- Powers as a single development control Planning Authority (in place of the three boroughs), enabling the Corporation to provide a 'one stop service' for investors and developers seeking advice and planning permission (but with no plan making powers, responsibility for which remained with the local authorities).
- Land acquisition powers, with the ability to acquire land quickly from public sector authorities, through special Parliamentary vesting procedures to achieve 'regeneration'.
- Powers as an Enterprise Zone Authority responsible for the Isle of Dogs Enterprise Zone, which was designated in April 1982 with a ten-year life.
- Finally, powers for marketing and promoting the Docklands area.
In addition to these, the LDDC Board itself set its own initial goals and overall objectives:
- To rapidly improve the image of Docklands, not only by undertaking programmes of physical works throughout the area, but also by creating confidence in the continuing improvements to come;
- To use its financial resources primarily as a lever to attract private investment, given that the amount of public money available to the Corporation was small in relation to the size of the task the leverage principle;
- To acquire as much public sector land as resources permitted, in order to undertake the necessary reclamation, servicing and site assembly, followed by remarketing to the private sector wherever such sites were not the subject of suitable active redevelopment plans by their current owners;
- To bring the roads and public transport network up to the standard enjoyed in other parts of London;
- To bring about significant improvements in a choice and quality of housing and community amenities without undertaking such work directly.
Two decades after the implementation of the above objectives, a great deal has occurred in the London Docklands. There can be no doubt that in many respects the transformations are impressive.
By 1996, 728 hectares of previously derelict land has been reclaimed from areas in the docklands that were once heavily polluted by the old heavy industries. About 370 hectares (53%) of this is now involved in the commercial sector, approximately 210 hectares (30%) has been used for housing and open space accounts for the remaining 120 hectares. Of this final 17%, particular attention should be paid to the nature walk, only a stone’s throw away from Canary Wharf Tower – the tallest building in the United Kingdom.
This reclamation of land is perhaps the most striking and noteworthy achievement by the authority; especially as urban sprawl and expansion onto green-field sites was a common mark of twentieth century urbanisation.
In the LDDC region alone, the authority had managed to attract more than £6 billion worth of private investment by the end of March 1998. This was then invested into the region using a payout from the nationwide collection of £4 billion worth of public-sector funds. This public-sector spending was put to use on paying for new some of the new transport links (predominantly the 250km of roads that were constructed) that were necessary to make the area more accessible.
This private-sector investment was responsible for the building and refurbishment of more than 19,000 housing units. In 1981, one third of homes in the area were declared unfit for human habitation. As a result, more than 6,250 new council housing and association homes were built between 1981 and 1998 and 48,000 council homes underwent major renovation inside and out, thus satisfying the demand for better quality housing. New accommodation has actually formed 26% of the total amount of houses built during this period and means that more accommodation is available for the residents who were living in the shaming concrete high rise blocks, or for those in temporary residence. The surrounding environment was also better improved as the old industrial areas were redeveloped, so many of the units could be built in close vicinity to, or even on, the waterfront.
Away from housing and accommodation, more than 2.25 million square metres of non-residential floor space (that is new industrial zones, commercial and leisure buildings) have been created by the LDDC. Although some of this does include a few light industrial developments, it is principally recreation complexes, shops and other retail establishments.
In addition, the creation of almost 67,000 new jobs in the docklands represents a massive achievement and one seemingly of considerable merit. At this rate, it has been forecast that the working population of the region is likely to be 175,000 by the year 2014. When the commercial and economic heart began to slow into non-existence just twenty years ago, the population could only foresee devastating levels of redundancy. Indeed, between 1965 and 1985, it is estimated that upward of 27,000 jobs were lost in the docklands region. This is an incredible turnaround from the future the region faced in the latter part of the twentieth century.
In relative terms, it can be said that this information is excellent news and that it is good evidence to suggest that the redevelopment of the London Docklands has been a success. Unfortunately, it is only one side of the coin and there are many other factors that contribute to the contemporary “success or failure” debate.
A feature of today’s economy is that more and more people now own the property they live in. Statistics show an increase of 40% in owner occupancies, and a rise of 6% in the number of people renting residences. In 1983, the ‘low cost home ownership policy’ was introduced. This scheme aided residents looking to purchase a home by attaching a fixed price to certain properties. Local authorities also made it possible to acquire a certain amount of council housing. As a possible direct consequence of this, the amount of local authority-owned housing has decreased considerably by 56%. However, it was (and still is to a certain extent) the case that new housing was unaffordable to local people and was occupied by more affluent immigrants, who chose to live in this new rejuvenated environment but often worked in other areas of the city. In light of this, the question of whether more than 6,000 new homes destined for council ownership were actually needed – especially if they were only to be sold off as part of a council initiative – is one to be contemplated.
It is also important to understand that although the amount of council and association housing in the area may have been reduced, it is only due to new housing being built. The absolute amount is therefore a smaller percentage in view that there is much more housing in the area than there was at the start of the redevelopment scheme.
