Even after the German occupation of Prague in March 1939, Neville Chamberlain was reluctant to confront Hitler and abandon the policy of appeasement How far do you agree?

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Poppy Steel

‘Even after the German occupation of Prague in March 1939, Neville Chamberlain was reluctant to confront Hitler and abandon the policy of appeasement’ How far do you agree?

When Hitler sent troops to invade the centre of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, it was done in blatant disregard of the terms that had been set at Munich and those who had made them this is inclusive of Chamberlain. Although it is uncertain as to whether it was at this point that Chamberlain decided to abandon his previous policy of appeasement has been highly debated among historians. Source 7 largely supports the claim that Chamberlain was still reluctant to identify Hitler’s aggression as a source of the event. It claims that instead he chose to remain with the opinion that through making concessions to Hitler that he would eventually be pacified, as Chamberlain continued to blame the harshness of the terms set in the Treaty of Versailles. Source 7 therefore can be used in support of both the ‘bungling man’ interpretation, as well as, that of A.J.P Taylor. Taylor’s view point was that Chamberlain was a well-meaning statesmen and the fault lay in the inadequacies at Versailles, depending on whether one want to criticise Chamberlain or vindicate his actions. However in contrast to this, Source 8 takes a counterview proposing the argument that Chamberlain (as well as the rest of Britain) was utterly outraged by Hitler ignoring the agreements made concerning the Sudetenland and so argues that it was this that led to the change in Chamberlains approach and the Polish Guarantee. Source 9 on the other hand appears to suggest that although British public opinion was against Hitler, Chamberlain himself initially did not share this viewpoint and even goes so far as to imply that it was not Hitler’s occupation of Prague that led to him abandoning his policy of appeasement but that as a result of public opinion he was forced in to a position whereby he had to.

There is some argument that Chamberlain did not see any reason to abandon appeasement whilst the Treaty of Versailles still remained, and therefore saw it as a necessary measure to make efforts towards preserving peace, rather than to react with military intervention. Source 7 presents the idea that the problem Chamberlain was now faced with, “This was something that had existed ever since the Treaty of Versailles” this suggests that he believed that Hitler only wished to revert those terms. Chamberlain had significant cause to hold this view; as a result of the fact that at the Nuremburg Rally in September 1938, Hitler himself had demanded self-determination of Germans living within the Sudetenland, which was a factor that had driven much of the 1919 peace settlements. There is evidence of Chamberlain acting upon this notion even within the Polish Crisis in March 1939, whereby Britain made some allowances within their guarantee to Poland for appeasement. This is shown by the fact that within The Guarantee Britain were committed to protect Poland’s independence only, this meant that should Chamberlain have wished he would be able to have negotiated territorial concessions for Hitler, which in turn suggests that even as Hitler had demonstrated that he was not someone whom should be trusted, Chamberlain was still willing to work with him for the sake of avoiding war. It seemed that based upon the context of Versailles, appeasement in Chamberlain’s opinion was a logical solution.

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Source 7 also supports this view by stating that even after Hitler’s invasion of Prague, Chamberlain remained deluded by him and still held the belief that it was not his aggression that motivated him but was still the issue of legitimate grievances as a result of Versailles, which is likely to have encouraged the policy of appeasement. The source claims that he “sought to blame [Versailles] rather than the actual aggressor, Hitler” publicly and immediately following the invasion, this therefore suggests that Chamberlain was unaware of Hitler’s aggressive nature and desire for victory. Within an alarming report from Duff Cooper ...

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