After the First World War, Germany was left crippled by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, which not only put the blame and responsibility for WWI solely on Germany, but also made them pay astronomical reparations, lose all of their colonies, restricted their military by limiting the army to 100k men and forbidding them to have an air force or navy. These terms clearly forced German Foreign policy to change and adopt a more peaceful regime- however this was so fragile and temporary that it cannot really be seen as a turning point. However, in addition to destroying the German economy, it also completely undermined this desire for Weltpolitik and the blame placed on Germany was seen as an insulting blow to their national pride which formed a key component of German ideology. These factors combined to create an unparalleled resentment and dissatisfaction with the Treaty across the entire German population, which subsequently created a vast pool of support for Hitler who despised the Treaty of Versailles, and made its destruction a priority among his policies.*****
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*William L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871–1890 (2nd ed. 1950) p 459
**Raymond James Sontag, European Diplomatic History: 1871–1932 (1933) pp 3–58
***U.S. Library of Congress (http://countrystudies.us/germany/33.htm)
****Nancy Mitchell, The Danger of Dreams: German and American Imperialism in Latin America. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999, p. 23.
*****United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC- Holocaust Encyclopaedia, Impact of WW1, Treaty of Versailles 1919
Gustav Stresemann could be argued to be another turning point of the Weimar Republic. He was appointed Chancellor of Weimar on the death of Ebert and served in this position from August 1923 to November 1923, and was then to remain as Weimar’s Foreign Minister until his death. As Foreign Minister, Stresemann achieved a great deal. He was able to get Germany accepted back into the European community through his philosophy of abiding by the Versailles Treaty, which won him allies in Western Europe, and it was France that sponsored Germany’s entry into the League of Nations in 1926.* Not only did his abiding of the treaty help regain the support of the Allies, but he felt that trying to fulfil the treaty's terms was the only way Germany could demonstrate that the reparations bill was truly beyond its capacity, and this approach paid off with the creation of the Dawes Plan, a system aimed to help alleviate the strain placed on Germany by the enormous reparations. On the other hand, Stresemann was in no way seeking a friendship with the Allies, rather he conceded that the best way he could take back lost colonies was through peaceful exchanges**, though he too detested the treaty, and in fact he was continuing the idea of Weltpolitik in the only way he could, reverting temporarily back to more Bismarckian methods of foreign policy in order to achieve his goals, and this ended with his death- so although the Dawes Plan and re-building of Franco-German Relations earned him the Nobel peace prize and arguably saved Germany from its darkest days of hyperinflation, his lasting impact on German Foreign policy was debateable.
Despite Stresemann’s efforts to improve the economy, it was still balancing on a knife’s edge until 1929- the Wall Street Crash. The collapse of the largest American stock market made waves throughout the entirety of the Western World, starting the decade long Great Depression, and Germany was hit the hardest.*** In addition to its already incredibly fragile economy, Germany had been relying on America for financial aid since the implementation of the Dawes plan, and later, the Young Plan. American banks immediately withdrew their loans and Germany was suddenly faced with extreme hyperinflation, to the point where even vast quantities of money became virtually worthless. People were left starving, scared, and in desperate need of a strong leader who could promise them a solution. The Great Depression paved the way for Hitler and the Nazis to rise to power.**** Before the Wall Street Crash the Nazi Party only held 12 seats in Parliament. But by 1932, in the height of the depression, they had 230 seats in the Reichstag. On the one hand, in could be argued that the Depression was vital- a turning point in terms of Hitler’s rise to power, which in turn affected foreign policy, however this is a secondary effect, and by itself the Depression did not lead to any significant changes in German foreign policy.
