“How significant was Bismarck in securing the unification of Germany 1862 – 1871?”

The first step in these events was his meeting with Napoleon III at Biarritz in October 1865. Here "vague promises were made to the French"(iv) of territory in the Rhine if they remained neutral in the event of a Prussian war against Austria. The alliance with Italy also indicated Bismarck was awaiting war. These diplomatic initiatives by Bismarck suggest a level of planning far beyond merely taking advantage of situations as they arose, and indicate Bismarck knew full well a war with Austria was on the horizon. Austria's isolation assured her subsequent defeat at the hands of Prussia, and the Peace of Prague abolished the Austrian-dominated German Confederation and replaced it with the North German Confederation, which would be the beginning of the united Germany. The final chapter in the unification of Germany came in the form of the war against France, in which Bismarck used the Hohenzollern candidature and more importantly the Ems telegram as a tool to provoke the country. By allying with the southern states Bismarck had effectively united them against a common enemy, which eased their incorporation into the new Reich when the time came. He had also manipulated events in Luxembourg to humiliate France, and it is clear he was attempting to provoke the country. The victory of Prussia over France put pressure on the states to join the confederation. The creation of the Reichstag appointed by universal suffrage was a strong indication of the will to empower Germany as a whole.

Advocates of the Bismarckian interpretation would argue that it is clear through his alliances with Italy and France, his manipulation of international disputes and willingness to wage war when the outcome would favour unity secured Bismarck as the 'master planner' behind the events leading up to 1871. Rather than 'just another factor' in the process, it could be argued that Bismarck was the key to the culmination of events through his statesmanship and patience. Bismarck's earlier decisions in Schleswig-Holstein gave rise to popular nationalist sentiment through the Nationalverein and Kleindeutsch, which eased reactionary attitudes towards the idea of unification and later encouraged the princes to unite under the North German Confederation. Although difficult to believe in light of mounting evidence to the contrary, there is sufficient supporting evidence to show Bismarck had planned all the entire process from 1862 to 1871, and thus any event was merely another stage in Bismarck's master intentions. If this is to be believed, this would place Bismarck as the sole force behind the unification, and his significance would be absolute - however, as the originator of this interpretation, his motives are suspect. Bismarck's term of office were over by 1890, and a driving force behind the memoirs would have been to look good and give himself as large a role as possible in the unification of Germany.

The concept of Bismarck masterminding the unification of Germany, although favoured by Bismarck himself, seems fundamentally flawed in retrospect. The fact that "Bismarck came to power just as the balance of power was rapidly shifting towards Prussia"(v) seemed to have more of a significant impact than Bismarck himself. The manoeuvre to aid Russia in the Polish revolt was more self-preservation than anything else; practically speaking, Bismarck sealed off the borders with Poland to prevent the riots spreading to Prussia and its lot in Poland. It is quite possible that Bismarck was first and foremost a pragmatist, with the aim of expanding Prussian territory as much as possible but with events leading, quite accidentally, to the unification of Germany - similar in many ways to Cavour in Italy. His decisions in Schleswig-Holstein again could be interpreted as a move to prevent it's independence, as this would prove a formidable barrier to annexation. While it is difficult to argue Bismarck did not in some way pre-plan this - many decisions made by Bismarck indicate he was antagonising Austria into war - the logical reason for his doing so is more in line with his own 'realpolitik' ideals than the romanticist notions he ridiculed. As Michael John states in The Unification of Germany,

"Bismarck's only clear policy was his determination to prevent any attempt by the Austrians to reassert their leadership of the German States. Bismarck certainly entertained the idea of a united 'Kleinduschland' under Prussian domination, but he was not committed to fighting a war to make this possible."

Bismarck's negotiation of the Italian and French alliances was a demonstration of his opportunism at its best. France was keen to alter the balance of power and regain territory in Europe; Russia held grudges against France for their part in the Crimean War and their criticism of the Polish revolt affair and so would remain neutral, and the expulsion of foreign power in Italy held interest for the fledgling country. In all, Bismarck was fortunate enough to face a very favourable international situation indeed: with the European powers pulling in all directions, Britain reluctant to intervene and Russia angered over France's Crimean war conduct Bismarck had to do little more than manipulate it to his own advantage.

