The Somali Republic inherited a backward and underdeveloped economy and a high percentage of illiteracy. A lack of educated and skilled personnel made Somalia continue to be dependent on foreign expertise for the daily running of its administration and economic sectors. The country was just managing to survive with assistance. The leadership in both the public and private sectors was dominated by a group of Somalis who had little experience and were ill-equipped to devise and implement a successful strategy for development. The new regime was also faced with a deepening budgetary problem, a multi-party political system, a growing urban population and intensifying competition amongst the more dominant social groups for resources (Samatar, 1992:) In 1967 Dr. Sharmaarke came into power and took daring political initiatives. He changed the aggressive political tone towards Somalia’s neighbours to a more conciliatory one. He also reestablished diplomatic relations with Britain and declared that Djibouti must negotiate with France for its independence. However the president met with stiff resistance at home; seen as ‘sell out’ by stabilising relations with the ‘enemies’ of Somalia and his government grew more and more unpopular (Issa-Salwe, 1996). The government did attempt something resembling a democratic process but proved incapable of mustering the energy and knowledge to see this through. A few benefits were enjoyed by the people however, such as freedom of speech, of association, of assembly and of the press. The multi-party system meant that people could openly air their views in public meetings.
Nevertheless the fact remained that the civilian government lacked any serious commitment to development. Somalia was experiencing all kinds of democracy’s ailments, and the deepening of corruption, not to mention the incompetence of the civilian government were deflating any democratic benefit (Issa-Salwe, 1996). The misuse of the European model of democracy was rife amongst most African countries, with Somalia not being an exception. Emphasis seemed to be on party politics and personal power rather than national development. There were stories circulating of deputies trading in their votes for personal gain and spreading corruption at all levels of government. Civil servants were giving up their jobs to participate in the political process, because it was a way of gaining more money from the state, not only for themselves but for also for their family and friends. The competitions amongst the elite for state resources ultimately led to the degeneration of the major political parties and the inevitable demise of parliamentary governance. The endless search for resources swiftly transformed the promising democratic society, which many were hoping that Somalia would into (Samatar, 1992). But before a solution could be found for the rapidly declining democratic process, the President was assassinated in Las Anod on October 16, 1969 during a tour, apparently by one of his personal bodyguards over a personal dispute. The takeover was welcomed by all Somalis and caused a massive celebration. The military immediately suspended the Constitution and the Supreme, closed the National Assembly and barred all political parties. Instead it announced the establishment of a Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) on November 1, 1969, with General Mahamed Siyaad Barre chosen as chairman. The SRC was popular initially as it embarked on revitalising the country’s lackluster economy. It introduced the First Charter of the Revolution, which emphasised the principle of social justice, the stimulation of economic growth, the eradication of tribalism and the setting up of an orthography of the Somali language (Issa-Salwe, 1996). Somalis were encouraged by these promises but were not to know where this ‘bloodless coup’ would take them and their country. What few ordinary Somalian’s knew at the time was that General Barre had partaken part in the ‘old spoils’ and his rhetoric of Scientific Socialism was only a device to divert attention away from the extremist communist policies of his regime.
The political turmoil in Ethiopia and the struggle for its ‘missing territories’ led to the Ethiopian-Somali War in July 1977 when the Somali government decided to commit its army to the liberation of Western Somaliland and launched a massive offensive. The Ethiopians declared themselves a Marxist-Leninist state, thus obtaining military assistance from the Soviet Union in what Lewis (1992) described as ‘one of the most breathtaking acts of treachery in history’. The war did not last long and in March 1978 Somalia was defeated, with huge repercussions until this present day. The war spurned millions of refugees, which left Somalia no choice but to rely on foreign aid. The economic, political and social standing of Somalia was virtually destroyed. The flood of refugees to Somalia were accompanied by modern weapons left over from the war; a wave that would transform the country (Issa-Salwe, 1996). The defeat generated dissatisfaction in the army and backlash led to General Barre publicly executing six high ranking officers accused of disloyalty and disobedience. The subsequent struggle for power became much deadlier, with both the government and the opposition parties employing the use of bullets to retain or gain access to the resources of the state, rather than through the ballot box or bribes ad previously conducted. The state, for ordinary Somalians, become an arbitrary and oppressive predator and spread fear amongst the people (Omar 1992). When it become obvious that his regime had no way of winning any more terms in office by democratic and fairly competitive means, General Barre embarked on a scheme of brutal oppression and persecution. Any hint of opposition lead to quick executions not only of the member involved but of anyone related or tied to him or her. Children were recruited in army training, men were being shot in the street for no apparent reason and women were systematically raped and robbed (Simons, 1994). The terror the military and the continual fragmentation of the opposition parties has meant that Somalis have gone back to find protection in pre-colonial clans. General Barre had ‘succeeded’ in his divide and rule strategy through blood-ties and skillfully manipulated the old feuds to his advantage to weaken his enemies. Such policy was likely to plunge the whole country into an explosive situation but General Barre did not seem concerned. This inevitably led to civil war and by the time General Barre promised to introduce political reforms in 1989, it was too late as Somalia