How far did Kennan's ideas actually shape US policy towards the Soviet Union?

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How far did Kennan's ideas actually shape US policy towards the Soviet Union?

George Kennan's "long telegram" set off a furor at the time. He had neatly summed up a certain view of the workings of Soviet society, and, however vaguely, had made a policy recommendation for how the United States should deal with the Soviet Union. However, it would seem that policy makers preferred to have his papers as a justification for their policy, or at least for a policy which they were still developing, rather than truly addressing Kennan himself and his ideas.

One can assess the extent to which Kennan's ideas on containment actually shaped US policy towards the Soviet Union by examining several aspects of US policy during the Cold War. First, one must look at the policy of containment, both in terms of its limits, and its militarization. Then, a look at the domestic political aspects of US policy would prove fruitful, followed by an examination of detente.

The Limits of Containment

Containment was a strategy to limit and prevent Soviet expansionism. It was a theory that said that communism was like water and would trickle into countries that were weak and unstable. In response, the US had to bolster the strength of other nations around the world in order to defend democracy and the open market. Truman made this his doctrine in 1947, as justification for intervention in the Greek Civil War (where the Soviets were believed to be involved in aiding the leftist rebellion) and aid to Turkey (which the Soviet Union was pressuring for concessions).

There had been a conclusion reached among American leaders that further Soviet imperialism necessitated their opposition. American tradition, however, forced them to attempt to "justify this resistance on nearly any basis other than as an appeal to the traditional balance of power." (Kissinger 113)

There was a tradition of idealism in America in all facets of its politics, but in international affairs in particular. Originally complacent in its acceptance of isolationism, not as a realist approach, but as a way of avoiding sullying American hands in European affairs, America eventually changed its tune. Following two world wars, America was ready to take its values to the rest of the world under a policy of crusading activism.

America was never comfortable with realist approaches to international affairs. It may well have been the founders' Protestant ethics reverberating within the political culture, but the positivist school never received much hearing.

George Kennan is cited as one of the original authors of the policy of containment. In describing the USSR's expansionist tendencies, he concluded that

its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. (Kennan 575)

He called for "firm containment" of the Soviet Union, countering the Soviets "with unalterable counter-force" anywhere the US saw them working against "the interests of a peaceful and stable world." (Kennan 581)

The ultimate objectives of containment were to prevent the expansion of Soviet power. This was an essentially contested concept, however, since there was no firm agreement on the limits. In examining containment policy, one must investigate both Kennan's views on the breadth of containment, and his views on what measures should be used and the limits of their usage.

Calling for America to choose its battles carefully, Kennan wanted the US to determine its spheres of interest and to defend only those interests which were most vital. For Kennan, that pretty much meant centers of military-industrial power, meaning Western Europe and Japan. America's foreign policy in the two world wars could be viewed in a similar light. America was preventing vital power centers "from falling under hostile control." (Gaddis 5)

Kennan placed emphatic limits on the reach of containment in this manner. Anything outside of the main areas was not to be fretted over. Obviously the fall of China was not a good development, but Kennan did not see it as an important loss for the US, since it was of little consequence as a center of military and industrial power. Kennan did not predict China's future status as a major power, but neither did most other experts at the time.

In the Third World, Kennan felt that, though the US could offer some modest aid to "help the emergent states," he didn't feel it was worth too much focus in power and resources. Besides lacking the military and industrial power he prized, he also noted that the immediate post-colonial period in the Third World was not conducive to real cooperation. He sustained that "anti-white and anti-American feelings were widespread," and would prevent any meaningful "partnership" with the West. (Mayers 259)

Probably, few leaders disagreed with this sentiment, but they certainly did not heed the implications of it as they set off on numerous forays throughout the Third World. According to NSC-68, "a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere." (Gaddis 6) Wherever communism was suspected, the US took the task of opposing it. Even where it was not, the US was there. It was not so much that American leaders believed every piece of the earth sacred and a 'vital interest' (to use Kennan's classification), but that they feared a 'domino effect.' They were worried that the fall of one nation to pro-Soviet forces would precipitate a whole stream of nations to fall or defect to the Soviets, like a falling row of dominoes.

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This was a serious leap from Kennan's provisions for containment. A psychological approach to containment was not what he usually preached, but he sometimes noted its importance. In general, though, it was part of the world of rhetoric and political posturing which he tended to ignore and downplay.

Therefore, the policy of the US in the Third World was fundamentally opposed to Kennan' ideas. America consistently expended an undue amount of effort and resources in defending against supposedly Soviet forces in the Third World in which it had no interest. Then, when Reagan began his campaign in the eighties ...

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