These factors enabled Stalin to gain a good standing with the Communist Party, which subsequently led to him having more respect and power within parliament. Though the Communist Party and government were different organisations, they were closely interlinked; to have a high position in government, Stalin needed to have a high standing within the Communist Party. Stalin had already achieved this through his careful manipulation of party members. Stalin was extremely cunning in the way he formed alliances to eliminate the opposition. For example, Stalin used the triumvirate with Zinoviev and Kamenev to remove Trotsky. Stalin portrayed Trotsky’s belief for the end of the NEP as an attack on Lenin, particularly when Trotsky began to criticise the increase in bureaucracy within the Communist Party. Even though to some, it may have seemed as though Trotsky just wanted to move forward with Socialism, Stalin considered it a threat. Aided by Stalin’s attacks on Trotsky’s policies and beliefs, Trotsky lost most of the little support that he had by this point. With Trotsky out of the way, Stalin began to attack Kamenev and Zinoviev-They supported Trotsky's theory that if revolution did not extend to other countries globally, the communist system in the Soviet Union was likely to be defeated by capitalist countries. Even though they had joined Trotsky in the United Opposition to try and defeat Stalin, by this point it was considered too late. When Zinoviev and Kamenev eventually began attacking Stalin’s policies, he argued they were creating conflict in the party and had them expelled from the Central Committee. Like this, Stalin was able to play his opponents against each other, and remove his main rivals for power.
The debates over NEP were significant as much of the power struggle focused over the beliefs of members of the Communist Party, and Stalin frequently manipulated their views. Trotsky, considered to be left wing, believed NEP was no longer a necessity and so should be abolished, as it had served its purpose and that it was time to move forward. By suggesting an end to one of Lenin’s policies, Stalin accused Trotsky of going against Lenin. It also helped to remove Zinoviev and Kamenev. Having become increasingly cautious of Stalin, they had gone over to Trotsky’s side and so Stalin was able to tarnish their reputation by raising doubt over their intentions. Once the left wing opposition had been removed, Stalin turned to the right wing opposition. Once again, the NEP was the defining issue, but this time, Stalin did a u-turn in his political beliefs. The majority of the right supported NEP, but Stalin now decided that NEP was inappropriate. He claimed that because of the Kulaks, the NEP had become unsuccessful and should therefore go. This is because Stalin felt that the Kulaks were putting their individual welfare before those of Russia on a whole, and that they supported Capitalism. The right wing, such as Bukharin, was accused of wanting to “increase the power of Kulaks…and hence frustrate the introduction of Socialism in the countryside.” (H. Shukman, 1999). In this way, Stalin had used the NEP debates to isolate his main competitors for power within the Communist Party.
The conflicts over NEP were broadened because of the different viewpoints towards it. During the power struggle between Trotsky and Stalin, the ideological rift between the two began to deepen as their opposing views came into conflict. Theoretically, Trotsky’s call for “Permanent Revolution” seemed ideal. It complied with Marx’s theory of international and world revolution as a means of spreading communism, but in reality it was unfeasible. Stalin reiterated this by stating that socialism would be unattainable on a global scale as there was very little support from countries worldwide to create socialist or communist societies. Having highlighted the political, economic and social problems that Russia had just suffered, Stalin argued, that it made it impossible for Trotsky’s “Permanent Revolution” to work globally; there were two world systems in direct conflict, and with Russia’s rebuilding of all aspects of society, it would be unreasonable use resources to spread Communism. Rather, they should concentrate on strengthening Russian society. These ideas of Stalin made him quite popular; most of Russia appreciated where he was coming from, as they understood the strain on resources and the upheaval it would cause. Having suffered great disruption as a result of the Second World War and the Civil War, they were exhausted economically and revolutionarily. By “mistrusting intellectuals like Trotsky, they [the Communist Party] preferred to place their trust in Stalin’s wisdom, with his simple calls for proletarian unity and Bolshevik discipline, when it came to matters of ideology.”(Figes, 1996) As a result, by 1927, Trotsky had lost his position in the Central committee, and was consequently expelled from the party. This gave Stalin the freedom to emerge as leader.