Hitler rose to power in 1933, following a surge in support due to the Great Depression. When Hitler came to power he was determined to make Germany a great power again and this time, to dominate Europe. His goals were to destroy the Treaty of Versailles imposed on Germany after her defeat in WWI, to unite all German speakers together in one country, and to expand into the East (Poland, Russia) to gain land for Germany, going back to the long standing traditions of lebensraum and expansionism. His tactics were blatantly aggressive, using the threat of violence to achieve his aims as he realised that his potential foes, France and Britain, were reluctant to go to war and were prepared to compromise to avoid a repeat of WWI. Contrarily to Stresemann, he refused to follow the rules set by the Treaty of Versailles, breaking them one by one, rebuilding his army and reoccupying old colonies. France and Britain failed to act. In March 1938, Hitler took control of Austria- again, he was met with no resistance from the Allies. The Treaty of Versailles had become more or less meaningless, as lack of action against Hitler’s violations of the Treaty led to a huge boost in confidence and support towards the Nazi party, and his foreign policy became more and more extreme and imperialistic until they invaded Poland- and the Second World War broke out.***** Evidently, Hitler’s rise to power had a huge impact on German foreign policy- the question here however, is whether Hitler himself is relevant at all, or would this turn of events have occurred no matter who had been in his position; the expansionism and dream of Lebensraum is one that the majority of Germans shared, and so perhaps Hitler’s rise to power and the events that entailed are not a turning point, but rather a continuity of what was already largely present in German society and politics.
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*"Gustav Stresemann". HistoryLearningSite.co.uk. 2005. Web.
**200 Jahre deutsche Polenpolitik, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972, p.220.
***"Stock market crash of 1929". Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved January 29, 2012.
****James, Harold, "Economic Reasons for the Collapse of the Weimar Republic", in Weimar: Why Did German Democracy Fail, ed. Ian Kershaw, Widenfeld and Nicolson, (London: 1990), pp 30–57.
*****Access to history; Germany; the Third Reich 1933-45, Geoff Layton p.118. and Challenging History, Europe 1890-1990, Nelson, By John Traynor
Germany was divided 1945 as a product of the early cold war. Two states were formed- the GDR (East Germany), and the FRG (West Germany). A treaty with Poland was signed, in which the GDR renounced any claims on the territories annexed by Poland, while Poland renounced any claims for financial compensation from World War II. The GDR was a Soviet satellite state; its foreign policy mirrored that of the USSR, and neither the GDR nor the FRG expressed any strong desire for aggressive expansionism or colonisation. Both German states claimed to be the sole legitimate successor of the German Reich (which ceased to exist in 1945), and thus were in a special competition for international dominance, for cultural heritage, for any kind of visible success.* The economically more successful FRG pursued the Hallstein Doctrine, refusing diplomatic relations with any country which recognized the GDR.** The GDR was forced to compete with an economically very successful state, where the same language was spoken and where all its citizens willing to cross the border were accepted with open arms until the building of the Berlin Wall. There are multiple factors that came into play in terms of how the division of Germany had this effect on foreign policy- a divided Germany was weaker, needed to focus on building a strong socio-economic foundation, and were competing with each other for international recognition rather than competing with other countries. Since the division (and consequent reunification) of Germany, expansionism, Lebensraum, and military aggression have not played a significant role in German Foreign policy, which distinguishes this turning point as different to the others, in that the country has not this time relapsed into its old Weltpolitik ways. In particular during the Cold War – but continuous into the 21st century (West) German foreign policy pursues the country's integration into NATO and a strong co-operation and collective security with its Western partners.
In conclusion, in over a century, Germany has experienced a large flux in its methods for handling foreign policy, and this flux has been sparked by key turning points throughout German history- the introduction of Weltpolitik, The Treaty of Versailles, Gustav Stresemann, the Depression, Hitler’s rise to power, and the division of Germany. While Weltpolitik established the basis of all the expansionist goals to come, and Hitler’s rise to power as well as the division of Germany all mark evident and undeniable turning points in terms of foreign policy, the Great Depression is neither. Its only significance is that it helped lead to a key turning point- that does not make it one itself, and when compared to other events that occurred from 1890-1990, it becomes relatively insignificant.
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* World History at KMLA- GDR Foreign Policy, First posted in 2000, last revised on June 22nd 2006 (Web)
** Explanation of the Hallstein Doctrine, Interview of Wilhelm Grewe, Head of the Political Dept. of the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany (11 December 1955).