Dizzy with Success - lenin and stalin
Lenin once observed that Stalin had a tendency to "make a rotten compromise in order then to deceive." In other words, he was willing to make tactical retreats in order to lull his rivals or his enemies into a false sense of security. These concessions were meant to be temporary- not, as he would have enemies believe, genuine changes of heart.
Nowhere was this propensity for deceit more clearly displayed than during his article of March 2, 1930, Dizzy With Success. Stalin, in addition to passing responsibility for his mistakes on to "some of our comrades," deliberately lied to the peasants by insisting that the organized terror and theft that had hitherto characterised the collectivisation was completely contrary to his wishes. This was a crucial tactical retreat in Stalin's attempts to crush and collectivise the Soviet peasantry.
A brief chronology of the preceding years is necessary to place all this in context. From 1918-20 the Bolsheviks were engaged in a bloody civil war. The ravaged state of the country at the end of this struggle, combined with foreign opposition and further internal unrest in 1921, illustrated that their grip on power was uncertain. Lenin, seeing the need to rebuild the economy and appease the people, instigated the New Economic Policy (or NEP), which allowed for the limited reintroduction of capitalism.
This measure worked, but most Bolsheviks regarded the NEP as only a temporary piece of pragmatism. They longed to introduce proper Communism- in particular collectivisation, although there were sharp disagreements as to the timing and extent of this collectivisation.
In 1929, Stalin set about collectivising Soviet agriculture. The results were disastrous. The peasants, angry at being forced to join collective farms, slaughtered their cattle en masse, rather than surrender it to the State. The government later admitted- and these figures are probably understated- that 42.6% of the cattle and 65.1% of the sheep were lost. When this was coupled with virtually non-existent planning and the removal of incentives to work, it can be imagined how devastating Stalin's policies were to the Soviet countryside.
The unjust and brutal nature of the collectivisation only further exacerbated the situation. Peasants, seeing that many of their number were being deported and that much of their grain and property were being stolen, were obviously less inclined to join the collective farms, less inclined to work and more inclined to slaughter their animals and hinder production. The cruel nature of Stalin's policy can be seen in a speech given by one of his henchmen, Khatayevich, to a group of activists.
"You must assume your duties with a feeling of the strictest Party responsibility, without whimpering, without any rotten liberalism. Throw your bourgeois humanitarianism out of the window and act like Bolsheviks worthy of Comrade Stalin. Beat down the kulak agent wherever he raises his head. It's war- it's them or us! The last decayed remnant of capitalist farming must be wiped out at any cost!...Your job is to get the grain at any price. Pump it out of them, wherever it is hidden...Don't be afraid of taking extreme measures. The Party stands four-square behind you. Comrade Stalin expects ...
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"You must assume your duties with a feeling of the strictest Party responsibility, without whimpering, without any rotten liberalism. Throw your bourgeois humanitarianism out of the window and act like Bolsheviks worthy of Comrade Stalin. Beat down the kulak agent wherever he raises his head. It's war- it's them or us! The last decayed remnant of capitalist farming must be wiped out at any cost!...Your job is to get the grain at any price. Pump it out of them, wherever it is hidden...Don't be afraid of taking extreme measures. The Party stands four-square behind you. Comrade Stalin expects it of you. It's a life-and-death struggle; better to do too much than not enough...This is no time for squeamishness or rotten sentimentality."
for Comrade Stalin, these "extreme measures" led to a massive decline in productivity- the exact opposite of what he had hoped for. Peasants were rebelling all over the country, production was falling, and Soviet power- in particular his own authority- was being seriously challenged. While he was still determined to crush the peasantry and force his collectivisation down their throats, he realised that he first had to make a tactical retreat. This is the context of Dizzy With Success.
Bibliography:
R. Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment, (London, 1992)
R. Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow, (London, 1986)
Dizzy With Success began by trumpeting the success of the collectivisation- a complete distortion of the truth. "The Soviet government's successes in the sphere of the collective-farm movement are now being spoken of by every one. Even our enemies are forced to admit that the successes are substantial. And they really are very great. It is a fact that by February 20 of this year [1930] 50% of the peasant farms throughout the USSR had been collectivised. That means that by February 20, 1930, we had over-fulfilled the five-year plan of collectivisation by more than 100%...What does all this show? That a radical turn of the countryside towards socialism may be considered as already achieved.
Stalin then goes on to emphasise the "supreme importance" of this historical triumph, before also noting some negative consequences. "But successes have their seamy side, especially when they are attained with comparative 'ease'- 'unexpectedly,' so to speak. Such successes sometimes induce a spirit of vanity and conceit: 'We can achieve anything!' 'There's nothing we can't do!' People not infrequently become intoxicated by such successes; they become dizzy with success, lose all sense of proportion and the capacity to understand realities; they show a tendency to overrate their own strength and to underrate the strength of the enemy; adventurist attempts are made to solve all questions of socialist construction 'in a trice.'"
