Why was Ireland partitioned in the 1920's?
Why was Ireland partitioned in the 1920's?
Tom Bartlett asserts that the French Revolution of 1789 proved to radical Protestants that '...Catholics had the vital capaces libertatis which republicans had long doubted.' 1 A century later the Protestant Unionist perception of Catholics had regressed in the view of Michael Laffan to their being '...members of a worldwide conspiracy against the beliefs, customs and liberties of Ulster protestants.' 2 Throughout the nineteenth century Ulster protestantism experienced a series of internal and external pressures that eventually metamorphosed a politically and doctrinally heterogenuous grouping into a pan-protestant political front during the crisis precipitated by the third Home Rule Bill in the period 1911-1913. This anti-home rule caucus through dint of its geographical concentration and numerical superiority in the North-east lodged a counter claim to that of the nationalists for self-determination as a distinct people in their own right. They were prepared to resort to armed struggle in order to protect this claim and their position in the union with Britain.
This belligerent response was engendered by the quest of the nationalist Irish Parliamentary Party (I.P.P.) to dissolve the Act of Union with Britain. The Act was lumbered with the bulk of the responsibility for Ireland's socio-economic malaise by nationalist politicians throughout the nineteenth century, though the nature of the connection had changed markedly from one of laissez-faire to an interventionist - sometimes benevolent one from mid-century. This change in tack by London governments of both hues came too late to nullify the negative perception of the political relationship between the two islands that had been instilled in the nationalist popular psyche. The Famine of the late 1840's compounded the deep seated resentment the Irish peasantry, and the Diaspora it created, felt towards the Union. Though as late as 1868 Irish political representation in Westminster ostensibly displayed a party political cleavage similar to that in Britain with 66 Liberals and 39 Conservatives elected, the geographical distribution of the party's seats betrayed another story. The three southern provinces provided 62 Liberals and 13 Conservatives while Ulster returned 4 Liberal and 26 Conservatives. 3 Before the appearance of the I.P.P. a political schism had already developed between North and South. It only needed the prospect of home rule for this polarisation to manifest itself in the familiar guise of nationalism and unionism.
The I.P.P. had its origins in O'Connell's Repeal Association, but its aims were more modest in that a limited domestic legislature was envisaged in the three separate Liberal home rule bills presented to parliament. 4 It was not until Parnell's accession to the leadership of the Irish Party that the prospect of home rule emerged as an attainable proposition. To merit any chance of success Parnell's campaign required positive support from powerful elements in the British parliament. Gladstone's conversion to home rule provided this backing and his motivation and that of most of the Liberal Party was not dissimilar to the Irish nationalists. As early as 1846 Gladstone had written of Ireland thus: '...that cloud in the west, that coming storm, the minister of God's retribution upon cruel and inveterate and but half atoned injustice! Ireland forces upon us these great social and great religious questions...' 5 Due to electoral reform the class base of the Liberal party had expanded and the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed a more interventionist and socially concerned attitude to government on their part. Gladstone's sense of guilt and embarrassment at Ireland's parlous condition was increased by the depredations inflicted by the Great Famine.
The Catholic Church, if somewhat ambiguous in its attitude to the activities of the Land League, was enthusiastic in its support for home rule. Though suspicious of its mainly protestant origins, in 1884 Parnell moved quickly to assuage the Church's reticence by conceding to it primacy in areas of special interest such as education. The obverse of this 'concordat' 6 was guaranteed Catholic support for the home rule movement. This huge up-welling of nationalist sentiment caused by the inflated expectations engendered by Parnell's home rule activities was according to Paul Bew '...too sudden and too dramatic to leave much time for speculation on the meaning of the national soul.' 7 The negative implications of this rush of blood to the nationalist psyche was described by Roy Foster as '...the assumption that the "whole nation" was Catholic...' 8 It indicated a collective amnesia regarding the demographic peculiarities of the North and the political sensibilities of the protestant majority who resided there. The extent of Ulster's difference was ignored by Irish catholic nationalists and perhaps more ominously by the British prime minister and his Liberal supporters. This supposition of cultural homogeneity and the readiness of Parnell and his Party to accept the Catholic Church's endorsement of and participation in the home rule movement, also had a marked effect on politics in Ulster during this period.
