Assess the view that the failures of the Congress of Vienna outweighed the successes.

Nationalism also received some token of acceptance in the reduction of the number of German states, and in the recreation of Poland. Some historians have also argued that, had nationalist ideas been heeded, it would only have encouraged aggressive expansion, as happened later in the century, resulting in greater disruption to the settlement. This would indicate that while few concessions were made, this does not necessarily constitute a failure, as moves were either unpractical or perhaps precarious, and therefore does not support the view that the failures outweighed successes in the congress to Vienna. In addition, these forces were of secondary importance, as Castlereagh explained to the House of Commons: ‘the Congress of Vienna was not assembled for the discussion of moral principles, but for great practical purposes, to establish effectual provisions for the general security.’ Nationalistic ambitions were not a priority, and therefore, the lack of tokens of liberalism and nationalism should not be constituted as a failure of the settlement as this was not the aim of the peacemakers; the settlement should be assessed in accordance of the aims of the peacemakers. This is supported by Henry Kissinger, who argues that ‘in international affairs, there is an inescapable priority to pursue order and stability over justice of any other consideration.’  

Furthermore, the case for success of the settlement is based on the appreciation that neither liberalism nor nationalism was particularly widespread in 1815. John Lowe argues that the ‘Vienna Statesmen cannot be criticised for ignoring the (alleged) national aspirations of the small masses, which scarcely existed in 1815.’  There was little demand for them and certainly the unification of Italy and Germany was a dream to very few at the time, such as students. Tim Chapman argues that ‘popular sentiment especially in Germany but also in Spain was anti French rather than pro German or pro Spanish.’ This suggests that the view can be rejected as the chief complaint of the Congress was acceptable. Furthermore, apologists of the settlement have also argued that the Vienna Statesmen were unaware of Nationalism, and therefore could not possibly foresee its potential force. Frederick B Artz argues that 'in 1815 neither the statesmen nor the peoples of Europe had any thorough understanding of the vague principles of nationalism and democracy.’ However, Adam Zamoyski opposes this argument by stating that ‘huge shifts in perception had taken place...even the oldest fashion had come to regard states as more than just the partitioning of their ruler,’ suggesting that the disregard for liberalism and nationalism cannot be justified.    

The settlement has also been criticised for restoring rulers on the basis of legitimacy, and disregarding public opinion. Archduke John wrote in his diary ‘we cursed Napoleon and his system, and justly so, for he disregarded mankind... now the very men who fought against it are walking in his footsteps.’ However its application was haphazard and it was ignored in Western Germany, Poland, Saxony, Norway the Austrian Netherlands and Northern Italy. In 1817, the English Radical newspaper, Black Dwarf complained of the ‘accursed principle of legitimacy,’ upheld by the Congress of Vienna. It is clear that former dynasties were restored when it suited interest of the Great powers, but a legitimate ruler such as King of Saxony was threatened with dispossession of his territory, to satisfy Prussian claims. The Frenchman, Antonin Debidour, wrote in the 1890s that the allies ‘consulted only their own convenience and interest and took no account of the aspirations of the people.’ This was a prime failure of the settlement, as in most cases where the principle of legitimacy was applied, there was another consideration at work, for example, in central Italy restoring Habsburgs dukes and principles was part of Metternich’s design to create an Austrian paramountcy over Italy. It can also be argued that the principle of legitimacy was invoked to justify the return of discredited dynasties in Spain. The haphazard practice of the principle of legitimacy can be seen as a failure of the Congress of Vienna, as legitimacy was clearly used to the national interests of the powers, rather than for the stability of Europe, and there provides some support for the failure of the Congress.

