However, what Gorbachev did not realize was that by giving people complete freedom of expression, he was unwittingly unleashing emotions and political feelings that had been pent up for decades, and which proved to be extremely powerful when brought out into the open. In actual fact, he had merely taken the lid off a box that could never be closed again. The people of the Soviet Union had been promised reforms and they wanted them quicker and much more extensively than Gorbachev could grant them. This led them to turn against communism, not stand behind it. Glasnost had made government more open, but it had allowed people to see more and more of the problems. Relaxation under Glasnost resulted in the Communist Party losing its absolute grip on the media. Before long, and much to the embarrassment of the authorities, the media began to expose severe social and economic problems the Soviet government had long denied and actively concealed. Among the earliest expressions of Glasnost was the exposure of many social pathologies once presented solely as a product of capitalism. Crime, prostitution, child abuse, suicide, corruption, poverty, declining health standards - all were detailed in reams of statistics, interviews, films, TV documentaries. Glasnost thus disclosed a range of new social problems, which official ideology had denied, and made clear that the older concerns, such as housing and health care, were far from showing steady improvement. In all, the very positive view of Soviet life which had long been presented to the public by the official media was being rapidly dismantled, and the negative aspects of life in the Soviet Union were brought into the spotlight. This undermined the faith of the public in the Soviet system and eroded the Communist Party's social power base, threatening the identity and integrity of the Soviet Union itself. Moreover, his policy of economic reform did not have the immediate results he had hoped for and had publicly predicted. But such political openness subjected the Soviet government to undue criticism as the Soviet people abused their newly allotted freedom of speech to criticize Gorbachev and the CPSU for failure to improve the economy and livelihood of the people. Essentially, while Glasnost exposed the country’s many problems in exhausting debate, it had done little to resolve them. It was equally apparent that the historical foundations of the Soviet socialism were built on violence, repression and monstrous proportions, hence giving expression to both anti-communist and anti-Soviet views, which subsequently gained momentum as organized social movements which threatened the ideological and social glue of the Soviet Union, thus leading to the disintegration of the Soviet regime.
Glasnost and perestroika revealed one of the fundamental weaknesses of the Soviet Union. It was not a union of equals, nor indeed was it a union of willing partners. Instead, it was made up of many different peoples, cultures and nationalities, most of whom resented assimilation into a Russianized state that imposed Russian culture and language on them. Each of them had their own self-vested interest and fought for their rights and privileges to be protected, thus resulting in the widespread upsurge of communal conflicts. This happened in Azerbaijan where the Armenian people resented being ruled by the Muslims and asked to become part of the republic of Armenia, but the Gorbachev government refused. This led to several years of fighting between the ethnic groups and also between the two republics. Once this "Pandora's box" had been opened, nationalist movements emerged in Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Byelorussia, and the Central Asian republics. Moscow was unable to these instances of political unrest which weakened the power of the Central Government. Hence, there was no unity within the government because of opposition groups and there was also no unity between the people and the government. What kept the union together was the authority of the central government and the power of the Red Army. However, by 1989, the Red Army was in disarray. It had suffered heavy losses in failing to win the war in Afghanistan and the Soviet government was struggling to find the money to pay the soldiers’ wages. As such, there was no way that this army could be used to maintain control of the Soviet Empire from Moscow. This led to the growing nationalism within the various states in the union and the need to break away to be independent and free. Massive peaceful protests in the Baltic republics such as The Baltic Way and The Singing revolution drew international attention and bolstered independence movements in other groups. The growing nationalism threatened the existence the disunited and multinational USSR which eventually collapsed under the pressure of nationalism.
Another unintended effect of Gorbachev’s reforms was the political opposition that resulted from his policies. Conversely, to some people such as Boris Yeltsin and anti-communist intellectuals, Gorbachev seemed to be going too slowly in his reforms. Gorbachev depended on them for support against the conservatives who were trying to block his reforms. However, if he went too far and fast in order to please the radicals, he would offend the conservatives and it was the conservatives who had the power to overthrow him. The communist hardliners, who formed the conservative majority in the Politburo, were critical of any attempts to reform the Soviet system – of which they were the principles beneficiaries – hence they did their best in blocking these reforms. Even if their opposition did not derive from selfish motives, others (such as Ligachev) opposed too much reform on grounds of principle and ideology since it would destroy the Soviet system in which they believed. For example, Gorbachev’s democratization, in particular the striking out of Article 6 in the Soviet Constitution, resulted in the formation of a multiparty system where all the newly emerged opposition groups posed a huge challenge to the CPSU leadership. Gorbachev had in many senses diminished the authority of the CPSU and thus, the party had been separated from the government and stripped of its leading role in society and its function in overseeing the national economy. For seventy years, the CPSU had been the cohesive force that kept the Soviet Union together, without the authority of the party in the Soviet center, the nationalities of the constituent republics pulled harder than ever to break away from the union.