Because of the number of factors involved in Stalin’s rise to power, there are various interpretations as to which was the most significant. For example, some liberal historians place importance on the role of individual figures and their personalities. According to O. Figes, “if Lenin’s final stroke had not prevented him [Stalin] from speaking at the Congress in 1923, Stalin’s name today would occupy a place only in the footnotes of Russian history books.” This is reinforced by historians such as Conquest and Deutcher who believe that his determination, craftiness and capacity for cruelty allowed him to deceive opponents and manipulate ideology for his personal gain. Similarly, by placing emphasis on personality, this viewpoint can explain why other prominent Communist Party members were unsuccessful; E. H. Carr sees Zinoviev as an unpleasant careerist, Kamenev was seen as having no goals and Bukharin as being politically short sighted. Likewise, Trotsky was considered to have “engineered his own defeat...when he came up against a superior rival... he chose to retreat and sulk.” (O. Figes, 1996) This view highlights how certain individuals can influence the course of history by drawing attention to Stalin’s role and the role of other individuals in the struggle for power.
Other historians believe that the rise of Stalin was attributed primarily to the structural changes that occurred within government and not necessarily to Stalin’s personal qualities. E.H. Carr concludes that Stalin’s victory “was a triumph, not of reason, but of organisation.” As the party administration began to replace government, administration replaced politics. With this new structure, the centre of power fell into the hands of the party secretariat and general secretary. Having accumulated sufficient power, “He relied very little on the General Staff and made no adequate use of the skills and experience of its personnel.” It was therefore, according to this structuralist approach, Stalin’s position rather than character, which gave him a foundation to gain power; he could use his state position to influence major policies to win votes by people who had been appointed by himself to begin with.
Lastly, one other important interpretation is believed to explain Stalin’s rise to power. The ideological view credits Stalin’s rise as being for practical and ideological incentives and not personal ambition. Historians such as E.H. Carr believe this was the primary reason for Stalin’s yearn for power. Historians who accept this approach underline that the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky was caused by conflicts over the future direction of the revolution. According to C. Ward, “the general secretary [Stalin] was not so much an opportunist as a practical politician balancing between extremes.” For instance, they believe that Stalin’s attack on Trotsky’s belief of “Permanent Revolution” could be seen merely as the actions of a practical politician who was concerned about the possibility of the Soviet Union becoming involved in a war it was ill equipped to fight, rather than that of a manipulative member of government.
Though his personality could be seen as the most significant factor, other circumstances aided his rise to power. Through a combination of his determination and ruthlessness, his attacks on the opposition’s flaws, he was able to take advantage of his position the Communist Party. The economic and political confusion left by Lenin’s death and the civil war allowed him to gain support in the Politburo and Central committee. Taken into consideration with his appealing ideology, this gave him an edge over his opponents. Therefore, by 1929, Stalin was able to convince the Communist Party that he was the appropriate figure to take control of Russia. As pointed out a fellow Party member, “he was a man whose aim was very clear…he accomplished it in the most convincing way…and he allowed nothing to get in his way.”
Bibliography:
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S. Phillips- Lenin and the Russian Revolution
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A. Wood- Stalin and Stalinism
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H. Shukman- Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy
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O. Figes- People's Tragedy: Russian Revolution, 1891-1924
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R. Conquest- Stalin: Breaker of nations
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I. Deutcher- Stalin: A political biography (2nd edition, 1972)
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E.H. Carr – The Russian Revolution from Lenin to Stalin
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C. Ward- Stalin’s Russia
www.spartacus.schoolsnet.co.uk
J. Laver- Russia and the USSR: 1905-56
again – this is too strong – by suggesting it was now time to end it, Stalin accused Trotsky of going against Lenin
good explanation of How Stalin used this debate – can you shorten it any?