        In some respects, the Congress of Vienna can be seen as a wasted opportunity, as Europe could have been constructed along progressive lines. E.V. Gulick argues ‘their (Statesmen’s) minds did not lift anything above the orthodox. There was no stunning act of leadership and no lasting or creative advance towards the future.’ Only in some general agreements on the abolition of slavery and the navigation or rivers, which made little difference in practice, was there any attempt to reform. The diplomats were too frightened of what the Duke of Wellington put into words in 1830 ‘beginning reform is beginning revolution.’ Humanitarian freedom was also given some attention at the Congress, and while little progress was made to abolish slave trade, France, Spain and Portugal had all complied by 1820. Many of Metternich’s contemporaries were far from impressed with work of the Congress. Von Gentz, Metternich’s principle adviser, stated ‘the Congress resulted in nothing but restorations which had already been effected by arms, agreements by the Great Powers of little value for the preservation of peace in Europe…but no act of higher nature, not great measure for public order or the general good.’ This therefore, was a major failure of the Vienna Settlement, and it is clear more could have been done to reform Europe, indicating that the failures outweighed the successes.

The Great Powers also made provisions to maintain the terms of the Settlement and the idea of continuing their meetings was laid down, providing the basis for the Concert of Europe. While no permanent structure for meetings was agreed, and despite the collapse of the Concert of Europe after the Congress of Verona in 1822, the idea of consulting and cooperating survived well into the second half of the century, and may be deemed one of the most lasting achievements of the Vienna statesmen, hence constituting a success of the Congress. Adam Zamoyski notes that some form of conference would henceforth be held to deal with ever major crisis, indicating a growing sense of solidarity between the powers. A second agreement to maintain decent Christian order in Europe, Alexander’s Holy Alliance, was also established. While Metternich thought the document ‘absurd but harmless’ and Frederick William as ‘ridiculous,’ virtually all the rulers of Europe were prepared to sign it, except Prince Regent of Great Britain, the Sultan of Turkey and the Pope. However, this agreement was a failure of the settlement as it was an agreement between the rulers rather than the peoples of the nations. Furthermore, the Prince Regent’s abstention hinted at the fundamental weakness of the whole Settlement; the attitude of a country with a parliament and a limited monarchy was different from that of an autocratic Empire such as Russia or Austria, and hence it was going to become increasingly difficult for such countries to co-operate. This Alliance also became a focal point for the suppression of liberalism and nationalism, showing that the failures of the Settlement did outweigh the successes.

French historians generally argue that the Vienna Congress provoked the 1830 and 1848 revolutions as it left France feeling weak, henceforth contending the Vienna Congress was a failure, as it failed to achieve its aim of re-establishing order. Gentz believed that the conditions imposed on France were in ‘direction opposition to the eternal laws of social progress.’ Talleyrand commented that ‘by the treaty of Paris, France had escaped destruction but she had not the position she ought to occupy in the general political system.’ This would indicate that the settlement failed as she was deprived of the ability to exercise influence of her neighbours Belgium and Italy, normal for a great power.  However, the primary aim was to contain France and so the imposed conditions can be justified. France was also readmitted to the Great Powers Club in 1818, and grievances were not serious. Moreover, Seaman stresses the negative policies of Austria, Prussia and Russia in the years after 1815 is far more at fault than the treaty itself, and hence this would suggest that the Congress itself was a success, but it was the policies by reactionary powers after the 1815 arrangements which should be criticised, hence discrediting the view that the failures outweighed the successes.

Although there were a number of revolutions in the following decades, there was more stability than instability; the eighteenth century has often been regarded as a period of limited war. Harold Nicolson comments that ‘the settlement arrived at a preserved Europe free from conflagration for all but a century.’  Paul W Schroeder also endorses the century of peace view, by calculating that the ratio of battlefield deaths to the population of Europe was seven times greater over the eighteenth century than the nineteenth However, this statistic may not be an insignificant indicator, as he fails to mention any consideration for improved medical care, or whether he includes the colonial wars in his statistics. Furthermore, Adam Zamoyski argues that there was in fact, no hundred year peace, and that in the absence of a general war, there was still plenty of fighting as wars broke out in Spain, Italy and Greece during this period, involving the intervention of France Austria and Russia, and ultimately Britain and Turkey. Moreover, many of the terms of the Vienna Settlement were short lived. In a little over 15 years, many elements of the Settlement were undermined: the newly created Kingdom of Holland was broken up, the Bourbon restoration in France had ended and Tsar Nicholas I had revoked the constitution granted to Poland. During the second half of the century, Austria was thrown out of Italy, the German Confederation was dissolved and the French boundaries altered. In this way, one of the most significant successes of the Vienna Settlement, the absence of a general European war, can hardly be attributed to the arrangements of 1814-15, when so many significant parts of the Settlement were soon changed, and therefore the failures may be said to overweigh the successes.

