'At Munich Hitler gained what he wanted and achieved conquest without firing a shot' How valid is this assessment of the outcome of the Munich agreement, 1938?

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Tom Houston                History Coursework

‘At Munich Hitler gained what he wanted and achieved conquest without firing a shot’

How valid is this assessment of the outcome of the Munich agreement, 1938?

 

On the 12th March 1938 German troops marched into Austria. Two days later, in Vienna, Hitler formally proclaimed his Anschluss with Austria. It was a foretaste of what was to follow.

        

Hitler’s next objective was the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. But the coup this time was not to be carried out by the Fuhrer alone. After months of mounting tension, violent disorder and tales of Czech atrocities in the Sudeten lands which, Hitler promised would be his last territorial claim in Europe, Chamberlain and Daladier assembled together with Hitler and Mussolini at Munich to sign what eventually turned out to be the partition of Czechoslovakia. Instead of intensifying pressure on the aggressor, Britain and France had chosen - for the sake of peace and stability to sacrifice ‘a far away country’ appeasing Hitler from a position of weakness, not a wise move. The Sudetenland was thus severed from Czechoslovakia. To The western democracies Hitler’s racial ambitions appeared satisfied and war was comfortably delayed for another year. In Chamberlains view Munich meant ‘peace in our time’. It was a temporary expedient.

        

The assignment title has two questions within it that need to be considered; did Hitler gain what he wanted at Munich? -Without a war? There has been much debate as to Adolf Hitler’s and with that Germany’s aims at Munich, was it simply the occupation of the once owned Sudetenland, Which Hitler felt had been stolen unjustly from them at Versailles, as a result uniting the German blooded people? Or was there a sinister larger objective as outlined in Mein Kampf and at Hossbach, the destruction of the Czech state and further more a possible war against the western powers? There is evidence that supports both possibilities as to Hitler’s aims, the evidence is based on Hitler’s style of leadership and historical interpretations put forward by recognised Historians help support these possibilities.

The Munich crisis has been analysed and looked at in depth my many historians who were trying to understand Hitler’s aims and actions. Often the historians reach different conclusions over the issues surrounding the event, this is largely due to the conflicting information that exists.

A. J. P. Taylor  ‘Origins of the Second World War’ Chapter 8  

A. J. P. Taylor expresses the opportunist argument, suggesting that Hitler lacked clear planning and consistent direction. Taylor argues that in fact Hitler was an opportunist making maximum use of the occasion. In 1961, Taylor published his Origins of the Second World War and immediately the temperature of the historical debate rose, though Taylor followed previous historians in giving criticism to the western leaders for their inconsistent policies, he added two more points. He argued that Hitler continued the policy of previous German governments in seeking eastward expansion in acquiring Lebensraum. Taylor also argued that, in aiming to make Germany the dominant power in Europe and in the World, Hitler was pursuing ambitions no different from that of previous German leaders pre-first world war or by the Weimar leaders of the 1920’s. Of the book I have chapter eight at my disposal (appendix 1), which focuses directly on the Czech crisis. Within this chapter there are several examples of Taylor’s opportunistic views. With regard to the mounting internal tension from the German National movement in Czechoslovakia.  ‘Hitler did not create this movement. It was waiting for him, ready - indeed eager – to be used…. The crisis over Czechoslovakia was provided for Hitler. He merely took advantage of it’ this shows how the Fuhrer seemed to exploit favourable situations that came about through the actions of others in the build up to the Munich conference. In relation to the western powers, Taylor shows how Hitler’s traditional substantial German appetite was constantly whetted by the concessions offered to him by the British and French leaders.   ‘Not only did the British and French urge concessions on the Czechs. The British also urged Hitler to make demands’ Again this shows how Hitler didn’t plan the unfolding of events, others presented opportunities even beyond his expectations. In terms of the French, Taylor suggests that perhaps Hitler didn’t plan for a war and didn’t intend to use military force to overthrow France in Europe. From the chapter it can also be established that Taylor felt that Hitler’s intentions at Munich were not to go to war but that war was only a threat, to add pressure to his mounting demands. The term that Taylor uses to support this view is that Hitler wanted to  ‘screw up tension.’. Taylor illustrates reasons that suggest why Hitler was not planning for war and on several occasions uses methods to avoid conflict.  ‘If Hitler wanted war, he must give the signal himself. A surprising result followed. The dreaded day of the 12th September arrived. Hitler delivered an impassionate speech at Nuremberg. He recounted the Sudeten grievances…. And then? Nothing. No announcement of German mobilisation; no threat of war. Hitler’s patience was not exhausted. He still waited for the nerves of others to crack.’ Here Taylor shows that if Hitler really wanted war it would have been the perfect/favourable time to do so, the conclusion of the speech suggests that war was not his objective. However Taylor does suggest that Hitler’s fundamental aim was to destroy the Czech state by liberating the Sudeten Germans, however truly opportunist-like this aim lacked real plan.  ‘Hitler undoubtedly wished to ‘liberate’ the Germans of Czechoslovakia. He was also concerned, in more practical terms to remove the obstacle of which a well-armed Czechoslovakia…. He was by no means clear how this could be done.’ Taylor sees Hitler’s lack of planning as a factor effecting his decision making, in fact from looking at the chapter It could be said that absent planning meant Hitler was often sporadic acting/talking on impulse rather than thinking a plan through, Taylor recalls events of the 21st May  ‘He was enraged at his apparent humiliation…. He struck out the first sentence – which repudiated military action against Czechoslovakia – and wrote instead. ‘It is my unalterable intention to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future.’ Taylor states that one-day prior to this announcement on 20th May, on Hitler’s instructions a draft plan was released, which suggested otherwise,   ‘it is not my intention to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the immediate future without provocation’. Here Taylor shows the extent of Hitler’s spontaneity, because of accusations from Czechoslovakia of Germany’s intentions, Hitler let his emotions, in this case, anger, dictate his actions.

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Taylor’s work has been scrutinised and has often been the subject of criticism, this is due to approach he takes when deriving and interpreting information on the subject area. Many historians feel that when Taylor sifts through the information he only highlights the information that supports his opportunist school of thought. This therefore does not give a fair/balanced account of the course of events and instead gives a biased personal account of Hitler’s objectives and plans.

Alan Bullock ‘Parallel Lives’ Chapter 14

Like Taylor, Bullock’s views shares some opportunist ideals but with that, unlike Taylor, he ...

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