"After 1949, the superpowers saw a need to extend their influence beyond Europe." How accurate is this view.
Name : Lin Zhexian
Class : 1 A01 D
Subject Tutor : Mr. David Liew
"After 1949, the superpowers saw a need to extend their influence beyond Europe."
How accurate is this view. Make reference to at least 2 case studies.
The Cold War, most commonly regarded to as the era of superficial calmness between the Blue and the Red with the lurking of crises beneath the floating thin ice. It is during this period that invisible tension was felt across the globe. Not only in Western Europe but even in East Asia. The war between Communism and Democracy during the Cold War is generally a war fought because of ambiguities. When proper answers could not be obtained about the foe, the proper tends to pick up assumptions, more often than not, assumptions that reflect the worst scenario. This consequence in preventable apprehension between the two sides - out beating each other by being able to foretell the other's next move. This piece of essay shows how the superpowers, over the years of the Cold War, turned out to be playing a game whereby the victor controls most territory of our Earth. This essay would be making references to the Korean War (1950 - 1953) and the Cuban Missile Crisis to illustrate the statement of territorial influence being crucial during the Cold War era.
Korean War (1950 - 1953)
"An all-out war with China would be
the wrong war at the wrong time in the wrong place against the wrong enemy."
~ General Omar Bradley~
Containment was previously seen only necessary in Europe. However, due to the rising McCarthy sentiments, President Truman needed to prove to his American people that his Democratic Party was not fearful and soft in the face of the rising Communist threat1. But, to support his massive ideology of suppressing Communism, it called for huge sums of monetary backing which would need the endorsement of the Congress. Previously, Truman had managed to obtain a reluctant Congress's approval for huge expenditure to espouse the crisis in Greece and Czechoslovakia. He was certain that unless and insurgencies were evident in other countries, which would undermine democracy, it was impossible to have the endorsement of the congress for his proposed monetary package, National Security Council Document 68 (NSC68)2. The NSC 68 would be used to extend containment to Asia, most importantly, prop up Chiang's military position in Formosa and to retain American naval and air bases in Japan and to rearm the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)3. During that period, with Europe in a more stable condition, it was more probable and sensible to wish for an Asian crisis.
Possibilities littered across the Asian region. In China, there were signs of army movements threatening an assault on Formosa, where Chiang's forces retreated. However, this was too minute a problem as proven so when the Senate demanded for American Pacific Fleet to blockade the Straits of Taiwan and the matter was over4.
In Japan, Japanese Communist Party challenged American military presence and even the majority of non-communist Japanese backed the violent demonstrations staged by the Communist Party. The loss of the Tokyo military base would have the Americans lose a strategic airfield closest to Eastern Soviet Union. But, the United States was already in the process of drafting a unilateral peace treaty, which would guarantee American military presence in Japan on a long-term basis5.
The most plausible was thus Korea where all is tension. In May 1948, both United States and the Soviets had their occupation troops stationed in North and South Korea respectively recalled, though military aid was consistently being poured into both sides.
By June 1950, a series of agenda seeking immediate attention was up facing Truman. A crisis was needed to sell his NSC 68 program, Chiang's forces was showing signs of trouble holding onto Formosa, Military bases retention in Japan needed justification and the Democrats had to provide evidence of its hard lines towards Communism both ...
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The most plausible was thus Korea where all is tension. In May 1948, both United States and the Soviets had their occupation troops stationed in North and South Korea respectively recalled, though military aid was consistently being poured into both sides.
By June 1950, a series of agenda seeking immediate attention was up facing Truman. A crisis was needed to sell his NSC 68 program, Chiang's forces was showing signs of trouble holding onto Formosa, Military bases retention in Japan needed justification and the Democrats had to provide evidence of its hard lines towards Communism both in Europe and in Asia for the McCarthyites6. The endorsement of the NSC 68 would thus solve these outstanding problems.
On June 25, 1950, Truman's long awaited crisis arose. North Korean troops had crossed the thirty-eighth parallel in force, declaring war on South Korea on the grounds of unification of the Korean peninsula under Communism.
North Korea was condemned as the aggressor and with the approval and support from the United Nations; American military aid arrived in South Korea almost immediately, on June 26. President Truman formally extended the Truman Doctrine to the Pacific by pledging United States military intervention against any expansion of Communist rule in Asia. All on the same day, America found herself committed to the French in Indochina fighting Ho Chi Minh, the Philippines where the Huks were continuously challenging the government and the order to the Seventh Fleet was sent out to "prevent any attack on Formosa"7. The Korean War had begun.
