Mussolini gambled everything on a ‘lightning war’ or ‘guerra lampo’. This was inoperable partly because Italy had no equivalent to Germany’s Panzer divisions (not enough tanks for this), and, partly because Italian generals were intensely suspicious of such methods. The Italian army was badly led: the 600 generals were steeped in the defensive tactics of the First World War. It was Mussolini’s fault that they were so incompetent: he had concentrated power in his own hands, promoting officers more for their obedience and powers of flattery than for their military expertise. There was virtually no co-operation with either the German government or the German High command. This contrasted with the joint planning undertaken by the western Allies in their conquest of North Africa.
Of the other 2 services, the NAVY was better equipped. However, it was reluctant to risk its battleships against the vulnerable British Med Fleet; Italian warships were designed essentially for speed, which meant that their fuel consumption was excessive; there were NO aircraft carriers. Mussolini considered them unnecessary as he thought of Italy as one large aircraft carrier; furthermore, the airforce was hostile to the prospect of naval control if aircraft carriers were to be employed. Italy possessed the world’s largest fleet of submarines. However, they were notoriously slow to submerge with the result that 10% were lost within the first few weeks of war.
In terms of the Airforce, it only had 1000 effective planes with which to ‘blot out the sun’. Italian production was far below that of the other Axis powers, Germany and Japan. The quality of the Fiat CR42 was suspect – the RAF had little difficulty in knocking out these slow, under-armed biplanes. Moreover, they had to be grounded in large numbers in North Africa as they lacked essential sand-filters. Plus, the airforce leadership refused to co-ordinate its plans with the other services. The Italian airforce always demanded, and received special autonomy.
The three armed services were fighting virtually separate wars. Mussolini had retained the traditional structures of the armed services (not modernised!); each branch was acutely jealous of the others.
There were fundamental weaknesses in the Italian military strategy, as there was no clear overall plan and Mussolini thought that all his campaigns would be won quickly. The failed invasion of Greece or the rout of the Italian army in Libya are key examples of Italian military weakness. This all led to the failure of Italy in the Second World War.
by
erinruth99gmailcom (student)
