Why did Great Britain and France pursue a policy of non-intervention during the Spanish Civil War ?
Why did Great Britain and France pursue a policy of non-intervention during the Spanish Civil War ?
On frequent occasions since the decline of Spain as Europe's principal power, that country has become a thorn in the side of the two other great powers on the Atlantic, France and Britain: Napoleon described the Peninsular War as his "greatest mistake" and the Quadruple Alliance of the 1830's saw Spanish difficulties shatter the Anglo-French entente. Indeed, France's greatest military humiliation in 1870 was provoked by a dispute with Prussia over Spanish succession. Little wonder then that in August 1936 both France and Britain sought a haven in a policy of non-intervention when the Officers rebellion in Spain became a civil war.
`Anglo-French non-intervention ultimately proved little more than a confession of weakness which left Spain with a Fascist dictatorship for nearly forty years, but the reasons for the policy, which most countries agreed to but only a handful adhered to, were more complex than a purely historical reaction to the Spanish problem. In practice, French policy was to mirror British policy in many ways but the rationale and the goals of the two allies were rather different. Much controversy surrounds whether Leon Blum was bullied into the policy of non-intervention or not; I am unable to contribute further to that debate but in the absence of firm evidence either way we are best placed to take an objective stance and examine the concerns and interests of each country. The French and British Governments were influenced by presumptions, estimates and prejudices which were not always accurate but, in Foreign Policy, perception is often more important than reality. It is necessary therefore to look in turn at each country and examine how the leaders and diplomats perceived their respective interests and how they assessed and claimed those interests were most likely to be promoted or threatened.
`British Foreign Policy in the 1930's is often summed up by one word: appeasement. Though this is chiefly remembered because of Chamberlain's attitude towards Germany and Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938, the general trend of trying to reduce the international consequences of small disputes and maintain the peaceful balance was evident in Eden's policy towards Spain in August 1936. The Italian invasion of Abyssinia and in March 1936, the German militarization of the Rhineland were certainly of significance to the Foreign Office since both these right wing Nationalist governments were sympathetic towards Franco, so heavy British intervention on behalf of the Republic could lead to a broader crisis. Despite the fact that neither Hitler nor Mussolini were yet capable of fighting a European war the perception was that Britain's unreadiness meant that she could not risk a widening of the conflict. At the same time she did not want to abandon the Republic to the mercy of the Germans or Italians so an attempt at multilateral non-intervention was the preferred policy.
`It also has to be noted that in August 1936, Spain was not the chief priority of the British Government. The Foreign Office was in the process of trying to arrange a redrafting of the 1925 Locarno Pact and was aiming to get the main powers together to reassert the balance of power. The Spanish Civil War, as it escalated and as Italy, Germany and the USSR flagrantly violated the Non-Intervention agreement of 15th August, contributed to the failure of such an agreement, which is partly a testament to the weakness of the appeasement policy. As Adams says ...
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`It also has to be noted that in August 1936, Spain was not the chief priority of the British Government. The Foreign Office was in the process of trying to arrange a redrafting of the 1925 Locarno Pact and was aiming to get the main powers together to reassert the balance of power. The Spanish Civil War, as it escalated and as Italy, Germany and the USSR flagrantly violated the Non-Intervention agreement of 15th August, contributed to the failure of such an agreement, which is partly a testament to the weakness of the appeasement policy. As Adams says of the Non-Intervention agreement: "All attending piously condemned intervention but resisted the creation of any effective means of preventing it." (1) But when the conflict broke out it was perceived as only a minor concern and not worth risking the long term peace of Europe over.
`Within Britain there were mixed opinions as to what the policy in Spain should be. Even though the Opposition Labour Party generally rallied to the Republican cause the division was apparent in both main parties. There was vocal opposition to the Fascism of the Falangist nationalists, but in some quarters support for Franco, especially in the Navy whose command were appalled at the Republican murder of Naval Officers. Whilst historic policy and relations with France dictated an official sympathy with the elected Republican government, anti-Communist paranoia within the Conservative Party presented a difficulty for the government. This, as Puzzo argues, was a fallacy, as the Communists had only received 4% of the vote in the February elections in Spain and held no cabinet positions. It was only through the conditions of war and the unilateral intervention of the USSR that the extremists prospered, creating further Western paranoia in a kind of "vicious circle" (2). Therefore there was little basis in fact for ideological opposition for supporting the Republicans at the outset but the perception was enough to cause sufficient division; it was henceforth expedient for the British to support non-intervention.