Added to this was the fact he was "inexperienced in war"(vi), with his actions "rather calculated to frighten Austria"(vi) through Schleswig-Holstein than as a pretext for war. The fact that the situation resulted in war although Bismarck did not initially intend for it could be seen as evidence for his 'strategy of alternatives' - a direct contradiction to the idea of Bismarck as a 'master planner'. Pflanze submitted that Bismarck's strategy was to hold as many solutions open as possible, and explore each one until a final decision had to be made: "the ability to wait while conditions develop is a requisite of practical policy". An example of this strategy in action can be seen in the Schleswig-Holstein affair - the alliance with Austria suggested Prussia's ambitions had been curbed, when in fact "Austrian support had been enlisted to further Prussia's interests."(vii) In this way there could have been many different possible outcomes in Bismarck's terms of office, all with differing consequences on the possibility of German unification. With this in mind as well as the war with France, it becomes evident that Bismarck's significance spread only far as taking a hand in engineering the events; as Breuilly states, Prussia was in on the eve of a great power shift. This wave of industrial change brought tactical advantages, such as the railways and a wealth of local materials. Another element to Prussia's advantage was the Zollverein: the economic unity between states (under strict Prussian supervision) that helped ease the formation of the Confederation. Bismarck had little if nothing to do with these developments, as primarily he was a diplomat and concerned himself only with politics. Other events which the minister-president could never have foreseen, such as exactly when the candidature of Spain would be open for application also indicate flaws in the idea he was the 'master planner'.

Bearing in mind Bismarck's previous statements on his contempt for nationalism, it also seems likely that later decisions could have been influenced by the rise of the Kleindeutsch. The concept that Germany could be united under Prussia with the exclusion of Austria arose after the Schleswig-Holstein affair, along with its Austrian counterpart Großdeutsch. Although short-lived the movement gained some degree of notoriety through the creation of the Reformverein. Bismarck would have had trouble ignoring these developments, and already had sympathy with the idea of Prussia extending her rule over the entire German region. However, rather than 'believing' in the notion as such, it is entirely more plausible that Bismarck again exploited this to his own ends, "instrumentalising German liberal nationalism"(viii) to gain support within the emerging movement. Overall, it is perhaps more believable that Bismarck never really planned the entire process and more or less brought all the factors important in the unification process together; his 'strategy of alternatives' often presented the most favourable outcome for eventual unification as well as for the present circumstances. The man was not without flaws - he had made several mistakes in his early years in office, and the Hohenzollern candidature had nearly ended in humiliation for the minister-president. It was the combination of Bismarck, the unstable international situation and Prussia's military strengths rather than Bismarck himself that led to unification.

Both arguments hold some validity, but in truth it is most likely Bismarck was neither the sole momentum behind the events nor wholly insignificant, but instead a amalgamation of the two; in all probability he didn't plan for the unification of Germany, but there is reasonable evidence to suggest he knew from 1862 war with Austria was inevitable- "the great questions of the day will not be settled by speeches...but by blood and iron." His statesmanship and ability to manipulate the political and international situation of the time are undeniable, but the factors he was not able to foresee and prepare for are evidence that Bismarck had not masterminded the entire series of events, and could not be credited for them except if to congratulate his 'strategy of alternatives'. It could be argued that his significance in unifying Germany stretched only as far as his ability to facilitate current events to successfully secure the next - for example, had Austria had won the war against Prussia, there would have been little hope for the creation of a North German Confederation and France would never have intervened. Bismarck was ostensibly the most important factor in the unification of Germany in 1871 - of course, Prussia was gaining strength and the international situation was ripe for a change in the balance of power, but it took the Prussian minister-president to utilise these individual factors for the eventual formation of a united Germany, whether it was his original intention or not.

(i) Whitfield, Germany 1848 - 1914

(ii) Michael John, The Unification of Germany

(iii) Breuilly, The First German Unification, 1847-71

(iv) Smith, Bismarck's planning of German Unification

(v) Breuilly, The First German Unification, 1847-71

(vi) AJP Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe

(vii) Whitfield, Germany 1848 - 1914

(viii) Michael John, Early Modern History