To what extent does the Theory of Language Games satisfactorily do justice to the potential of Wittgenstein's contribution to the debate about religious language?
To what extent does the Theory of Language Games satisfactorily do justice to the potential of Wittgenstein’s contribution to the debate about religious language?
In his first book, the ‘Tractatus’, Wittgenstein praises his friend ‘Mr Bertrand Russell for much of the stimulation of [his] thoughts’. In understanding his theory of logic games it is therefore necessary to understand the context of its origin and thus the implications of his theory as Wittgenstein saw them. While the division of analysis into separate areas or games has far reaching ramifications, of particular interests are the implications the theory has on metaphysics and religious language. The Tractatus was defined as an attempt to ‘draw a limit to thought’, to state clearly what could be asserted and the means by which these ‘facts’ could be represented. While his later works digress from this basic assumption remains in terms of language games. These do not directly affect these assertions however it is his statement that ‘what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence’, that Wittgenstein essentially revokes. In talking of language games Wittgenstein asserts that scientific and religious statements, for example, cannot be mutually exclusive as they are of a different nature. The implications of the theological assertion that God created the world in seven days thus cannot be judged to contradict scientific beliefs such as the big bang theory as he sentences do in fact have different meaning and relevance. Wittgenstein thus analyses the relations of philosophy to science and the world in terms of language. In order to avoid being ‘perplexed’ by different value statements one must view philosophical statements as ‘description’ and ‘do away with all explanation’.