        On the other hand, 20th century historians such as Henry Kissinger and Harold Nicolson, with experience of one or two World Wars have tended to regard the first half of the nineteenth century as a period of relative stability. Rene Albrecht-Carrie acknowledges that ‘In our time of greater trouble and uncertainty, the nineteenth century appears by contrast with the present a period of relative stability and minor disturbances.’ Charles Mowat also praised the peacemaking at Vienna which contrasted favourably with that of Versailles in 1919. France was included in the decision-making process, a stark contrast to the Treaty of Versailles. The Congress was also remarkably lenient in its treatment of France, and is the chief factor contributing to the lasting period of peace. Tim Chapman suggests that ‘if France was animated instead by a spirit of anger and revenge it might seek again to break out of its borders and the balance could not last.’ Compared to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, the Congress of Vienna can be looked upon more favourably, opposing the view that the failures outweighed the successes. Rene Albrecht-Carrie observes that ‘the settlements of 1815 served Europe for a century; the contrast certainly is arresting with the mere twenty-year truce that followed the 1919 settlements.’  On the other hand, Seaman argues that the ‘rigidly reactionary character of the 1815 settlement was contrasted the democratic and progressive spirit of the Versailles Settlement,’ due to the notion of self determination advocated by Woodrow Wilson. Hardy wrote in the Dynasts that in the settlement he had in mind ‘peoples and provinces’ would not be ‘bandied about like pawns in a game,’ indicating that the Vienna Congress was perhaps no more successful than the Treaty of Versailles, and providing some support to the case for failure.

                The Vienna Settlement did not state any obligations by the Great Powers to keep to this system, and thus it could be argued that it was not the settlement itself that achieved peace in Europe, but the statesmen’s endeavour. This is argued by Seaman who contends that ‘the Vienna Settlement must not be regarded as having itself prevented a European war for a century… what prevented a major war until 1853 was the determination of the powers that there should not be such a war.’ Henceforth, it could be contended that the peacemakers at Vienna failed because they created a system relying too heavily on themselves to enforce it, and assumed their continuing desire to work together. Britain, having avoided any continental entanglements in 1814-15 was to grow increasingly independent over the following years, and less inclined to cooperate with the other European powers, unless its own interests were at stake. Hence, the statesmen could not accomplish a lasting peace, and the primary aim was not achieved, indicating the Settlement largely failed, and therefore the failures did outweigh the successes.

 Another failure of the Vienna Settlement was that it excluded significant nations such as Spain, Sweden and Portugal, and hence provides some support for the case for failure. Cavour, Prime Minister of Piedmont commented in 1846 ‘resting on no principle neither that of legitimacy nor of national interest, nor of popular will, this august assembly acting only by might of the strongest, erected a political edifice without any moral foundation.’. Furthermore, Adam Zamoyski argues that the exclusion of the second-rank states led to the decline of the formerly powerful states such as Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Naples with a consequent narrowing of the range of powerful alliances. However, some of the German states, and Poland would have liked to see France treated far more harshly, and John Lowe argues that if these states were included, ‘France would have been dismembered.’ Moreover, the Great Powers did show some consideration for the lesser ones. For example, guarantees of religious toleration and commercial equality were given to the Belgians, and promises of national rights were accorded to the Norwegians and Poles. In any case, practicalities demanded that small states be protected by larger ones, and hence the overlooking of the smaller states cannot be deemed a failure of the settlement, hence opposing the view that the failures outweighed the successes at the congress of Vienna.