While Parnell controlled the I.P.P. it was a broad church. He managed to unify nationalists with often widely divergent views into a disciplined and coherent movement through the force of his personality and political success. A. M. Sullivan maintained that: 'The Parnellite party, between 1885 and 1890, was a composite body, whose digestive function was mainly engaged in educating emotional "rebels" into sensible politicians.' 9 This important function was lost after Parnell's fall when the party descended into ten dark years of internecine warfare and it was never recovered. The scions of the new and ascending petit-bourgeoise were ...
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While Parnell controlled the I.P.P. it was a broad church. He managed to unify nationalists with often widely divergent views into a disciplined and coherent movement through the force of his personality and political success. A. M. Sullivan maintained that: 'The Parnellite party, between 1885 and 1890, was a composite body, whose digestive function was mainly engaged in educating emotional "rebels" into sensible politicians.' 9 This important function was lost after Parnell's fall when the party descended into ten dark years of internecine warfare and it was never recovered. The scions of the new and ascending petit-bourgeoise were therefore excluded and became disenchanted with what passed for legitimate political nationalism. They turned to the politics of the cultural revival and romantic nationalism - the backward look - as the Empire progressed towards a secular and welfare oriented society. The exclusivist nature of their propaganda which included a commitment to the Gaelic language, fed the fears and prejudices of Ulster Protestants who already looked askance at the somewhat naive inclusiveness of constitutional nationalism and saw no place for themselves in an all Irish Ireland. The political manifestation of this movement - Sinn Fein - eventually accepted partition with considerably less clamour than the Ulster unionists caused when they demanded it. Ultimately most of the Sinn Fein leaders saw that partition facilitated their catholic Irish Ireland project by creating a homogenous state.
Northern Presbyterians had in Marianne Elliot's words '...an ingrained dislike of the entire hierarchial system of prelacy, aristocracy and authoritarianism in government...' 10 This radical mindset was inimical to both the conservative ideology of the Anglican aristocracy and the orange predilictions of the Ulster Episcopalian peasantry. Yet the fractious nature of Ulster protestantism was undergoing a fundamental shift towards internal conciliation during the nineteenth century. A militant campaign instigated by Henry Cooke early in the century ensured that Presbyterianism shed its 'New Light' liberal progressive tendencies for the 'Old Light' certainties of conservative evangelism. This move towards unity was confirmed in 1840 by the establishment of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland and consolidated presbyterian orthodoxy. Cooke also strove for a political union with Episcopalians and in a speech indicated the Ulster protestant view of the Union: 'Look at Belfast and be a repealer if you can ... the masted grove within our harbour - our mighty Warehouses teeming with the wealth of every climate ... all this we owe to the Union.' 11 Economic partition was already becoming a reality. The disestablishment of the Anglican Church in 1869 removed another obstacle to rapproachment between the protestant churches. Much of the rancour that presbyterians felt due to tithe and cess payments had also ended. Anglicans were in retreat as they had seen the Union as their ultimate guarantee of safety and '...it now seemed to be less permanent and less secure than they had hitherto taken for granted.' 12 Ulster Episcopalians were more than ever attracted into co-operation and isolation with Presbyterians in the face of an ever more confident and strident catholicism.
