To What Extent did the Gradual Abandonment of the Maoist Development Paradigm Between the years 1978 and 1988 Improve or Worsen the Lot of the Chinese Peasant?

The issue that needs to be addressed is which measures to use. One obvious distinction that could immediately be made is that between physical and non-physical measures. This refers to the difference between the well-being of the body and the mind. For example, a prisoner could have everything he could wish for, but without his freedom would he be truly happy? Conversely, what use is freedom of action or expression when you are starving to death? For this reason the initial distinction was made. The physical measures used are fairly obvious, consisting of food (intake, variety and starvation rates), consumption (of ‘non productive’ services and consumer goods), work (length of working day and the types of work done) welfare (percentages in different stages of education and access to healthcare), relative income levels, life expectancy, birth rates, infant mortality rates and finally suicide rates, and are all objective. The reason for using most of these statistics should be obvious. All show different aspects of either a person’s life, or general social trends. Unfortunately, some of these may be unobtainable, but providing that enough data can be found, a satisfactory picture of peasants’ lives should emerge.

The non-physical factors are harder to measure, and tend to be non-quantifiable. For example, how does the gradual erosion of communism (in all but name) affect the people? What degree of state control was maintained over speech, religion and conscience? What happened to the people’s pride in their nation, and did the disbanding of the communes lead to a fall in social cohesion and the breaking of social ties? All these factors and more will be examined, and from that analysis should emerge an objective picture of the peasants’ welfare.

Before the essay proper can begin, there are just a few more issues that need to be addressed. The term peasant needs to be defined. In the context of this project, ‘peasant’ refers to all rural inhabitants, not just those that toil the fields. The reason for this is that over the decades rural inhabitants will change jobs, with the farmer becoming a worker and vice versa. Also, most available data makes no distinction between the different types of rural worker, simply grouping then all under one banner. If appropriate, regional inequality will also be assessed. This will be interesting as it may show how the rise and fall of different goods can cause regional disparities.

The situation of the peasant that resulted from the Maoist development paradigm is a tricky subject. Do you look at the years of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, when millions starved? Since the question refers to how the abandonment of Mao’s policies affected the peasant, it seems logical that we should compare what things were like after 1976 with how things would have been had the paradigm been continued, as opposed to how things had been during Mao’s reign. For this reason, wherever possible, statistics for the late 70s will be used, especially with regard to food consumption levels and so on. The 50s and 60s cannot be ignored however, and data from these periods will also be used.

One final point which needs to be made is with regard to the available literature on the subject. Most of the available material only covers up to the late 1980s, and therefore that is where the scope of this project must end. Due to the nature of the Chinese regime, most of the data dealing with the 1990s is either unobtainable or anecdotal, and cannot be used here.

In a nation with a recent history of starvation as great as China’s, food seems to be the obvious place to start when measuring standards of living. In 1978, the period when Mao’s policies effectively ceased to hold sway, about 68 per cent of the average Chinese peasant’s consumption expenditure was on food. During the reign of Deng this figure was to fall steadily, to around 53% by 1988. The variety of the diet also increased, with the consumption indices of grain and vegetables staying fairly constant between 1978 and 1988, whilst consumption of oils, meat, eggs and aquatic products roughly doubled, and consumption of poultry and wine increased nearly 5 fold! This shows that overall food consumption, and therefore calorific intake must have also increased. These figures of increased and more varied eating habits are validated by data from a separate source that shows increased consumption of every major foodstuff between 1980 and 1984. The average peasant ate 138 jin (one jin is equivalent to just over 500 grams) more grain and vegetables, 0.48 jin more sugar, used 2.1 jin more cooking oil, and consumed 7.91 jin more protein in the form of meat, eggs, poultry and fish. Consumption of ‘alcoholic drink’ also increased, rising from 3.78 to 6.95 jin over the 4 year period. When using these statistics, it has to be borne in mind that Deng had already been in power for 2 years, so possibly some of the initial 1980 levels can be credited to his policies as well, further increasing the benefit his reforms did to the peasant. It is therefore clear that, at least in the initial years of his rule, Deng’s policies increased not only the quantity, but also the quality of people’s diets. Variety was greater, as were consumption levels. Figures show that in 1983 the average per capita calorific intake of a Chinese peasant was 2806 calories per day. This represents a level that would not only suggest a lack of any large scale starvation (as was present for much of Mao’s governance), but in fact indicate a food surplus, with people eating approximately 200 calories more per day than is recommended! The policies which achieved this were simple but effective. The collectives were given more autonomy, there was a rapid de-collectivisation of both labour and income systems, collectives were allowed not to be totally self sufficient, and finally food prices were significantly increased over a number of years.  

