The first, and most significant aspect was that Stalin did not seem a threat to other politicians. This was of immense help to him, as he could accumulate enough power without anybody becoming aware of his actions. The ability to appoint friends into key positions meant that Stalin’s rivals had no support in the party; this allowed him to suppress Lenin’s testament; which condemned Stalin and other leading communists. His ‘trickery’ also helped him a great deal as well. An evident indication of this is when he deceives Trotsky that Lenin’s funeral was on the 26th. However it was on the 27th. As he was already on a train journey, he decided to continue on. On the day of the funeral, Stalin addressed the Russian population, stating that he was “Lenin’s disciple” – a cunning hint that he cares about Lenin more than Trotsky. The majority of the Russian population were convinced that he “wasn’t bothered". The second piece of evidence is the way he ‘destroyed’ the Leftists and Rightists. As Stalin was in the centre of the party, he had the flexibility of moving between the two extremes. In 1924, Stalin allied with Zinoviev and Kamenev (Leftists) to defeat Trotsky. After a party vote, (with the building packed with his loyal supporters), communism in one country became Party policy in 1925. Trotsky was isolated and thrown out of the party shortly afterwards. However, his trickery was palpable when he turned on Zinoviev and Kamenev and allied with Bukharin, a Rightist. He forwarded his ideas on the NEP and gradual reformation of the economy: ideology that Bukharin strongly believed in. Again, Stalin packed the congress with his own supporters and easily won the votes. This now allowed Stalin the chance to eliminate the Leftist duo of Zinoviev and Kamenev. They were done so in 1926 as the party policy was gradual economic reformation rather than fast economic modernisation (which Trotsky also believed in). However, in 1928 Stalin adopted the fast modernisation instead of NEP. This swing to the left meant he could now remove the leading figures on the right of the party (i.e. Bukharin) who supported the NEP: he now didn’t have any rivalry and was the unprecedented leader of the USSR. Stalin’s will power also aided him – he was keen to become leader. Also, his ability to appoint friends into key positions in the government also helped; this is denoted by the way he easily won votes in the party congresses.
Although the majority of the factors which contributed to Stalin becoming leader, in addition a minority of errors were Trotsky’s and were hindering factors to his campaign to become leader. The first impeding factor was his fervent belief that public relations ‘were a waste of time’. This further fractured his relationship with the Russian population and imminently ended all aspirations of becoming leader as most people at this point distrusted him. His arrogance also mired his struggle for leadership. This is apparent when he was told (by Stalin) that the funeral of Lenin was on the 26th rather than on the 27th. This, however, should not have stopped him to attempt to return to Petrograd to endeavour to witness the funeral. As it happened, he didn’t and Stalin made his march on to becoming leader of the USSR. The most important factor, nevertheless, to him failing to gain the leadership of USSR was that he underestimated Stalin. In doing so, he had become ignorant of the potential dangers that were to approach him. Undoubtedly, this made him unprepared for his dismissal as a party member, his exile to Siberia and finally his exile from the USSR.