Furthermore, Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ de-ideologised Soviet foreign policy. Unlike previous political leaders like Andropov and Chernenko before him, he was determined achieve his goal of peaceful coexistence and détente with the west and was willing to give up what had previously been considered as vital foreign policy interest. He ended the arms race with the West and restored diplomatic relations with the West. Gorbachev also set out to adopt a new relationship between the USSR and Eastern Europe. By 1989, he repudiated the Brezhnev doctrine and adopted the “Sinatra Doctrine”, in favour of non-intervention in the internal affairs of its Warsaw Pact Allies. Gorbachev also made it clear to the communist leaders in Eastern Europe that they would no longer have the support form the Red Army to put down protests and demonstrations and that they would have to listen to their own people. In the past these governments had relied on Soviet support. Without this help they had to deal with the protests on their own. Generally, they were not prepared to use too much force to suppress the Anti-Moscow demonstrations, patriotic declarations and revolutions which arouse as a result of the political consequences of Glasnost which reverberated throughout Eastern Europe. The cracks in the Red Empire began to appear in June 1989, where free elections were held in Poland and Solidarity, a non-communist government, was set up while a completely new government had been set up in Czechoslovakia shortly after. Hence, this undermined the stability and unity of the USSR which was severely shaken, with the demolition of the Berlin Wall and reunification of both Germanys completing the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.
Thus, Gorbachev’s foreign policy, aimed at improving the standing of his country in the world and to strengthen its position as a superpower, resulted in the USSR losing the cold war and its superpower status. The “loss of Eastern Europe” in particular, while an essential step in ending the Cold War, was viewed the communist hardliners and by much of the military in the USSR as a sever blow to the security and prestige of their country. The depth of opposition to Gorbachev’s reforms could be seen in August 1990, where these hardliners launched a coup to overthrow Gorbachev. He was placed under house arrest during his holiday and the army took control of the streets in Moscow and staged a coup against Gorbachev. This, in turn, dealt a mortal blow to his position and strengthened the hand of his rival, Boris Yeltsin, who was determined to take Russia out of the USSR. Although the coup was eventually put down, this marked the collapse of the communist party and communism in the USSR. Perestroika and Glasnost had failed, thus disgracing the communist system. As the coup had been led by key members of the communist government, this further ruined the people’s faith in communism.
However, though Gorbachev’s policies played an important role in accelerating the downfall of the USSR, it was the inherent political and economic weaknesses of the system that existed between 1917 and 1991which caused the eventual downfall and collapse of the USSR. Hence, internal pressures caused more cracks or enlarged those that already existed.
The political system in the USSR was highly centralized. It all depended on the man at the top. If he was capable, the system functioned well. If he was not, stagnation and drift occurred. The USSR lacked effective leadership between 1977 and 1985 as the Soviet leaders keep dying. The late 1970s and early 1980s were a period where enormous and difficult decisions needed to be taken inside the USSR (concerning the economy, the role of the communist party, foreign policy, and the relationships of the republics to the USSR) and all these were not being taken. This leadership vacuum lead to the decline of the USSR and can be attributed partly to its eventual decline. By the early 1980s, the CPSU had long ceased to be in the “vanguard” of the proletarian revolution and had become a brake on progress. Having a vested interest in the maintenance of the status quo, it was resistant to any form of change, in particular the apparatchiks who got their positions on the coat-tails of a Stalinist-style leadership. Others like the “old guards” who had enjoyed the leadership for a long time and did not want to introduce changes as this could mean losing some of their privileges, such as living in great luxury and access to consumer goods which were not available to ordinary Soviet citizens. Others were hardliners, communists who firmly believed that the communist way was the only way to do things. There was also a lot of corruption among party and government officials. Essentially, traditional prophecies had failed to come through - world revolution had not occurred, crime had not vanished, nationalism and religion had not disappeared with the passing of capitalism, as had been predicted. This resulted in the inspiration of Marxist-Leninist ideology turning more into a ritual, especially in the Brezhnev years. There was no longer any serious effort made to reconcile conflicting articles of faith and observation, leading to the disillusionment and loss of faith in the communist system itself.
