In 1896, when Theodore Herzl wrote Das Judenstaat (the Jewish State), there was not one mention of ‘Arabs’ or ‘Palestinians’, giving further reinforcement to the fact that “the question” had indeed, been answered. Herzl absolutely denied the existence of an Arab population, for if there were ‘no populace’ living in Palestine, could the Jewish people not just simply move in? Herzl clearly obsessed with solving the ‘Jewish Question’, even going as far as to write a Utopian novel “Altneuland” (Old New Land), detailing a perfect world in Palestine (1923) where Zionism had “brought prosperity and progress, in cooperation with the Arabs, of the land”. In 1897, after the establishment of the World Zionist Organization at the Basel Conference held from August 29 to August 31, rabbis dispatched a ‘two-man fact-finding team’ to Palestine. Resulting from this was a message the travelers sent back via cable which described the obvious truth about Palestine, “beautiful but married to another man”. This ‘hard fact’ of an Arab populace in Palestine being ‘existent’, however, did not faze Herzl and he continued his work towards Zionism’s ultimate goal.
By 1903, Herzl had been courting the Sultan of Turkey attempting to gain influence as the Ottoman Empire still had a power – a decaying power – but power nonetheless over the ‘Holy Land’. Many others such as the King of Italy and Pope Pius X were approached by Herzl, all of whom had some degree of influence that would assist in declaring Palestine as a Jewish State. These undertakings were not especially successful, and it was not until 1903, however, that Herzl realized that to achieve his goal he needed to turn to a much greater power - Britain. The offer of a ‘patch of colonial Uganda’ by the British as a Jewish homeland was met with two sides of Zionism; the ‘territorialists’ (who argued that ‘anything was better than nothing’) and the ‘Zionists for Zion’ (who argued ‘all or nothing’ for Palestine). Herzl was clearly seeking the same goal as the latter, and then, a year after Theodore Herzl’s death in 1904, the offer of Uganda was rejected at the Seventh Zionist conference.
In 1914, following the suffering of Jews across Europe, just as the world plunged into The Great War, over 2 million Jewish people, one quarter of Europe’s Jewish population, had immigrated to America. These Jews, although a minority, would become an essential driving force behind the final result of a Jewish State through the Zionist movement through the 20th century. In response to the Zionist purchasing of land and takeover of labour in Palestine, Arab Palestinians began to finally develop their particular Nationalism (although, earlier forms existed in the 1890s by observant Arabs). Considering that as the Jews were still a minority among the Palestinian population, the Zionists perceived that they could only achieve their goal, in time, with the assistance of Britain.
In a memorandum written on January, 1915, Herbert Samuel, a Jewish Zionist, wrote, “The attempt to realize the aspiration of a Jewish State one century too soon might throw back its actual realization for many centuries more”. What Samuel was stating, was that a “Jewish minority rule should not be imposed on an Arab majority, but a Jewish majority should be created first”, and although there was in no way enough room for all of the world’s Jews, there was room in Palestine for another 3 or 4 million. Samuel continued to argue, that in order for the British to fulfill their ‘historic calling of bringing civilization to primitive lands’ they had to control Palestine and settle it with Jews. For all of this effort, the British did not see a strategic advantage in handing Palestine to the Jews, as they could just the same give it to the Arabs. Thus, the British would not agree to assist the Jews for another two years.
From July 14th 1915, to January 30 1916, the Hussein-McMahon correspondence between the Sharif of Mecca, Husayn bin Ali and Sir Henry McMahon occurred. This correspondence sought to have the British support the Arabs in the area of the Ottoman Empire in keeping their independence should they assist in destabilizing Turkey during WWI. The letter on 24th October 1915 is a substantially important contributor to later ‘anti-British’ sentiment of Arabs. The letter outlined that, “…Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca.” This would later be undermined by the ‘secret’ Sykes-Picot agreement which would contradict the promise. The Sykes-Picot agreement would involve Britain, France and Russia, and the partition of the Ottoman Empire would be agreed upon. For the Palestinian case, Britain was allocated control of areas roughly comprising today's Jordan, southern Iraq, and a small area around Haifa. This abrogation of the Hussein-McMahon agreement would see the British gain substantial opposition from the Arabs.
The 12th of November, 1917, ushered in the Balfour Declaration, the result of consistent lobbying by Chaim Weizmann (future first president of Israel). Britain expressed in the Balfour Declaration, “views in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people…best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this project…”, but also recognized the Arab population, “…nothing shall be done which may prejudice…civil…religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine...”. This, indeed, can be viewed as a major success for Zionism, but the Declaration itself was vague, and subject to contradictions, leaving the question of the Jewish homeland a plaguing problem for the Zionist organization.
On the 19-26th of April 1920, following the end of World War I and the ‘breaking up’ of the Ottoman Empire, the principal allies (Britain, France, Italy and Japan) convened at the San Remo conference. This was when Britain acquired their ‘mandate’ over Palestine and would overturn the earlier agreements with the Arabs to support their right for independence – due to the fact they had to now take care of two peoples – Arabs and Jews. At this point, there were some 663,000 Muslim and Christian Palestinians, and the approximately 97000 remaining populace were Jews. Britain was faced with a significant and predictably difficult challenge. It had been given Palestine by the League of Nations to be administered “for the good of its people” (Peter Rodgers, “Herzl’s Nightmare”, 2004). The question was, though, is how to define Palestine’s ‘people’ as both Arabs and Jewish communities had completely different perspectives for the future. The other problem was that in the Balfour Declaration, the British had obligated themselves to “something Jewish in Palestine” (Peter Rodgers, Herzl’s Nightmare, 2004).