was already up in flames. As Drysdale (1994) points outs between 1980 and 1990 there was not a clan that did not fight against its neighbouring, and in some cases related, clans. In complete contrast to what was supposed to be state responsibility, the situation was in fact that Somalia had a regime whose policies contradicted the state’s duties to maintain order (Issa-Salwe, 1996).General Barre refused to relinquish his power or leave the country; instead he chose to hold the ‘throne’ by force of the gun (Omar, 1996). Opposition movements promising justice, equality and democracy finally managed to overthrow the evil dictator in 1991 and took over the country. But the leaders who came into power generated the whole country into total anarchy; conceived not possible by most Somalis. If anything they paved the way only for more violence and bloodshed. In 1992 alone war and drought took over 350,000 innocent human lives and according to reports an estimated 2,000 people – mainly women and children – die daily Somalia, in addition to the thousands of refugees in neighbouring countries (Omar, 1996). The two most prominent leaders that were involved in the overthrowing of General Barre were Ali Mahdi and General Mohamed Farah Hassan ‘Aideed’. Both, however, had competing political interests and could not agree on which direction to take the country. A civil war was raging during this period, with both men struggling to get a hold on the capital, Mogadishu. Reports indicated that Hargeisa, the second largest city, was being bombed and blasted to pieces (Simons, 1994). The Red Cross in 1991 described the situation in Somalia as a ‘human disaster of the first magnitude’ Young vigilantes began to ransack both public and private property and within a few months of General Barre’s departure the new ‘leaders’ destroyed more people and property than the military regime had done in its twenty year reign.. Each warlord had dreams of replacing General Barre and whilst people perished, the warlords keep the United Nation and other relief agencies at bay for fear that their enemies would win support and international recognition (Samatar, 1992).
Initially the international community abandoned Somalia, but after appeals by aid agencies the UN partnered with the United States to organize and lead a limited enforcement operation under the authority of the Security Council. President Bush Senior labeled the plan ‘Operation Restore Hope’ (Drysdale, 1994). The plan was to avert further tragedy, restore law and order and reinstate political authority in the country. Initially, this saved the lives of many innocent civilians, brought temporary respite from the violence and registered some success. But after failing to end the political crisis, the United Nations` Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was brought to an end on March 4, 1995. After spending more than $4bn, the UN left the country in a situation no better than that which had prompted its intervention (bravanese.com). The US and the UN had failed to facilitate peaceful talks in Somalia, and there were disastrous consequences, with the deaths of UN and US peacekeepers, as well as hundreds of Somalis. Particularly upsetting for most Americans was the parading of an American soldier’s dead body, by jubilant Somalis, on the streets of Mogadishu. There was increasing bitterness in Somalia towards what was perceived as external opportunism and negligence. ‘Somalia became a free-for-all... states and organisations could interfere in any way they liked,’ (Mohammoud, 2001). It also seemed that the distrustful relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia has changed very little. While in the past, Ethiopian governments had felt threatened by a strong, united Somalia, the absence of any state at all was just as bad. In the name of national defence, Ethiopia went ahead and pursued a policy of backing and creating "friendly forces" in Somalia (Janes, 2000). Ethiopia has also been accused of meddling in Somali affairs by supplying weapons to opposition factions. The OAU and particularly Ethiopia are the external players in trying to bring an end to the anarchy in Somalia, although not without self-interest. However the main problem remains the reluctance of various warlords to agree on a new way forward, with each wanting to assume leadership of the country without much compromise on power-sharing. As recently as 2005, violence raged between the different parties when brought together under the same roof to thrash out a deal. Somalia therefore remains stateless and unaided crying out for stability from the disaster and destruction; it is the problem child of Africa.
In December 1990 the Somali state collapsed into disarray, and since January 1991 it has lacked any kind of central government authority. Some of the things which impacted on the eventual collapse have been boundary problems with its Horn of Africa neighbours, especially Ethiopia, neo-colonial super-power interests in the Horn which have left it littered with weapons, the undermining of traditional authority over decades, the brutal oppression by the military government by General Siyaad Barre and the subsequent reversion of the Somali people back to clan loyalties and divisions (Issa-Salwe, 1992:145). After its thirty one year of colonial restraint, it was thought Somalia would build a successful state and country. Instead it was faced with human misery and spreading uncertainty as it degenerated into mutually destructive clannish civil war. The economic and political systems were rendered worthless. The ‘bloodless’ military coup staged by General Barre in 1969 further aggravated Somalia’s problems and led to the country into total anarchy. Nobody has escaped the twenty year old tyrannical rule and thus when Barre was overthrown people were relived. Yet their desperate hope for peace, restoration and economic development was shattered when the new leaders who came into power virtually took the country at war with itself. The tragedy in Somalia was said to have posed ‘one of the greatest humanitarian and political challenges to the international community’ (Omar, 1996:2), yet it has largely been left to its own devices since the unsuccessful ‘Operation Restore Hope’, which led to the thousands of deaths of Somalis, UN peacekeepers and most notably eighteen American soldiers. The situation remains the same as it was since the three decades of Somali independence; the Somali continue to experience suffering, oppression, corruption and hunger.
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Bibliography
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