Economically, the USSR was in dire straits as it was plagued with a plethora of economic problems. Central planning under the command economy was theoretically ideal but it was not working effectively. Because the command economy emphasized the fulfillment of targets, quantity of output rather than quality was considered more important. As a result, the goods were frequently shoddy and of poor quality. It was also inefficient as initiatives were discouraged and over-concentration on heavy industry for military purposes increasingly by the 1970s diverted precious resources away from the domestic market. Moreover, basic consumer goods such as food, clothing and footwear were in serious shortages. This was because consumer industries received little investment. Queuing for long hours for such goods was a way of life. This was inefficient and a waste of manpower. In view of the high prices of scarce consumer goods, a black market developed in the Soviet Union. In 1985, Ivestiia (a Soviet newspaper) estimated that this black market was worth seven million rubles. All these sales on the black market meant that the government was not receiving income from taxation on sales. By the late 1970s, the growth rate of the Soviet economy had stalled – Gorbachev was to call this “the era of stagnation”. Unlike the economies of the West, the Soviet economy had not modernized, it was still producing “yesterday’s goods using yesterday’s methods”. As a result, Russia lost touch with the Western world which was rapidly industrializing and inventing newer technologies. The Soviet economy did not benefit as no new ideas or technologies were brought in and this caused the economy to be technologically backward.
US foreign policy, which largely impacted Soviet priorities, resulted in the incurrence of huge costs in order to maintaining its military machine. Given the Soviet’s leadership commitment after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 to catch up with American military might, including research and development in advanced technology, a totally disproportionate share of Soviet GNP (clearly over 15 percent) was allocated for the arms race - in an economy whose total production was a good deal less than that of the U.S. The result of these investments was to seriously distort the economy at precisely a time when the decline in growth rate required cuts in allocations to other parts of the economy, including welfare, services and consumption. The USSR also had tried to win prestige in the space race at enormous costs. It had also spent billions of roubles on developing nuclear arms and from 1979, had spent huge sums fighting the un-winnable war in Afghanistan, which was a military disaster. The USSR had provided financial support for other communist countries in the world, such as Cuba, Vietnam and Ethiopia, in term of loan, weapons, advisers etc. Given the parlous state of its economy, the USSR decision to subsidize and fund them jeopardized its economy. Furthermore, as head of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union had the duty to lead the defence of the European countries. But in doing so, the state had been bankrupted and the communist government had lost the support of its own citizens.
Essentially, the broader picture is of a social transformation since the 1930s which was not matched by the changes in the political and economic system. Urbanization and economic modernization had occurred at an unprecedented speed within the Soviet Union and had led to social changes of enormous magnitude, outpacing the capacity of the state structure to adapt. The needs of a rising, techno-scientific and intellectual class accompanying the urbanization process were poorly served by the straight-jacket of the political system. Perhaps the main problem facing the Soviet Union was that it was simply not wealthy enough to play the role of a superpower. It allies were weak and poverty-stricken, liabilities to the USSR rather than assets. Due to the inherent weaknesses aforementioned, the Soviet Union was simply an “Upper Volta with missiles” to begin with and its inability to match up to West economically resulted in the collapse of the USSR, which led to the end of the Cold War.
In conclusion, the August coup was the short term factor which led to the fall of communism in the USSR as the failed coup merely sped up the collapse of the USSR. The coup was a result of Gorbachev’s policies which worsened the economic conditions which he had inherited initially. The Soviet economy was not on the point of collapse when Gorbachev came into power. The catastrophic economic collapse of the late 1980s was a direct result of failure of Gorbachev’s policies of Perestroika and Glasnost, but obviously, the collapse would not have taken place had not the serious economic weaknesses already existed. Even without Gorbachev’s policies, communism would have bound to fail eventually due to the poor economy and corrupt communist system which had already existed since Stalin’s time. Gorbachev’s policies merely acted as a catalyst which speeded up the collapse of communism in the USSR. Furthermore, Gorbachev’s unprecedented move to adopt the Sinatra Doctrine stemmed from the economic realities of the USSR – the Eastern European states were more of economic liabilities than assets and its bankrupt economy could no longer finance the Red Army to maintain tight control over the republics. Essentially, the inheritance of a troubled Soviet Union was the main reason for the collapse of communism in USSR. The prolonged economy and the rigid and corrupt communist system which Gorbachev inherited was simply unable to support his polices and also unable to cope with the internal as well as external pressures threatening the USSR. Not only did Perestroika and Glasnost fail in objectives, communism in USSR came to an end due to this long term pre-existing inherent economic weakness which rendered the USSR an incomplete superpower to begin with and thus contributing to its eventual demise.
