Despite huge political pressure, there was stubborn resistance to collectivisation. By December 1929 and March 1930, nearly half the peasant farms in the USSR had been collectivised. But millions of peasants nevertheless resisted. They protested by frequent arson attacks, and organised rural mass disturbances increased by a third. The peasant’s voice was spoken by the women as they were less likely to suffer reprisals from the authorities, as judging by court records it was unlikely for female demonstrators to be prosecuted so women were often at the front of demonstrations and the picture of women lying down in front of the tractors was not an uncommon site. The widespread resistance became perceived by Stalin and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) as evidence of ‘sabotage’ and contributed to paranoia about subversion, which would spiral out of control in the 1930’s.
However despite all the effort the peasants had no chance of halting Soviet collectivisation. The officials and their requisitions pressed on, with their policies. By the end of February 1930, the party claimed that half of all peasants households had been collectivised- an astounding success. But in actual fact it was agricultural disaster. Peasants had been shot or deported, agricultural production disrupted, and a huge number of animals had been slaughtered. Around 25-30% of all animals in USSR had died due to the peasants killing and eating them through protest.
Stalin backtracked in 1930 as he feared if there was further peasant resistance it was likely to lead to the collapse of grain production. He said that his officials had moved ‘too far too fast’. This was in all likelihood very true, as the central government seemed to have little direct control over the young, militant urban CPSU activists who competed with each other to see who could get the most households to collectivise. So Stalin called for the return of voluntary principle, which lead to a lot of peasants going back to farming for themselves. But the campaign was restarted shortly afterwards and was just as determined as the previous wave. Throughout 1931 peasants were once again forced back into collectivisation, taking back 50 per cent of peasant households. The peasants had suffered all ready due their resistance and having vested interests. But worse was to come.
The peasants were unable to work- some wouldn’t and others couldn’t. Leading to many peasants eating their own seed corns and slaughtering their livestock. This Resulted in no crops to harvest and no animals to tend to. The Soviet authorities responded with fiercer intimidation, but this just made matters worse, with the peasants being imprisoned, deported and even executed they were obviously unable to tend to farming crisis. But CPSU activists from the towns and cities, who were party workers or cadres as they were termed, were sent to restore the food production but not many of these cadres had background experience so their unawareness added to the disruption.
By 1932 the Agricultural situation was disastrous. The grain requisition squads, established to find grain that had been hoarded by the peasantry, were maintaining adequate supplies to the industrial regions. This resulted in the countryside desolation being proportionally larger.
Ukraine and Kazakhstan were devastated by the famine which persisted throughout the 1930s. It was at it worse during 1932-1933 when famine hit these Soviet Republics particularly hard. Collectivisation led to desolation among the peasants, with many of them stopping to produce either through a final act of resistance or they could not adapt to the new land system. This led to many of the peasants heading to the towns in huge numbers. Which worked in Stalin’s favour seeing this was one of his aims in collectivisation as it would increase the available labour in the industrial regions. But with so many migrating to the North this led to packed inhumane trains which some old and young peasants didn’t survive.
But despite all the miserable deaths that had hit the USSR, the Soviets did not see a famine, they fell silent. So because the government was denying an actual famine there was nothing to relieve it, and there was no appeal from outside of Russia as well, the peasants were on their own.
So what had collectivisation actually achieved? In spite of the hardships produced by the endeavour, it was nevertheless true that the peasants were not capable to produce the extra food that Stalin demanded for the Russian people. In 1939 agricultural productivity had almost returned to the level of tsarist Russia in 1913. If anything they had taken one step forward and two steps back. The collectivisation tragically killed guiltless Russian people through the “man-made” famine, in the 1930s about 15 million peasants died. But despite this Stalin did achieve one of his goals, to move the peasants to industrial towns which were needed for Russia to blossom as an industrial power, which it was to do, which in all likelihood ensured its ability to defeat Nazi Germany militarily in World War II. In the past Russian people had mostly been rural, by the middle of the 20th Century the USSR was much more of an urban society. The right ratio had to be established for Russia to progress, and this indeed happened. Even though the suffering shouldn’t be overlooked it did help the industrial goals set.
The industrial ambitions were seen through the Five Year Plans, it was Stalin’s aim to be a new prevailing country, and also to prepare the USSR against the capitalist countries. But he saw that industries such iron, steel and oil needed to modify if he wanted Russia to modernise. If they were successful in production then Russia would be strong and ready to defend itself for the future. Heavy industry was introduced he was hoping to follow in the footsteps of other countries who experienced industrial revolutions through iron and steel production. Only the USSR would follow the path of socialism while in the past the countries were following the capitalist way. At this time his western foes were going through the great depression. If Russia moved quickly she would be able to catch up with them while they were trying to get back on their feet.