By 1930, David Ben-Gurion, an important figure of the Zionist movement and Chairman of the Jewish Agency, had experienced a shift in his attitude since 1920, from not wishing to ‘push’ the Arabs aside to a newer notion of a much harsher ‘transfer’ for the Arabs, stating in 1929, “We must expel the Arabs...and take their places…and if we have to use force…we have force at our disposal”. This is arguably the result of anti-Jewish riots in 1920, 1921 and in 1929, when there was a substantial conflict over Jewish access to the Wailing Wall. Over 130 Jews died, and 116 Arabs were killed – almost all due to British attempts to quell the violence and restore calm. This was, according to a report by Sir Walter Shaw, ‘the result of Jewish demonstrators, and Arab agitation caused by fear of the Mandate system’. This violence became persistent, slowing escalating from 1929 onwards, with Political Terrorism now a part of ‘everyday life’. The majority of Arab attacks were aimed at Jewish farmers, and the violence escalated from there.
In October 1930, following much Arab fear and dissatisfaction, the British commissioned Lord Passfield to draft another White Paper on future policy for the Mandate. Then, from this came the 1930 Passfield White Paper which implied that Arab Palestinians should have economic equity with Jews. This required the “suspension of Jewish immigration and a restriction on land sale to Jews”. For the five years following this White Paper, there would be “only allowed 75,000 Jewish immigrants”, after that, none - unless the Arab Palestinians wished to allow it. Zionists, naturally, denounced the White Paper with great detest and thus lobbied Britain to amend policy. Before this White Paper was ever implemented, the Zionists triumphed and succeeded in overturning the White Paper, mainly resulting to a large extent from Weizmann’s lobbying of highly-influential British officials and wealthy British citizens where he showed his, “charm and craftiness, and diplomatic astuteness…” (Tom Segev, “One Palestine, Complete”, 2000). Despite repealing this policy, however, Weizmann would be removed from Presidency of the Zionist movement in 1931. Then, in 1931, amendments, only due to Weizmann’s work would be made which assured that Jewish immigration and land settlement would continue. Arabs interpreted this as Britain undermining their trust, and siding with the Jews – pushing them to the side and thus Arab opposition towards the Mandate grew.
The month of July, 1932, saw, for the first time an assassination attempt on a senior British Official. He escaped death, but his wife, however, did not. It could now be seen that the nationalist Arab movement ‘had gained momentum’ since 1929, as over five political conventions had taken place – among them a student’s congress and a women’s congress. At the time, a one Chaim Arlosoroff estimated, “within fifteen to twenty-five years, the Arab National Movement would be equal to that of the Zionists”. This very movement soon gave birth to a ‘radical nationalist Arab party’ – “The Istiqlal (Independence) Party”. However, the Party did not mobilize fast enough and thus did not last very long, but it did influence Arab leaders to demonstrate their loyalty to the cause.
In 1933, Grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini arranged for several thousand demonstrators, in cities across Palestine, to protest against the government’s immigration policy; as nearly 30,000 Jews had immigrated into Palestine that year. In the weeks that followed Arab demonstrators clashed with Police in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Nablus, and Haifa; then at the end of the violence, the official death toll had reached thirty eight (half of the dead were killed in Jaffa’s Clock Square alone) – including a policeman and a 6 year old boy. With another two hundred injured, Khalil al-Sakakini (an Arab Christian who was arrested by Ottoman authorities in 1917 after he sheltered a Polish-American Jew and fellow Jerusalemite, Alter Levine) wrote to his son, Sari, “Today…Palestine has become a Battlefield…What tomorrow will bring, god only knows”. It is clear that the Arabs were as disgruntled about their predicament – losing ‘their homeland’ - as the Zionists were about the ‘hindrances’ to their goal ‘caused by the Arabs’.
Reflecting on the incidents in December, 1933, Khalil al-Sakakini stated that, “Whoever investigates the rebellions in Palestine during the English period will see them as an ongoing development”. This statement could not be further from the truth. It would, of course, be quite narrow-minded to say that the protests ‘involved everyone’ from the beginning. It started with, as Palestinian Khalil al-Sakakini perceived, “locals in Jerusalem, the second broader and limited to a few cities and eventually encompassed all cities”. The conflict – demonstrations and violence (terrorism included) – had eventually involved all Palestinian Nationalist Arabs who were in fear of becoming a majority ruled by a minority (where Palestine would be a Jewish-ruled State). The incidents in 1933 can then be seen as “a single-chain of events” (Khalil al-Sakakini, 1933), which he believed also developed a message - placing emphasis on the goal of the demonstrations; “The entire world will see that the Arab nation is not easy prey”. The demonstrations themselves, of course, can be seen as a direct response to the British Mandate and policies at the time – the Zionists having the British perceptually on their side (or at least, in the Arab’s eyes). That being said, past ‘betrayals’ and disapproval of the Mandate system had left an accumulation of ill-felt loyalty to the British control which had then been fueled by further Jewish ‘oppression’ and incursion upon the Arab land. This had culminated to a single, focal point of unrest; a very unrest that the Arab nationalist movement would soon evoke upon their ‘oppressors’ in the years to come.