Outline what you understand to be Weber's theory of ideal types. Provide some examples of its application and suggest what you consider to be its weaknesses.

Despite classifying sociology as a 'science' and advocating value-freedom and the search for causal relationships, Weber distinguished between the social and natural sciences and therefore moved away from what he considered to be the positivist pretence of a completely objective 'science' of sociology. Webers belief was that it is futile to aspire to complete objectivity because all knowledge about the world is tainted with the researchers preconceptions by virtue of the apparatus they use to view it, no matter what technique they use or the state of mind they adopt to begin with. The goal of the positivist is to seek laws of social behaviour and can be seen as a parallel to the instincts of the natural scientist. Weber objected to a holistic conception of society that can be explicated by making generalisations about human behaviour. For Weber, it is useless trying to explain society using empirical information about human behaviour. To ascertain the true nature of mans action, we must seek to find the subjective meaning and motivation behind it. Even if we accept the positivist claim for objectivity, it is misleading to "seek to make sense of behaviour in the raw by ignoring the motives and subjective states of the actors concerned" (Parkin, F, 1982, pg19). This renders a structural, deterministic approach impossible for Weber who saw the relationship between man and society as much subtler and more two-way. In response to positivist objections about the use of subjective information, Weber reminds us again that "there is no absolutely 'objective' scientific analysis of culture or...of 'social phenomena' independent of special and 'one-sided' view points according to which-expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously-they are selected, analysed and organised for expository purposes" (Coser, 1977, pg.219-222).

Webers value-freedom meant that the social scientist should maintain a neutral standpoint when dealing conducting explanatory procedure. Considering that Weber was concerned to find the subjective meaning behind human action, on the face of it value-freedom seems unattainable. However, Weber argued that all scientists make a subjective choice about what it is he will study, and like the scientist this is done almost naturally by assessing the values relevance of the information to be studied. Furthermore, as this involvement takes place prior to the investigation, it does not interfere with the investigation proper. A more prominent criticism along these lines is that in studying the subjective meaning of actors, the sociologist must place himself in a position where he can attain an empathic understanding of the motives of the actor. The obvious point here is that attempting to sympathise with the actor's situation jeopardises value-neutrality immediately. Weber counters by maintaining that it is possible to empathise without sympathising or supporting the actor's situation. As Weber (1982) eloquently explains: "One need not have been Caesar to understand Caesar" (cited in Parkin, F. pg.20)

So far I have outlined where Weber departs from the two major opponents of his work and now I will begin to explain how Webers epistemological aims relate to his methodological principles. Given that the positivist approach paints a picture of an individual whose actions are driven by forces external to him and that the historians vision of man is that he is a unique entity whose actions cannot be attributed to forces outside the realm of the subjective meanings that motivate him; it becomes clearer that Webers aim it to achieve and understanding of why man behaves the way he does by accepting that there are external factors whilst retaining and explanation based on meaning.

Central to Webers method is verstehen. This is the "attempt to comprehend social action through a kind of empathic liaison with the actor on the part of the observer" (Parkin, F, 1928, pg.19). Verstehen is useful as it allows the sociologist to place himself in historical contexts and seek an understanding of the world as it was through the eyes of the person who lived at the time. The process involves attempting to identify the encouraging choices and the inhibiting factors that constrain or urge the actor down a particular path. It is not enough to simply observe the actor's behaviour, if the sociologist is to arrive at a causal explanation for events, he must attain an explanatory understanding of social action. On its own, the "interpretative understanding of social action" is not sufficient to "arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects" (Weber, M, cited in Campbell, T, 1981, pg.171). The task of the investigator then is to "frame a hypothesis about the nature of the social action in question on the basis of the type of conduct common to persons in such situations" (Campbell, T, 1981, pg. 174).

