In most respects, Vietnam is often considered as “America’s War.” Beginning with Kennedy’s “finger in the dike” approach to the Third World in 1960, to Johnson’s disastrous “Rolling Thunder” and ground troop escalation, and ending with Nixon’s “Vietmanization” and peace with honour, American foreign policy in the 1960s to 70s was unequivocally dedicated to Vietnam. In contrast, however, the U.S.S.R had none such interventionist policies. An overview of Soviet involvement will reveal that little more diplomatic pressure applied judiciously on Hanoi and the provision of weapons and other aid. Contrary to American paranoia at the time, Stately Kanow insisted: “Ho was never...a pawn of communist matters.” Stalin’s open criticism of Ho’s questionable commitment to Marxism, due to the latter’s attempts to engage the U.S.A and gain recognition from Tito in 1950, is ample proof of this.
Some historians, such as William J. Duiker, go as far to say that the Soviet authority was initially uninterested in Vietnam. After Stalin’s death, however, complete disinterest could only be maintained at the risk of for going a new ally in Asia, therefore, the U.S.S.R complete with China to pour aid and weapons into North Vietnam. Even so, Duiker maintains that Soviet policy towards Vietnam remained cautious, as the new Soviet leaders were keen to decrease Cold War tension and seek improved relations in Europe. Soviet policy towards Vietnam was therefore, in comparison to the U.S.A’s crusading “moral” policies such as Kennedy’s reform option, remarkably passive. It is also argued that the Soviets were responsible for persuading Ho to avoid military confrontation with the U.S.A and to “keep the struggle to the political plane.” The U.S.S.R also responded positively to Nixon’s offers of détante in exchange for their help in ending the war, pressuring Hanoi not to insist on Thiu’s removal as a prerequisite for peace.
This suggests that American policy was being operated on several incorrect premises. Kennedy and Johnson (both of whom successfully turned Vietnam into a “national obsession”) were convinced Vietnam; even more pervasive was the notion established by Eisenhower- that allowing one country to fall to communism would have a “domino effect” in its surrounding states. Containment of communism, therefore, became an imperative in American policy towards Vietnam.
Historical judgment tends to show that these were incorrect premises from which to formulate foreign policy. It must also be taken into consideration that Ho was “nationalist first and a communist second.” This observation leaves both Kennedy and Johnson’s personal motives for involvement in Vietnam without a leg to stand on. Both directed their foreign policy viewing U.S. involvement as necessary to halt communist aggression, when in reality, it was a “national liberation movement.” It therefore, also repudiated the claim that Ho was a puppet of the Soviets, since a nationalist would almost certainly have his own agenda. It can also be argued that the Domino Theory was essentially untrue: for example, the Vietnamese did attempt to exercise control over Laos, not for communist reasons, but simply because the Ho Chi Minh trail ran through it. All that the Theory achieved was to stimulate fanatic fears that contributed to the U.S.A seeking extreme military solutions.
Therefore, U.S. policy did not seem to have been formulated in response to that of the Soviets. Throughout the Vietnam War, Soviet policy was relatively unassuming and remarkably accommodating; it was American policy that took aggressive initiatives in Vietnam. In order for the U.S to win or even avoid the war, policymakers would have to reflect on a couple of aspects that were overlooked. Soviet threat was exaggerated, because the transfer of military resources to Vietnam was a fully logical action for a nation isolated from the bulk of world trade and sorely lacing allies. The American administration also should have realised that Ho was a nationalist and overall, they should have not attempted to support a genuine undemocratic and unpopular regime in Saigon, simply because the only alternative was a communist one.
Communist fears in the U.S. congress and executive were very real, and this highlights the main difference between Soviet and American policies to Vietnam. The Soviets did not involve themselves in Vietnam on an anti-capitalist platform, but America’s engagement was publicly anti-communist, thus their policy to Vietnam was coloured by nations of an ideological crusade. Not only would this encourage deeper involvement, but as Nixon’s efforts show, it was difficult for the U.S.A to get out of a situation that its own policies had proclaimed “moral” to be involved in.