         An overriding aim at Vienna was to establish a balance of power in Europe. Paul W Schroeder notes that ‘in everything from official treaties to private letters and diaries they spoke of peace and stability in terms of a proper balance.’ However, different states interpreted the balance of power concept to suit their own interests, and it can be argued that the Statesmen were too concerned in their own nationalistic aims, to establish a real balance in Europe, constituting a significant failure of the Settlement. C.J. Bartlett affirms, ‘The crucial question in 1814-15 was whether the great powers were sufficiently disposed to qualify their self interest and take a broader view of the problems facing Europe.’ This idea is supported by the Russia minister Count Ioannis Capodistrias who noted that ‘as soon as Napoleon was overthrown, the interests of the nations were forgotten and only the interests of the princes were addressed.’ It is clear that the Great Powers had nationalistic aims, and the attitude of the statesmen is summed up by Francis, the Emperor of Austria, in reply to a request for independence from the tiny former republic of Lucca: "Everyone is hungry, and I need to eat too; and it is better that I should eat you than another."

The pursuit of nationalistic interests is most evident in the issue of Poland and Saxony. Alexander was determined to take control of Poland, which his army already occupied, boasting ‘Poland is mine. There can be little negotiation with 600, 000 men.’ Likewise, Hardenberg announced in December 1814 that if his country were not given Saxony, he would see it as an act of war. However, this would have had serious implications for the balance of power in Eastern Europe, and suggests that the powers failed to put aside their national interests for the greater good of Europe, implying that the failures of the Congress outweighed the successes. Tim Chapman asserts that ‘none of the great powers was motivated by altruistic aims.’ However, Castlereagh opposes this view as he bluntly warned cabinet critics at home that ‘it is not our business to collect trophies, but to try to bring the world back to peaceful habits.’ Furthermore, neither of the two countries’ aims were completely satisfied; but enough territory was handed over to pacify them both. This therefore was a success as Russian desires were restrained in Poland and Prussian greed in North Germany, and therefore the Settlement was a reasonable compromise. However, the Saxon minister Georg von Greisinger notes that ‘of all the plenipotentiaries who were called to this congress, there is but a very small number who have left satisfied.’ This would indicate that the Settlement largely failed, as the Great powers were unsatisfied and therefore would be likely to cause problems in the future.

In some ways, there was no real balance of power, and Adam Zamoyski argues that Britain emerged vastly stronger and invulnerable, while Austria was highly vulnerable, and entirely dependent on the good-will of her neighbours. Austria’s financial and military resources were inadequate to defend against likely challenges from France and Russia, and therefore the peacemakers failed in creating equilibrium of power in Europe. FR Bridge and Roger Bullen regard the arrangements in central Europe as the ‘weakest feature of the new order,’ and contend that Austria ‘was overstretched’, indicating that the principle aim of the Congress of Vienna was not achieved, therefore suggesting that the view holds weight and the failures of the settlement did outweigh the successes. On the other hand, Tim Chapman argues that a ‘balance of power of sorts was achieved by the Vienna meeting,’ The fact that a general European war was avoided for a century, suggests that some form of balance of power was achieved, and hence the settlement can be deemed a success.  Furthermore, the Powers created a chain of buffer states along the French frontier, and this was successful as it ensured that France caused no trouble for the next half of the century, indicating the principle aims were achieved, and therefore the Settlement was a success. the primary aim was to rid Europe of French domination, which was achieved. As L.C.B Seaman points out ‘there were far fewer people being ruled and despoiled by foreigners at the end of 1815, than there were at the end of 1810.

        It is clear that this view holds minimal weight as the alleged failures of the Settlement such as disregard for nationalism and liberalism, or lack of reform were not the primary aims of the peacemakers, and therefore should not be regarded as a significant failure. The priority was to establish a workable peace and in this the peacemakers were generally successful. Tim Chapman contends that the Vienna Settlement ‘was a sensible attempt to rationalise and stabilise the European state system of the late eighteen century. And in this it succeeded.’  The Congress also created little hard feeling and dispute that the whole of Europe did not all go to war at once for a century, until World War I. Schroeder notes that ‘1815 is the one and only time in European history when statesmen sat down to construct a peaceful international situation after a great war and succeeded.’  In this way, the Settlement was largely successful as the principal aim was achieved, and hence the view can be opposed.  

---