Food was not only important to the peasantry for consumption, but also as the main source of income. Most peasants made the vast majority of their earnings from the sale of their agricultural produce, the lion’s share of which was bought up by the state, especially in the Maoist period. For this reason, food prices are vital indicator of the income of the farming peasant. Between 1978 and 1988 real state food procurement prices rose by 144.7%; a rise that, as mentioned above, was deliberately implemented by Deng. This was done because the leadership felt that too great a proportion of the rural surplus was being extracted from the peasant, and that the balance needed to be redressed in the favour of the working man. As mentioned earlier, this should lead to an implicit rise in rural incomes.

As is evident from the graph, the gradual rise in rural incomes is roughly matched by that of state food prices. It can therefore safely be assumed that the rising prices of food had a positive impact upon the incomes of peasants. Because the price rises were deliberate, it can once again be said that the policies of Deng improved the situation of the peasant.  

Despite their huge importance, agricultural prices were not the only issue of significance for determining peasant incomes. Output levels, employment rates in different industries, food to cash crop production ratio, unemployment, as well rural industry all affect peasants’ wealth. Between 1978 and 1984 per capita grain output rose by 78kg a year, an index rise of 24%. Cotton production went from 2.3kg to 5.9kg, a rise of 156 %, and meat production went from 9.0kg per person per year, to 14.9kg, a rise of 65.6%! When the government abandoned forced grain self sufficiency which had before been imposed on the collectives, more specialisation and diversification was possible. This is the main reason for the increased range of production, and therefore another way in which policy change helped the peasants. Because more diversification was allowed, the proportion of peasants working in agriculture dropped from 90% in 1978 to just 79% in 1988. Transport, building, commerce and industry all expanded greatly as a result of the loosening of laws, and the result was greater consumption production? options for the people. It was not all good news however. The freeing up and dismantling of the communes had the effect of greatly increasing unemployment. In 1978 there were 25,549,000 ‘surplus’ rural workers, compromising 9% of the rural workforce. What does ‘surplus’ mean in this context? By 1987 this figure had risen to 111,255,000, meaning that 36% of the rural workforce was ‘surplus to requirements’. One of the effects of this was the urban migration that occurred during this period. Between 1978 and 1988, approximately 20% of all new urban jobs were assigned to rural labourers, resulting in 84,319,000 rural workers (according to official figures) moving to the cities in the space of 10 years. Whether this is a good or bad thing for the peasant is unclear. Presumably, some of the people relocated were happy, and some were not. Most were desperate to move! What it would have done however is reduced competition for rural jobs.

In China, as with all economies, people’s consumption of goods was closely liked with their incomes. Unlike other economies however, Chinese peasants’ consumption was also limited by the fact that the availability of ‘non-productive’ goods and services was controlled and limited by the state. Under Mao, these had been all but eliminated to make way for the production of goods which would further the Communist cause. Deng however, just as Khrushchev had in Russia, realised that to keep the peasants contented it was necessary to provide them with the material luxuries that they felt their due. For this reason commerce was increased, as were many other sectors which under the Maoist system had been deemed ‘unproductive’ and therefore not in the interests of the ‘continuous’ revolution. This can be seen from the increased employment figures for the commercial, catering and material supply industries, with employment increasing an average of 28.9% per annum during the period 1978 to 1988. The best picture of rural consumption is in fact painted by the consumer spending figures. In 1978, the average peasant spent 102.5 yen per year on ‘consumer goods’. This figure rose steadily during Deng’s reign, having reached 236.4 yen per year by 1984 But is this ‘real’ expenditure?  What was happening to prices? The reasons for this rise are numerous, and can mostly be indirectly attributed to government policies, such as the increased income of peasants and the greater availability of goods, as well as underlying social trends and the fall in the price of  production Why were prices falling?

