The creation of the zemstvo as new representative bodies for the people in 1864 may seem as a huge improvement for the lives of the Russian people – as do the Dumas set up in 1870; it is important to note that in larger cities, commandants ran the Dumas and only those who paid trade taxes or were on the property register were granted the vote, obviously meaning that the poor peasants (who made up the vast majority of the population) who couldn’t pay the trade taxes or own property, were not granted the right to vote, thereby dismissing their views - however, just as with the Emancipation of the Serfs, this is merely a thin glass window of illusions; easily shattered by the hammer of facts. The zemstvo and the duma alike had no control over the police. Due to the fact that the police are the eyes, ears and executioner for the authority of the Tsar – the bridge of power between the people and the government, if you will – it would have been helpful, if not a necessity, for the people to be able to influence what the authority does. Alas, tis not granted – which further inhibits the amount of reforms the zemstvo and duma could have implemented to improve the lives of the Russian people. Furthermore, the zemstvo was always short of money, which meant that they could not tackle with some of the issues that needed to be tackled, and the provincial governors in the government in Moscow could always countermand any zemstvo decisions – equivalent to Nicholas II’s state duma having the power to revoke any of the duma’s decisions. These points greatly decreased the reach of their reforms and improvement of the live of the Russian people. Alexander II could have prevented this by giving the zemstvo more power or even more money to carry out their reforms, however, his limited nature in this aspect proves how little he actually cared and how little he actually achieved.
Perhaps the most significant matter which the Tsar did not deal with towards the end of his reign was the existence of a constituent assembly. His inability to decide clearly remarks upon his lack of conviction in reform for the Russian people – paving the road for his assassination. It could be argued that it was actually the peoples’ fault due to the attempted assassination of 1866 which made Alexander II so hesitant to grant further reforms, however, if he maintained himself throughout his reign and truly believed in his reforms, then he would have surely been able to deal with a little attempted assassination and ploughed forward. This does not change the fact that the Tsar proved to be lacking in motions towards improvements for the Russian people – his hesitance further confuses the Russian people, as they do not know what side they should be siding with.
The conservative Mir were not dealt with which meant that unelected, inefficient old drones were still being appointed heads of peasant villages. This severely decreased the amount of reforms and improvements that took place, due to the fact that the Mir was conservative, therefore disliking reforms. This leads splendidly onto the problem of land, which neither the Mir nor the Tsar touched. The issue with land was that of the distribution. Many Russian families struggled to feed themselves – which can also link in with the Emancipation of the Serfs in that the Serfs had 20% less land than before the Emancipation. The Tsar could have solved these two issues – the Mir and the issue of land – quite easily – well with the Mir at least. However, he let these two issues lie, which did not help the Russian people in any way whatsoever.
Moving on to the lifting of repression which his father – Nicholas I – implemented upon the Russian people, we again see the recurring patterns of reforms being mere illusions and the heartbeats of facts, pounding through the floorboards, itching to do away with this illusion with all its splendour and might. At first glance, the reforms of the law by the Tsar in November 1864 seem completely liberal and very unRussian with the implementation of a jury to decide cases and the increase of wages for judges in order to decrease corruption; however, it is important to note that political cases were not brought forward to decide by a jury. These were probably the most important cases of the court and state, however, it was still governed by an autocratic hand of power with no democracy or liberty present at all. Such underlying garbage pollutes the splendour which the illusion maintained and further shows Alexander’s inability to reform effectively for the Russian people.
Similarly, the issue of censorship and press further conveys Alexander’s lack of passion and mobility in improving the Russians’ lives. At first, it seemed as if the press had complete freedom as they were given the liberty to openly question the Emancipation of the Serfs, however, facts and figures show that from 1855-64, 66 newspapers were licensed which basically meant that the newspapers came under the Tsar’s/state’s control, and in 1865, the Ministry of Interior provided a new set of rules to guide writers and editors which stated that the work were to be submitted after printing but before release. This is essentially the same as prior to these rules where the writers/editors had to obtain prior approval to writing articles! Nothing has changed! However, perhaps these new rules coupled with the inefficiency of the censors, did in fact help the Russian people by educating them by seditious books being overlooked and printed such as Chernyshevski’s “What is to be Done”. Irony at its finest.
Alexander II did not only achieve his “improvements” by reforms, oh no, he utilised repression and violence upon nationalities such as the Polish uprising of 1863. Initially, he relaxed central control in some regions, especially Poland and the western provinces of Russia - Warsaw was even granted its own archbishop and medical school - however, after the attempted assassination of the Russian-appointed Polish Prime Minister, the perpetrators being caught publicly hanged, the rebellion ensued, being swiftly crushed. One must argue, however, that Alexander was either extremely foolish, or just a pseudo-liberal for appointed a Russian to represent the polish people. If indeed he was a pseudo-liberal in this case, then surely he must still want to maintain power by situating a Russian in such a power seat of Poland, rendering his earlier relaxation of central control a mere show to appear liberal; implying he does not really want to help the Russian people at all, also shown by his lack of improvements and increase of repression.
There is little to be said on the matter of Finance, as there was little done. The notoriously inefficient finance system – or lack of one – was ignored and was not improved at all. Another stricken note upon which the Tsar did not tune. The economy was developing and showed some improvements. By 1887, the workforce expanded from 860,000 to about 1,320,000 and oil and coal extraction increased dramatically within the two decades or so. However, in comparison to the West, these improvements were mere peanuts and bore no real challenge. In regards to the Russian people, the working class were still less than 1%, meaning that a vast majority were still unemployed, starving and probably dying. Alexander II’s lack of help here clearly shows his inability to want to reform and help reform.
Alexander, although recognised that reform was needed for Russia to move forward, was heavily influenced by autocracy – probably a consequence of being tutored by the moody, Russian-loving, conservative Pobedonestev – consequently, his reforms were weak and lacked follow through. This actually confused and irritated the Russian people more than they improved their lives at all. In a way, I even breathe a sigh of relief to have such a confusing “liberalist” out of Russia’s way, for to have someone of his nature on the throne would have led to dangerously temperamental actions.