In order to move nearer to arriving at a causal explanation of social action, Weber constructed a heuristic device that allowed him to compare empirical reality with an exaggerated reality arrived at through (in the first instance) rational deduction. He called these devices 'ideal type' although the term is not meant to apply to an 'ideal' reality. Ideal types allow the investigator to find possible causal relationships between empirical reality and the exaggerated components common to all realities in that context. This is achieved by identifying where empirical reality departs from the ideal type. Once the divergences are located it becomes more possible to locate causal relationships. The 'fit' between the exaggerated attributes and the attributes of 'reality' will be greater where there exists no external factor to upset the balance. Weber described the function of the ideal type as "the comparison with empirical reality in order to establish it's divergences or similarities to describe them with the most unambiguous intelligible concepts and to explain them causally" (cited in Ritzer, G, 2000, pg.223). By using ideal types, Weber is able to disassociate himself from the positivist's preoccupation with reducing complex and far reaching social phenomena to a singular structural conception of reality. Ideal types are selectively aimed and carry no pretensions toward descriptive perfection. Furthermore, the ideal type allows the investigator to exaggerate the typifying elements he sees as being most relevant to his study. Unlike the positivist who seeks an explanation of the world and everything in it, the ideal type allows Weber to be relatively unconcerned with either not assigning enough value to a 'type' or omitting it completely so long as he knows that the omission is irrelevant to the line of his investigation.

However, Parkin (1982) points out that that it is unclear "what kind of explanatory payoff this procedure actually yields. Merely to show that there is indeed a lack of correspondence is not a discovery guaranteed to set the pulse racing" (pg.30). As ideal types are exaggerations of characteristics that are most typical we are almost certain to find a considerable lack of 'fit'. Weber's assertion that ideal types can be used to identify causal relationships also comes into question. As we have already noted, the process of ideal type construction is always likely to produce a lack of fit so it would seem misguided to assign this difference a causal explanation. Weber believed that a good method of beginning an investigation would be to construct an ideal type that represents the rational approach to choices the actors may have. Thus it might be reasonable to construct a rational ideal type of bureaucracy and compare it with actual bureaucracy in order to highlight instances where non-rational or irrational choices have been made. However, according to Weber (1997), "the construction of such a rationally 'right' utopia is only one of the various forms of an 'ideal type'...Normatively 'right' [action] has no monopoly in this respect" (cited in Ringer, F, pg.114). Using 'normatively right' action as a comparative tool is especially useful though since Webers ideal types of action can be used to assess the mix of goal-rational, value-rational, traditional and emotional action within an ideal-typical institution or organisation.

Parkin has noted that Weber believed that "ideal types are, of necessity, morally loaded constructs" (1982, pg.30). Indeed, for Weber, "all knowledge of cultural reality...is always knowledge from particular points of view" (cited in Parkin, F, 1982, pg.30). Parking uses this fundamental belief of Webers to undermine his proposed function of ideal types. As I have already made clear, for Weber, the scientific methodology is flawed from the outset, as the proclamation that all investigation must be approached with a mind free of pre-conceptions is for Weber at best unrealistic. Parking seems to have Weber in a hole of his own making because given Webers standpoint, how can we "reconcile the explanatory claims made on behalf of ideal types" if "all theoretical constructs are shot through with biases?" (1982, pg.31). As an ideal type is a collection of typical elements of phenomena, that are selected according to the needs of the investigator, according to Webers own logic, it must be possible to "bring new facts into being and dispose of others simply by altering our conceptual frame of reference" (Parkin, F, 1982, pg.30). Furthermore, it is difficult for Weber to counter by subjecting each type to empirical comparison as the lens through which the real world is seen is also a construct and therefore unlimited in its variety of output. That said, it seems to me that Weber selects his type according to their relevance, and although other features may also be relevant, is it honest to construct an illusory picture of reality? However, for Weber to aspire to value-freedom while at the same time seeing "knowledge as an inescapably moral construct", is "puzzling" to Parkin (1982, pg.32).