`There was also an economic angle to Britain's involvement in Spain which made it difficult for the Government to sponsor an ongoing conflict. In 1935 there was forty million pounds worth of British investment in Spain (3), mostly in ore mining, textiles and sherry; and the two governments had just arranged a payment schedule for the £6 million of foreign debt owed by Spain to Britain. At the outset of the conflict, in which the Falangist Rebellion had cleared failed, it was believed that without foreign intervention the unrest would soon fade away. However, even when the conflict persisted with German, Italian and Soviet aid, the Foreign Office saw no reason to get involved. It was believed that whichever side emerged as victors would look favourably upon Britain for not having contributed to the death of any Spaniard. As Eden himself said in Parliament "intervention in Spain is not only bad humanity, it is bad politics." (4) This appears a very duplicitous approach but this was how British interests were perceived and as Stone rightly points out "lacking any emotional ties with the Spanish Republican Government the British could pursue non-intervention with much less bad conscience than the French." (5) Hence economics and the position of British investors led Britain away from Intervention in the hope that Spain would one day be grateful.
`For France the main issue remained as ever her security but at the same time she was well aware of the fact that she "was the pivot around which the hopes of the Spanish Republic turned". (6) Whilst the Fronte Populaire and the Frente Popular were not exactly equal (the French version contained ironically more communists in August 1936) there was clearly a community of interest between the two. French non-intervention is more difficult to evaluate.
`As already mentioned there is some controversy over whether Eden or Baldwin forced Blum to change his mind over intervention. Whether this is true or not what is undoubtedly the case is that the French would have been made aware of British concerns regarding Italy and Germany and that these concerns, since they impacted very heavily on French security interests, would have been persuasive to the Quai D' Orsay. French security rested entirely upon the Locarno agreements so Paris was just as keen as London to prevent a widening of the Spanish dispute which might threaten the renegotiation of those agreements.
`Whether or not Blum's hand was forced by the British his interests can best be judged by how he himself rationalised his policy in the French Chambres des Deputes on December 6th 1936 in which he declared that he had "no greater interest than that of peace;.....if we have to err, we prefer to do to much for peace than too little," and recognising the consciences of the Pro-Republicans claimed "Non-Intervention, despite the surprises, disappointments and anguish it may have caused, has at least diminished those risks and dangers [of European War]." (7) This could have been Blum making a virtue out of a necessity but by the tone and delivery of the speech it appears that the fear of war with Germany was significant enough to make the French premier a fully fledged supporter of Non-Intervention. Hence the issue of French security and, to that end, the need to maintain a close relationship with Britain led Blum to himself promote a multilateral non-intervention agreement, a fact which Blum made no effort to disguise: "Last August, Europe was saved from war by the French initiative." (8)
`Historical issues did play a part as well, as mentioned. In particular 1870-71 when a row over a Hohenzollern candidacy for the Spanish throne had escalated into a disastrous war for France which resulted in territorial loss, the creation of a mighty Germany on her borders and bloody civil unrest culminating in a change of regime. Blum was alert to the possibility of history repeating itself.
`This was a reasonable perception since the internal position in France was even more divided than in Britain with regard to Spain. In political circles there was the dispute between the Interventionists led by Air Minister Cot, and the Non-Interventionism espoused by Daladier. Blum, as mentioned switched sides but disparity in the views of his ministers was not the only problem. If the Frente Popular could be overthrown in Madrid then the perception was that the Fronte Populaire which was knitted together by a majority of coalition partners, could equally be made unstable in France. By directly involving France in the Spanish Civil War, Blum would be risking a spread of the conflict not only to involve the other Fascist powers but also to civil unrest within French borders. A multilateral non-intervention agreement would represent "the line of least resistance" (9) and Blum was quick to point this out in his December speech when he claimed to have "strengthened France towards the outside and strengthened the [French] Republican majority in the country as a whole." (10) In ideological terms the preferred policy for France ought to have been to support her socialist neighbours against the nationalist uprising. Furthermore, as Edwards argues there was a strategic reason for intervening on behalf of the Republic since a victory for the Falangists would leave France encircled by three right wing Nationalist states: Spain, Italy and Germany. But the threat of civil war in France made it "imperative that internal pressures be balanced" (11) and Blum appears to have had some success in achieving this.