The Protestant churches experienced a huge religious revival in the 1860's and 1870's which was instigated by ordinary members who often exhibited uncharacteristic bouts of intense emotional exposition. Lyons intimates that these emotional eruptions in the normally repressed Ulster protestant psyche were similar to '...the more diciplined fervour which was so evident at the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant against Home Rule in 1912.' 13 A tendency towards religious fervour was also evident in many active Catholic nationalists in the home rule period (Pearse was an obvious example) and indeed Catholics enjoyed their own religious renewal during this period. Jonathan Bardon asserts that both revivals '...displayed intense religious fervour and a triumphalist assertiveness.' 14 The dividing line between extremism in politics and religion is easily blurred in Ireland and this flexing of religious muscle contributed to political polarisation and eventual partition. The ultramontane leanings of sections of the Catholic hierarchy and the consequent enthusiastic adoption of Papal pronouncements such as the 'Ne Temere' decree threatened the very existence of protestantism and the dangers were graphically illustrated in the Belfast press by the coverage given to the McCann case in 1910. 15
A sectarian unity based on fear of Catholic numerical superiority began to develop. This burgeoning fear among all Protestants in Ireland was consistent with the growth in political power of the Catholic majority following emancipation in 1829 and this was further augmented by the broadening of the electoral franchise over the course of the century. George Boyce maintains that: 'The Whiggish and Liberal tradition, found especially among Presbyterians of the north of Ireland, held its own until the home rule crisis of 1886.' 16 Indeed there was a Liberal revival in Ulster during the 1880 election precipitated by what Roy Foster describes as '...an early commitment to the Land League programme in several Ulster counties...' 17 The increasing attachment of the land issue to the nationalist home rule cause and its endorsement by the Catholic Church in the South meant that Ulster agrarian radicals were estranged from the Land League. Their appeal to the farmers became increasingly peripheral in Ulster when sectarian violence greeted the introduction of the Home Rule Bill in 1886 and the Land Act of 1881 assuaged peasant grievances to some extent. As early as June 1882 an Ulster conservative writing to Lord Salisbury in obvious relief stated that among Liberals:'...there seems to be a growing feeling that the policy of the National party is to stamp out the English garrison and make Ireland a purely R. Catholic country. There is throughout Ulster a growing distrust of the R. Catholics on the part of the Protestant farmers.' 18
It would be more correct to assert that the 1886 home rule bill was the first major tangible political manifestation of this tendency to coalesce in the face of a threat to the Union. Indeed, Paul Bew et al argues that before the 1911-1913 home rule crisis the unionist 'monolith' '...was far from inclusive of Ulster protestants and even further from being unified.' 19 The rise of the home rule movement brought a new lease of life to the Orange Order which had been languishing in relative obscurity. Originally the membership was predominantly made up of lower class Episcopalians, but the threat from nationalism meant that it became a popular political forum and focus of anti-home rule unity for Protestants of diverse socio-economic backgrounds. Unionist opposition to the 1886 Home Rule Bill was orchestrated by Colonel E. J. Saunderson M.P. who promptly joined the Orange Order and advised his supporters to do likewise, so conferring a respectability on the organisation it previously lacked. Even the Liberal Northern Whig descended into orange like racial stereotyping when it described the second Home Rule Bill as '...a slave revolt...' 20 Ulster Liberal dissent had become quiescent after a brief resurgence at the turn of the century and the radical agrarian M.P. for East Down T. W. Russell became marginalised to such an extent in Ulster due to his dependence on Catholic votes that by 1910 he was regarded for all practical purposes as a representative of home rule. 21 By this stage opinion in Ulster had become so severely polarised on the national question that all other issues were seen as pernicious distractions from the single task of preventing Ulster's incorporation into any all-Ireland home rule scenario, no matter what guarantees were provided by Redmond or the Liberal government. The Rev. S. Prenter, the Moderator of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, envisaged in 1913 the effect of home rule as: '...subversion of our civil and religious freedom, destructive of our citizenship and perilous to the unity of the empire.' 22
