Europe and the Suez Crisis 1956 - To what extent was the military action undertaken by the British and French in the Suez Crisis 1956 really necessary?

The British-French attack on Egypt was greeted with angry protests all over the world.

According to Keith Robbin, the UN unanimously condemned the Franco-British action on 2nd November At last, the UN proclaimed cease-fire on November 6 and British and French forces withdrew.

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C. Evaluation of sources

“The Suez Affair” was published in 1966 (latest edition published in 1986), and was written by Hugh Thomas who resigned from the British Government after the Suez Crisis. Thomas stated purpose for this book is that “It is an interim Report.” in which he has used materials available and interviewed people, mainly British, involved in the Crisis. The value of this book is that it is a detailed and fascinating description of the British government’s handling of the Crisis, professionally narrated by Thomas who himself experienced the Suez Crisis has an insight in the internal situation in Britain during this period of time. However, this may also make the source biased as it is very much written from a British standpoint. This method has certain limitations as memories can alter and are not reliable.

David Carlton, who also has written a bibliography about Anthony Eden, published “Britain and the Suez Crisis” in 1988. The book is aimed at undergraduates; school students and other interested in post war British history. The purpose of the book is to inform people about the recent past, in order to prevent recent political indoctrination. Although it is acknowledged in the preface that there are problems of bias, subjectivity and perspectives in studying the past, the value of reading history “outweigh the drawbacks”. Carlton´s book is far more analytical than Thomas´ and includes different historical interpretations of the Crisis, which is of usefulness when studying the crisis from a broader perspective. However, Carlton´s book might be quite biased as it is very much written from a British perspective.

Although both Carlton´s and Thomas´s books are British, they present a different view of the Suez Crisis, probably due to the different date of publication of the sources first edition. Although Thomas rewrote some parts of the book in his latest edition, the most substantial parts of his book, are based on sources available when the condemnation of the military action after the crisis made the propaganda turn against the British and French. In Carlton case, he has made an extensive use of materials released in the 80s, which seem to be friendlier towards he British and the French. By taking both sources in account they tell us how the history of the Suez Crisis has been reshaped due to political controversy and propaganda.  

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D. Analysis

If the Suez problem possibly could have been solved in a more diplomatic way, British and French prestige during the Cold War would doubtlessly have been more favorably after the crisis. According to the American journalist Donald Neff the Suez Crisis was a “hinge point in history” as it discredited France and Britain as participators in the Cold War: it strained the Anglo-American alliance, intensified Egyptian nationalism and increased Soviet influences in the region. Along with that, the attention was driven away from the Hungary uprising, for the Soviets advantage, as the shadow of Europe fell over the Suez.

Hugh Thomas presents a view in his book “The Suez Affair” that the French and the British initially were determined to use military force in Egypt. He suggests that they acted in an opportunistic way: Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Crisis gave them the opportunity to justify the use of military force. He suggests that the British and the French had strong intentions in the Middle East and to weld as many countries of the area as possible into an anticommunist defense pact. This can to some extent be true, as the Suez Crisis was an event in the Cold War, when the British and French democracies tried to, together with America, contain the expanding Communist bloc. However, other possible interpretations of the Crisis and the British and French intentions contradict this view. The historian Lowe presents evidence of the Omega plan, which suggests that Britain intended to get rid of Nasser by more peaceful means. Other evidence also supports this view. For example Eden, as quoted in section B, wanted to use military power as only “a last resort.” As we can see from the evidence given, the Americans tried to pursue a more peaceful policy in Suez. The Six Principles, as well as the acceptance of the SCUA, showed signs that the British were approaching a peaceful settlement, on America’s initiative which, perhaps, could have saved them from an international defeat. However, one can argue that these diplomatic negotiations can be seen as prolonging the process in order to convince America to accept the use of military force. They were not real but merely a facade, which covered the militant intentions of Britain and France.  

The more contemporary view suggests different circumstances drew Eden take the fatal decision to use military force. “Eden was faced with unprecedented pressures (…).” . According to Carlton, the conspiracy between France and Israel was not really in the hands of Eden. “Eden didn’t know with certainty that Israel would attack Egypt”. The role of France in the Suez Crisis must not be underestimated as she actually, in contrast to Britain, wanted to undermine Arab influences in the Middle East.  

Hahn and Carlton suggests that France and Britain didn’t fully understand that the Americans were going to fear that military action would open Egypt and other Middle East states to Soviet influences, undermining the policy of containment. They didn’t calculate with the fact that the Americans were going to choose to, in the first place, pursue containment rather than endorse the ally’s action. One can argue that if the American standpoint had been clearer for the French and the British, perhaps the course wouldn’t have taken the militant direction that it took.

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E. Conclusion

Whether the military action undertaken by the French and the British was really necessary is a mere question of speculation. It is difficult to make a valid judgement on the issue as different sources present different information, which is one of the major difficulties in studying contemporary history and finding its “truth”.  Sources published not a very long time after the Crisis, such as Thomas first edition “The Suez Affair” indicate that the military action undertaken by the British and the French was inevitable: the countries were highly determined to use force against Egypt. More recent materials about the Suez Crisis, presented by historians such as Lowe and Carlton, suggest that Britain and France could have solved the Suez Crisis with more peaceful means. However, it is most likely that the British and French response to the nationalization of the Suez Canal will remain an issue of controversy among the historians for the nearest future.

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F. List of sources

Robbins, Keith, The eclipse of Great power, Modern Britain 1870 – 1975, Longman, New Work, U.S, 1983

Eden, Anthony,  Memoirs: Full Circle, Book three: Suez, Cassell & Company Ltd, London, 1960

Carlton, David, Britain and the Suez Crisis, Basil Backwell, Northern Ireland, 1968

Calhoun, Daniel F. , Hungary and Suez, 1956: An exploration of who makes history, University Press of America, United States of America, 1991

Thomas, Hugh, The Suez Affair, Wiedenfeld & Nicolson Limited, London, 1967

Hahn, Peter L., The United States, Great Britain and Egypt, 1945-1956 – Strategy and Diplomacy in the early Cold War, The University of North Carolina Press, United States of America, 1991

Bowne, Colin and Mooney, Peter J., Cold War to Détente 1945-85, Second Edition, Heinemann Educational Books, printed by Richard Clay Ltd in Great Britain 198i

Calvacocoressi, Peter, World politics since 1945, sixth edition: The Arabs and Israel to the Suez War, Longman, New York, 1991

Cornwell, R.D, World History in the twentieth century, Longman, England, 1984

Lowe, Norman, Mastering Modern World History, Third Edition, Macmillian Master Series, Biddles Ltd, Britain, 1997

Gildea, Robert, France since 194, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996.

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Appendix

The Six Principles:

1. There should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert.
2. The sovereignty of Egypt should be respected.
3. The operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country.
4. The manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreements between Egypt and the users.
5. Unresolved disputes between the Suez Canal Company and Egypt should be settles by arbitration.  

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