However, it is easy to use Filder as a scapegoat, but as Barnett says: “there must be some sympathy for Filder… it was his task to improvise in the field a complete supply organisation… without instructions”.  It is necessary to agree with Barnett here, as it would be over-simplifying to say one man was to blame.  This issue did however, highlight to the Aberdeen government that reforms were desperately required. The government attempted to make modifications during the Crimean campaign and some progress had been made by 1855.  In the same year the War Committee of the Cabinet had been set up, and it faced the difficult challenge of organizing the war after it had started.  The committee only had four members and so, in theory, reduced the likelihood of disagreement and increased efficiency.  The Times called it “the more immediate conduct of war”.  Olive Anderson thinks that the War Committee of the Cabinet was a success as “its continued existence even after the war suggests that it had proved of value.”  However, its success was only theoretical.  In practice, little had been done to operational efficiency and the British industries remained incapable of producing supplies in spurts to keep up with war efforts and future conflicts.  However, some of the reforms brought on by the Crimean war also affected the military institution in positive ways.  Barrack accommodation was improved, military discipline was toned down and the Act of 1859 and 1867 reduced the use of flogging.  Under Gladstone, more improvements were made with the help of Edward Cardwell, such as reduced spending, changes to regimental structure and new terms for enlistment.  However, even these had flaws.  The new short-term enlistments did not offer or replace a career, and it was still a low wage.  Men had to have two jobs in order to provide for their families.  Ultimately, the reforms that came were “too late to help the army in Crimea.”  Although the reforms had little good consequence, they show that the Crimean war prompted a big challenge to all aspects of the military institution.

The Crimean war also offered a significant challenge to the political institution.  When Parliament met in 1855, the press reports of the war had caused a “dangerous political situation”.  The Aberdeen ministry were responsible for the problems, but were incapable of solving them.  As Anderson says, “Aberdeen was an exceptionally weak Prime Minister” and the party as a whole did not have a prominent war leader.  When Palmerston took over in 1855 many were worried he was no better.  However, by October many believed he was “the master of his cabinet”.  This change in government due to the Crimean war and the effects it had on Britain showed that it had a large impact on the political institution as well as the military.  The government had a reputation for having bad relations with its legislature, and as Anderson says “the efficiency of cabinet government depends… not only upon the internal organisation of the cabinet, but also upon the relations between cabinet and legislature.  This was the aspect of government on which contemporary doubts were gravest before war began.”  On December 12 there was an emergency parliament meeting to pass the law allowing for the enlistment of mercenaries – “proof in itself to many members that military recruitment had been bungled.”  The government’s actions and administration do a lot to explain why the Crimean war was such a blunder.  The administration of war was in a terrible state with lack of clarity, instruction and funds, and so the challenge presented by the Crimean war was larger thank it should have been.

The Crimean war had a big effect on both military and political institutions and the challenge was a great one.  It highlighted the problems and for the first time the British public knew what was happening.  The terrible conditions and constant press reports meant that reform was unavoidable on the government’s part.  However, although the British government made some reforms, they were largely ineffective.  The truth was however, “neither government nor nation was very much interested in the army, except to cheer a victory.”  A consequence of this was that when the South African war broke out in 1899, the “results showed that the reforms had not eradicated Britain’s military weaknesses in a dangerous world.”