The Independent Orange Order threatened to split this nascent unionist unity along sectarian class lines. The formation of the Ulster Unionist Council in 1905, which declared its independence from the Conservative party (surely a sign of growing confidence), eliminated any proletarian political heterodoxy. From 1905 to 1913 the Unionist 'monolith' gradually became an actuality that was epitomised by the regimented discipline of the Ulster Volunteer Force which '...provided an irresistible focus of popular Unionist opposition to a united Ireland.' 23 In what seemed to be a vicious circle of reaction the growth of the Orange Order was paralleled by the formation of the equally sectarian Catholic Ancient Order of Hibernians. The U. V. F. was mimicked by the nationalist Irish Volunteers whose more militant adherents showed a grudging respect for the bellicose stand of Ulster protestants and went on to copy their tactics in 1916. 24 The virulence of Ulster Unionist feeling towards even the moderate nationalism displayed by Redmond can be explained to some extent by the wilful neglect of the party's image and organisation in Belfast. The Catholic Association, a clerical dominated political party was allowed a free hand in running nationalist politics there in the years 1897 and 1907. 25
However, there was little hope of changing Ulster protestant attitudes at that stage; the die had been cast much earlier in the nineteenth century. The economic divergence between North and South was underpinned by an increasing rabid sectarian division in Ulster that infected the erstwhile relatively unpolluted areas of Belfast and its hinterland due to the influx of migrants drawn by the prospect of employment in the swelling industrial revolution. Just as Southern catholics mentally eschewed the North and so became increasingly ignorant of its political dynamics, protestants stigmatised the South with the same disdain and contempt (often engendered by sub-conscious fears of domination and retribution) they reserved for their catholic neighbours in Ulster. This gradually resulted over the nineteenth century in the development a form of psychological partition whose tangible effects could be seen in the attitude of Ulster unionist and Southern nationalists to each other. They both developed radically different mindsets whose ramifications were consolidated in the inevitable partition of Ireland in 1914, disregarding the option of all out civil war. As A. M. Sullivan sagaciously commented: 'Ignorance is always so certain of its wisdom that it can make no compromise.' 26
The North-east prospered economically under the Union, the rest of the country which was largely dependent on agriculture performed poorly. Southern Protestants as well as Catholics were prone to a myopic and sectional view of the Irish economy. In 1847 the Protestant Repeal Association declared '...the Imperial Parliament has failed to make Union a source of prosperity to Ireland...' 27 and called for a return to self-government. The South wanted protection, the North relied on free trade for prosperity. Any possible late flowering of industry in the South that could have drawn these disparate regions divergent economic paths closer was stifled by the pattern of peasant proprietorship that developed due to the land Acts after the Famine. The acquisition of land constituted wealth and status in the community, so spare capital was used to purchase more land or if industrial investment was considered, the capital was exported; as indigenous industry was regarded as being highly speculative due to the lack of any extensive industrial experience or infrastructure in the South. Ironically, this pattern of development was fostered by the very politicians who clamoured for home rule. The Gaelic revival also tended to foster a view of industrialisation and modernism as alien to its exclusive concept of Irish culture. The '...uneven development of Irish capitalism...' 28 had instituted economic partition in Ireland by at least mid-century. A real union of mutual economic interest had been fashioned between Ulster and Britain as the rest of the country languished in agrarian upheaval.
During the nationalist euphoria, when the prospect of home rule of some description became a reality after the election result, the Cork Free Press commented soberly: 'When all is said and done the hostility of Ulster is the real obstacle in the way of Home Rule.' 29 Few people of either tradition in Ireland could envisage partition at this time. The unionist threat to use force was no idle boast however. Though it did leave them with the doubtful distinction of having brought the gun back into Irish politics, it was also indicative of the strength of feeling that underpinned their movement. It was Asquith's refusal to call their bluff when advised to do so by Redmond that forced the constitutional politicians to concede partition in 1914. The events that followed up to the implementation of partition only served to exacerbate the rift and made any remote possibility of rapprochement impossible. From the early Repeal agitation of the 1830's the demand for home rule of some description, whether gained by violent methods or constitutional means occupied every generation of nationalists up to the partition of Ireland in the 1920's. A developing sense of nationhood and a deep sense of grievance compounded by contemporary European trends led inexorably to a burgeoning movement for nationalist self-government. Conversely Ulster unionist welfare and even perceived survival became synonymous with maintenance of the Union. Given the economic, social and religious disparities that had arisen throughout the course of the nineteenth century between the North and South, Arthur Balfour's description of Ireland as '...two nations, two sets of aspirations, two ideals, two sets of historic memories...' 30 explain the nature and extent of the impasse that partition, however untidily and temporarily, managed to solve in 1914.