Weber put his ideal type device to many different practical uses but for purposes of example I will start with Webers ideal type of human action (in Campbell, T, 1981, pg. 176-178). In constructing his ideal types of action, Weber picks out four types of behaviour that he thinks best sum up the motivation behind the huge variety of human conduct. Firstly, Weber emphasises those actions that are purely rational in nature. The individual conducts himself in such a way as to take account of the most rationally sensible method of achieving a rationally referenced aim. To do this, the individual will inform himself of the consequences of each path he considers taking and decides by assessing which choice will take him to his goal most economically. Secondly, Weber finds a distinction between action that is purely rational and action that follows a rational means-end calculation but always bias toward a particular set of values (a moral outlook for example). The value-rational man will only decide his course from a pool of choices that do not conflict with his values. Furthermore, the value-rational man will not only choose value biased means by also a value-oriented end "so that a morally good objective must be attained only by a morally good means" (Campbell, T, 1981, pg.177). Webers third type of human action is affective or emotional action. This type of action characterises non-rational action or action with an entirely emotional motivation. Finally, traditionalist action is reserved for behaviour that takes account (often habitually) of traditional ideas, practices and authorities. Weber does not intend that these types of action are taken to relate to four different types of person, clearly everyone at some stage will exhibit the traits described in all four-even in the course of a single day! These types of action allow Weber to "construct a composite picture of individual persons according to the combination of types of action which characterise their behaviour and the particular beliefs and values which they possess" (Campbell, T, 1981, pg.178). Weber can then take these typical actions and apply them to phenomena in society; for example, it is not difficult to imagine how we might explain the typical Calvinist using these types.

Parkin provides us with a more critical analysis of Webers ideal types in practice. In this example, Weber is concerned with identifying an ideal type of bureaucracy. Among Webers features of ideal types are "a formal hierarchy of rank and officialdom, the application of rules according to the book, promotion by merit or seniority, strict controls of files and information and so on" (Parkin, F, 1982, pg.34). The collective power of these typical elements give bureaucracy a "technical superiority over any other form of organisation" (Weber, M, cited in Parkin, F, 1982, pg.34). However, Parkin criticises the lack of explanation Weber gives for how he arrived at this conclusion. Rather than follow his own methodology and compare his ideal type with an empirical reality, Webers conclusion "is simply stated as an axiomatic truth that requires no empirical proof" (Parkin, F, 1982, pg.34). Furthermore, Webers findings show that bureaucracies tend to suppress the individual tendency toward autonomous thoughts, feelings or sentiments. Given this, Parkin questions the value of Webers use of the methods of verstehen. If a bureaucratic machine takes an individual's choice of behaviour from him, how is Weber to account for action by tapping into his subjective motivation?

Webers use of ideal types is almost arbitrary in hindsight as only such a conceptual tool would allow him to examine society on the level of the individual whilst remaining faithful to structural conditions in society. Despite the criticism level at Webers methodology it is not my feeling that this fatally damages the use of ideal types. The ideal type provides the clever user with many angles with which to attack an investigation as such it has many uses, for example, Heinrich believed that "the chief function of the ideal type is to specify the hypothetical attribution of rationality to historical agents" (cited in Ringer, F, 1997, pg.116) although they are equally adept at pointing to causal relations in the present. Whether ideal types are as useful as Weber would have us believe is still open to debate, but it seems to me that Weber has found many a good use for them.

Bibliography

Campbell, T., 1981, Seven Theories of Human Society, Clarendon Press, Oxford

Lewis, J., 1975, Max Weber and Value-Free Sociology-A Marxists Critique, Lawrence and Wishart: London

Parkin, F., 1982, Max Weber, Ellis Horwood Limited: Chichester and Tavistock Publications: London and New York.

Ringer, F., 1997, Max Webers Methodology, Harvard University Press

Ritzer, G., 2000, Classical Sociological Theory, 3rd Edition, McGraw Hill: Boston

Ian Sutton