Truman tried to cautiously refrain the Soviets from getting involved with the Korean attack. On the same day as his White House announcement of the change in the Truman Doctrine, Truman sent a note to Moscow assuring Stalin that the American objectives were strictly limited to contain and not conquer North Korea and expressed wishes that the Russians would help in restoring peace on the Korean peninsula8.
President Truman ordered air raids on the capital of Pyongyang and he, in fact, was convinced that American ground support was unnecessary. Much of this was wishful thinking. Air power in the Second World War was assumed of equal effect in the Korean War. Also contributing partially was the racist attitude that Asians was unable to stand up in the face of Western guns. Most importantly, Truman believed that the Communists were afraid to commit their troops to battle and even if they did, the troops would not be motivated to fight for the unpopular Communist regime9.
He was wrong. The North Korean army drove their southern counterparts straight down the peninsula and American air raid campaigns barely hampered the North Korean Army. On June 30, Truman was compelled to order United States troops stationed in Japan to proceed to Korea. That was the first batch of American ground forces. In favour of keeping the war at its limited cost, Truman emphasised yet again that the aim of the United States was "to restore peace". The policy in other words was containment and not rollback10.
In September, MacArthur's troops successfully captured the Southern capital, Seoul and thus encircling the North Korean Army. On September 27, the Joint chiefs ordered for the destruction of the enemy army and empowered him with the authority to conduct military operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel11. MacArthur responded promptly to the order and within 2 weeks, American troops had crossed the parallel12. At this point, Truman was full confident of total victory over the Korean peninsula that he, with the full concurrence of the State and Defence departments made the decision to liberate North Korea, accepting the potential risks and changed the decision of containment to liberation. The Russians were cautious with America and kept a low profile while the Chinese issued a series of warning, which ended with an October announcement that should the Americans pursue up North of Korea, the Chinese would enter the conflict.
MacArthur issued statements that the Chinese would never dare risk war with the United States of America. Just like everybody else, he was wrong. The Chinese poured thousands of "volunteers"13 and soon sent MacArthur's men retreating. It was a completely reversed military situation. Now, they had to risk going to war with China but fighting China would mean fighting with the Soviet Union. America was unprepared for that extent of intervention. The policy thus veered back onto containment and never again would the United States attempt to force to free a Communist state14.
In February 1951, MacArthur resumed the offensive and drove the Chinese and North Koreans back. Just as the Administration was ready for negotiations, MacArthur crossed the parallel and demanded an unconditional surrender from the Chinese15. Truman was furious and disposed the genera at the first opportunity. This angered the American people who were disapproving of the way Truman was conduction the war and they seemed to be rejecting the idea of containment. Truman declined victory over Chinese and North Korea and this leaves peace talks as the sole alternative16. On July 27, 1953, the Korean Armistice Agreements was signed, ending the Korean War without a formal peace treaty17.
Cuban Missile Crisis
"This country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies."
~ President JF Kennedy~
The story of Cuba began with a revolutionist turned statesman named Fidel Castro. Upset with the seizure of the Cuban government by dictator Fulgencio Batista y Zaldiva in 1952, Castro took up the leadership of an underground anti-government faction. After a series of unsuccessful attempts to overthrow dictator Batista, Castro, with increasing popular support marched on Havana in December 1958, proclaiming a Cuban Revolution18. This time round, he was the victor. Within two years of his establishment of a Marxist-similar government, Castro negotiated for weaponry and monetary support from the Soviet Union. In 1960, Castro nationalized all Cuban resources. In particular, The United States was furious over Castro's seizures of American-owned companies and in 1960 cancelled all remaining trade agreements with the Cubans19. US - Cuban relations faces a downward turn ever since.
By 1962, America, in the name of NATO, has installed missile silos across Western Europe to counter its fear of the Soviet Union probable offensive stance, especially over the status of Berlin. The missile site closest to the Soviet Union and the most crucial in Soviets' opinion is the medium-range nuclear missiles the United States installed in Turkey. They were reportedly operational20.