Bibliography
Bardon, J., A History of Ulster (Belfast, 1992)
Bartlett, T., The Burden of the Present: Theobald Wolfe Tone, Republican and Separatist, in Dickson, D. et al, in The United Irishmen - Republicanism Radicalism and Rebellion (Dublin, 1983)
Bew, Conflict and Conciliation 1890-1910 Parnellites and Radical Agrarians (Oxford, 1987)
Bew, P. et al, The State in Northern Ireland 1921-72 Political Forces and Social Classes (Manchester, 1979)
Boyce, D. G., Trembling solicitude - Irish conservatism, nationality and public opinion, 1833-86, in Boyce, D. G. et al, Political Thought in Ireland Since the Seventeenth Century (London, 1993)
Elliot, M., Wolfe Tone - Prophet of Irish Independence (London, 1989)
Foster, R. F., Modern Ireland 1600-1972 (London, 1988)
Kee, R., The Most Distressful Country - Vol. 1 of The Green Flag (London, 1976)
Laffan, The Partition of Ireland 1911-1925 (Dublin, 1983)
Lee, J. J., Ireland 1912-1985 Politics and Society (Cambridge, 1989)
Lyons, F. S. L., Ireland Since The Famine (London, 1963)
Lyons, F. S. L., Culture and Anarchy in Ireland 1890-1939 (Oxford, 1979)
Sullivan, A. M., Old Ireland: Reminiscences of an Irish K.C (London,1912)
The '...uneven development of Irish capitalism...' 31 had instituted economic partition in Ireland by at least mid-century.
Essay submitted by
J. G. Colm Power
to
Professor Paul Bew
T. Bartlett, The Burden of the Present: Theobald Wolfe Tone, Republican and Separatist, in D. Dickson et al, in The United Irishmen - Republicanism Radicalism and Rebellion, p.15
2 M. Laffan, The Partition of Ireland 1911-1925, p.6
3 Ibid., p.8 The north/south divide theory was accepted in Britain in the 1980's where much less of a representational imbalance was evident.
4 R. Kee, The Most Distressful Country - Vol. 1 of The Green Flag, p.188. Kee believes O'Connell's assertion in the repeal debate that 'Repeal cannot endanger the connection - continuing the Union may...', set the home rule agenda for the rest of the century. p.118
5 F. S. L. Lyons, Ireland Since The Famine, p.141. Gladstone's Tory opponent Disraeli was more precise on the crux of the Irish Question '...a starving population, an absentee aristocracy, and an alien church, and in addition the weakest executive in the world.' Ibid. p.141
6 R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972, p.419.The Free State also developed a similar relationship with the church post 1922.
7 P. Bew, Conflict and Conciliation 1890-1910 Parnellites and Radical Agrarians, p.4
8 R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland, p.419. Foster also draws attention to the irony of Parnell's protestant backround apropos nationalist homogenuous perceptions.
9 A. M. Sullivan, Old Ireland: Reminiscences of an Irish K.C., p.186
0 M. Elliot, Wolfe Tone - Prophet of Irish Independence, p.117. Though this statement applies to the 18th. century, it is still pertinent to presbyterianism in the 19th. century.
1 R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland, p.303
2 F. S. L. Lyons, Ireland Since, p.146
3 F. S. L. Lyons, Culture and Anarchy in Ireland 1890-1939, p.126
4 J. Bardon, A History of Ulster, p.348
5 J. J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985 Politics and Society, p.11. The case entailed cath. father leaving prod. wife to raise children as caths.
6 D.G. Boyce, Trembling solicitude - Irish conservatism, nationality and public opinion, 1833-86, in D. G. Boyce et al, Political Thought, p.124
7 R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland, p.419. For more detail see Bardon, A History of Ulster, pp.336-370
8 J. Bardon, A History of Ulster, p.371
9 P. Bew et al, The State in Northern Ireland 1921-72 Political Forces and Social Classes, p.46
20 J. J. Lee, Ireland 1912, p.7
21 P. Bew, Conflict, p.91
22 J. J. Lee, Ireland 1912, p.9 Lee describes this book of essay's as '...an able collective presentation of the Ulster Protestant case.'
23 P. Bew et al, The State, pp.46-47
24 Pearse's quip illustrates this growing militarism: 'I think the Orangeman with a rifle a much less ridiculous figure than the nationalist without a rifle.' in J. J. Lee, Ireland 1912, p.18
25 J. J. Lee, Ireland 1912, p.10
26 A. M. Sullivan, Old Ireland, p.208
27 D.G. Boyce, Trembling solicitude, p.134
28 P. Bew et al, The State, p.3. This theory is applicable to both industrialised Ulster and the the agrarian South.
29 P. Bew, Conflict, p.200
30 M. Laffan, The Partition, p.14
31 his theory is applicable to both industrialised Ulster and the the agrarian South.
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