`Again it must be remembered that the initial revolt by Franco and his generals was a failure and it was only after the beginning of aid and intervention in violation of the N.I.C. agreement that the Falangists began to reassert themselves. So at the outset French policy was entirely understandable: why put internal stability and external security at risk to help quell unrest in a foreign country which already appears to be under control ? However once the conflict began to escalate and other countries became involved, the French were no longer so pious about their commitment to Non-Intervention. Despite her continued presence on the Non-Intervention Committee France allowed aid and arms to get through to Republican forces through covert means. Ultimately is was not enough and if the Quai D'Orsay was serious about wanting to save the Spanish Republic then they should have committed themselves more fully to the cause. In the end only Britain, with the exception of volunteers, stood as a great power in Europe, entirely to the letter of the Non-Intervention Agreement. For her stability and security France nominally pursued the policy but for her conscience she wavered from the commitment.
`In conclusion, both France and Britain feared the widening of the Spanish Revolt into a wider European conflict although the feeling was more intense for the French whose security depended upon Britain. Hence France was prepared to abandon her community of interest with the Spanish Republic in preference for the more fundamental community of interest with Britain. Both countries also saw remaining aloof from the crisis as the best way to pacify the divisions of sympathy for either Republicans or Nationalists within their respective political systems, but the internal instability in France again added to the intensity of the problem. To the British was added the economic concern, and to the French was posed the direct strategic issue. It is hard to quantify the success or failure of the objectives for France and Britain since European War occurred soon enough anyway; it was certainly to the detriment of Spain whose legitimate, republican government was thrown out with the help of Hitler and Mussolini and replaced with a Fascist dictatorship under Franco who would outlast either of his two auspicious benefactors.
`END NOTES
`(1) ADAMS, R.J.Q.; British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement 1935-39 (Stanford; 1993) p.51
`(2) PUZZO, Dante; Spain and the Great Powers 1936-41; (Columbia University Press; 1962) p.83
`(3) EDWARDS, J; The British Government and the Spanish Civil War 1936-39; (Macmillan, London, 1979) p.65
`(4) Eden quoted in STONE, Glyn; Britain, Non-Intervention and the Spanish Civil War; European Studies Review; (volume 9 1979) p.136 sourced to Hansard 5th series, vol. 319, p.95
`(5) STONE; op.cit. p.144
`(6) PUZZO; op.cit. p.81
`(7) Blum's speech of 6 December 1936 to La Chambres des Deputes translated by Colin Nettlebeck in: KENWOOD, Alun (ed.); Spanish Civil War; (Berg; Oxford 1993) page 204
`(8) ibid. p.209
`(9) PRESTON, Paul; The Spanish Civil War 1936-39; (Weidenfeld and Nicholson)
`(10) KENWOOD; op. cit.; p.211
`(11) EDWARDS; op. cit; p.16
`
`BIBLIOGRAPHY
`ADAMS, R.J.Q.; British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement 1935-39 (Stanford; 1993)
`EDWARDS, J; The British Government and the Spanish Civil War 1936-39; (Macmillan, London, 1979)
`PUZZO, Dante; Spain and the Great Powers 1936-41; (Columbia University Press; 1962)
`CARLTON, David; Eden, Blum and the Origins of Non-Intervention; Journal of Contemporary History; (Volume 6; No. 3; 1971)
`GALLAGHER, M. D.; Leon Blum and the Origins of Non-Intervention; Journal of Contemporary History; (Volume 6; No. 3; 1971)
`KENWOOD, Alun (ed.); Spanish Civil War; (Berg; Oxford 1993)
`STONE, Glyn; Britain, Non-Intervention and the Spanish Civil War; European Studies Review; (volume 9 1979)
`GATHORNE-HARDY; G.M; A Short History of International Affairs 1920-39; (Oxford University Press: 5th edition 1968)
`PRESTON, Paul; The Spanish Civil War 1936-39; (Weidenfeld and Nicholson)