It is fairly obvious that the material wealth of peasants improved during Deng’s rule at a faster rate than it would have had Mao’s principles been adhered to. It is also important, when looking at how Deng’s policies affected the peasants, to see how their situation compared with that of the urban poor. When he came to power, the average town dweller was spending approximately 433.7y per year on consumer goods, and as mentioned earlier, the average peasant was spending 102.5y per year. By 1984 this disparity was greatly reduced, with urban workers yearly spending falling to an average of 347.7y, and peasants spending having risen to 236.4y. When examining these statistics one thing that has to be considered is the vast levels of rural – urban migration that was taking place over this period. Since those forced to migrate were generally worse off than other peasants, their movement from the rural to the urban population would have tended to reduce the inequality between the two groups. Not sure about this, it wasn’t always the poorest who moved first. There is more clear evidence that rural-urban inequality was reduced during Deng’s regime. For example, just between 1980 and 1981 the urban/rural ratio of ownership of seven key goods evened out significantly. Taking the value of the rural ownership level to be always be 1, the urban ownership levels for radios fell from 3.7 to 2.9, bikes fell from 5.0 to 4.7 and television sets fell from their 1980 level of 11.7 to a 1981 low of 9.3. Although these figures do not explicitly state an increase in rural ownership, it can be safely assumed that the general trend was positive as overall income levels were continuously rising for this period. Again, although these changes were most likely not caused by any direct state intervention, it would be an indirect consequence of the increased incomes and freedom allowed by Deng’s reforms.

Two measures of the standard of living which are obviously important are the birth and death rates. If a society is prospering and people are happy then both will tend to fall. The reasons for this trend are numerous. With the increased welfare afforded by affluence, more people can live to enjoy an old age, and more importantly fewer children die prematurely. After a while people will realise that more of their children are surviving to adulthood, and that the need for large families is significantly reduced. The eventual effect of this will be for the average age of the population to increase, with an initial fall in ‘non-productive’ dependants, followed by an eventual rise in the number of pensioners. This would certainly cause a rise in the standard of living for the population in the long run. However, China is a unique case in that the fall in the birth rates was not natural but enforced. In 1979 Deng introduced what because to be known as the ‘one child policy’, the aim of which was so slow the growth rate of China’s already vast population, thus avoiding any repetition of the famines and mass starvations of Mao’s era. All couples were limited to one child, people were encouraged to delay marriage and conception, and it was seen as crucial to carefully nurture the one child you had, as is illustrated by the initial slogan: “Later, Longer, Fewer”. This policy was enforced by tax penalties for having more than one child, and people could be financially ruined by one unwanted birth. Some, but increasingly as incomes rose, not all. There were two main negative consequences of the one child policy. Firstly, there was a huge rise in the number of abortions, both voluntary and forced, especially when the expected child was a girl. This occurred because of the considerable emphasis the Chinese place on the importance of having a male heir. The second main consequence of the policy was the creation of ‘illegal’ children. Unknown quantities of births were hidden from the authorities, children either born at the houses of relatives, or simply concealed from the outside world. These children were on the whole denied any formal schooling as well as many of the other benefits enjoyed by other children, and therefore would not lead such productive or fulfilling lives. On top of this there was the individual impact on parents who could not fulfil their dreams of a large family, and on the generation of over-pampered ‘Little Emperors’. There was also a big rise in infanticide, especially in cases where the first-born was a girl.

The ‘One Child’ policy was not simply a black and white case of thoughtless and authoritarian communist action. There was a genuine need to slow the growth rate of the already vast Chinese population, and since re-education policies could not work as quickly as the urgency of the situation demanded, perhaps drastic action from the top was the only viable option. In the 1970s China’s average population growth rate was close to 2% per year. By 1984 it had been cut down to nearer 1%, a change whose impact on modern China can only be guessed at. Why? It is complex and far-reaching, but we can do more than guess. It is estimated that the result of this fall in population growth has reduced the population of 21st century China by around 300 million. Some argue that the effect of this policy on individual families was so appalling that even the eventual achievement of its aims would not atone for the huge suffering it had caused. Others think that China’s population problems were so serious that any means to the end were acceptable, as long as the population time-bomb was suitably defused. Even with the population at the reduced one-child levels, China is still a net importer of almost every major foodstuff. Maybe, though this might simply be a matter of cost.  It is cheaper to import rice into Shanghai from S.E. Asia than from the interior. Had the policy not been introduced and the population had risen by the predicted 300 million extra, the average per capita daily calorific intake would now be close to the 2,350 mark, as opposed to its current level of 2,800 (taking into account the diminishing marginal production efficiency of each new peasant, and also their dependant status up until the mid teens). It is therefore possible that in the long run and on a wider social level the One-Child policy has had a positive impact on the Chinese peasant, although this is a purely subjective conclusion.