The First Five Year Plan was aimed at intensifying and modernising existing industries, establish new ones, and relocate those in the west further to the east, so that they would be more secure and protected by the vast quantity of land if Russia were to be attacked by the West.
Many objectives which the labour had to meet were set – most of them being not viable. For instance, there was to be a 250% increase in total industrial output and a 350% increase in heavy industries. The people were given no leave and absenteeism was treated as treason. Many workers had to labour for 11 hours. The workforce’s wages were paid in food rations, which meant they would definitely not eat if they did not work. Propaganda was used; Brochures, pamphlets and posters were distributed all over to boost the people's morale. By their own efforts the Russian people were led to believe they were changing the character of society in which they lived and providing it with the means of achieving greatness.
Human examples were used. One man, Stakhanov, a coal worker was said to be working at a rate 500% more productive than the average worker.This example created an entire popular movement of people who sought to emulate Stakhanov’s work rates , these were known as the ‘Stakhanovites’, a term still recognised even in modern Russia for hard workers. The sense that Soviet people were masters of their own fate was expressed in the slogan “there is no fortress that we Bolsheviks cannot storm”
The Russian heavy industries were significantly below average, and Stalin felt that developing these industries were imperative. The factories would be able to churn out machinery for farming, which would increase productivity and allow more workers to join the urban working force. Not only that, these factories would be able to change their products into war machinery. Tanks, weapons and airplanes could be produced at these factories if ever essential. The large supplies of iron and steel, for example, which would otherwise have been used to make machinery meant for agricultural uses, could then be used for war machinery manufacturing. This would be an adequate backup for machines to defend Russia if the West decided to attack.
Even though the official government figures were in all likelihood exaggerated, there is no denying the fact that the production drive and industrialisation drive was a great success. The plan was achieved in four years, and not five as scheduled. There was a huge expansion of energy production as new factories and towns needed power. Dams were created and other major projects also led to the progress of Russia. Roads, railways and canals were constructed. Russia was able to increase manufacturing and thus make more ample preparations for the war that would threaten it in the future.
However, the Five Year Plan was not all that successful if we talk in terms of the social aspects present in Russia at that time. The enormous demands placed on the workers meant that millions of them lived in harsh conditions, working on the vast projects in the interior of Russia. The state tightened its control on the workers. Absenteeism was treated extremely harshly. The large emphasis on heavy industries meant that consumer goods were high in demand, but very low in supply. Shops were often empty, personal items such as clothing was in short supply and many household items were unavailable. The lack of consumer products was one example of the fall in the standard of living. Because of the huge influx of people going into the cities from the countryside, there were insufficient medical facilities, houses and schools. Despite this shortage of consumer goods, it cannot be denied that the period saw a huge increase in the social wage of many ordinary Russians, who had been in absolutely abject serf-like poverty before the Revolution. The social wage consisted of increased access to health care, the establishment of universal adult literacy, the creation of a vast system of efficient and highly motivated education, which provided the possibility of social advancement to people who had previously had been for generations consigned to illiteracy and poverty. A later leader of the USSR in the 1950’s, Kruschev advanced due to schooling to University in this period, his parents had been illiterate peasants.
Collectivisation left many peasants dead and a lot of humans suffered during these bleak years. But even though it seems inhumane if you put aside the brutally that did occur, the enforced migration under Stalin did aid the economic situation in Russia. With people moving because of collectivisation they became the workforces which build up industrialisation. This increased the expansion of industrial output and enabled the USSR to develop an armaments industry, producing the rifles of Kalashnikov and tanks which proved crucial to turning their near defeat by Nazi Germany into victory in 1945. This technological and industrial might developed largely in this period, furthermore allowed the USSR to successfully protect itself from the West in the period after the end of World War II, when certain US generals were in favour of taking on the USSR militarily, they were deterred by the strength that they would now be facing.
It did result in an over-emphasis on heavy industry; the balance between sectors of industry was not balanced. The workers needs as consumers were neglected, with many living and working in harsh conditions, even though Stalin’s aims could be understood his methods were unacceptable to a democratic test Also because of the failure to meet consumer needs the final outcome was not as impressive as he had hoped. After ten years the USSR was not modernised well enough to be truly competitive in terms of consumer goods as the West.
But all in all the Russian economy did improve enormously, and that was down to the Russian workers many of them formerly peasants. So without collectivisation it is doubtful that the economic structure would have improved sufficiently to allow the USSR to successfully resist the invasion by Nazi Germany, which was after all only a matter of 10 years away from the commencement of the drive to industrialise.