So Stalin has now blamed his own idea of crash collectivisation- his own desire to do everything "in a trice"- on certain "people" imbued with "a spirit of vanity and conceit." This is a lie. He then adds to this lie by promising to punish those responsible.
"Hence the Party's task is: to wage a determined struggle against these sentiments, which are dangerous and harmful to our cause, and to drive them out of the Party. It cannot be said that these dangerous and harmful sentiments are at all widespread in the ranks of our Party. But they do exist in our Party, and there are no grounds for asserting that they will not become stronger. And if they should be allowed free scope, then there can be no doubt that the collective-farm movement will be considerably weakened and the danger of its breaking down may become a reality. Hence the task of our press is: systematically to denounce these and similar anti-Leninist sentiments."
After blaming his own catastrophic lack of planning on others, and after declaring his plans to punish "these dangerous and harmful" people, Stalin now tells the biggest lie of all. He declares his opposition to the use of terror, which, as we have seen with the Khatayevich quote, was the very essence of his policy. Furthermore, he also declares his opposition to rigid centralisation- again a lie, as this was another policy dear to Stalin's heart.
"A few facts...The successes of our collective-farm policy are due, among other things, to the fact that it rests on the voluntary character of the collective-farm movement and on taking into account the diversity of conditions in the various regions of the U.S.S.R. Collective farms must not be established by force... Clearly, the principle of taking into account the diversity of conditions in the various regions of the U.S.S.R. is, together with the voluntary principle, one of the most important prerequisites for a sound collective-farm movement. But what actually happens sometimes? Can it be said that the voluntary principle and the principle of taking local peculiarities into account are not violated in a number of areas? No, that cannot be said, unfortunately."
Stalin then gives an indication of some of the tactics he has ordered to be employed, although he again decries their use. "We know that in a number of areas of Turkestan there have already been attempts to 'overtake and outstrip' the advanced areas of the USSR by threatening to use armed force, by threatening that peasants who are not yet ready to join the collective farms will be deprived of irrigation water and manufactured goods. Who benefits by these distortions, this bureaucratic decreeing of the collective-farm movement, these unworthy threats against the peasants? Nobody, except our enemies!"
Stalin continues to plead his innocence and to condemn his own policies. "Can it be said that this line of the Party is being carried out without violation or distortion? No, it cannot, unfortunately...Who benefits from this running too far ahead, which is stupid and harmful to our cause? Irritating the collective-farm peasant by 'socializing' dwelling houses, all dairy cattle, all small livestock and poultry, when the grain problem is still unsolved, when the artel form of collective farming is not yet consolidated- is it not obvious that such a 'policy' can be to the satisfaction and advantage only of our sworn enemies?...What is this- a policy of directing the collective farms, or a policy of disrupting and discrediting them?"
Stalin concludes his article by again denying responsibility for his collectivisation catastrophe and by again promising to end the excesses and punish those responsible. "How could there have arisen in our midst such blockheaded exercises in 'socialization,' such ludicrous attempts to over-leap oneself, attempts which aim at by-passing, classes and the class struggle, and which in fact bring grist to the mill of our class enemies? They could have arisen only in the atmosphere of our 'easy' and 'unexpected' successes on the front of collective-farm development. They could have arisen only as a result of the blockheaded belief of a section of our Party: 'We can achieve anything!' 'There's nothing we can't do!' They could have arisen only because some of our comrades have become dizzy with success and for the moment have lost clearness of mind and sobriety of vision. To correct the line of our work in the sphere of collective-farm development, we must put an end to these sentiments. That is now one of the immediate tasks of the Party.
So Dizzy With Success marked a retreat by Stalin in his war on the peasantry. While some peasants no doubt believed that they had taught Stalin that their centuries old way of life could not be altered by force, he had actually learn a different lesson; he had concluded not that he needed to abandon collectivisation, but instead that he needed to massively increase his terror to implement it.
As a result the peasants- especially those in the Ukraine- paid a terrible price in the next few years for their earlier resistance. Stalin decided to deliberately starve the Ukrainian peasantry into submission; seven million were to die in the next three years. By such means, he finally managed to collectivise the Soviet Union. Another statement by Khatayevich, spoken to an activist in 1933, speaks for itself. "A ruthless struggle is going on between the peasantry and our regime. It's a struggle to the death. This year was a test of our strength and their endurance. It took a famine to show them who is master here. It has cost millions of lives, but the collective farm system is here to stay. We've won the war."
Bibliography:
R. Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment, (London, 1992)
R. Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow, (London, 1986)