When the South African war began the government was still neglecting the British army.  This is evident by the statistics of the deceased and injured.  Out of 450,000 troops, 6,000 were killed in battle, 16,000 died of disease and 23,000 were wounded.  This shows that from the very beginning the South African war had a big impact on the military and they had a great challenge to rise to.  The Boers were obviously not going to be as easy to defeat as was first thought.  Although there was less Boer than British, the deaths were proportionally much fewer.  In 1899, three British armies were beaten and the week was named ‘Black Week’.  It proved that inadequate intelligence and direction was present in fighting this war.  In 1900 there were further defeats.  This shows that the Boer war was becoming a greater challenge to the military institution with every day that passed.  Thomas Pakenham said that between 1815 and 1914 the Boer War was “the longest (two and three-quarters years), the costliest (over £200 million), the bloodiest (at least 22,000 British and 25,000 Boer and 12,000 African lives), and the most humiliating.”  This shows that Pakenham thought the South African war was the greater challenge to the military institution and this is plausible as it had such a big effect on the men themselves and the reputation of the British army.  As Corelli Barnett said: “Once more Britain had to forge the victory of Britain after the war had begun.”  It was pure luck that the Boers had not taken advantage of their early lead had invaded British territories and because of this Britain could just salvage a victory.  After ‘Black Week there were many more volunteers from elsewhere in the British Empire and “it was a sudden demonstration that the British Empire really did exist as a collective military power.”  The fact that Britain had to get extra troops from its empire in order to win the war shows just how substantial a challenge the Boers posed to the British military institution.

However, the British military faced the challenge presented well.  By February 1900 the “military tide had changed.”  Lord Roberts was appointed as Commander-in-Chief and gave the British army the direction they needed.  This is shown by the fact that Paardeberg, Bloemfontein and Transvaal were all annexed to the British crown.  Roberts left South Africa but the war was far from over.  The Boers responded with guerrilla warfare that was partly successful, again raising a challenge.  Roberts’s chief of staff, Kitchener used expensive techniques in order to keep the upper hand.  Concentration camps were also introduced, but were defective.  One in six Boers died in them due to bad sanitation.  This was another challenge the British military institution had to face.  It was not until 1902 that the Boers were worn down and peace negotiations began.

Although the South African war was a great challenge to the military institution, it was more of a challenge to the political institution.  It showed not only the inadequacies of the contemporary government, but also those of the government after the Crimean war and how little had been done during peacetime.  Therefore the South African war posed the greater challenge to the political institution due to the ongoing political challenge of the Crimean war at the time also.  As Pakenham suggests, “the war… damaged the government… [and] had confirmed their reputation for incompetence.”  This is evident, at yet the government decided to hold an election.  They were confident in winning as the pro-Boer opinion was still strong, and the opposition was not.  The liberals were in disarray and completely split three ways.  It was a perfect time to call a general election.  The election itself showed how great a challenge the political institution of Britain faced due to the South African war.  As Richard A Cosgrove said: “At its outset the Boer War presented British authorities with a series of problems whose magnitude negated the experience gained in early imperial wars.”  This shows that one of the factors that meant the South African war was such a significant challenge was that experience from past was simply irrelevant.  The government was dealing with something new, which they now had to face and organize.  They had also instigated an election, which they also had to campaign for and win.  Although they did win, in votes it was a close election: 2.4 million votes for the Tories and 2 million for the Liberals.  The South African war was the obvious tool for both parties to use in their campaigns.  While Chamberlain was saying that every seat for the liberals was a seat for the Boers, Lloyd George was attacking Chamberlain, revealing that his family had shares in ammunitions factories.  This shows that the South African war offered a great challenge to Britain’s political institution particularly during the time of the election.

One cannot say that either of these wars simply presented a greater challenge than the either.  To some extent it is hard to separate the two.  The fact that issues from the Crimean war remained unresolved in 1899 meant that the South African war offered the greater challenge to Britain’s military and political institutions.  The great challenge was also due to its sheer size, death toll and the fact that a general election was held at the time.  However, the Crimean war was also a great challenge to both institutions and was made worse by the evolution of the press and war correspondents.

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Bibliography

• Olive Anderson, A Liberal State at War: English Politics and Economics during the Crimean War, 1967 New York
• Olive Anderson, The Growth of Christian Militarism, English Historical Review 1971

• Corelli Barnett, Britain and her Army 1509-1970, 1970 London
• Richard A Cosgrove, The Boer War and the Modernization of British Martial Law, Military Affairs 1980
• Andrew Lambert and Stephen Badsey, The War Correspondents: The Crimean War, 1994 Gloucestershire
• Norman McCord, British History 1815-1906, 1991 New York
• Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War, 1979 London

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