Despite the thousands of housing units that have been built or renovated, many people still live in the old relics that are the tower blocks. Like many of their generation, the Samuda estate in Greenwich is similar to most of its generation; it was constructed quickly from cheap materials, has leaking walls and ceilings, and does little to provide a pleasant environment for people to live, work and play. This example alone does not reinforce the argument that redevelopment in the locality has been a success.
These deductions have been made from data collected in a district that is not socially or culturally stable. Not only is the region used as a stepping-stone by waves of migrants coming into the country as a suitable area to start their life in the UK, but also the actual population of the area is subject to great fluctuation and it always has been. In 1960, the population of the borough of Tower Hamlets was 240,000. By 1991 it had dropped to 160,000.
The vast majority of employment created in the Docklands was in the service sector, i.e. mainly office jobs. This is not much use for those made redundant from working in the dockyards and who have never been trained or even educated to a level suitable for that type of work. It is also a fact that the figures of “new” jobs are biased, as many were merely relocations from other parts of the city.
This is not to say that no employment has been provided for the less skilled working population, as a growing population means more shops and other such commercial enterprises. Even the Docklands Light Railway is reported to consist of a workforce made up of one third former dockworkers. Nevertheless, not only was the number of truly newly-created jobs insufficient to make up for those lost, but such employment is often poorly paid and frequently only part-time or on a temporary basis.
Despite this, a MORI report published in 1991 for the Docklands area discusses the sorts of qualities employers seek in their employees. It reveals that nearly 7 in 10 employers find it hard recruiting suitable staff. This is not necessarily because of applicant’s lack of formal education - only 25% of employers felt qualifications were important. The main weaknesses employers felt existed among local workers was a lack of enthusiasm and laziness (30%), poor discipline (41%), poor communication skills (10%), and a lack of social skills (36%). This mirrors some claims that jobs were not provided for the local populous, as it clearly expresses employers’ perception of local people and their employability. It is also argued that there are many organizations such as ‘Skillnet’, designed specifically for enabling people to gain formal qualifications that were unavailable to them before.
Further to these problems however, is the total embarrassment of the handling of the transport network for the Docklands. It was obvious that if you are intending to increase the working and living population of an area that more transport links are required, especially in an area notorious for its inaccessibility (unless you happen to be travelling by boat). Aside from the 250 km of roads that were built to cope with traffic on the roads, it was believed that other options had to be considered. After dismissing plans to extend the underground system’s Jubilee line to the centre of the region on the grounds of excessive cost, a brand new transport investment was to be made. The London Docklands Light Railway system was constructed and was initially designed to take 3,000 commuters and hour from central London to the Docklands. It was to cost £100 million.
However, the scale of the operation was vastly underestimated. By the mid-1990s, upward of 6,000 people and hour needed to get to the Canary Wharf complex in the heart of the Isle of Dogs – a number that could not be coped with by the roads even when assisted by light railway scheme. Therefore the entire system was rebuilt at a further cost of £1,500 million – significantly more expensive than was approximated for the Jubilee Line extension which, by the end of the decade, was forced to be built anyway due to huge demand.
Having referred to several contemporary debates about development in east London, it is clear that there are problems in assessing the success and failure of redevelopment in the region. The disputes that impede this evaluation include one or two trying questions; if an authority is to spend a lot as much money, as the LDDC has, who should benefit? The local people should surely be top of the list? If an authority are supposed to provide for the ‘local’ people then they have to know who the local people are – how do you define ‘local’? How long does one have to live in an area to be considered local?!
Inter-urban differences further the argument as to who should benefit from such colossal spending. As the LDDC has a strict, defined border, areas that it can develop are frequently right next door to those that are much older and more run-down, making contrasts obvious.
Having studied these arguments, it is without a doubt extremely difficult to come to a standard, straightforward conclusion as to the success or the failure of regeneration in east London. The debates that arise over the actual need and appropriateness of some of the changes in the region that the LDDC once surveyed are still very much open, despite evidence to suggest great achievement in some sectors. Indeed, there are concerns about the paths that were followed in the hope of regeneration.
The LDDC has now been disposed of, but issues may still be raised as to its equity and democratic responsibility.
Bibliography
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London Docklands Development Corporation (1998), Regeneration Statement
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LDDC (1998), Housing in the Renewed London Docklands
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LDDC (1993), Annual Report and Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31st March 1993
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HALL P (1971), London 2000, Northampton. John Dickens and Company Ltd
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HUDSON R (1998), Geography Review (Volume 12, Issue 2, November 1998), pp. 26-27 “Regeneration or crisis in northeast England?”, Phillip Allan Publishers
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HUDSON R (1999), Geography Review (Volume 12, Issue 3, January 1999), pp. 34-35 “Regenerating England’s Inner Cities”, Phillip Allan Publishers
- http://www.addington3.freeserve.co.uk/beforelddc.html#Intro
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BUCKLE B (1981) London Docklands - Past, Present and Future, Docklands Joint Committee
Creating Regions and Managing Change, Level 2 Semester 1 assessment essay