It was a recognized fact by the Soviets that the United States did in fact have superiority in global political, economical and military power. This strongly puts them in strong advantage in the growing missile power gap between themselves and the Soviet Union21. While Cuban-American relations were far from cordial, Nikita Khrushchev thus took the threat of the Jupiter missiles installed in Turkey one step further and pondered on the possibility of stationing Soviet medium-range missiles in the face of the Americans - Cuba22. This step would achieve numerous goals in favor of the Soviet Union. With the installation of nuclear missiles capable of reaching Washington D.C in less than five minutes, the Soviet Union would now be in a position to negotiate with the Americans. First and foremost would be the removal of Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Secondly would be the guarantee of Cuban sovereignty as American invasion was highly probable in the circumstances of that time and lastly, a possibility of starting a new round of negotiation on the status of Berlin23. The Soviet missile presence in Cuba would greatly aid in the redress of Soviet strategic inferiority.
The shipment of the missiles, accompanied by an additional combat force to aid prevention of invasion, was carried out with great stealth. Incredibly, the Soviet leadership was caught by an absolute surprise when the Americans disclosed that missiles have been discovered in Cuba and President Kennedy's "first step" was to impose a quarantine coupled with a demand of all stationed missiles to be removed24. Soviet response was cautious and the blockade was never challenged though there were reports of an angry Khrushchev wanting to challenge the quarantine-blockade authorized by the new American leader.
On October 27, also known as "Black Saturday"25, an ominous chain of events chocked the Washington administration. Soviet intelligence reported that signs of American military preparations were inclined in an invasion of Cuba by 30th October. An alarmed Castro expresses his fear to the Soviets of an attack by the United States within 24 to 72 hours and urged Khrushchev to preemptively attack the United States26. Castro evidently would not accept a verbal assurance of non-invasion of Cuba in exchange of the removal of missiles, which was proposed by Moscow. Far more dangerous was the completely unforeseen action of Soviet Air Defense in Cuba for shooting down a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. This confuses Washington over Soviet's goodwill of Khrushchev's initial deal of American pledge of non-invasion of Cuba in exchange of Soviet missiles to be removed from Cuba. Tensions were running high and the world was on the brim of being exposed to a nuclear war never seen before.
On the 27th of October, Robert Kennedy, with permission of the highest authority in Washington informed Ambassador Dobrynin (Moscow ambassador to the US) that the United States was planning to phase out it's Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy, coupled with a pledge of no invasion of Cuba was a virtual ultimatum the United States was offering to the Soviet Union27. It was promptly accepted and Khrushchev replied to the President's terms openly over Radio Moscow that all offensive weapons would be removed from Cuba and none would be shipped into Cuba again28. Four months later, American Jupiter missiles were removed from Turkey.
Overall Conclusion
The two case studies undoubtedly illustrate the extent of the want and need for influence, which would result in benefits to the United States and the Soviet Union.
In the case of Korea, we observe that President Truman took on American military commitment in the Korean peninsula due to his need for a crisis to justify his need for an NSC 68 package (tripling military budget), which would aid the military rearmament in West Germany and American military commitment in NATO. However, to simply say that Truman's interest in Korea is solely for his need to obtain Congress approval would be unfair. President Truman too needed to establish grounds that his government is challenging and not ignoring Communism, whilst McCarthyism sentiments were running high. Furthermore, there was an introduction of the Domino Theory. Though at that time, the domino effect was not apparent, there was still a possible threat because all over South East Asia are small insurgencies calling for a Communist government. Korea, with such proximity to Communist giants Soviet Union and China, would serve as an important ally to the United States. We also notice the little reaction the Soviet Union had in response to American intervention in the Korean War as compared with the Chinese.
In the case of Cuba, we witness that Soviet intentions of missile installation in Cuba was very much due to the fact of United States dominance in countries near Russia. Especially so is the presence of American Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey, clearly aimed at Russia and even China. With democracies sprouting across the region with American aid, it was natural for the Soviet Union to be intimidated and would thus seize every opportunity to introduce Communism and Soviet military strength in America's doorstep. Cuba served two purposes. One, communist presence in the Americas and two, Soviet military presence, which is simply across the Florida Straits. Should all the missiles be shipped into Cuba and installed without American detection, it would be totally Soviet's call for demands in Western Europe. Khrushchev could easily call for renegotiations for Berlin; and the removal of all missiles in Europe and the list goes on.
Henceforth, from these two cases, we see that the superpowers did in fact see a need to have their influence extended. For the Americans, it would be to curb Communism from spreading - containment. And for the Soviets, it would be the need for an equal status in weaponry and threat to the United States as it was threatening her in Europe.
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International History Assignment
Done by: Lin Zhexian
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