When examining the situation of any rural peoples it is vital to take into account the effect that weather and other external factors can have upon livelihoods. Particularly good or bad seasons, as well as wars and the state of the international economy, can all have an impact on top of that of the government’s policies. During the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s China faced no conflicts on any scale large enough to affect the peasants, and weather patterns were fairly average for the period, if anything being slightly worse than normal. The international economy can also not take any credit for China success. Throughout the 1980’s the general situation in the developed world was gloomy, a factor which again boosts the case for Deng’s policies.

When you take into consideration all the available evidence, it seems indisputable that at least in a material sense the life of the Chinese peasant improved during the period of Deng’s premiership. He presided over increased and more varied food consumption, an opening up of society, a marked reduction in needless authoritarian policies, as well as an increase in the production and consumption of what Mao had deemed ‘unproductive’ goods and services. Whether these were all the direct result of his policies or simply the natural progression of China’s economic development can never be conclusively proved, although all evidence would point to a marked improvement in nearly all of the quantifiable measure of peasant life after 1978. It may therefore be said that on the whole, the economic situation of the peasantry steadily improved during Deng’s stewardship, but this is a very different thing to saying that Deng’s policies were good for the Chinese peasants. It seems likely that while he was in command things did indeed get better, but that his introduction of the market system made China vulnerable to fluctuations in the international economy. Many people feel that China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 was a step too far down the capitalist road, at least as far as the welfare of the peasant was concerned. After joining it became impossible for many farmers to compete with the low prices of the subsidised farmers of Europe and America, and ‘dumping’ became a major problem. One effect of this was a huge quantity of unofficial urbanisation, with anecdotal evidence suggesting the existence of huge out-of-town slums around cities such as Shenzhen, housing untold millions of former farmers and agricultural labourers in conditions reminiscent of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Yes, though these features had emerged well before WTO membership

It is obvious that Deng was more of a pragmatist than Mao, realising that many of his reforms, whilst not communist, were good for the nation. Deng once said that “Being poor is not socialism, to be rich is glorious”, but it now seems apparent that while he believed that socialism could be a route for escaping poverty, it was not a path he or his successors would tread. The end result of this is a nation split into 2 polar extremes, with the average income (including non income factors) of an east coast resident being around 6 times that of a peasant. Communism is no more in China, with repression and human rights abuses the only remnants of an abandoned doctrine.

Bibliography:

• J. Zink, China’s One Child Policy, axe.acadiau.ca/~043638z/one-child/index.html
• C. Riskin, China’s Political Economy, Oxford, 1991
• Kueh and Ash, Economic Trends in Chinese Agriculture, Oxford, 1993
• P. Nolan, The Political Economy of Collective Farms, Cambridge, 1988
• China SSB, Zhongguo Tonji Nianjan (ZGTJNJ) (Chinese statistical yearbook), 1989
• J. R. Taylor & J. Banister, China: The Problem of Employing Surplus Rural Labour
• G. Heilig, Can China Feed Itself,

http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/ChinaFood/index_h.htm

• Z.X. Simon & T.S.P. Christopher, Spatial Disparities, Inflation, and their Impact on China's Investment Environment in the 1990s and Beyond, Hong Kong Baptist University
• S.G. Powell, Agricultural Reform in China 1978-1990, Manchester, 1992

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DEPARTMENT OF HISTORICAL STUDIES

PROJECT FEEDBACK SHEET

NAME:  Joe Inwood

TOPIC:  Reforms                                                                MARK:  70

COMMENTS

A thoughtful, perceptive and carefully put together Project.  You develop your theme quite effectively.  I think you underestimate the effect of the rise of rural industry on peasant incomes (at least after the initial rise in agricultural prices).  You also need to take account of the effect of various subsidies to the urban population.  On the whole though, a good Project.

There is no evidence that you have used any web-based material.  You have two sources in the bibliography but as far as I can tell nothing in the text.  To get your IT credit points can you need to provide the evidence that you are able to incorporate internet material in your analysis.  Shouldn’t be too difficult for you.

pr\essay\project04\Inwo                                                        7 May, 2007

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